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Woord vooraf 
 
Eindelijk is het zover! Nu ik het eindpunt heb bereikt, is het tijd om even stil te staan, 
terug te kijken en een ieder te bedanken die dit boek mogelijk heeft gemaakt.  
 
Toen ik vijf jaar geleden begon aan mijn promotieonderzoek werd ik weleens gecon-
fronteerd met (lichte) desinteresse bij mijn gesprekspartners in mijn onderwerp. Of 
zoals een gemeentelijke beleidsmedewerker die ik interviewde tegen me zei: “eigen-
lijk zijn die masten helemaal niet zo spannend … uiteindelijk is het ook maar gewoon 
een metalen stok van een meter of twintig tot 40 hoog die neergezet wordt, waar ze 
een antennetje in hangen”. Maar hoe meer ik sprak met burgers die zich inzetten om 
de plaatsing van zo’n mast tegen te gaan, en hoe meer ik me verdiepte in de beleids-
processen rondom mobiele telefonie, hoe meer ik erachter kwam dat deze hele pro-
blematiek niet ging over ‘een metalen stok’ maar over de hedendaagse rol van actieve 
burgers, de omgang met onzekere wetenschap en de legitimiteit van beleidsbeslissin-
gen – zaken die eigenlijk gaan over hoe we onze democratie willen inrichten. Als eer-
ste wil ik dan ook alle mensen die betrokken waren bij een mastcontroverse bedanken 
om me te woord te staan, soms urenlang, altijd enthousiast en behulpvaardig. Ik ben 
op vele mooie plekken geweest in de lage landen, bij mensen thuis, in gemeentehui-
zen en in onderzoekscentra. Ik denk met veel plezier terug aan al die ontmoetingen.  
 
Ik bedank mijn promotoren, Marjolein van Asselt en Wim Passchier, voor het vertrou-
wen dat ze in me gesteld hebben. Ik was gezegend met twee begeleiders die me de 
vrijheid gaven mijn eigen koers te bepalen, maar ook aanvoelden welke sturing op 
welk moment nodig was. Marjolein, ik bedank je in het bijzonder om me mee op 
sleeptouw te nemen of me op pad te sturen om alle aspecten van het academische 
leven te verkennen. Wim, bedankt voor het delen van al je kennis en expertise, je 
geduld en je doortastendheid. Ik voel me vereerd dat ik je laatste promovenda mocht 
zijn. Ook bedank ik Ragna Zeiss, mijn co-promotor in de eerste twee jaar van mijn 
promotieonderzoek, voor al haar waardevolle feedback.  
 
Er zijn een hele hoop mensen die me hebben helpen groeien als jonge academicus. Ik 
wil mijn (oud-)collega’s bij FASoS bedanken en in het bijzonder alle mensen van de 
vakgroep MWT en de onderzoeksgroep MUST. Sabine, Jacqueline en Dianne, bedankt 
voor jullie professionele en secretariële ondersteuning. Ook dank ik de onderzoeks-
school WTMC en in het bijzonder de coördinatoren Willem Halffman en Teun Zuide-
rent-Jerak, alsook de FASoS Graduate School. De basis voor mijn keuze om te promo-
veren werd gelegd in de onderzoeksmaster CAST. Daarom bedank ik Wiebe Bijker en 
Erik Millstone. Ik heb ook veel te danken aan mijn BKO-coach Jessica Mesman en aan 
Frederic Bouder.  
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Ik ben de laatste jaren als promovendus slimmer geworden, maar nog belangrijker is 
dat ik als mens wijzer ben geworden. Voor deze persoonlijke ontwikkeling zijn een 
aantal mensen onontbeerlijk geweest. Marijke Heemskerk heeft me in de beginperio-
de van mijn promotietraject in contact gebracht met yoga. Een nieuwe wereld ging 
open. Dankzij Marga Sleijser ontdekte ik mijn eigen wijsheden. De geweldige docenten 
bij HealthWorks fitness club in Cambridge hebben me doorheen mijn laatste schrijf-
jaar geholpen. Amy (in Cambrigde) en Iris (in Maastricht) slaagden er altijd in de nodi-
ge stress uit mijn lichaam te masseren. Het beste medicijn tegen de onderzoeksblues 
bleek dansen te zijn: bodyjammen of charleston dansen met de immer positieve Sabi-
ne (danke schön!) en mijn dansbuddy Véronique. Merci meid voor al onze dansavon-
turen!  
 
Nog een speciale dank aan al mijn vrienden. Liefste Bianca, je hebt me door dik en dun 
gesteund, alle ups en downs meegekregen. It means the world to me!  Katrien, Lotte 
en Claudia, wat ben ik trots op onze langdurige vriendschap, die ondanks alle drukte 
van verbouwingen, trouwerijen, bevallingen en promoties toch stand houdt. My CAST-
buddies Constance, Koen, Livia and Julia, thank you for being there to symphatise, 
laugh, drink, sing and dance together! My DD-ladies Eefje and Anna, thanks for learn-
ing me the meaning of ogling, a much-appreciated distraction from PhD work. Thanks, 
Rike, for making my US experience a little bit more European! My colleagues of the C-
building, Natasja and Karlijn and office C.0.12 in particular (the coziest office around), 
Claudia, Ilse, Maarten, Barbara and (for a very short time) Joan, what a wonderful 
time we’ve had, thank you! Claudia, my work buddy, and now my paranymph, having 
you on my side (literally!) helped me so much. Tessa, mijn paranimf, sinds die eerste 
ontmoeting bij CL hebben we samen veel meegemaakt. Wat bof ik met zo’n vriendin 
als collega.  
 
Ik heb het grote geluk ouders te hebben die me altijd gesteund hebben in al mijn 
wilde plannen. Ik mocht studeren wat ik interessant vond, zo lang ik wilde en zelfs de 
vele verhuizingen van het ene kot naar het andere in binnen- en buitenland waren 
geen punt. Als ik iets echt wilde, zou het ook lukken. Dat hebben mijn ouders mij ge-
leerd. Zonder hun aanmoediging zou dit boek nooit geschreven zijn. Bedankt mama 
en papa! Joris en Niki en mijn allerliefste neefjes, bedankt voor de nodige afleiding en 
de ontspannende momenten. Joris, ik ben er zelfs in geslaagd om Star Wars een plekje 
te geven in mijn boek. Als dat geen reden is om trots te zijn op uw kleine zus! Lode, 
Rina, Noortje en Robby, bedankt voor jullie onvoorwaardelijke steun, advies en vooral 
de gezelligheid en familietradities die we intussen al bijna tien jaar delen.  
 
Samen studeren. Samen promoveren. Samen het leven delen. Zo simpel en mooi kan 
het zijn. Merci, lieve Joeri, voor alles.  
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Picture 1.1. – Three members of ‘Spijkenisse against Radiation’ (StS). 
Photograph by Algemeen Dagblad. 
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An episode from Star Wars 
When three men from ‘Spijkenisse tegen Straling’ (StS, ‘Spijkenisse against Radiation’) 
entered the council chamber in their shiny protective suits in October 2005, many 
councillors of the city of Spijkenisse, the Netherlands, laughed. StS was there to pre-
sent the results of their own investigation into health complaints due to exposure to 
radiofrequency electromagnetic fields (RF EMF) – or ‘radiation’ as they prefer to call 
it1 – from antennas for wireless communication. The men had orchestrated their entry 
with dramatic effect. They had changed their clothes for suits and helmets in the toi-
lets, where nobody could see them. When called in, not only did they catch the coun-
cillors by surprise, but they also presented the invited press with a great story. “It 
looked fantastic!”, one of them said (Interview S1).2 The next day already, the local 
papers had picked up on their stunt: “the municipality looked like an episode from 
Star Wars” (n.a., 2005a). 
 Three close neighbours had founded StS only a few months earlier. News had 
reached one of them that the municipality and a mobile phone operator planned the 
siting of a 15-meter high mast for UMTS-antennas in the park close to their homes. 
Upon returning empty-handed from inquiries with the municipality, he had turned to 
the Internet: “searching the Internet, I started to worry. Is this radiation healthy at 
all?” (Abels, 2006). Going from door to door, the neighbours began to share their 
worries and suspicions with the community. By the time the municipality organised an 
information meeting, the community centre was filled to the brim and the atmos-
phere was tense. Unsatisfied by the assurances of the municipality and the telecom 
operator that the mast needed to be placed in that particular spot, the neighbours of 
StS took matters into their own hands. With the financial aid of neighbours, the group 
acquired a measuring device to see what was going on, for although “I cannot smell it, 
I cannot see it, I do want to know it” (Interview S1) (see picture 3.10 & 3.11 in chapter 
3). They first experimented with measuring electromagnetic fields in their homes, but 
the men soon shifted their attention to the flat complexes on the other side of the city 
that had several GSM and UMTS antennas on the roof. Their presence in the flat com-
plexes elicited coffee table stories by tenants about headaches and other health com-
plaints, inspiring the men to tackle the issue “in a – between quotation marks – scien-
tific way” (Interview S1). The ensuing campaign, in which StS surveyed tenants’ griev-
ances, conducted questionnaires and recorded radiation, yielded an interesting result: 
                                                                
1 In scientific terms, ‘radiation’ is a correct word. But because it has a strong connotation with radiation 
from ionising radiation (X-rays), which is a potent carcinogen, professionals and experts prefer to use ‘elec-
tromagnetic fields’. Concerned citizens however mostly use ‘radiation’, as in this case.  
2 I refer to interviews by abbreviating the location of the case study (S for Spijkenisse, M for Maastricht, N 
for Nieuwkoop, MA for Maarkedal, D for Drongen and E for Euverem), followed by a number indicating the 
anonymised interviewee. For a discussion of my methods, see later in this chapter. For a list of interviews, 
see Appendix 2. I have translated all of the quotes from Dutch to English. 
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[o]n the side [of the flat] where the antennas were located – where we could also 
measure it – a higher percentage of tenants had all sorts of weird [health] com-
plaints. On the other side where we had hardly measured any radiation, we also 
did not receive many complaints back (…) We did it in a very simple but objective 
way. We simply categorised everything from the front and the back of the flat 
and now looking at these striking differences. I mean, you can’t make this up! (In-
terview S1). 
Compelled by the complaints and public pressure, the city council promised to look 
into the tenants’ health complaints, employing a research institute to check their 
evidence and instructing the Gemeentelijke Geneeskundige Dienst (GGD, Community 
Health Services) to examine the health complaints. The research institute’s report of 
the measurements in different parts of town concluded that the electromagnetic 
fields should be considered safe, because they did not exceed the exposure limits 
proposed by the International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection (IC-
NIRP) and endorsed by the Dutch government. Based on this report, the GGD advised 
that siting of base stations was safe in view of health effects. 
 Sts objected to these conclusions and questioned the safety margins of the expo-
sure limits. The standards, referred to by the GGD, were based only on the thermal 
effects of EMF, they claimed, while the group had since connected with scientists 
claiming that RF EMF at exposure levels below the standards could also lead to DNA 
damage and cancer. But despite StS’s objections, neither the group nor the city coun-
cil had any legal means with which the mast siting could be prevented. The group 
continued their battle against the expansion of a mobile phone network by giving 
presentations in other municipalities confronted with base station siting. They also 
became a contact point for people claiming to suffer from electrohypersensitivity 
(EHS), a constellation of complaints ranging from headaches, rashes, dizziness to in-
somnia attributed to exposure to RF EMF (see de Graaff and Bröer, 2012 for a discus-
sion of EHS as a new health risk). One of the members of StS ultimately set up an 
international NGO called the International EMF Alliance with which he continues to 
draw attention to the issue of health risks from RF EMF. 
Setting the scene 
This account of three Martians turned out to be a tale of three citizens3 trying to pre-
vent the siting of a base station for a wireless telephone network in their neighbour-
                                                                
3 Throughout this thesis I use the term ‘citizen’ to refer to individuals and communities who have an interest 
or stake in the topic of wireless communication technology. I do not define ‘citizen’ in a narrow, legal way, 
i.e. as people that are eligible to vote. Neither do I talk about ‘lay people’ because I do not want to empha-
sise a distinction in their knowledge and experiences compared to experts dealing with EMF; nor do I use 
the concept of ‘activist’ since this has a negative connotation and does not cover the broad range of citizens 
that engage with the siting of base stations. 
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hood. This thesis investigates more of these stories with the aim of understanding the 
societal dynamics of wireless communication siting controversies. ‘Siting controver-
sies’ are cases where citizens respond to the local siting of a technological infrastruc-
ture, ranging from disposal, storage and production facilities to critical components, 
such as base stations. The search for such geographical sites often leads to opposition 
from the local community – often described by implementers, policymakers, public 
press and academics as Not In My Backyard (NIMBY) behaviour. The NIMBY concept is 
also an appealing and popular way to explain opposition to mast siting given the im-
mense popularity, ubiquity and continuing development of mobile telephony. If peo-
ple have a positive attitude towards the technology itself, the argument goes, then 
mast siting controversies arise because of citizens’ selfish reasons such as landscape 
pollution or devaluation of property prices or because of irrational fears about nega-
tive health effects. Remarks about citizens’ seemingly incongruent behaviour – engag-
ing around a mast siting whilst also using wireless communication technology – came 
up regularly in my research. 
 In one of the cases of mast siting controversies I investigated, one engaged citi-
zen told me during an interview that he had installed GSM-microcells in his office 
(which was next to his house) to enable better mobile communication for his ICT busi-
ness (Interview D1). He needed it because his employees each had a mobile phone in 
the office to contact clients and because, apparently, the mobile phone reception was 
bad in the area. Yet, this citizen did not want a mast in his neighbourhood even 
though it would solve the connection problems for his business. Whenever I present-
ed this story to an academic audience, they reacted with disbelief and laughter at the 
presumably inconsistent behaviour of this engaged citizen. Municipal officials 
(ambtenaren), aldermen for spatial planning (wethouders (NL) or schepenen (B) voor 
ruimtelijke ordening), mayors, mobile phone operators and other government officials 
also shared their surprise at engaged citizens’ behaviour: 
[o]f course, everybody wants to make calls, which then is also weird. We don’t 
want that mast, but we want the convenience of the mast. Just like a community 
centre, important to have, but nobody wants it next door (Headmaster of primary 
school, Interview N5). 
[w]e think the cited arguments [of citizens] are insufficiently relevant. Nowadays, 
everybody uses a mobile phone, but nobody wants a pylon in his or her surround-
ings (The mayor of Maarkedal in Lauwerier, 2009). 
[i]t remains exceptional that citizens who complain [about base stations] hardly 
consider the pros and cons. Participating in traffic is much more (demonstrable) 
risky than the radiation of GSM/UMTS. That we had similar radiation for years 
from television antennas, few know. Citizens do not seem to accept the conse-
quences of their own behaviour (e.g.: no more mobile phone calls, then we don’t 
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need masts), but like to point at someone else (Municipal official Zutphen, per-
sonal communication, July 30, 2012). 
Throughout my research, it became a recurring finding that engaged citizens were not 
anti-technology or anti-GSM, -UMTS or -Wi-Fi. In most cases, they surrounded them-
selves with the latest wireless technologies. Citizens were very aware of this paradox 
themselves – “we also know that everybody has a mobile phone” (Interview MA1) – 
and wanted to assure me that they were not against progress. The engaged citizen 
who installed the GSM-microcells argued that society should think about technological 
innovation, and about its possible side effects, in order to adjust and evaluate. He 
believed this viewpoint represented “more than radical rejection” (Interview D1). An 
engaged citizen in Nieuwkoop said, “I am in favour of innovation and progress, I have 
a wireless network at home, I use my iPhone a lot and even have a wireless printer” 
(Interview N3). In Maastricht, the same reasoning was used: “[t]he population thinks 
that a mast for mobile connection is necessary, definitely in this digital era. This 
should however not lead to rejection of our objections and alternatives” (M1, 2011, 
notice of objection). Nevertheless, those actors in favour of mast siting used the 
popularity and even necessity of wireless communication technology as an argument 
for the NIMBY-character of mast siting controversies. 
 I argue that NIMBY is not the right conceptual tool to understand mast siting 
controversies. The NIMBY-perspective takes for granted a dichotomy between an 
assumed general good (in this case: the siting of mobile phone masts) and a biased 
self-interest of local citizens. Academics have increasingly called for a move beyond 
NIMBY to more critical interpretations that better comprehend the range of motives 
for citizen reactions to siting (Boholm, 2004; Burningham et al., 2006; Devine-Wright, 
2005, 2010; Luloff et al., 1998; Pepermans and Loots, 2011). They claim that the lack 
of clarity about the meaning of the concept has led to uncritical assumptions of 
NIMBYism, in particular about citizens and their motives to engage. From this litera-
ture, and the literature on citizen involvement in scientific practices more generally 
(Bröer, 2006; Hannigan, 1995; Irwin and Wynne, 1996; Irwin, 1995; Murphy, 2006; 
Ottinger, 2013b; Tesh, 2000), I derived four focal points that form the nexus of my 
investigations in this thesis. 
 Firstly, I focus on the role of individuals: seeing them less as irrational and emo-
tional ‘laypeople’ or as selfish rational decision makers but instead as citizens embed-
ded in diverse networks of people and forms of knowledge that have an influence on 
their opinion. For instance, citizens in siting controversies often engage with science, 
such as the members of Spijkenisse against Radiation, which leads to the contestation 
of scientific knowledge. Secondly, I shift my attention from the individual to collectives 
of individuals, as citizens often set up a neighbourhood group, such as the group in 
Spijkenisse. Collectives of people have their own dynamics that cannot simply be un-
derstood as the sum of individuals. The support of neighbours, for example, enables 
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particular types of actions: in Spijkenisse the citizen group purchased a measuring 
device with financial help from the neighbours in the street. Thirdly, my focus goes 
beyond the locality of sitings, as local characteristics are important to understand 
siting controversies but do not only shape the siting dynamics. Studies have increas-
ingly argued for the influence of institutional arrangements within particular policy 
domains on siting controversies, as they can for example limit the opportunities for 
local views to be expressed or hold misplaced assumptions of broad public support for 
the to-be implemented technology. The decision-making context may thus generate 
particular citizen responses (Bröer, 2006; Futrell, 2003; Wolsink, 2000). Fourthly, the 
focus on the decision-making process has also led to increasing academic interest in 
public participation in siting controversies. In recent years, public participation has 
become a popular approach – almost a panacea – for policymakers dealing with public 
worries about new technologies. Various academics, however, are wary of assuming 
that more inclusive forms of decision making will necessarily resolve siting controver-
sies (Owens and Cowell, 2002; Petts, 2004). 
 In this thesis, I examine one type of siting controversy with these perspectives in 
mind: the siting of mobile phone masts. Through local case studies, I explore respons-
es, engagement and situated learning of the different actors involved in siting contro-
versies, most importantly citizens. I also take into account the regional or national 
level in which decisions about mast siting are entangled, in particular how the issue of 
mast siting controversies has been dealt with in terms of a possible negative health 
effect. Furthermore, I build upon the insights about public participation and delibera-
tion by focusing on such a recent Dutch initiative in which societal actors gather to 
discuss the issue of mobile telephony and health, the Klankbordgroep (Sounding 
board) of the Kennisplatform EMV & Gezondheid (Knowledge Platform EMF & Health). 
The existing literature on mast siting controversies either is concerned with eliciting 
individuals’ opinions about mobile telephony and mast siting or with analysing the 
decision-making process (see chapter 2). There is little research that does both. Yet it 
is important that we understand the dynamics between citizens engaging with mast 
siting on a local level, national decision-making processes, the role of scientific 
knowledge and participatory processes in order to understand why siting controver-
sies emerged and continue to emerge, and how they develop. 
 I start from the recognition that siting conflicts are not technical problems with 
social aspects, but social problems with technical aspects. It is for this reason that I 
believe we must first try to understand the local dynamic in which siting takes place. 
This dynamic depends amongst other on the local culture, the institutional setting and 
societal beliefs and changes (Pepermans and Loots, 2011). Yet this thesis is not just 
about siting controversies pertaining to wireless communication technology or siting 
controversies more generally. Research on siting controversies fits into a broader 
academic and policy development that acknowledges the need for a different view on 
relationships between policymaking, science/technology and society – especially 
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when it comes to emerging technologies (Blankesteijn et al., 2014b; Callon et al., 
2009; Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998; Ottinger, 2013b; Stilgoe et al., 2013). As a response 
to these calls, governments have experimented with different ways to involve and 
engage publics with science and technology in the form of consultation papers, focus 
groups, stakeholder dialogues and citizens’ juries (see e.g. Irwin and Wynne, 1996; 
Wilsdon and Willis, 2004). These initiatives have hardly reached the impact hoped for 
by governments (support for scientific or technological developments, more public 
interest in science and technology, etc.), but have foremost shown the limits of these 
approaches. As academic interest soared in these engagement exercises over the last 
years (also because academics have often been actively involved in setting up or ana-
lysing these initiatives), we might arguably have lost sight of other ways in which citi-
zens spontaneously try to become involved in the agenda setting, decision making, 
policy forming, and/or knowledge production processes regarding science and tech-
nology (Bucchi and Neresini, 2008). There is a wealth of literature on citizen science 
initiatives, such as patient groups demanding influence on research priorities (Callon 
and Rabeharisoa, 2008; Epstein, 1996) or activist scientists helping communities living 
in deprived areas to challenge the neighbouring industry’s scientific claims (Frickel et 
al., 2010; Ottinger, 2013b). Yet, siting controversies are hardly investigated from the 
angle of citizen engagement, and the opportunities it offers for more robust decision 
making. 
 I therefore argue that there is a fundamental need for the re-conceptualisation of 
citizen involvement in siting practices. If one sees citizens as ‘resisting’, ‘protesting’ or 
‘opposing’ siting (such as in the NIMBY-terminology), mast siting controversies be-
come a story of antagonism, of citizens being against technology and even democra-
cy, thus making their concerns illegitimate. Yet, I claim that citizens are using their 
democratic rights to become engaged with decisions that affect themselves and the 
world they are living in. To help avoid framing citizens’ behaviour in mast siting con-
troversies a priori as caused by irrational and poor individual ‘risk perceptions’, I sug-
gest using the term ‘engagement’ when it comes to describing the behaviour of citi-
zens in siting controversies (also see Verhoeven, 2009). Siting controversies can then 
be understood as potentially productive, leading to better-informed decisions that are 
also more fitting. Instead of seeing siting controversies as disruptive, hostile, frustrat-
ing or challenging, we could start to see them also as a healthy sign of democracy at 
work (see also Wilsdon et al., 2005).4 In this way, siting controversies offer us much 
more than just a story of engaged citizens like the one above about Spijkenisse, but 
afford us a view upon the governance of innovation – without doubt a major chal-
lenge for contemporary democracies. 
                                                                
4 This paragraph is inspired by Prof. Judith Petts’ commentary as panel discussant on the symposium ‘siting 
controversies’ that Marjolein van Asselt and I organised at the Society for Risk Analysis conference in 
Trondheim, Norway (16-19 June 2013). 
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Case of mobile telephony 
Mobile telephony can be described as the provision of telephone and data services to 
phones or similar instruments that do not need wires. It is an application of wireless 
communication technology, together with (amongst others) Wi-Fi, radio receivers, 
GPS and remote controls. Wireless communication technology can transport infor-
mation over a certain distance without the need of wires or cables. Base stations for 
mobile telephones, TV, radio, radar and satellites use electromagnetic waves, or more 
precisely, radiofrequency electromagnetic fields (RF EMF) (see Figure 1.1.). A base 
station for wireless communication technology is made up of 3 elements: an antenna 
(or several antennas), a supporting structure such as a mast or a building and equip-
ment to power the base station and radio equipment (see Picture 1.2. & 1.3.). In this 
thesis, I mostly deal with controversy around the siting of masts: the steel pole con-
structions that rise to a maximum of 40 metres and can carry several antennas from 
different telecom operators. I refer to base stations when talking about all construc-
tions for wireless communication technology (masts and antennas). In the beginning 
of 2014 in the Netherlands, there were 29 851 GSM- (Global System for Mobile Com-
munications, 2G), UMTS- (Universal Mobile Telecommunication Systems, 3G) and LTE-
antennas (Long-Term Evolution, 4G) (Antenneregister, 2014). The evolution in the 
technology has led to increased capacity and speed. Each base station covers a certain 
geographical area called a cell. The magnitude of the cell varies from a few dozen 
meters in big cities to 35 kilometres in sparsely populated areas. More masts have to 
be sited in the countryside where there are obstacles between the antenna and re-
ceiver. The cell-structure requires a great number of antennas that each ensures a 
good connection and sufficient capacity for a particular area.  
 
 
Figure 1.1.  –  The electromagnetic spectrum  
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Picture 1.2. – Mast for mobile communication with 
several antennas in it. Photograph by author. 
Picture 1.3. – An antenna for mobile communication 
on a roof. Photograph by author. 
 
Mobile telephony has come a long way since it was heralded in the 1980s as a tech-
nology that could increase economic productivity by helping business people ‘on the 
go’ to be in constant touch with the office (Agar, 2004). It was not until the change 
from analogue (first generation, 1G) to digital (second generation, 2G) in the 1990s, 
that mobile phone use really kicked off and became affordable and available for many 
people. The introduction of the third generation or 3G transformed the mobile phone 
and computer industry as it enabled people to use their mobile phones as a small 
personal computer, the so-called smartphones and tablets. Since I started my re-
search project, the technology has developed from the third to the fourth generation. 
It is very likely that by the time you read this, things will have further changed. It is 
astounding how swift this technology has become seamlessly integrated in our every-
day lives. A life without mobile phone calls, text messaging or mobile Internet might 
seem quite unsettling for many of us. Even though issues of privacy, cyber-bullying 
and addiction received more and more attention over recent years, we as a society 
have not only accepted that this technology is here to stay, but we have warmly em-
braced it. 
 And yet, mobile telephony has also become a technology that triggers public 
reactions, especially at a local level where base stations are sited to enable the trans-
mission and reception of mobile phone calls, messages and data. It has been on the 
agenda of European governments, the European Union and the World Health Organi-
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sation since the end of the 1990s. Around that time, many mobile phone operators 
across Europe were starting to site base stations for an increasingly popular device: 
the mobile phone. At the same time, citizens started to engage with the siting of these 
base stations. Governments and mobile phone operators started to worry as this 
could hamper the rollout of a mobile network – a technological innovation that was at 
the heart of budding ICT policies. The mast siting controversies generated strings of 
expert reports, policy analyses, publications and conferences, mostly focused on pos-
sible health effects from the technology. This in turn led to regulatory measures, re-
search programmes and intensive media coverage throughout the 2000s. All these 
measures and actions, however, did not end the controversies around mobile teleph-
ony, but as I will argue in this thesis, reinforced it as a health issue. Within a few years, 
the issue of mobile telephony became firmly established as a health problem because 
of the dynamics between policymaking, politics, science and society. 
Mast siting controversies 
Mast siting controversies are instances in which citizens engage with the siting of a 
base station. How often do these occur? What are the reasons for this engagement? 
At the start of my research, I searched for an overview of cases in the Netherlands, 
but did not find one. As part of my research design (for a full discussion of my re-
search design, see below.), I thus decided to map the occurrence of mast siting con-
troversies and to investigate for each case what was the main reason for the engage-
ment. The goal was to get an indication of the amount and diversity of mast siting 
controversies alongside the more in-depth analyses of several cases of mast siting 
controversies. We5 analysed half of the Dutch municipalities (n=211 out of 415) by 
checking it for one or more of the following criteria: 1) the media and/or municipal 
officials had reported problems with siting of base stations; 2) there has been a judi-
cial process about the siting; and 3) a collective of citizens rather than a single person 
had been actively engaged in a public discourse. The information was sought through 
online searches and by contacting municipal officials directly via e-mail and phone. 
The selection of municipalities was based on an even distribution over 12 provinces 
and amongst cities and countryside to account for differences in siting practices. The 
goal was to get an indication of the amount and diversity of mast siting controversies. 
The overview in Figure 1.2. shows that more than half of the researched municipali-
ties, 129 cases out of 211, had experienced one or more mast siting controversies. 
 We also analysed the diversity of citizens’ concerns in mast siting controversies. 
The analysis of mast siting controversies in the 129 Dutch municipalities indicated 
which concerns and arguments citizens deemed most important. Concretely this 
meant that we paid attention to the arguments that were mentioned most by differ-
                                                                
5 Elias Buchetmann assisted me with this particular research.  
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ent sources of information such as websites or blogs from citizens involved, newspa-
per articles and/or municipal officials’ personal communication (see Table 1.1. and 
Figure 1.3.). An important observation was that citizens’ reactions to mast siting were 
generally diverse and often layered. It was hardly ever the case that citizens only men-
tioned one concern. In one particular case, residents handed in 20 notices of objec-
tion with several complaints stating that “the devaluation of houses, landscape pollu-
tion, health risks from radiation, other preferred locations and societal need [for mast] 
were contested” (Municipal official Bunnik, personal communication, June 28, 2012). 
Yet, figure 1.3. shows a predominance of yellow dots, which represent concerns for 
negative health effects from base stations. We identified 72 out of 129 cases as con-
cerns over health effects from masts. The health concern was also often mentioned in 
conjunction with a concern about aesthetics, or landscape pollution, from the mast 
(blue, 37 cases). Other predominant reasons for siting controversies were aesthetics 
(9 cases, orange); democracy, i.e. citizens feel they were excluded from the decision-
making process about the siting (4 cases, purple); devaluating of property prices (2 
cases, red); technical malfunctions due to interference of radio waves (4 cases, dark 
green); and environmental protection (1 case, light green). 
 
Table 1.1 – The different citizen concerns in mast siting controversies with the number of cases in which the 
particular concerns were expressed the most. 
Concern Explanation  Number of 
cases 
(n=129) 
Health Citizens are afraid of harmful consequences for their health caused by 
radiation from the antenna(s) 
In combination with aesthetics 
72 
 
37 
Democracy Citizens lament being excluded from the decision-making process, they 
feel taken by surprise and not acknowledged in their role as responsible 
citizen 
4 
Aesthetics Citizens consider the base station ugly or not fitting in the environment (= 
landscape pollution) 
9 
Devaluating of 
property prices 
Citizens are concerned that their home will decrease in value due to the 
close vicinity of a mast 
2 
Technical 
malfunctions  
Citizens are concerned about technical problems of their equipment due 
to interference of RF EMF 
4 
Environmental 
protection  
Citizens are concerned about harmful effects on flora and fauna due to 
exposure to RF EMF 
1 
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Figure 1.2. – Map of the Netherlands with an overview of 211 municipalities: 129 municipalities with siting 
controversies (red dots) and 82 municipalities without mast siting controversies (green dots). This map can 
be viewed online at http://bit.ly/KLb9lg for more detailed information (such as main reasons of concern and 
the year in which the controversy arose).  
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Figure 1.3. – Map of the Netherlands with an overview of municipalities with mast siting controversies. The 
colours represent different reasons for citizen engagement: health (yellow), democracy (purple), aesthetics 
(orange), devaluation of property prices (red), environmental protection (light green), technical malfunc-
tions (dark green) and combination of arguments (blue). This map can be viewed online at 
http://bit.ly/1lGDHdv for more detailed information. 
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Engaging with risks 
Our analysis suggests that concern about health effects from base stations is the most 
expressed reason for citizens to become engaged with mast siting, at least in the 
Netherlands. Health is also the issue that municipal officials and journalists refer to 
most when discussing siting controversies. One municipal official, who explained the 
situation in his city, was surprised about the focus on health by the residents: 
[o]f the known opposition against siting of masts almost 100% is attributable to 
perceived health aspects. We have had 1 or 2 notices of objection against the de-
valuation of property prices. There has hardly or never been [a notice of objec-
tion] on the basis of aesthetics or other local planning aspects. While upon those 
[arguments], one could be successful to ward off such facilities [masts] (Municipal 
official Terneuzen, personal communication, July 23, 2012). 
So why is there such a dominant focus on health, even though health concerns are 
only one of the many issues pertaining to mast siting and more importantly, do not 
even seem to be a successful avenue for getting rid of the masts, according to this 
municipal official? Are there any known health effects? 
 The only established health effect is that from heating of the tissue (by a tenth 
part of one degree Celsius) (van Leeuwen et al., 1999). The majority view in the scien-
tific community concerned with this issue is that there is no strong scientific evidence 
of any other non-thermal effects of this technology for humans (The INTERPHONE 
Study Group, 2010; Vecchia et al., 2009; WHO, 1993). Research into the technology 
can be divided into psychological (risk perception and communication), epidemiologi-
cal (observe health effects in human populations), biological (human and animal ex-
perimental studies) and technical (development of measuring devices and models to 
understand exposure) research. A lot of the research focuses on the possibility of 
cancer development. Other areas of interest are physiological effects on the hormone 
and immune systems, neurodegenerative diseases, effects on reproduction and de-
velopment (e.g. infertility), negative impacts on cognitive functions (e.g. memory and 
learning), and symptoms such as headaches, dizziness or fatigue (also known as non-
specific physical symptoms) (van Asselt et al., 2009). The majority of the epidemiologi-
cal and biological studies have not found a correlation that can explain possible health 
impacts that could be attributed to RF EMF. 
 Informed by a review of these studies, the International Commission on Non-
Ionizing Radiation Protection (ICNIRP) (International Commission on Non-Ionising 
Radiation Protection, 1998) has recommended exposure limits that are based on the 
scientifically well-established evidence about thermal (i.e. heating) effects of EMF 
exposure (WHO, 1993). The issue about whether exposure below these exposure 
limits might still cause negative health effects is less certain and more controversial. 
Scientific bodies, such as the WHO, call for more research to fill the gaps in knowledge 
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about the existence of possible effects below the exposure limits. There are some 
scientists who claim to have found effects on human health, ranging from cancer to 
concentration and sleeping difficulties (see e.g. Carpenter and Sage, 2007). But these 
latter studies are criticised for not adhering to established scientific standards of sci-
entific research, for example, they are not according to double-blind procedures (in-
formation from the experiment is concealed from the tester, the subject or both). The 
positive results of these latter studies, however, get a lot of attention from those 
individuals and groups who (claim to) suffer from electrohypersensitivity (or EHS), a 
constellation of non-specific complaints that people interpret as due to an increased 
sensitivity they have with respect to electromagnetic fields (Baliatsas et al., 2012; 
Bogers et al., 2013). A biomedical explanation for EHS does not exist (at present). 
 Hence, according to the majority view in the scientific community, there are no 
clear scientific indications for negative health effects from mobile telephony. Yet, only 
a quick glance at the scientific literature, media reports, municipal information, citizen 
websites and policy papers on the topic suggests that possible health effects are, or 
are believed to be, at the heart of the discussions. In addition, our analysis of the mast 
siting controversies in the Netherlands confirms this point: even though there are 
many reasons for citizen engagement, in most cases (72 out of 129), concerns about 
health prevailed. It thus seems that most of the actors in the controversy are caught 
in a debate about the very existence of health effects of wireless communication 
technology. The key question featuring in siting controversies is ‘is it safe or not?’. 
Policymakers have turned towards experts for information on which to base their 
decision making. This evidence-informed approach in policymaking is a well-rooted 
way of dealing with unknown technologies (Bijker et al., 2009; Hilgartner, 2000; Jasa-
noff, 1990; Slob and Staman, 2012; Weingart, 1999). It makes an issue – such as the 
siting of base stations – into a ‘health risk’-issue. Once an activity is identified and 
accepted as a ‘risk’, a ‘risk-based’ policy approach can be applied which can be under-
stood as “the set of standards, protocols and guidelines that define how risk objects 
should be assessed, evaluated, managed, communicated and monitored” (Borraz, 
2011: 970). This approach requires the identification of uncertainties to turn them 
into ‘risk-issues’ that can be scrutinised by scientists, who are believed to have the 
authority and capacity to characterise and assess uncertainties (WRR, 2010). 
 In this thesis, I understand ‘risk’ to be a quality ascribed, through a social process, 
to an object (Borraz, 2008, 2011): 
[r]isk is not an inherent or objective characteristic of an activity. Risk is a quality, 
which comes to be associated to an activity in the course of a process during 
which uncertainties related to the activity are converted into a risk (Borraz, 2008: 
2). 
I am interested in this ‘conversion process’ of wireless communication technology into 
a ‘health risk’. I wonder why it is such a prevalent argument in mast siting controver-
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sies and what the effects of this framing are on the different levels of engagement and 
decision making. I claim that the terms ‘risk’, ‘risk regulation’ and ‘risk perception’ as 
they are conventionally used to describe the ways of dealing with or the public atti-
tudes towards new technologies are themselves a problem. The notion of ‘risk’ has 
infiltrated our language to the extent that “risk management and risk ‘talk’ are all 
around us” (Power, 2004: 9): 
[i]n recent years, ‘risk’ has been promoted as a universal organizing concept for 
improving the quality, efficiency, and rationality of governance in ways that far 
exceed its traditional association with the environment or health and safety 
(Rothstein et al., 2013: 215). 
[j]ust, as a century or so ago, the idea of progress helped to name an optimistic 
era, so today risk, by its very pervasiveness, seems to be the defining marker of 
our own less sanguine historical moment (Jasanoff, 1999: 136). 
In this thesis, I will examine the ‘risk discourse’ that has become so dominant in dis-
cussions on wireless communication technology. I am interested in whether and how 
different actors in the wireless communication controversy engage with this ‘risk 
discourse’. Citizens engage with ‘risks’ through spontaneously becoming involved in a 
local mast siting decision. Their engagement around the decision to site a mast makes 
them familiar with the argument of health effects. Policymakers engage with ‘risks’ 
through a specific set of policy practices, i.e. by way of applying a risk-based approach 
that implies the need for more scientific knowledge on the issue at hand in order to 
make an informed policy decision. Scientists, to which both citizens and policymakers 
turn to, engage with ‘risks’ by scrutinising the technology for signs of harmfulness. In 
any discussion on ‘risks’, science thus plays a dominant role: 
[t]hus the entire discussion of risk – of perception, management, and communi-
cation – is conceptually linked to the larger societal debate on the nature and role 
of science in our modern, industrialized civilization (Bradbury, 1989: 394). 
[a]n almost diagnostic feature of risk as a topic has been the presumption that it 
is a fundamentally ‘scientific’ object (Jasanoff, 1990; Wynne, 1989), whose nature 
can be revealed without at the same time being ‘constructed’ (Felt and Wynne, 
2007: 31). 
I will therefore pay analytical attention to the role of scientific knowledge and uncer-
tainties in the debates around wireless communication technology, and on the ‘con-
struction’ of wireless communication technology, and the siting of base stations, as a 
‘risk-issue’. I will examine the pervasiveness of a ‘risk discourse’, in both public, politics 
and (social) sciences, as ‘risk’ seems to have become the dominant mode of explana-
tion for the emergence of mast siting controversies and for its policy solutions. 
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Research questions 
My research questions thus developed out of a curiosity about the recurring observa-
tion that tensions and social dynamics that are likely to emerge in relation to new 
technologies are mostly understood in terms of NIMBY or ‘risk’. Policymakers, scien-
tists and the media assume that mast siting controversies arise because people do not 
want the infrastructure in their neighbourhood or because they are afraid of their 
health. It surprised me that so much social science research into this and related con-
troversies does not question the assumption that public concerns are primarily related 
to health effects (see chapter 2 for a discussion of these studies). When I attended 
meetings about EMF at various conferences, for example, most social scientists re-
ported the findings of their studies into the perceptions of lay people about the ‘risks’ 
of masts or mobile phones. They recommended better risk communication strategies 
for diminishing the concerns. I agree that it is important that authorities inform citi-
zens properly about new technological developments and possible health risks, but I 
disagree with two assumptions often made by these studies: 1) that public concerns 
about EMF are primarily related to health concerns and 2) that the solution is to mind 
the gap between laypersons’ and experts’ views on the risks. Paradoxically, the abun-
dance of social science research into risk perceptions of EMF, often commissioned by 
policymakers faced with controversy, only reinforces this view. 
 Instead of trying to understand why people are worried about a technology that 
is not considered harmful in the dominant scientific view, I would like to draw the 
attention to the way the issue has been dealt with by policymakers, scientists, citizens 
and other actors involved in siting controversies. The controversy around the ‘reality’ 
of health problems from wireless communication technology thus allows me to inves-
tigate why and how this technology has become seen as a serious ‘health risk’. This 
question focuses on the social construction of the world through discourses and ac-
tions. Because the focus in this controversy is primarily on health, scientific knowledge 
about assumed health effects becomes an important resource to corroborate claims. 
One tactic used by the members of ‘Spijkenisse against Radiation’, for example, was to 
turn to natural scientific knowledge to find out more about an artefact – a mast for 
antennas – and a technology – wireless communication – they knew nothing about. It 
started with a simple online search on the dangers of the technology. It continued 
with the purchasing of a couple of measuring devices to perform their own ‘research’. 
Eventually, they became engaged in (inter)national networks where scientists, NGOs 
and citizens meet to discuss health effects of this technology. 
 I am not concerned with judging whether a person has the ‘right’ knowledge 
about possible dangers from this technology or not, but instead I want to find out how 
this person deploys scientific knowledge. When I use the term ‘deploy’ in reference to 
scientific knowledge, I denote all means of acts such as mobilising, constructing, con-
testing or ignoring knowledge. I therefore also ask how and why different actors in the 
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controversy (citizens, companies, policy bodies, scientists) deploy scientific knowledge 
about wireless communication technology. I answer my research questions on the 
basis of material gathered predominantly in the Netherlands and Flanders (Belgium). 
 
My research questions are thus as follows: 
1. How to understand the societal dynamics and mechanisms, in particular the role 
of scientific knowledge and uncertainties therein, that account for the emer-
gence, sustainment and possible ending of mast siting controversies? 
2. Why and how did wireless communication technology become a serious ‘health 
risk’? Why does this ‘health risk’ framing dominate? 
3. How do different actors in the controversy (citizens, policy bodies, scientists) use, 
construct, contest or ignore scientific knowledge regarding wireless communica-
tion technology? 
Constructing health risks 
In asking these questions about mast siting controversies – explicitly investigating the 
construction of the issue in terms of a ‘health risk’ – I ally myself with an academic 
community that theorises the relationships between science and society, and more 
specifically between society and so-called ‘risk issues’, from a social constructivist 
perspective. The idea that science is socially constructed has been the baseline of 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) research since the field started to investigate 
the ‘making of science’, i.e. the nature of scientific knowledge claims, in the 1970s in 
laboratories, zoos, botanical gardens, and research clinics (Golinski, 2008; Hess, 1997; 
Pickering, 1992; Sismondo, 2012). STS scholars argued that the outcome of scientific 
investigations is as much determined by negotiations and social processes as by as-
sumed objective scientific methods and theory. By taking a social constructivist per-
spective to investigate mast siting controversies, I do not uncritically accept or deny 
the existence of a health problem, but instead try to unravel the social, political, cul-
tural and scientific processes by which wireless communication technology has be-
come defined as an (un)acceptable ‘risk’ and as something that needs to be acted 
upon (compare Hannigan, 1995; Murphy, 2006). Yet, STS is not the only research 
community that is engaged in research into public and siting controversies. I thus also 
engage with other academic communities, most importantly social scientific risk re-
search, social movement theory research, environmental sociology and social geogra-
phy. 
 The literature that I build upon is concerned with finding out how we assign 
meaning to the world around us and how we know and interact with it. It pays atten-
tion to the construction work that is needed to give meaning to particular contempo-
rary phenomena – whether that is global warming, gay rights, youth crime or the 
siting of mobile phone masts. These constructionist or constructivist ideas have a long 
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history in the social sciences. In the 1970s, conventional explanations for the exist-
ence of social problems were challenged by scholars (see e.g. Spector and Kitsuse, 
1987) who viewed social problems not as static conditions, but as sequences of 
events, a process of claims making, which was believed to be more important than the 
task of assessing the validity of the claims themselves (Hannigan, 1995). These schol-
ars thus focused on the ‘meaning work’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 613) or ‘framing’ 
(Benford and Snow, 2000; Goffman, 1974) of particular issues by individuals, groups of 
people such as citizens, policymakers or scientists or whole cultures or societies. This 
type of work has been very influential in social movement theory in which theories of 
framing are used to emphasise how mobilisation takes shape around and actively 
involves the construction of a ‘problem’. Social movement scholars are interested in 
the ways in which activists use or even manipulate cultural frames in order to mobilise 
people (Tesh, 2000). Social movement literature, as well as environmental sociology, 
are mostly concerned with emphasising meaning and democratic processes, mostly 
focusing on the U.S., often taking the side of the minority groups in controversies, 
such as citizen groups from economically deprived areas (see e.g. Allen, 2003; Ot-
tinger, 2013b). 
 Sociologists and psychologists also turned their attention to notions of ‘risk’ and 
‘danger’. They examined ‘risk’ as a social construct in a particular historical and cultur-
al context. From the 1960s onwards, psychometric studies already closely examined 
the construction – or ‘perception’ in their jargon – of risk-issues by individuals. Around 
that time, the need to understand the public’s negative reaction to emerging technol-
ogies, such as nuclear energy, increased. Psychologists accounted for these responses 
by looking at the complexities of the human mind. Key characteristics such as familiar-
ity, control, catastrophic potential, equity, and level of knowledge have been proven 
to influence ‘risk decisions’ (Slovic, 2000; Slovic et al., 1982; Vlek and Stallen, 1980; 
see also van Asselt, 2000 for an overview of the literature). In the 1980s, anthropolo-
gist Mary Douglas and political scientist Aaron Wildavsky moved beyond the focus on 
the individual and her subjective estimates. They challenged the dominance of the 
psychometric paradigm by publishing Risk and Culture (1982) in which they introduced 
the ‘Cultural Theory of Risk’. Cultural theorists analyse social responses to risk as being 
determined or constructed by cultural belief patterns that encourage individuals and 
social groups to adopt certain values and reject others. Cultural Theory outlines four 
‘ways of life’ in a group/grid typology: fatalism, hierarchy, individualism and egalitari-
anism. The emphasis on the social construction of ‘risk issues’ was further explored by 
several risk studies scholars in their attempt to integrate the research on the public 
experience of ‘risk’ from psychology, anthropology, sociology and communication 
studies into an interdisciplinary framework called ‘Social Amplification of Risk Frame-
work’ (SARF) (Kasperson et al., 1988; Pidgeon et al., 2003). The main thesis of SARF is 
that information processes, institutional structures, social behaviour and individual 
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responses shape the social experience of what a ‘risk’ is in ways that either increase or 
decrease public reactions to the particular issue. 
 In the last decade, the concept of ‘risk governance’ has emerged as the critical 
study of complex, interacting networks in which choices and decisions are made 
around risks, and as a set of normative principles which can inform all relevant actors 
of society on how to deal responsibly with risks (International Risk Governance Coun-
cil, 2005, 2007; Klinke and Renn, 2002; Stirling, 2001; van Asselt and Renn, 2011; van 
Asselt and Vos, 2008). Risk governance issues are related to the complexity of con-
temporary uncertain and/or ambiguous risks (often multi-level and multi-actor), the 
role(s) of science and experts in our society, and the dimensions of trust, credibility 
and participation (for an explanation of the genesis and analytical scope of risk gov-
ernance, see Hermans et al., 2011). The notion of risk governance refers to the vari-
ous ways in which many actors, individuals and institutions, public and private, deal 
with risk-issues. From an interdisciplinary point of view, it conceptualises policy pro-
cesses as a complex web of “actors, rules, conventions, processes and mechanisms”, 
and is concerned with “how relevant risk information is collected, analysed and com-
municated, and how management decisions are taken” (Renn, 2008: 9–10). Risk gov-
ernance thus starts from the assumption that the possibilities of damage that society 
is confronted with cannot be adequately managed by existing technocratic proce-
dures that are based on the idea that these possibilities of harm can simply be calcu-
lated. 
 Risk governance ideas are thus a radical shift from previous ideas on how to gov-
ern risks (see Hermans et al., 2011). Disciplines such as engineering and economics 
that use technical risk analyses to calculate expected benefits and monetary costs, 
played and still play a dominant role in the regulation of activities and substances that 
might pose a risk to humans and the environment. In this so-called classical or positiv-
ist risk approach, ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ are believed to be predictable, even when it 
relates to human behaviour; and the calculation ‘risk = probability x effect’ has be-
come the golden formula. Based on this classical risk approach, science-based govern-
ing became institutionalised as a two-way process with a clear separation between 
science and policy: the identification and evaluation of risk (risk assessment) and tak-
ing measures to control risks that are deemed unacceptable (risk management). The 
U.S. National Research Council (NRC) endorsed this model in the 1980s in a report 
that became known as the ‘Red Book’ (US NRC (National Research Council), 1983) and 
that was adopted by many powerful policy-making institutions in Europe. Notwith-
standing this official popularity, science policy analysts and STS scholars have criticised 
the model for years (Hilgartner, 2000; Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998; Jasanoff, 1990; 
Millstone et al., 2008; Pielke, 2007; Weingart, 1999). Their critique is aimed at two 
assumptions. Firstly, that scientific knowledge will be readily available, is reliable and 
will be based on a consensus amongst scientists. Secondly, that scientific risk assess-
ments are conducted in socially, politically and ethically neutral settings. Several dec-
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ades of social science research has indicated that there is no well-defined demarca-
tion between ‘science’ and ‘policy’ as is typically argued. An important implication of 
these observations is that the development of science and technology is not simply a 
matter for science or government. This assertion is a key idea within risk governance. 
It denotes a broadening of the conventional perspective on policymaking by acknowl-
edging that the government is not the only and perhaps not even the most important 
party in the organisation of society. This is particularly relevant in risk-issues that are 
characterised by a high degree of uncertainty and/or societal anxiety. In those in-
stances, risk governance scholars claim that other actors need to be involved in the 
decision-making process. 
 The notion of ‘uncertainty’ has been of particular interest for scholars contrib-
uting to the risk governance field since they claim that traditional risk assessment 
tools are not adequate to deal with contemporary uncertain, complex and ambiguous 
risks. Many have pointed out that there is no ‘real’ uncertainty in public controversies 
and that the ‘problem’ of uncertainty is thus not fundamentally quantitative (Klinke 
and Renn, 2002; van Asselt, 2000; van der Sluijs, 2012; Walker et al., 2003). More 
knowledge does not necessarily mean less uncertainty and vice versa. The definition 
of what uncertainty is, along with other issues such as what counts as scientific evi-
dence, what methods are appropriate, or how much evidence is enough has to be 
negotiated, constructed, sometimes monopolised or manipulated (Campbell, 1985). 
Uncertainty is thus the result of negotiations about the adequacy and relevance of 
current knowledge. 
 I adopt this broader understanding of uncertainty which encompasses both its 
relation to knowledge and its social dimension. I follow the definition by van Asselt: 
uncertainty refers to a lack of knowledge and the difficulty to predict future events, 
outcomes and consequences (van Asselt, 2000). The ‘social dimension’ thus denotes 
situations in which individuals, groups, communities, cultures or everyone experience, 
construct or ignore doubt on something that matters in view of decision making and 
acting, which is partly or fully possible, because (scientific) knowledge is perceived or 
portrayed as limited (van Asselt, 2005). Uncertainty should thus be understood as that 
which emerges from negotiations about the adequacy and relevance of current 
knowledge. The issue of mast siting, which is the focus of this thesis, is characterised 
by uncertainty, because at least some relevant stakeholders and scientists hold the 
view that there exists significant uncertainty about potential adverse health effects. As 
mentioned earlier, I understand ‘risk’ in the same way, as a quality ascribed to an 
object or activity through a contended social process. In situations of uncertainty, 
decision makers can try to convert ‘uncertainties’ into ‘risks’, or in other words, resort 
to a risk-based approach with which to determine the acceptability of adverse out-
comes. In recent years, risk governance scholars have become increasingly interested 
in exploring the dynamics of risk-based governance, as risk has become a key organis-
ing concept for regulation and governance (Beck, 1992; Hood et al., 2001; Jasanoff, 
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1999; Power, 2004; Rothstein et al., 2006, 2013; Stirling, 1998). Researchers raise 
questions such as: what makes this policy instrument so popular, what are the driving 
forces behind it; and what are the consequences, limitations or restrictions? Framing 
an object or activity as a ‘risk’ makes it governable by putting it in the hands of ex-
perts, but it is much less clear what the regulatory and societal effects are of this 
framing. 
 
I relate myself to this diverse body of research in examining mast siting controversies. 
In different ways, these various research communities focus on 1) citizen engagement 
with science and technology: how they make sense of the world and changes around 
them; and how they act to counter these changes. Therefore, it is both about the 
discourses, hence the collective framing of an issue as a problem, and about the mobi-
lisation in terms of socio-political processes of citizen actions. The bodies of literature 
also pay attention to 2) the engagement with science: how policy makers and citizens 
take a recourse to scientific knowledge by way of framing certain issues as ‘risks’. A 
third theme in the bodies of literature is 3) the governance practices and the interac-
tion between policy and citizens; in particular, how policy processes may influence 
(ignite, constrain, reinforce, etc.) citizens’ meaning work and behaviour and how citi-
zens’ framings and actions might reciprocally influence policy decisions. 
Structure 
In chapter 2 Exploring wireless communication technology as a risk issue, I start with a 
literature review of the social science research on mobile telephony. The review ex-
plores the risk framing of the technology by focusing on two issues that are the main 
interests of social scientists studying this controversy: 1) citizens’ reactions to the 
(siting of the) technology and its presumed health effects, and 2) policy responses to 
these societal concerns. The review serves as a starting point for my own investigation 
of the topic, as it identifies those issues that are in line with my own empirical find-
ings, and other issues that I deem worthy of further research. 
 Chapter 3 Citizen engagement around mast siting starts from the perspective of 
the citizens who become engaged in mast siting controversies. I examine how and 
why they get involved, how they respond to mast siting and how their engagement 
develops. I thus focus on the societal dynamics around the emergence, sustainment 
and ending of mast siting controversies. I go through different important aspects of 
citizen engagements: the collective character of the engagement, the contact with 
grassroots support teams on the Internet, the landscape of knowledges and experi-
ences in which citizens were embedded, the uncertainty around EMF health effects, 
and the appeal of the health risk framing. I discuss how citizen engagement can be 
understood as forms of non-orchestrated forms of citizen involvement in local politics. 
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 The citizens’ perspective in chapter 3 leads me to consider the broader political 
and institutional context of mast siting in chapter 4, The politics of mast siting. I pay 
attention to the national and international dimensions of constructing wireless com-
munication networks from the 1990s onwards by examining the dynamics that took 
place between international, national and local authorities, scientists, industry, citi-
zens and the media. I discuss the government’s risk-based policy strategy in dealing 
with mast siting controversies and the effects of this policy on the dynamics of citizen 
engagement. 
 I continue the analysis of the risk-based policy approach to mast siting controver-
sies in chapter 5 The role of science in the antenna policy. I discuss how science be-
came an important resource, not only for policy makers but also for societal actors 
who were critical of the government’s interpretation of science. Science went from 
judge of a policy decision to being judged itself by societal actors. This development 
was particularly visible in discussions in the Klankbordgroep (Sounding Board) of the 
Kennisplatform EMV & Gezondheid (Knowledge Platform EMF & Health), an initiative 
of participatory governance that was established in the second half of the 2000s to 
discuss the topic of EMF and health with diverse societal actors. 
 The concluding chapter recapitalises the findings of this thesis and revisits the 
research questions by way of two focal points: the dynamics of citizen engagement 
and the governance approach to citizen engagement. I also pay attention to the prac-
tical consequences of my conclusion: what lessons can we learn from this particular 
controversy that help to increase our understanding of how best to govern innova-
tions. 
The research 
Controversies seem at first sight a thick mesh of arguments, people, places, anecdotes 
and objects. Ethnographical methods have helped me in understanding the language 
used by the actors and objects that make up this controversy. I became acquainted 
with several communities that were engaging with the siting of a base station and 
interviewed people that were involved: citizens, mayors, local politicians, aldermen 
(wethouders) for spatial planning, journalists, lawyers, and spokespersons from mobile 
phone operators. I explored the networks and networking activities that these local 
actors were part of, paying explicit attention to the interaction between my actors 
and science, which led me in turn to spend time attending and observing public meet-
ings and conferences on EMF. This allowed me to witness the networks between citi-
zens, government officials, scientists and industry. 
 I followed in the tradition of STS ethnographies that are informed by Bloor’s 
strong program (Bloor, 1976). The principles of the strong programme are as follows: 
1) impartiality, adapt a principal of impartiality with respect to ‘true’ and ‘false’ be-
liefs, 2) causality, explain how beliefs or knowledge claims arise, 3) symmetry, give as 
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much credence to successful or true beliefs as to unsuccessful or dissident beliefs and 
4) reflexivity, be mindful about applying these same principles to your own work as a 
researcher (Hess, 1997). Bloor’s principles served as a guidance to deal with the intri-
cacies of researching an on-going controversy. Firstly, my analysis did not depend on 
the accuracy of competing claims: whether wireless communication technology is a 
health risk or not did not have any bearing on my explanation for the dynamics of 
mast siting controversies. Next, I deconstructed and problematised knowledge claims 
of scientific institutions, government and public groups without drawing a priori 
boundaries about particular knowledge claims being more legitimate than others are. 
Throughout my research I aimed to avoid vilifying or romanticising any of the actors 
involved (Burningham et al., 2006). Yet, this does not mean that I do not value a high-
er-level asymmetry and partiality in social science research in which scientists make 
claims about inequality (Allen, 2003) or the lack of certain types of scientific 
knowledge (‘undone science’) (Frickel et al., 2010; see Hess, 2001). 
 From the moment I started my research, I was reminded that there are many 
diverse interests at stake in siting disputes and that actors are keen to get you on their 
side. In the early stages of my project I contacted some engaged citizens who were 
active online in organisations that proclaimed health risks from RF EMF (in chapter 3, I 
call these organisations ‘grassroots support teams’). The replies followed quickly. The 
respondents did not see any merits in investigating mast siting controversies sociolog-
ically – most of them in fact reinterpreted my project as psychological risk perception 
research, of which they were very critical. They did not understand why I would be 
interested in the social dynamics of mast siting controversies. They also did not see 
how this could help their cause. They wanted me to know that scientific evidence was 
mounting about the harmfulness of wireless communication technology: “it is by no 
means an innocent technology and more and more people are worried about their 
health” (Board member Meldpunt Gezondheid en Milieu (Dutch organisation for moni-
toring health and environment), personal communication, 14 & 21 August, 2009). My 
research was viewed with suspicion: not only was one of my supervisors linked to a 
scientific advisory body6 that was critical of claims that RF EMF is dangerous, my re-
search could also be used by the government to suppress citizens’ reactions. Ethno-
graphic handbooks warn researchers about this: 
[p]eople will often be concerned with what kind of person the researcher is – 
more than with the research itself. They will try to gauge how far the ethnog-
rapher can be trusted, what he or she might be able to offer as an acquaintance 
or friend, and perhaps also how easily he or she could be manipulated and ex-
ploited (Atkinson & Hammersley, 2007 (1983), p. 65) 
                                                                
6 Prof. Wim Passchier has worked for 22 years for the Gezondheidsraad (Health Council of the Netherlands) 
most of the time as the deputy executive director prior to becoming my supervisor. 
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In a few cases, potential interviewees needed the reassurance that my research was 
not funded by the telecom industry. Most of the time, however, interviewees were 
very keen to share their knowledge and experiences of mast siting with me. 
Case studies 
Since I was interested in the dynamics of siting controversies and how scientific 
knowledge played a role in there, I decided to investigate a small number of cases of 
mast siting controversies in-depth. Case study research is a particularly apt method 
when dealing with a contemporary situation over which the researcher has little or no 
control and is thus required to be sensitive to the context of the object that is being 
studied (Yin, 1994): “[a] case study is an empirical inquiry that a) investigates a con-
temporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when b) the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 1994: 18). The aim of 
case study research is 1) to generate meaningful insights into particular cases and 2) 
to make analytical generalisations. I chose to investigate six cases in-depth that al-
lowed me to make analytical generalisations, instead of more cases that would in 
principle have allowed me to make statistically significant generalisations. However, it 
was impossible to investigate more in-depth cases for statistical generalisation with 
the resources and within the timeframe of PhD research. Thus, case studies were best 
suited for answering my research questions since they enabled to examine fundamen-
tal patterns and mechanisms that helped explain the rise, the endurance and the 
(possible) ending of mast siting controversies. 
 From the start of my project, I explored several candidate case studies on the 
basis of visibility and potential of the case. The cases of Spijkenisse and Drongen were 
an early choice because of the media attention they received, the scale of the contro-
versy (as the protagonists involved were still active in proclaiming the adverse health 
effects of wireless communication technology), and the accessibility of the people 
involved (as I had met one of these protagonists at a conference). The openess in 
choosing cases meant that I was flexible and could adjust to opportunities along the 
way. When at the end of 2010 a mast siting controversy emerged in the town were I 
lived, Maastricht, I could start with my empirical research right away. Also, whenever 
the Antennebureau (Antenna Office), the official information office for public ques-
tions about antennas, organised an information session for the neighbhourhood 
about the siting of a mast close to Maastricht, I tried to attend. 
 I selected the cases on the basis of two criteria: 1) the ‘health risk’ framing in the 
course of the mast siting controversy and 2) the impact of the controversy. The first 
variable is related to the question whether health effects were a dominant theme 
during the citizen engagement, and at which moment (or the lack of that moment) 
‘health risks’ became an important focus point of local discussions. As noted earlier, 
other reasons also prevail in mast siting controversies such as governance issues, local 
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and environmental planning, aesthetics, or devaluation of property prices. This crite-
rion accounts for three sorts of cases: a) cases where the base station has been 
framed as a possible ‘health risk’ from the very beginning, b) cases where it has been 
framed as a ‘health risk’ during the course of the protest and another framing domi-
nated (first) and c) cases where base stations have not been framed as a ‘health risk’. 
The second variable takes into account the impact of the protest actions. Impact could 
mean a) whether the municipality supported the local protest actions, and/or b) 
whether the citizen group won a case in court and/or c) whether the mast against 
which the protests were aimed is sited or not. One of the six cases (Euverem) had 
been chosen because of a lack of controversy; in fact, citizens there were quite happy 
to get better mobile phone connection. This case is included to serve as a counterbal-
ance to the investigation of siting controversies because it allowed me to take notice 
of productive patterns or other dynamics that account for the lack of controversy. 
 Notwithstanding scholarly social scientific interest in mast siting controversies 
(see chapter 2 for a review), there turned out to be a lack of empirical studies into 
multiple cases of mast siting controversies. Existing research on mast siting controver-
sies was mostly based on single case studies. Yet, it seemed to make sense to take 
several cases of mast siting controversies into account. Researchers from an Actor-
Network perspective emphasize the importance of place, thus the local settings of a 
controversy (Venturini, 2009) since they claim that the experience of ‘risk’ is mediated 
by place. The physical and socio-demographic features of location may give clues to 
reasons of emerging ‘risk-issues’. It is thus important to study other local issues and in 
particular, how the ‘place at risk’ is governed. Also, place offers some of the resources 
and motives for political action: 
social movements can hardly be understood when isolated from their local con-
text: the fact that a similar activity will give rise to protest movements all across 
the country, or even in different countries (as is the case with mobile phone 
masts) should not hide the fact that each movement also finds in its specific con-
text both resources and motives for action (Borraz, 2008: 9). 
By investigating several mast siting controversies, I explored different local settings 
that accounted for different outcomes, and it allowed me to identify dynamics that 
came back in all cases, and hence seem more fundamental than primarily context-
dependent. 
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Table 1.2. – Case selection. For a description of each case, see appendix 1. 
Mast siting  
controversies 
Health risk framing  
in time 
Impact of protest 
SPIJKENISSE (NL) From beginning 
Focus: health risk 
Municipality supportive of citizen 
engagement 
Mast was sited 
NIEUWKOOP (NL) From beginning 
Focus: health risk 
Municipality unsupportive of citizen 
engagement 
Mast was sited 
MAASTRICHT (NL) During protest 
Focus: landscape pollution 
Municipality trying to be supportive of citizen 
engagement 
Mast is sited 
EUVEREM (NL) Not at all 
Focus: getting mobile connection  
for residents & tourists 
-– 
DRONGEN (FL) During protest 
Focus: from landscape pollution to  
health risk 
Municipality supportive of citizen 
engagement 
Court decision in favour of citizens 
Mast is not sited 
MAARKEDAL (FL) During protest 
Focus: landscape pollution 
Municipality unsupportive of citizen 
engagement 
Court decision in favour of citizens 
Mast is not sited 
 
 
I also compared four cases in the Netherlands with two in Flanders, one of the three 
Belgian regions in the Northern part of Belgium. Since STS have shown us that 
“[h]uman responses to nature and technology are culturally embedded and place-
specific”, it made sense to investigate local mast siting controversies in two different 
legislative and political cultures (Jasanoff, 1999: 68). I took an exploratory comparative 
approach between the Netherlands and Flanders. It was thus not my intention to 
make a cultural comparison between the Netherlands and Flanders (as homogeneous 
units) but the latter mostly served as a contrast to the former in highlighting interest-
ing aspects (compare Mesman (2002) who made such an exploratory comparison 
between the Netherlands and the USA concerning prenatal care). The case studies in 
Flanders thus served the goal of a research ‘lens’ on the Netherlands, in order to bet-
ter examine and understand the dynamics of the Dutch controversies. Flanders ade-
quately served this purpose because the region had many similarities that make an 
exploratory comparison possible, but was divergent enough to provide this con-
trasting lens. The similarities with the Netherlands were firstly found in the way the 
scientific side of wireless communication technology was managed by a scientific 
advisory body: the Hoge Gezondheidsraad/Conseil Supérieur de la Santé (Superior 
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Health Council) in Belgium and the Gezondheidsraad (Health Council of the Nether-
lands) in the Netherlands (see van Dijk et al., 2011). Both councils also worked closely 
together as some of its members are advisors for both councils. Yet, their opinions on 
wireless communication technology differed: in 2009 the Hoge Gezondheidsraad 
recommended the application of the precautionary principle by lowering the exposure 
limits to 3 V/m (at the common frequency of 900Mhz) in order to protect the popula-
tion (Hoge Gezondheidsraad, 2009). The Flemish government decided to take over 
this recommendation for places where people spent a lot of time (Vlaamse Regering, 
2011, 2012). The Netherlands followed the recommendations of the International 
Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection (ICNIRP) (International Commission 
on Non-Ionising Radiation Protection, 1998) as also recommended by the European 
Council (The Council of the European Union, 1999). Unlike the Hoge Gezondheidsraad 
in Belgium, its Dutch counterpart did not call for the lowering of exposure limits. 
 At first glance, mast siting controversies in the Netherlands and Flanders were 
also very similar to each other, i.e. they tended to go through different ‘arenas’ (com-
pare Mourik, 2004): the setting up of a citizen group (social movement arena), the 
searching for political supporters in their local municipality or beyond (political arena), 
going to court on different levels (legal arena) and getting in touch with the media 
(media arena). In addition, in the Netherlands and Flanders, mast siting controversies 
had only a limited number of ‘protagonists’ or engaged citizens involved in mast siting 
controversies. Nevertheless, the impacts of these engagements were often consider-
able in terms of social and political responses. Lastly, the same arguments against 
mast siting circulated in the Netherlands and Flanders: devaluation of property prices, 
lack of citizen involvement in the decision-making process, fears for negative health 
effects of RF EMF and landscape pollution. In contrast with all four cases in the Neth-
erlands, however, the Flemish citizen groups managed to win lawsuits against the 
siting of a base station. In the end, in both Maarkedal and Drongen, the mast was not 
sited. In this way, the Flemish case studies highlighted the importance of the (national 
or regional) rules and regulations, and the judicial system on the dynamics of mast 
siting controversies. 
Data collection and analysis 
The empirical basis of my thesis consisted of three parts: I collected data for 1) analys-
ing my cases of mast siting controversies, 2) the policy process around mobile teleph-
ony and mast siting; and 3) the emergence and existence of (knowledge) networks 
around mobile telephony. Below, I will detail these research activities. 
 As a preparation for my fieldwork, I reviewed the literature on the topic of mobile 
telephony and risks and mast siting controversies (see chapter 2), I did desk research 
on the Dutch and Flemish situation of mast siting, and I conducted several exploratory 
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interviews (see appendix 2). This allowed me to ‘enter’ the field well informed, but still 
with an open mind (Atkinson and Hammersley, 2007). 
 I selected 4 Dutch and 2 Flemish case studies (see Table 1.2.). The key research 
activities to investigate each case have been: desk study, analysing media archives and 
relevant policy and legal documents pertaining to the case and grassroots websites, 
interviewing engaged citizens and local actors and transcribing and coding the inter-
views. I interviewed 46 people, ranging from seven to eleven persons per case, except 
for the case without controversy (two interviews) (see list of interviewees in appendix 
2). I identified interviewees via an Internet search on the particular controversy by 
looking for different types of sources: Internet websites and blogs of citizens, groups 
or organisations involved in the controversy, municipal information in local newspa-
pers or on official websites, media accounts in local newspapers, jurisprudence on the 
particular case and other written sources (such as newsletters from local associations 
or schools). I also used the ‘snowballing technique’, i.e. asking interviewees for other 
interviewee candidates, to find more respondents. Most respondents, however, were 
found through desk study. 
 For each case, a case study protocol (Yin, 1994) was made prior to the start of 
data collection which consisted of a synopsis of the case on the basis of desk research 
(different arenas of controversy, timetable and interesting findings of desk research), 
data collection procedures (data sources and interviewee planning), interview proto-
col and case study specific questions. The case study protocol served as a research 
tool to guide the interviews and thus increase the consistency throughout and be-
tween the cases. Interviews were semi-structured, evolving around a set of themes 
and key questions but being flexible enough to follow the interviewee in his or her 
own conversation and thought-processes (see interview protocol in appendix 3). The 
interviews took place in the interviewee’s own home and were audio-recorded with 
prior consent. Since I was interested in the way the issue of siting had been framed by 
different actors, I asked open-ended questions and did not elaborate on my specific 
research interest: 
[a] truly open-ended question does not presuppose which dimension of feeling or 
thought will be salient for the interviewee. (…) [I]n qualitative inquiry one of the 
things the inquiry is trying to determine is what dimensions, themes, and imag-
es/words people use among themselves to describe their feelings, thoughts, and 
experiences (Patton, 2002: 362). 
In my interviews, the interviewees could construct their stories in their own terms 
with me only interrupting to ask for clarifications where I felt it was necessary. Since I 
had analysed the occurrence of events for each particular controversy using a case 
study protocol in preparation to the interviews, the interviews were used less for 
analysing what interviewees said about the controversy (the interview as resource – 
providing ‘facts’ about the engagement), but more for how s/he experienced the 
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engagement with mast siting (the interview as topic – taking the interviewee’s ac-
count as a social event in itself in order to analyse the ways the interviewee describes 
the experiences) (Seale, 2004). In order to increase data validity, all interviews were 
transcribed and, in a reiterative process, a number of categories were produced based 
on an initial reading of the transcripts. Each interview was then systematically coded 
and analysed using these categories with the qualitative data analysis and research 
software Atlas.ti (see the coding scheme in appendix 4). 
 The second part of my empirical research consisted of analysing the international, 
national, regional and local decision-making process around mast siting through desk 
research of online sources and through attending meetings organised by official bod-
ies. I collected policy documents (Kamerstukken (documents from the House of Rep-
resentatives of the Netherlands), press releases and legislation), and media accounts 
(mostly from newspapers). In order to acquaint myself with the current policy per-
spective on mast siting, I attended three information sessions for neighbourhoods in 
which a mast was planned to be sited, organised by the Antennebureau (see list of 
participant observations in appendix 2). The Antennebureau is the official Dutch in-
formation portal for questions about mobile telephony, and one of their tasks is to 
organise information sessions for citizens. They also offer courses for municipal offi-
cials to learn how to deal with questions from citizens that are open to the public. I 
attended two of them (see list of participant observations in appendix 2). I also at-
tended one information session for provincial and municipal officials in Flanders (see 
list of participant observations in appendix 2). 
 For the third part of my empirical research, I paid attention to the emergence and 
existence of networks around mobile telephony: both top-down versions, initiated by 
governmental bodies or research institutes and bottom-up initiatives of citizens. For 
the latter, I searched for websites of local and national engagement with mast siting 
through search engines and the Internet archive, the WayBackMachine.7 I was also 
interested in instances where the networks mixed: where citizens, pressure groups 
and activists would meet with scientists, government officials and health care profes-
sionals to discuss issues of EMF and health. I attended two conferences on the health 
effects of RF EMF where the various networks met (see list of participant observations 
in appendix 2). In 2007, the Dutch government established the Kennisplatform EMV & 
Gezondheid (Knowledge Platform EMF & Health) to combine the knowledge on EMF 
and health that was present in different institutions, knowledge centres and universi-
ties throughout the country. The Kennisplatform also envisioned becoming a vital link 
between science and society on the topic of EMF and health. It provided a forum in 
the form of a Klankbordgroep (Sounding Board) where societal organisations were 
represented that deal with the issue of EMF and health: for example, the mobile te-
                                                                
7 I cited and archived web documents that I used as sources in my thesis through WebCite 
(www.webcitation.org). After each web document, I added “archived at [website URL]” to ensure that the 
web document stays accessible for readers of this thesis even after the original URL is no longer working. 
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lephony industry, the Dutch Organisation for Medical Imaging and Radiotherapy and 
citizen organisations and pressure groups who plead for the safe use of the technolo-
gy (see chapter 5). Throughout my research, it became clear that the Kennisplatform 
and Klankbordgroep played an important role in (dealing with) the societal dynamics 
on siting controversies. I thus decided to attend 4 meetings of the Klankbordgroep 
(see list of participant observations in appendix 2) and to interview 11 persons who 
were involved in the Kennisplatform and Klankbordgroep (see appendix 2 for a list of 
interviewees). 
 Table 1.3. below summarises my research approach. 
 
Table 1.3. – Summary of the research approach, for more details see Appendix 2. 
Local mast siting controversies Policy Knowledge networks 
Drongen (BE) 
Maarkedal (BE) 
Spijkenisse (NL) 
Nieuwkoop (NL) 
Maastricht (NL) 
Euverem (NL) 
Mast siting controversies maps  
(see Figure 1.2. & 1.3.) 
(Inter)national, regional and local 
regulation of EMF and health: 
international organisations (such 
as WHO and ICNIRP), European 
institutes, Dutch government, 
Flemish government and 
municipalities involved in mast 
siting controversies 
Kennisplatform EMF & 
Gezondheid (Knowledge 
Platform EMF & Health) 
Klankbordgroep (Sounding 
Board) 
Conferences on EMF  
46 interviews with engaged citizens, 
mayors, local politicians, aldermen 
(wethouders) for spatial planning, 
journalists, lawyers, and spokespersons 
from mobile phone operators 
Personal communication with municipal 
officials (through telephone and e-mail) 
4 exploratory interviews, mainly 
in Flanders, in order to identify 
the main policy issues in relation 
to EMF 
11 interviews with staff 
members of the 
Kennisplatform EMF & 
Health, grassroots support 
teams, interest groups and 
scientists 
Document analysis of personal 
communications with municipal officials, 
media reports about mast siting 
controversies, personal folders of 
collected information on the mast siting 
from engaged citizens (in the case of 
Spijkenisse and Maarkedal), official 
municipal information, and legal 
documents from court cases.  
Document analysis of policy 
documents (Kamerstukken (NL), 
press releases and legislation), 
media accounts (mostly from 
newspapers), scientific papers, 
conference proceedings and 
municipal documents about mast 
siting. 
Document analysis of the 
reports of Klankbordgroep 
meetings and other official 
communication by the 
Kennisplatform 
Participant observation of 3 information 
sessions for citizens about the intended 
siting of a mast in the neighbourhood  
 Participant observation of 
Klankbordgroep meetings, 
conferences and closed 
meetings between 
grassroots support teams, 
scientists and staff members 
of the Kennisplatform 
  
41 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
Exploring wireless communication 
technology as a risk issue 
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Introduction 
Scholarly interest in the health effects of wireless communication technology in-
creased from the end of the 1990s onwards. But it was not just physicists, epidemiol-
ogists, biologists and technical scientists that took the presumed health effects of RF 
EMF as a starting point for their investigations. Social scientists also found the tech-
nology an interesting case to test their theories about risk perception and communi-
cation, social movement theory or public understanding of science. For many, it was 
intriguing that even though the technology was so well accepted and embedded in 
social life, people seemed to worry about the associated health effects. Part of the 
social science research on the controversy thus endorsed or even reproduced the 
scientific framing of the wireless communication technology controversy as a ‘health 
risk’. Social scientists from a wide range of perspectives turned their attention to the 
controversy over health risks from wireless communication technology. In reviewing 
the literature, I drew on sociological and psychological studies on risk, science and 
technology studies, studies by policy scientists and social movement theorists. I 
searched six databases using several key words8, applied ‘snowballing’ and asked 
contacts in the field for relevant literature. I also included non-peer-reviewed articles, 
such as workshop proceedings and reports. This search generated around 50 papers. 
 In this chapter, 1) I summarise the social science state-of-the-art research on the 
topic of RF EMF, with the aim of 2) sharpening my own research focus by identifying 
which insights from the literature are in line with my own empirical findings and which 
ones I further want to investigate. For this reason, I also 3) discuss insights of my own 
empirical research when they fit with the existing literature. In other words, in those 
cases where my empirical findings are in line with the literature discussed, and when 
these findings do not add anything significant to the literature, I will discuss these 
insights in this chapter as part of the review. Since these empirical insights are only 
relevant in relation to the review, but are not of added value in answering my re-
search questions, I do not come back to them in the empirical chapters (chapter 3, 4 
and 5). In contrast, if the literature review pointed to aspects that were of interest for 
my research questions, but were not analysed in-depth yet, I will not discuss my own 
empirical findings in this chapter, but in the following empirical chapters. 
 The review revealed that two research questions are central in the literature: 
‘Why are people concerned about wireless communication technology?’ and ‘How 
have policymakers reacted to the public concerns?’. The chapter is thus divided in two 
parts (Citizens and EMF and Policymakers and EMF) in which I review the literature 
                                                                
8 Databases used were ISI Web of Science, Science Direct, Sage Journals Online, SocIndex (EBSCO), 
Swetswise, and PubMed. Key words used were ‘electromagnetic radiation’, ‘microwaves’, ‘controversy’ and 
‘mobile phone’, ‘non-ionising radiation’ and ‘public protest’, and ‘electromagnetic fields’ and ‘public pro-
test’. I also found literature using the ‘snowball effect’ and asking my contacts in the field for relevant 
literature. I also included non-peer-reviewed articles, such as workshop proceedings and reports for Dutch 
and EU projects.  
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that poses and answers these two questions. In Citizens and EMF, I focus on scholarly 
insights about citizens’ perspectives on mobile telephony and mast siting; research 
into the role of the media in the controversies around EMF; and case study research 
on local mast siting controversies that point to a dominant framing of the issue in 
terms of a health risk. In the second part, Policymakers and EMF, I review the litera-
ture on the divergence in regulatory approaches to EMF and on the emergence of 
new governance forms such as participatory processes. In the last section, I recapitu-
late the findings from the review, and discuss which aspects of the mobile telephony 
controversy I find lacking in in-depth empirical investigations. I conclude by briefly 
discussing my research approach in the light of the review. 
Citizens & EMF 
Citizens’ concerns about EMF 
From the mid-1990s onwards, academic interests in possible risks from wireless 
communication technology and in how people experience these risks increased. This 
type of knowledge was considered critical, not only by scholars but also by policymak-
ers and (health) research organisations that sponsored many of these research pro-
jects. The National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (Rijksinstituut voor 
Volksgezondheid en Milieu, RIVM) in the Netherlands, for example, performed a pre-
liminary investigation into concerns about base stations in 2005, on request of the 
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports of the Netherlands (Bolte et al., 2005). It con-
cluded that: 
[t]he number of people concerned about the location of base stations is not de-
pendent on the actual distance of these stations from residences. Concern about 
electromagnetic fields seems to be mainly a matter of risk perception (Ibid.: 2) 
The field of risk perception and communication has dominated research into people’s 
reactions to and perspectives9 on wireless communication technology. They have 
tried to find out firstly, why people are concerned about the technology and secondly, 
how to better communicate information about the technology in order to alleviate 
some of this concern. 
                                                                
9 I use the concept of ‘risk perspective’ instead of ‘risk perception’, not because I do not agree with the 
outcomes of risk perception research on EMF and health, but because I want to be critical about the often 
implicit normative assumptions present in risk perception research about concepts such as ‘laypersons’ and 
‘risk perception’. Risk perception has been criticised for implying a distinction between ‘perceived’ (by 
‘emotive and irrational’ ‘laypeople’) and ‘real’ (by ‘objective’ scientists) risks (Marris, et al., 2001). If not 
made explicit, one can interpret these findings as drawing a boundary between one superior knowledge 
base above another inferior one. ‘Risk perspective’, in contrast, is less ambiguous. I use it to refer to the 
multiplicity of views on risk in various arenas. 
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 Well-established insights from psychological research explain that concerned 
citizens make subjective judgments that might be at odds with experts’ judgement. At 
the end of the 1960s, Starr (1969) developed a quantitative method to look at how 
people weigh risks and benefits. He was one of the first to show that people accept 
activities that are voluntary (e.g. smoking) more than those that are involuntary (e.g. 
living next to nuclear power plant). So-called ‘psychometric studies’, rooted in psy-
chology and decision theory, have since focused on the roles of affect and emotions in 
influencing how people make estimates of the ‘riskiness’ of a particular technology. In 
the field of risk perception research, the siting of base stations can be seen as a ‘typi-
cal risk scenario’: 
exposure to radiation from the masts is involuntary and without a sense of per-
sonal control, the health consequences of exposure are presently unknown but 
questioned by some experts, [and] technical knowledge about radiation is limited 
among lay persons (Nielsen et al., 2010: 505). 
Studies using the psychometric paradigm showed that wireless communication tech-
nology is considered a medium dreadful and little-known hazard (Siegrist et al., 2005). 
A study into risk ratings of mobile phones and base stations by participants of a public 
hearing (Hutter et al., 2004) found out that that the highest risks were attributed to 
asbestos exposures, smoking and living near a nuclear power plant. Only a minority of 
respondents rated the risks from wireless communication technology as ‘high’. 
 Yet, survey results from the Eurobarometer in 2007 specified that 36% of the 
respondents thought that mobile phone masts affected their health ‘to a big extent’, 
40% ‘to some extent’ and 18% ‘not at all’ (European Commission, 2007). In the Neth-
erlands and Belgium respectively, 12% and 32% was concerned to a big extent, 39% 
and 43% to some extent and 41% and 23% not at all. The Eurobarometer survey also 
indicated that individuals were more concerned about base stations compared to 
mobile phones, a finding that has also been established by risk perception research 
(Hutter et al., 2004; Ruddat et al., 2010; Siegrist et al., 2005) and case study research 
on local mast siting controversies (Drake, 2006). In Drake’s case study, citizens were 
well aware of this paradox but felt to have more control over their mobile phone 
compared to base stations. Voluntariness or perceived control was an important psy-
chometric variable: 
[i]t may seem that campaigning against a mobile phone mast whilst owning a 
mobile phone is either irrational or based purely on self-interest. [However] (…) it 
is neither of these. For several of those involved there was a genuine fear that 
mobile phone masts could exacerbate pre-existing medical conditions. The pro-
testers concerned about health used their mobile phones in such a way as to min-
imize the perceived potential health risks and maximize the benefits of mobile 
phone ownership. They were more concerned about the masts, not because they 
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thought they posed a greater risk than the phones, but because they had no con-
trol over that risk (Slovic, 1987) (Drake, 2006: 405). 
Thus, risk perception studies show that, in the view of engaged citizens, masts are 
sited involuntary and are thus out of control for them to ‘switch off’, unlike their 
phones. 
 
Relation with empirical findings from my case study research – My case study research 
of several mast siting controversies is in line with this finding. It explains why all of the 
citizens I met throughout my research had a mobile phone and other wireless devices 
such as tablets whilst at the same time engaging with the siting of a base station. 
Some explicitly told me that they were not ‘anti-technology’ (see the Introduction). 
Even those citizens that claimed to get ill from EMF exposure would tell me that I 
could contact them on their mobile phone, but that they rationalised its use – not 
keeping it close to the body, calling with an ear set, using it only as an emergency line 
and switching it off at night (Interview N1 & D2). The mobile phone was thus per-
ceived as more controllable than the base station. Therefore, my experiences with 
engaged citizens provide further evidence of Drake’s and risk perception research 
insights that a lack of control increases negative risk perspectives. 
 Risk perception researchers have theorised that negative perspectives of health 
risk, and the emotions that are triggered by mast siting such as fear and anger, might 
be explained by different appraisal dimensions: not only control, but also certainty, 
fairness and trust. In a large-scale survey among the Dutch population, van Dongen et 
al. (2013) found that a lack of trust in government policy, coupled with low perceived 
control over EMF-sources, increased negative risk perspectives. More evidence for a 
lack of trust in authorities and mobile phone operators can be found in other studies. 
In three studies using a case study approach (Drake, 2006; Law and McNeish, 2007; 
Soneryd, 2007), engaged citizens often referred to previous industry cover-ups of 
health related issues such as smoking, BSE, asbestos and thalidomide to make their 
point that one cannot trust industry-funded research results. In Ruddat et al.’s (2010) 
focus group study, the high-concerned group (persons who expressed strong concerns 
about risks) viewed the mobile phone companies as untruthful and self-interested 
‘villains’. 
 Also the relationship between trust and fairness is known to be of importance for 
risk perspectives (see e.g. Earle and Siegrist, 2008). Dohle et al. (2012) investigated 
the influence of the emotions of fear and anger on risk perspectives and concluded 
that “control and fairness are important antecedents of fear and anger related to 
mobile communication. Fear is strongly determined by control, and anger is influ-
enced by both control and fairness” (Ibid.: 442). A heightened sense of control could 
thus be achieved, according to the latter authors, by increasing fairness, for example 
by involving the public in base station siting procedures. Contrary to their hypothesis, 
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“certainty was only weakly related to fear, and no relationship was found between 
certainty appraisal and anger” (Ibid.: 443). The authors speculated that since the 
technology was so new, people were perhaps more interested in possibilities of con-
trolling exposure from the technology instead of knowing whether it in fact entailed a 
negative health effect or not. Overall the results show that anger is as important as 
fear in understanding ‘risk judgments’ about base stations since – in contrast to fear – 
anger “strongly determines the acceptance of mobile phone base stations [and] has a 
strong impact on benefit perception” (Ibid.: 443). 
 
Relation with empirical findings from my case study research – My case study research 
also revealed that lack of trust in the ability of governments (both local and national) 
and mobile phone operators to make adequate decisions on the siting of base stations 
had a bearing on the engagement. If citizens considered the competences low, they 
expressed low levels of trust and demanded good governance practices (see chapter 
3). I also experienced a lot of anger and frustration during the conversations with 
citizens. The lack of information about and involvement in mast siting decisions was 
the main cause of these emotions. In some cases, feelings of fairness also played a 
role. In Drongen, for example, citizens referred to living in areas with existing ele-
ments of landscape and noise pollution (such as railroads). In Maarkedal, citizens did 
not find it fair that all the neighbours had to agree to living close to a mast, but only 
one (not respected) neighbour reaped the financial benefits because the mast was 
sited on his property.  
 
Dohle et al. (2010) also looked into public preferences regarding base station siting 
and concluded that out of a choice of four attributes of base station siting, the loca-
tion of the base station was found most important (35%) compared to the decision-
making process and the choice of building (24% and 23% respectively), whilst the 
appearance of the base station was of least importance (17%).10 In addition, respond-
ents preferred base stations to be sited outside of the village, a conclusion that con-
firmed an earlier study (Cousin and Siegrist, 2010). Dohle et al.’s analysis also corrobo-
rated another finding by Cousin and Siegrist (2010), i.e. people generally have little 
knowledge about the technical aspects of mobile communication: “[t]he results sug-
gest that lack of knowledge and understanding, especially about the interaction pat-
terns between cell phones and base stations, is associated with unfavourable base 
station siting preferences, which would cause more exposure for the phoning popula-
tion” (Ibid.: 244). The authors referred here to the fact that siting base stations far 
away from residential areas does not lead to lesser exposure for the residents. 
                                                                
10 However, in a study by Cousin and Siegrist (2010) in which they also asked participants to elicit base 
station siting preferences on a map, visibility was an important factor. 
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 More risk research studies have looked into public knowledge about wireless 
communication technology, as it is felt that the lack of knowledge or the prevalence of 
contradicting information is problematic for citizens to form a proper judgment. In a 
survey of the German population, Ruddat et al. (2010) reported low levels of infor-
mation acquisition by a large section of respondents. Only 17% of respondents felt 
sufficiently informed about possible health effects of mobile telephony. However, 
most respondents did not actively search for more information either. Overall, it 
seemed that once people had made their minds up, they ignored additional infor-
mation. This survey was preceded by focus group research in which participants were 
divided in a ‘high-concerned group’ (persons who expressed strong concerns about 
risks), ‘low-concerned group’ (persons who judge health effects to be rather harmless) 
and ‘ambivalent group’ (persons who had not yet formed an opinion). People from 
the ambivalent and low-concerned group were confident that they could rely on their 
own judgements about possible risks from mobile phones and base stations. They only 
passively acquired information mainly through the mass media. The high-concerned 
group on the other hand “actively search[ed] for more and more critical information 
about radiation risks and explore[d] multiple information sources other than the mass 
media” (Ibid.: 267). In addition, the high-concerned group also expressed their desire 
for more than information – they wanted to share their concerns more widely to au-
thorities in a participatory process about the siting process. 
 
Relation with empirical findings from my case study research – Some of my case study 
findings fit with Ruddat et al.’s research. Only one engaged citizen, who had previously 
experienced health problems from exposure to EMF in the workplace, was well in-
formed about EMF and health. All the other citizens I spoke to knew little about masts 
and wireless communication technology before the mast siting controversy. Yet, from 
the moment they heard about the intended siting, they started to look for more in-
formation through several channels: local newspapers, acquaintances (neighbours, 
friends, family) and the Internet (see chapter 3). Most of the engaged citizens exhibit-
ed the behaviour of the ‘high-concerned group’ in Ruddat et al.’s research, not neces-
sarily, because they were highly concerned about EMF and health, but because they 
were highly concerned that the information the government provided was not the 
entire story. They thus wanted to gather as much information about EMF and health, 
and especially critical information that did not agree with the government’s perspec-
tive. This group of engaged citizens also wanted to become involved in the siting deci-
sion (see chapter 3). 
 
Some risk studies have further explored the extent to which communication and re-
ception of knowledge and information about RF EMF influences citizens’ risk perspec-
tives, spurred by the empirical finding that the public is “confronted with conflicting 
information by representatives of politics, science, industry, the media and civil socie-
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ty” (Ibid.: 262). The issue of communication became particularly poignant in the view 
of two Special Eurobarometer reports on EMF (European Commission, 2007, 2010) 
claiming to have noticed:  
a link between the feeling of being satisfied with the information about the po-
tential health risks posed by EMF and the level of concern: those who are not sat-
isfied with the information are also significantly more concerned over the risks 
(56%) than those who say they have sufficient information on this topic (37%) 
(European Commission, 2007: 13). 
Moreover, in 2010, “[o]nly 20% of respondents [said] that they have received infor-
mation on the potential health effects of electromagnetic fields” (European Commis-
sion, 2010: 95). Thalmann and Wiedemann (2006) investigated the impact of different 
styles of information, e.g. one-sided vs. balanced or emotional vs. unemotional. They 
stressed that concerned people, i.e. those respondents that scored high on a set of 
statements about the alleged harmfulness of EMF, are even more concerned after 
being exposed to highly emotional risk information in which reference is made to 
‘frightening diseases’. The group of ‘unconcerned’ respondents on the other hand 
diminished its risk appraisal after reading the same information. 
 Scholars are particularly interested in how precautionary information about 
health risks of the technology might increase public concern. These studies are still in 
the experimental phase and are problematic to generalise (the psychological laborato-
ry research is mostly conducted with students), but they do raise a lot of interest as 
governments feel the need to inform their citizens – without unduly alarming them. 
Several studies (Barnett et al., 2007; Burgess, 2004; Cousin et al., 2011; Wiedemann 
and Schütz, 2005; Wiedemann et al., 2006) showed that the knowledge of precau-
tionary measures can augment rather than diminish concerns even though it is often 
seen by authorities as a way to lower heightened concerns. Moreover, Wiedemann et 
al. claimed that “information about the implementation of precautionary measures 
has no positive effect on trust in public health protection” (Wiedemann et al., 2006: 
361). 
 Yet, other insights from the literature complicate matters. Timotijevic and Barnett 
(2006) painted a more complex picture in their focus group study, claiming that: 
understandings of the general public [about precaution] were not primarily 
framed in terms of either concerns or reassurance. People made sense of precau-
tion by drawing on a range of evidence from their understanding and experience 
of the costs and benefits of the technology as well as their often-sceptical under-
standings of the regulatory context in which MT [mobile technology] health risks 
are managed and communicated (Timotijevic and Barnett, 2006: 159). 
These findings about the array of understandings and experiences people related to in 
order to form an opinion came back in another focus group study (Collins, 2010) that 
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examined the responses of participants to media representations of base station con-
troversies. Collins also referred to the complexities of people’s perspectives on risk, 
which he called ‘rationalities’: “[r]espondents used a wide range of sources including 
personal networks of information and contextual knowledges to make sense of the 
potential and perceived risks of mobile phone technology” (Ibid.: 634). Participants 
relied on “personal experiences, social contexts and multiple information sources” 
such as the advice of family members and friends, past health experiences or the 
involvement in local protests against a mast (Ibid.: 627). 
 
Summary – We can summarise the social scientific insights into citizens’ concerns 
about EMF (mobile telephony or mast siting) as follows: 1) because the siting of masts 
is perceived as involuntary and out of citizens’ control, it is more likely to contribute to 
negative risk perspectives on siting. In addition, 2) fairness and anger are emotions 
that contribute to this process. In the general population, 3) knowledge about EMF 
and health is limited, and, according to Ruddat et al. there is not a lot of incentive for 
people to start looking for information. This is however different for the groups of 
‘concerned people’ that some researchers differentiated in their studies. Those indi-
viduals wanted information from different sources and wanted to become involved in 
the decision-making process about mast siting. The citizens I spoke to in my research 
mostly resembled these ‘high-concerned groups’ found in the literature, in the sense 
that they were highly concerned about mast siting (which is not the same as being 
highly concerned about EMF health risks), and wanted more information and more 
involvement in mast siting. Another topic that received quite some scholarly and poli-
cy interest is risk communication of health risks from mobile telephony. However, 
most of these studies had limited explanatory value because of their experimental set-
up. Even though these latter studies showed that concerns about health risks from 
EMF increased after being exposed to risk information about the technology, they did 
not make clear how this information was digested, and how people in general made 
sense of the technology. The few studies using focus group research showed that risk 
perspectives were embedded in social and personal contexts, networks and (past) 
collective and personal experiences. 
 Hence, the scientific ways in which people’s perspectives on wireless communica-
tion technology are extracted range from large-scale surveys with questionnaires to 
focus group research with a limited number of people but more time to go deeper 
into their perspectives. No matter what type of research design was chosen, I claim 
that it always runs the risk of endorsing or even reproducing the scientific framing of 
the wireless communication technology controversy as a ‘health risk’. If research 
starts from the assumption that base station siting controversies or public concerns 
about wireless communication technology are about ‘risks’, then the aim of the re-
search is to find out why the technology is deemed to be a ‘risk’, how ‘risky’ the tech-
nology is deemed to be and what risk communication strategies can be developed to 
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remedy this discrepancy. Some of the studies thus (more often implicitly than explicit-
ly) portrayed the social dynamics around mobile telephony as a ‘problem’ of public 
misunderstanding of EMF science and suggested as solution to put more efforts into 
better risk communication to change these views. 
The role of the media in mast siting controversies 
Various scholars paid attention to the role of the media (radio, TV and newspapers) in 
the mobile telephony controversy. The role of the media in heightening or amplifying 
risk perspectives has been the focus of risk researchers for many years, in particular 
those interested in the social amplification of risk framework (Petts et al., 2001; Pidg-
eon et al., 2003). The arguments about the media and risk perspectives range from 
blaming the media for igniting and sustaining citizens’ concerns to understanding the 
media as one source amongst many others from which citizens draw to make sense of 
risks. Also in the few studies on mobile telephony and the media, these two perspec-
tives were found. Burgess (2002, 2010) claimed that “the media have been instrumen-
tal in elevating health concerns about nearby masts” since “[t]he national media’s 
problematization of cell phones and the local media’s encouragement of campaigns 
against all towers combined to give considerable momentum to campaigning on the 
tower issue” (Burgess, 2004: 82–83). Burgess (2010) stated that media in the U.K. 
have taken on a “risk campaigning role” (p. 62), with the BSE crisis of the 1990s as an 
incentive for media to attack the denial or downplaying of risks. At the same time that 
the lessons of BSE were being digested, speculations over possible harmful effects 
from wireless communication technology arose, focused on mobile phones and base 
stations. 
 Vasterman et al. (2008) reported on the media coverage of citizen engagement 
around the siting of UMTS masts and antennas in the Netherlands, using content 
analysis and interviews. They aimed to counter the criticism that the media regularly 
receive about how they report risk and scientific topics: critics accuse the media of 
being biased, exaggerating the gravity of events or polarising the debate. The authors 
showed that the media always operate in a social context in which several actors de-
fine the issue. They found that the sources of the media information in the UMTS-case 
were predominantly residents, followed by local politicians and then telecom opera-
tors/corporate business. Residents talked about risks and negative consequences and 
their engagement, while local politicians addressed policy issues. News media defined 
the issue in terms of several frames, according to the authors: a precaution frame 
(defines problem as a potential negative health effect that demands government 
action), followed by a technocratic frame (problem can only be solved by balancing 
the different interests involved), a scandal frame (builds on outrage of continuing 
exposure without proper action being taken) and a scientific frame (states that expo-
sure within official limits is not a problem). The content analysis showed that “media 
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are positive towards action groups and citizens, negative towards property owners 
and telecom operators, and neutral about local politicians” (Vasterman et al., 2008: 
329). The local arena, in which citizens engaged around the siting of a base station, 
was thus the primary interest for journalists in the Netherlands interested in UMTS 
masts. 
 Two studies, each based on case study research of one local mast siting contro-
versy (Drake, 2006; Law and McNeish, 2007), also examined the relationship between 
citizen groups and the media and pointed out that the media were important in many 
ways. Drake noted that the citizen group largely relied on news media reports to keep 
informed about the issue. In both cases, local media reported about the campaigns 
against the base station. Even though the media were sympathetic towards the citizen 
group, they did not simply communicate the citizen group’s message in a unilateral 
way. In Drake’s case, the citizen group was most concerned about possible health 
effects, but despite several interviews with key campaigners, the local press did not 
emphasise the health aspect but focused mainly on the planning issue. Law and 
McNeish (2007) also showed how campaigners advanced their case through strategic 
use of the media: the citizen group undertook “a concerted effort to generate public 
awareness of the planning and health issues by ensuring coverage of the story in local 
media” (Ibid.: 448). Yet, the citizen group was also critical about the newspaper cov-
erage, and became frustrated about “the inability to get Airwave’s [the citizen group] 
perspective properly represented in the local press” (Ibid.: 449). The three authors 
agreed that the media, and especially the local media, were crucial in understanding 
local mast siting controversies, but that in their research there was no evidence of the 
local media taking on a “risk campaigning role” (Burgess, 2010) to advance arguments 
about possible health effects from base stations. 
 
Relation with empirical findings from my case study research – The social scientific 
research on the role of the media in mast siting controversies can be summarised as 
consisting of two viewpoints: the media (especially local newspapers) have been in-
strumental in amplifying citizen engagement with mast siting; and neither the media 
nor citizens uncritically take over or influence each other’s views on mast siting. My 
research findings also showed that the media, and especially the local newspapers, 
were an important source of information for engaged citizens, and that local journal-
ists were very interested in talking to the engaged citizens, even to the extent that 
they would attend their meetings. Yet, in none of my cases did the media shape the 
course of the engagement. Engaged citizens were mostly very aware of the potential 
of the media (mostly local newspapers) as an outlet for promoting their cause, and 
used their personal contacts with local journalists accordingly. 
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Citizens in mast siting controversies 
Case study research of mast siting controversies (including interviews and document 
analysis) by Drake (2006), Law and McNeish (2007) and Soneryd (2007) showed that 
citizens expressed various concerns about the mast, but that health concerns often 
took precedence in the end. Drake (2006) and Law and McNeish (2007) were critical 
of describing mast siting controversies as cases of Not In My Backyard behaviour 
(NIMBY) because landscape pollution and the devaluation of property prices was de-
bated. Law and McNeish asserted that house prices were not an issue for the core set 
of the citizen group they investigated, but health concerns were. The focus on the 
public health issue cannot easily be explained by NIMBY behaviour, they claim, be-
cause it “goes beyond the narrow confines of immediate locality” (Law and McNeish, 
2007: 447). Also Drake asserted that a NIMBY explanation “ignores the issue of scale” 
(Drake, 2006: 405). In all cases, the planning debate was not restricted to local con-
cerns but other issues related to the necessity of 3G technology, the role of the opera-
tors in funding scientific studies or general concerns about the future of the environ-
ment were also voiced. As Soneryd put it: 
[i]n protests against the 3G development and planned masts, people can be mo-
tivated by sympathy with others, concerns from themselves, or anticipation to-
ward the capital city, the political system, or public authorities. (…) All of these 
concerns can be linked to societal concerns, however, as they always begin with 
reflections on how we want to live and the type of society we want (Soneryd, 
2007: 302–303). 
The ‘issue of scale’ was also visible in the extent to which local citizen groups forged 
networks that stretched beyond the local community. One of the citizen groups (Law 
and McNeish, 2007) did not only lobby local elected representatives but also focused 
their attention towards the Scottish Parliament, joining forces with other local groups 
to demand a moratorium on further expansion of the wireless communication net-
work. According to Drake and Law and McNeish, NIMBY was thus not the right analyt-
ical approach to understand mast siting controversies since citizens “rationally de-
ployed their high levels of educational, cultural and organizational resources” to voice 
their concerns about health, the environment and local democracy (Law and McNeish, 
2007: 452). None of the citizens represented the actions of the group as “an unthink-
ing, zero-sum rejection of technology and science” but instead were much more con-
cerned with raising “universal questions concerning the direction of modernization, 
development and the power of communities to participate in shaping their environ-
ment” (Ibid.: 451). 
 Drake (2006) observed that over time the mast turned from a problem of ‘an 
inappropriate development’ into a health concern. The protagonists of the citizen 
group were medically trained and wanted reassurance that the mast did not pose a 
53 
health threat: “[w]hile acknowledging that there was no proof that mobile phone 
masts caused any health problems, the lack of proof that they didn’t was enough for 
six interviewees to damn them” (Drake, 2006: 401). This is a very strong interpretation 
of the precautionary approach that is also found in other mast siting controversies 
(Law and McNeish, 2007). Drake and Law and McNeish observed that campaigners 
were “often those with scientific training, giving them the confidence to question the 
dominant scientific paradigm” (Drake, 2006: 398). Researched citizen groups focused 
on the potential for long-term health effects and non-thermal effects of radiofrequen-
cy fields. Some also demanded studies with a control group that had not been into 
contact with RF EMF exposure for a considerable period of time (also see Asveld, 
2009). The critique on current scientific study results and international guidelines 
concerning RF EMF also led to calls for more research – to be done independently 
from the mobile phone industry. 
 
Summary – The few case studies on siting controversies show some interesting dy-
namics. Firstly, they highlight the importance of networks: the engagement did not 
remain restricted to the local area, but citizens addressed national government and 
organisations to find support. Secondly, also in the arguments against siting, citizens 
stated a wide variety of concerns, both local and more global, about the development 
of wireless communication technology, the importance of the countryside and the 
policy process of mast siting. Thirdly, even though local concerns about the mast were 
wide-ranging, in all three case studies, concerns about the harmful effects of the ex-
posure from the mast were dominant in the end. Yet, none of the authors gave a clear 
answer as to why the health framing dominated. One possible explanation in Drake’s 
study was the medical training, and thus interest, of some engaged citizens. All three 
authors did point at the consequences of such a focus on health risks: citizens became 
interested in the scientific details of EMF research and criticised it for not looking into 
long-term or non-thermal effects. 
 
Relation with empirical findings from my case study research – In chapter 1, I showed 
an overview of mast siting controversies in the Netherlands, and indicated that even 
though arguments against siting were diverse, health concerns were a dominant 
theme (see Figure 1.2. and 1.3.). This ‘controversies map’ thus confirms the findings of 
the few existing case studies. The map also showed that NIMBY is not an adequate 
explanation for mast siting controversies, because reasons for citizen engagement 
with mast siting were varied, and not only related to selfish personal arguments. The 
importance of the review in this section, however, is the fact that it pointed to three 
aspects in relation to mast siting controversies: the emergence of networks, the varie-
ty of arguments against siting yet the primary focus on health risks, and the engage-
ment with EMF science. These issues served as starting points for my own investiga-
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tions into mast siting controversies. I will discuss my empirical findings related to 
these issues in detail in chapter 3. 
Policymakers’ response to EMF 
The second key question asked by social science research on wireless communication 
technology addressed policymakers’ responses. Scholars observed that policymakers 
had to manage a tricky problem: 
[o]n the one hand, they must adopt levels of exposure, with a strong incentive to 
follow the recommendations of international expert groups; on the other hand, 
they must answer the doubts and worries of the populations living near base sta-
tions (Salomon and Borraz, 2007: 117). 
Social scientists argued that governments responded to public concerns about mast 
siting primarily by resorting to scientists for advice on whether or not this technology 
posed a health risk (de Marchi et al., 2009; Kheifets et al., 2010; Salomon and Borraz, 
2007; van Asselt et al., 2009; van Dijk et al., 2011; Walls et al., 2005). Even though 
‘regulatory science’ (Jasanoff, 1990) is a well-embedded mechanism in democratic 
societies, obvious problems arise when experts do not agree (Jasanoff and Wynne, 
1998). Despite the fact that scientists in all countries had roughly the same scientific 
evidence at their disposal, the advices of experts to their respective governments 
differed from country to country and even within countries, contributing to diver-
gence in regulation of RF EMF. Some policymakers also experimented with new forms 
of governance to facilitate a regulatory decision about RF EMF in which other stake-
holders besides experts, for example, citizens or NGOs, were involved. In this section, I 
will not refer to my own empirical findings about the decision-making processes 
around EMF, because I will discuss this in-depth in chapters 4 and 5. 
Regulatory divergence 
In a comparative study of the role of scientific advisory bodies, van Dijk et al. (2011) 
observed a strong divergence between the advices of the health councils in the Neth-
erlands and Belgium on regulatory exposure limits, even though they had the same 
scientific body of studies at their disposal. The Belgian Hoge Gezondheidsraad/Conseil 
Supérieur de la Santé (Superior Health Council) advised its federal government11 to 
take a precautionary approach in setting EMF exposure limits, while its Dutch coun-
terpart the Gezondheidsraad (Health Council of the Netherlands) deemed such pre-
cautionary measures unnecessary and supported internationally proposed (ICNIRP) 
exposure limits: 
                                                                
11 The competence for setting exposure limits for the technology has changed in Belgium from federal to 
regional government. 
55 
there is no difference in the appreciation of the scientific evidence [by both coun-
cils]. They differ, however, with respect to the interpretation of the state-of-the-
art in terms of action perspectives: they value the available information and the 
many uncertainties differently and they arrive at different recommendations (van 
Dijk et al., 2011: 460). 
Both councils thus agreed on the facts, but disagreed on the policy implications. 
 A study by Schütz and Wiedemann (2005) also showed that experts disagreed on 
the interpretation of scientific knowledge. The authors set up an expert dialogue12 on 
potential negative health effects from RF EMF in order to “make transparent how the 
different conclusions drawn by the experts have been brought about” (Schütz and 
Wiedemann, 2005: 533). The experts evaluated the existing evidence in different 
ways: they selected relevant studies and applied scientific quality standards with the 
goal of establishing a scientific overall assessment. The experts disagreed on all as-
pects. The authors explained this discrepancy by different orientations of the experts, 
i.e. precautionary principle versus danger prevention orientation, which formed the 
basis for their evaluations and risk assessments. For instance, a crucial point in the 
discussions concerned the special weight of studies that pointed to negative health 
effects. One expert claimed that these findings, even if they were scarce, should be 
considered as valid as long as they were not refuted by an identical replication study. 
Other experts disputed this statement. It became clear that evaluating scientific stud-
ies was based on elaborate interpretations and tacit knowledge of individual experts. 
Schütz and Wiedemann therefore concluded that “existing pre-assumptions (and their 
underlying values and attitudes) which guide the evaluation of evidence seem to be as 
important as the evidence itself” (Ibid.: 450) 
 In the past years, the publication of a few research reports on wireless communi-
cation technology triggered scientific and public controversy about the results and 
their correct evaluation and interpretation (Böschen et al., 2010; de Marchi et al., 
2009). One example is the BioInitiative report written by the BioInitiative Group which 
is a group of scientists, researchers and public health professionals that call for pre-
cautionary measures and lowering of exposure guidelines based on their review of the 
literature (Carpenter and Sage, 2007). The report has been attacked by some authori-
tative bodies as ‘unscientific’ (Gezondheidsraad, 2008). The Gezondheidsraad claimed 
that the review of scientific literature was selective and that the analysis and peer-
reviewed process was unbalanced. This critique resonated with an earlier debate 
concerning a series of epidemiological studies conducted by oncologist and epidemi-
ologist Hardell (Hardell et al., 2006, 2007). Hardell claimed to have shown a health risk 
for a certain type of brain tumour from long-term use of mobile phones. Hardell’s 
critics countered that a weak statistical correlation cannot simply be equated with a 
                                                                
12 The experts had been selected to reflect different orientations in science. 
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causal connection in the absence of an underlying physiological mechanism (Böschen 
et al., 2010). 
 A number of social scientists investigated these controversial research reports 
(Böschen et al., 2010; de Marchi et al., 2009) and pointed out that the debate might 
seem to be a purely scientific one, conducted by scientists and scientific advisory 
bodies. Yet, the authors claimed, the methodological issues under discussion, such as 
‘what is sufficient evidence’; ‘when is action warranted; ‘what action to undertake’; 
and ‘whose opinion should count’, were in fact of an ethical and social nature, and 
should thus be seen as inherently political. Not only scientists have a say in the debate 
then. Van Dijk et al. (2011) concluded their article on the differences in expert advice 
between the two Health Councils in the same vein: in case of substantial uncertainty, 
advisory bodies should not attempt to offer unequivocal advice presented as the sci-
entifically best policy option, but should outline various possible courses of action. 
Also Schütz and Wiedemann (2005) proposed a structure for a dialogue on risk as-
sessment in which it became clear: 
where the experts agree, where they disagree and what the reason[s], therefore, 
are (…) In this risk evaluation, which is no longer a task of science alone because 
political valuations are incorporated here, are decisions on the guiding principles 
of evaluation – for instance, on the application of the precautionary principle – to 
be made” (Schütz and Wiedemann, 2005: 543–544). 
All authors thus agreed that divergence between experts and scientific advisory bod-
ies about the outcome and policy implications of EMF science was the result of differ-
ences in opinions that led to different political interpretations of these results, as 
some countries took precautionary measures based on roughly the same scientific 
evidence. Many authors therefore argued that scientists alone should not discuss the 
issue, but that it needs a broader social debate. 
 The different policy choices also led to different levels of controversy. Several 
scholars (Bröer et al., 2010; Burgess, 2004; Salomon and Borraz, 2007) explained 
these differences by arguing that government policy played a substantial role in ampli-
fying concerns about wireless communication technology. Burgess (2004) claimed 
that, in the UK, “it is the high profile given over to the issue that has itself been in-
strumental in fuelling concern and campaigning activity” (Burgess, 2004: 90). The 
attention from government institutions was embedded in a precautionary ‘imperative’ 
that lingered on after the BSE health scare. Burgess assumed that “what is a risk ‘is-
sue’ is determined by the extent and character of government reaction” (Ibid.: 177). 
Also Salomon and Borraz (2007) concluded on the basis of a comparison between 
different European countries with mast siting controversies that: 
the response of public authorities to these [public] oppositions amplified the dy-
namics of contestation: in other words, it is not so much the reactions of the local 
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populations which constitute the problem, but rather their management by pub-
lic authorities both at the national and local levels (Salomon and Borraz, 2007: 
116). 
Summary – To conclude this section, scholars interested in regulation around EMF 
focused on the regulatory divergences around EMF and the relation between public 
controversy and policy measures. A few social scientists closely examined scientists’ 
reasoning and debates about controversial research reports. Instead of explaining this 
divergence as resulting from good versus bad scientific practices, the authors pointed 
to fundamental differences in the assessments of scientific evidence, i.e. in how to 
interpret and evaluate the outcomes of research or reviews, and how to act upon 
these findings. Some authors explained the regulatory divergence by differences in 
government styles: some took a more precautionary approach because of past policy 
experiences. 
New forms of governance 
In various European countries, new forms of governance surfaced in which public 
views were represented, alongside scientific deliberations. Social scientists analysed 
these initiatives, particularly in England, Sweden and France. As said, the initial reac-
tion of most governments was to ask scientific advisory bodies for advice. Questions 
and concerns from journalists, politicians and the general public primarily had to be 
addressed by those advisory bodies, which made them an actor in the debate. 
 In the U.K., the National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) was criticised for 
not adequately dealing with these public concerns (Stilgoe, 2005) which led to the 
establishment of the Independent Expert Group on Mobile Phones (IEGMP). Stilgoe 
(2005, 2007) argued that the NRPB constructed public concern as a problem outside 
their scope: 
[q]uestions about the health effects of mobile phones, the adequacy of existing 
regulatory standards, or relative exposures from different handsets or masts 
were met with the response that the relevant technologies all complied with 
guidelines, which were supported by the best available scientific evidence 
(Stilgoe, 2007: 50). 
For the NRPB, the issue at stake was ‘scientific’: the interaction of electromagnetic 
radiation with biological tissue. Citizens’ concerns were tackled with a ‘discourse of 
compliance’, implying that all questions were met with the reply “that all mobile 
phone technology complied with (…) guideline levels, which had a well-established 
basis, so there was no reason to worry” (Stilgoe, 2005: 58). This discourse was essen-
tially set as the endpoint for discussions with the public, even though the public ques-
tioned the adequacy of the guidelines and raised concerns about their experience 
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with the technology, e.g. about electrohypersensitivity. In sum, the public was seen by 
the NRPB as “a formless mass of unfounded fears, as nothing more than the opposite 
of expertise” (Stilgoe, 2007: 57, emphasis in original). The experts viewed the public as 
“homogeneous, cognitively deficient or passive, demanding reassurance rather than 
engagement” (Ibid.: 56). 
 By 1999, the NRPB had lost all credibility in dealing with the public context of 
wireless communication technology. In the same year the government decided to set 
up a new advisory group, the Independent Expert Group on Mobile Phones (IEGMP), 
with two citizen members, which held public meetings and invited “a broad range of 
activists, scientists and other interested parties to give evidence” (Ibid.: 51). This is an 
example of what Walls et al. (2005) called a ‘meta-governance’ strategy, which is a 
reconciliation between two ideal types of governance: ‘neo-liberal’ and ‘social-
participative’. Also in Sweden, new forms of governance emerged in which citizens or 
non-experts were involved. The Swedish Radiation Protection Authority (SSI) initiated 
a Transparency Forum for Mobile Phone Communication in which some of the Swe-
dish citizen groups that had voiced criticism on wireless communication technology 
participated (Soneryd, 2007). In the Swedish public forum on mobile communication, 
it became also evident that the issues raised by the public “tended to be translated by 
the authorities into “anxieties” and “fears” to be balanced against scientific evidence” 
(Soneryd, 2007: 297). The discussion that took place usually focused on the accuracy 
of facts and eventually ended in a deadlock in which every party rearticulated their 
polarised views. 
 Walls et al. (2005) concluded that even though citizens’ perspectives were in-
cluded in the IEGMP, participation was controlled to such an extent that these “views 
became framed and embedded in a largely scientific-technical discourse” (Walls et al., 
2005: 654). Also in Sweden, Soneryd observed pressure to “speak in a particular fash-
ion”, which she qualified as “a dominating technical discourse rather than a focus on 
ethical concerns or on the driving forces of technological innovation” (Soneryd, 2007: 
310). Moore and Stilgoe (2009) indicated that the so-called ‘anecdotal evidence’ from 
citizens submitted to IEGMP was used in the discussions to demarcate the boundaries 
of science, i.e. the anecdotes were equated with ‘public concern’ and sharply put 
against ‘risks’ discussed by scientific experts. The authors concluded that the ‘anecdo-
tal evidence’ was held subordinate to epidemiological and other studies. Yet, the 
anecdotes were taken seriously “on grounds that they represent public concern, and 
on those grounds ought to be acknowledged” (Moore and Stilgoe, 2009: 671). Public 
involvement had some impact as it inspired alternative research programs. 
 On the basis of research on the wireless communication controversy in France, 
Borraz (2011) summarised these European-wide regulatory initiatives or ‘pluralistic 
approaches’ as covering three important, yet contested, dimensions: 1) the types of 
knowledge used, 2) the providers of knowledge and 3) the scientific and political pro-
cedures processing this knowledge. Borraz distinguished several types of knowledge: 
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1) non-peer reviewed studies, 2) social and economic sciences and 3) ‘anecdotal evi-
dence’ (also described as ‘practical knowledge’ or ‘individual experiences’). The dis-
cussion of these different types of knowledges was a major challenge to expert-driven 
regulatory processes, according to Borraz, as it led to the questioning of the bounda-
ries between science and non-science, and because it produced new uncertainties. 
For example, scientists did not consider anecdotal evidence as a legitimate type of 
knowledge. When the Stewart report included this knowledge, it was heavily criticised 
for it. 
 A second contented dimension Borraz distinguished was the question who can 
provide input in these policy processes. Usually, experts in different scientific domains 
dealing with EMF health risks provided input; they had the necessary credentials and 
knew how to behave and argue within the context of an expert body. There were, 
however, also other actors with different insights, values and worldviews that have 
been, or should have been, involved in expert deliberations, according to Borraz. 
Those were alternative experts (to provide non-peer reviewed studies, such as the 
BioInitiative report discussed in the section above); sociologists, economists, political 
scientists or psychologists (they are often asked to perform risk perception studies, 
but rarely asked as experts in committees); and NGOs, patient organisations, or indi-
viduals (the Stewart Committee, for example, included two lay persons who had no 
specific knowledge on EMF). 
 The last dimension Borraz discussed were the scientific and political procedures 
needed to make the process more legitimate: he proposed to give more weight to 
uncertainties when analysing new technologies and to develop procedures that take 
into account political choices and values, and not just outcomes of scientific delibera-
tions. 
 
Summary – We can sum up the social scientific insights into new forms of governance 
as follows. All scholars identified the inclusion of different actors such as citizens with-
out prior knowledge about EMF, NGOs or alternative scientists as a challenging exer-
cise. Several insights attributed to this understanding: 1) it led to the demarcation 
between scientific and non-scientific knowledge, with the latter considered to be less 
legitimate; and 2) even if citizens expressed their wide-ranging concerns, the discus-
sions nevertheless turned into a highly scientific and technical discourse, which re-
stricted the policy outcomes of these deliberations. The social scientists analysing 
these processes concluded that it is not only necessary to include other types of 
knowledge, and thus other actors, in discussions of new technologies, but also to 
break open the procedures from a narrow focus on science to the incorporation of 
political and ethical values. 
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Conclusion and discussion 
In this review, I summarised the social scientific literature on the topic of RF EMF to 
find out which aspects of the wireless communication technology controversy have 
and have not been investigated. Scholars focused on two research questions: ‘Why 
are people concerned about wireless communication technology?’ and ‘How have 
policymakers reacted to the public concerns?’. 
 Concerning the first question, there are a number of scientific insights that are 
thoroughly investigated, and that were in line with my own empirical findings. Firstly, 
scholars in risk perception studies have shown that the siting of masts is perceived as 
an involuntary act that is out of control of citizens. In risk perception research, per-
ceived lack of control of a technology or activity is a well-known factor that can con-
tribute to adverse responses to this technology or activity. Also in my research, citi-
zens expressed their inability to influence the exposure coming from the mast – unlike 
the devices using RF EMF they used in the house – as a frustrating aspect of mast 
siting. Secondly, risk perception literature paid attention to the emotions that were 
triggered by mast siting, and identified anger and fairness as important factors in 
contributing to negative risk perspectives. My findings concurred with these insights. 
Thirdly, risk perception and focus group research differentiated between groups of 
citizens according to their levels of concern about health risks associated with RF EMF. 
Some of the mechanisms these scholars identified in the high-concerned groups fitted 
with the behaviour of the engaged citizens I encountered: they were highly concerned 
about mast siting and demanded more information and participation in the decision-
making process. 
 I conclude that risk perception studies have been crucial in increasing scholarly 
understanding about how citizens perceive technology, but their focus on individual 
perspectives on risk also has its limits: 1) scholars start their investigation from the 
assumption that ‘risk’ is the main conceptual tool for understanding citizen ‘re-
sistance’ against emerging technologies; 2) they extract opinions from people about 
masts and mobile phones, but leave out the context in which these opinions are 
formed; 3) scholars often give ‘negative’ explanations of the controversies that point 
to citizens’ knowledge gaps or misunderstandings concerning the science behind EMF, 
or citizens’ naïve belief in what charlatan scientists tell them. This explanation is 
known as ‘the deficit model of public understanding of science’ (Irwin and Wynne, 
1996; Sturgis and Allum, 2004). Scholars have shown that this model does not do 
justice to the social reality of public understanding of science (see the section STS 
insight: the public understand science in chapter 5). 
 These limits of risk perception studies are addressed in scientific studies that 
study how citizens make sense of possible risks of wireless communication technolo-
gy, and of the siting of masts. This implies looking beyond the individual and instead 
focusing on collectives of individuals that are to be found in mast siting controversies. 
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What is missing in the literature thus far, I claim, is a focus on citizens and their collec-
tives in the context of mast siting controversies. There were only a few studies focus-
ing on collectives of citizens in mast siting controversies by way of a single case study 
(only 7). I therefore undertook a multi-case study approach, to advance systematic 
comparison between cases. Only some studies explicitly endorsed a comparative 
approach: Burgess (2002), Salomon and Borraz (2007), Borraz (2011) and van Dijk et 
al. (2011) compare regulations in different countries; Böschen et al. (2010), Moore 
and Stilgoe (2009), Walls et al. (2005) and Lezaun and Soneryd (2007) compared wire-
less communication technology with other technologies, for example biotechnology 
or GM food. However, what remains missing in the comparison between wireless 
communication technology cases is a focus on the societal dynamics in which citizens 
and their collectives participate. 
My research focus in the light of the review 
How do my research questions relate to the social scientific body of literature that 
focused mainly on citizens? I also analyse mast siting controversies from the perspec-
tive of citizens, but dive deeper into questions that were posited by scholars but not 
investigated in-depth. The questions I ask are: what makes citizens start to become 
engaged with mast siting?, what arguments do they use (also beyond possible health 
risks)?, and how does the health risk argument play a role? As the review has shown, 
technical or scientific expertise became a crucial resource in this particular siting con-
flict, and thus a contested issue. However, when it came to understanding citizens, 
most of the accounts did not problematise the role of science in the controversy. In 
the review, much of the social science research was about the impacts or acceptance 
of technologies and science, without taking a closer look at how knowledge was pro-
duced and used by citizens and other societal actors. I focus on the role of science and 
expertise in public arenas. There is always a question about what will count as 
knowledge in a given context and another about who will decide about what counts as 
knowledge (Cayley, 2006). I pay close attention to the process of social identity and 
problem construction in relation to scientific expertise around social issues that were 
also about risks. 
 In this thesis, the focus on citizens in mast siting controversies automatically leads 
to the consideration of the policy processes around RF EMF. A number of scholars 
focused on the research question ‘How have policymakers reacted to the public con-
cerns?’, and concluded that policy makers asked scientific advice about the harmful-
ness of RF EMF from expert committees or advisory groups. The regulatory diver-
gence, scholars explained, comes down to differences in opinion about the assess-
ment of scientific data. A research focus that I deem worthy of further investigation is 
the dynamics between citizen engagement in mast siting controversies and the devel-
opment of policies, including whether and how they resort to science and expertise. I 
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thus analysed policy responses to this engagement and citizen responses to policy 
decisions. 
 Focusing on engaged citizens, and their responses to and participation in the 
governance of mast siting, allows me to both analyse local settings of mast siting con-
troversies and the macro level settings of governance practices. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Citizen engagement around mast siting 
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“Once upon a time…. 
 
No, not so long ago. Actually, it was only recently that Snow White and her dwarfs, who have been living on 
the Kafhoek for a long time, saw a very strange billboard (see Picture 3.1. & 3.2.). With much effort and 
consulting thick books (Snow White and the dwarfs have no Internet) they found out what this sign meant. 
They learned that there is a company that wants to place a big mast, close to their home. Their home is in a 
lovely region where people live because the environment is still healthy and because the area is so beauti-
ful. 
 
What Snow White and the dwarfs considered even worse, was that in the area where they live, near to 
where the mast would come, a youth centre is located. Kids enjoy the centre throughout the year. 
 
Even Grumpy, who is not so crazy about children because they make too much noise in his opinion, thought 
this was too much and did not understand. “If they still do not know that those mast-things and the radia-
tion they emit are NOT dangerous, how can they then allow it? This I do not like!” he added. 
 
The other dwarves totally agreed and wanted to organise a meeting. “Let us call the neighbours together 
and join forces. Together we are strong!”, yelled Sleepy who had been woken up by all the noise. 
 
And so that was done. On a beautiful day, a meeting was convened with the local residents. Some people 
had already expressed their willingness to gather signatures for a notice of objection. They set to work 
immediately and noticed that most of the neighbours were not keen on having a mobile phone mast either” 
(Heeel lang geleden..., 2009) 
 
 
 
Picture 3.1. – Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs as the protagonists of a mast siting controversy in the 
Kafhoek, Maarkedal, Belgium. Picture taken by residents of the Kafhoek and shown on their online blog 
http://geensupermastopdekafhoek.blogspot.com/, entry on June 16, 2009. 
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Picture 3.2. – Yellow billboard announcing the applica-
tion for a planning permission to site a mast for wireless 
communication technology. Picture taken by residents 
of the Kafhoek and shown on their online blog  
http://geensupermastopdekafhoek.blogspot.com/, 
entry on June 16, 2009.  
Introduction 
Snow White and the seven Dwarfs feature as the main protagonists in this story of the 
citizens of the Kafhoek, a small rural neighbourhood of the city of Maarkedal in Flan-
ders, who were confronted with the siting of a base station in their backyards. One of 
the neighbours wrote the story on a website blog called Geen Supermast in de Kaf-
hoek (No supermast in the Kafhoek). The story illustrates why these citizens made an 
effort to become engaged in the decision-making process around the siting of a base 
station. In view of the hustle and bustle of the everyday lives we live, it can be consid-
ered striking that so many citizens spent time and effort into getting involved in mast 
siting controversies. It is a long, time-consuming and sometimes costly process and 
the outcome is very uncertain. Yet, in all of the mast siting controversies I investigat-
ed, citizens showed tremendous energy and skills in their engagement with the siting 
of a base station. Some members of a neighbourhood community spent several in-
tense months, sometimes years, on planning and executing their engagement. For a 
few, the issue of masts and electromagnetic fields (EMF) became an integral part of 
their lives, a fulltime unpaid job. Why do citizens bother to get engaged? What do 
they think about mast siting? And how do they decide that the intended siting of a 
mast is something they should ‘do something about’ and ‘make fuss about’? This 
chapter is based on my case study research of 6 mast siting controversies: Nieuwkoop 
(NL), Spijkenisse (NL), Maastricht (NL), Euverem (NL), Drongen (FL – there were two 
locations of engagement, one near the station and one in the neighbourhood of 
Keiskant) and Maarkedal (FL). For a timeline of the engagement in each case, see 
appendix 1. 
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In this chapter, I describe the process of citizen engagement around mast siting. The 
following structure (Figure 3.1.) is a schematic overview of this process. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. – Schematic overview of citizen engagement in mast siting 
Early engagement 
The moment in which early engagement became manifest was when alert citizens 
found out that a mast was (planned to be) sited in their direct neighbourhood. Both in 
Belgium and the Netherlands, the spatial planning aspect of siting masts is on par with 
any small project for which municipal building permission is needed (such as building a 
home extension or carport), so citizens needed to pay attention to actually find out 
that a siting was going to take place. In both countries, an exemption decision (on-
theffingsbesluit) and light building permit (bouwvergunning) is needed for siting a 
mast, since the construction of the mast (ranging between 30 and 40 metres) is usual-
ly in conflict with the zoning plan as developed by the municipality. Municipalities in 
the Netherlands have to publish all requests for the mast siting in a free local paper 
and/or on their website. During 6 weeks, citizens have time to hand in a submission of 
their viewpoints (zienswijze). In Belgium, the mobile phone operator has to announce 
the construction on a yellow billboard that should be put on a spot where the plot of 
land on which the mast is to be sited intersects with a public road (see picture 3.2.). 
The owners of the adjacent parcels have to be notified by post. Moreover, the munic-
ipality has to publish the notification of the construction in the town hall for 30 days. 
During these days, anyone can appeal against the decision. In both countries, these 
are the normal procedures for building applications. In Flanders, the regional planning 
official (Gewestelijk stedenbouwkundig ambtenaar) grants or does not grant an ex-
emption decision and building permit after receiving an advice from the municipality. 
 Citizens could thus be informed about the intended siting of a mast through for-
mal, institutionalised ways of communication used by local governments and mobile 
Formal announcement of  
building permit 
Construction work 
Early engagement 
Collective engagement 
Knowledge gathering 
Official complaints 
Appeal of health risk 
framing 
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phone operators: announcements on official billboards, in local media or through 
individual post. Yet, the information available through these formal channels of com-
munication often went unnoticed. When citizens discovered the mast siting inten-
tions, they felt caught off their guard: 
[t]he municipality published [the building permit] somewhere on the back of the 
local newspaper. It’s a good thing someone in the neighbourhood was paying at-
tention! (Interview N3). 
I also take my hat off to the correct way the municipality follows the procedure. 
Completely by the book. But without involving the citizens openly and honestly. 
The exemption decision for the mast was published in de Faam [local weekly 
newspaper] and made available for inspection at the town hall. That de Faam is 
not always and everywhere delivered in time is irrelevant. That de Faam can thus 
not be read by everyone: no point. And then there was an official in charge of cit-
izen participation. Who reported soberly: look on the Internet! And what about 
more than half of the elderly residents who do not have a PC and let alone Inter-
net! (Ingezonden brief, 2009). 
I think there has been a lack of information to the people in this neighbourhood. 
The people who live directly to the mast, they had apparently been given a letter, 
but the radiation goes so far, has such a radius, that they should have invited the 
whole neighbourhood. The municipality has failed (Interview M4). 
 [i]t also happens during the holiday periods and then you see a little announce-
ment somewhere in some or other local newspaper that something is going to 
happen and then it is assumed that people see this and react to it (Interview N1). 
Citizens criticised that the announcement of the siting was inconspicuous, ‘just a little 
note in the free newspaper’, arguing that this made it hard if not impossible for most 
of the neighbours to actually find out about it. Or they referred to ‘underhand tricks’ 
used by the mobile phone operators: they were accused of deliberately making the 
announcements unremarkable or describing the site on which the mast would be 
sited as a ‘semi-industrial zone’, which did not fit the reality according to citizens as it 
was right next to a public sports hall (Interview D2). In Drongen, the mobile phone 
operator was accused of hiding the yellow billboard on which the announcement of 
the mast was put in the bushes: “[r]ecently we (residents of the extensive residential 
area) ‘discovered’ a very well hidden (coincidence?) yellow billboard with the an-
nouncement of a building permit of [the mobile phone operator]” (D1, 2007: 1). As a 
neighbour explained: “the perfidy of the company who wanted to put the mast there 
was so big that they almost tucked away the billboards” (Interview D1) (see Picture 
3.3.). 
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Picture 3.3. – An article about the engagement in 
Drongen (Keiskant) with a picture of an engaged 
citizen pointing to a yellow billboard that he claims 
was tucked away out of sight by the mobile phone 
operator. Photograph by author. 
Picture 3.4. – View of the mast, observatory and 
Middelweg in Spijkenisse. Photograph by author. 
 
A larger number of citizens were notified through informal networks and the local 
media. In all researched cases, a person acting as a mediator between the found 
sources of the information and citizens was necessary. In Maastricht, for example, one 
citizen performed this mediating role because he always paid close attention to the 
formal ways of municipal communication, and considered this piece of news so im-
portant that he wrote an article about it in the local newspaper, sparking citizen en-
gagement in his neighbourhood. In Spijkenisse, the announcement of the siting of a 
mast on the Middelweg first went unnoticed, as nobody recognised the street name 
(see picture 3.4.). A journalist from the local newspaper picked up on the announce-
ment and discovered that the Middelweg was in fact a road that crossed the middle of 
a park and was commonly known as the ‘bus lane’ in the neighbourhood. Residents 
became informed through his articles. A local politician explained: 
[n]obody knew that this was called the Middelweg. So (…) you say ‘we are going 
to build an antenna on the Middelweg’, (…) but if there is no recognition then no-
body can raise the alarm over it. Like, hey, this is close to me. So it all went well 
and it got approved, and when it finally was known that the Middelweg was right 
here, commotion broke loose (Interview S8). 
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Another local politician who lived 500 metres away from the Middelweg said: 
 [s]o there was an announcement and probably I read it at the time, and I proba-
bly thought ‘huh, the Middelweg, where is that?’. And so I didn’t give it any fur-
ther attention, and then say half a year later, [the siting] became an issue be-
cause obviously there had never been any objections against it. And then they 
talked about the bus lane all of a sudden! (Interview S7). 
In the case of Spijkenisse and Drongen (station), citizens only became engaged after 
the municipality or local authorities had already granted the building permit for the 
mast and construction works had already started. In Spijkenisse, the alderman 
(wethouder) admitted that something had gone wrong with the communication to 
citizens. Because they already had granted a permit, the only option was to go to 
court against the mobile phone operator (Interview D6 & S3). The municipality of 
Ghent (of which Drongen is a formerly independent municipality) supported the en-
gaged citizens in their legal actions, because the regional planning official did not 
follow the municipality’s negative advice. 
 Thus, early engagement started either when alert citizens picked up the news of 
an intended siting (Spijkenisse, Maastricht, Maarkedal and Drongen Keiskant) or when 
citizens were surprised by construction work (Drongen station and Spijkenisse). These 
alert citizens can be described as ‘early engagers’: they were the first individuals that 
noticed the (intended) siting of a base station and actively sought to become engaged 
in the decision-making process – a decision they believed would affect their neigh-
bourhood. Early engagers fitted a particular profile: they were higher educated 
homeowners, often living in newly built or renovated houses and firmly embedded in 
their neighbourhoods. The fact that two of my cases, Nieuwkoop and Maastricht, 
were in newly built neighbourhoods is not a coincidence. Residents of new houses 
also use mobile phones, which may lead to a lack of capacity of the antennas in the 
surrounding areas. Mobile phone operators thus have to site more antennas to en-
sure sufficient connection. Since these new neighbourhoods are often located close to 
open land or countryside, high buildings for placing antennas on are scarce. Operators 
thus need to resort to masts for placing their antennas. Moreover, prices of the hous-
es in these new neighbourhoods are high and people buying them are usually “young 
professionals with a good income. The houses, the interior decoration and the cars on 
the driveway tell you that”, as one resident of the neighbourhood in Nieuwkoop ex-
pressed it (Interview N3). Also in Maastricht, a municipal official of the city, responsi-
ble for the antenna policy, related how the particular neighbourhood that engaged 
with the mast siting was a “highly educated neighbourhood where everybody protest-
ed [against the mast]. Other neighbourhoods often let themselves be walked over 
more easily, like ‘the municipality does whatever it wants anyway’” (Interview M7). 
 Engaged citizens, and especially early engagers, were often active in their neigh-
bourhood. In Maastricht and Spijkenisse, early engagers were part of the neighbour-
70 
hood or residents’ associations (buurtplatform or bewonersvereniging) that served as 
intermediaries between the neighbourhood and the municipality and had the means 
to identify issues relevant to the neighbourhood. In the neighbourhoods without 
these institutionalised networks, residents shared their experiences of living in a 
young and vibrant area with schools, playgrounds and other amenities for children 
(Nieuwkoop) or living in the countryside (Maastricht). Early engagers defended their 
vision of their community, such as in Nieuwkoop: 
[y]ou move here, knowing that your children will go to the nearby school, to 
sports – this is their everyday surrounding until they leave the house. That is the 
same for all the people [living] here. So it makes you think very differently. And 
those are all people who are very active in sports life, in music and theatre and 
that sort of thing (Interview N3). 
An engaged citizen in Maarkedal explained how she had made a conscious decision to 
move to the countryside – showing me the view from her house of the cows in the 
meadow – and was thus keen on keeping the area as it was, emphasising that she did 
not necessarily want to sacrifice it for better mobile connection (Interview MA4). In 
Maastricht, one early engager conveyed why he “put forward a defence”: “because it 
disturbs the peacefulness and quietness, there is the visual aspect in a rural area, and 
it is an invasion of the village character (…) All in all, it is a disturbing element” (Inter-
view M1). Early engagers were often entrepreneurs with their own businesses in the 
neighbourhood. In Maarkedal, two early engagers owned a bed and breakfast in a 
restored historical building and an award winning youth camp respectively. As the 
latter said: 
[w]e have renovated our [ecological] youth centre for 10 years. We received sev-
eral prices for it. We have put and still put loads of energy in this project. And 
then they thank us with siting a giant GSM mast [next to the camp]! (Interview 
MA1) 
In Spijkenisse, one early engager had a background in sales and marketing, which he 
considered very helpful in communicating his concerns about the mast to others (In-
terview S1). Also in Drongen, one early engager had an ICT business, situated next to 
his home, which had the financial benefit of being able to start a lawsuit in name of 
the company instead of doing it as a private person (Interview D3). 
 Perhaps because of the way early engagers were grounded in their neighbour-
hoods, many had previous experience with engaging with policy decisions. In 
Drongen, they had in previous years been in close contact with the municipality be-
cause of the intended construction of a highway through the neighbourhood. Back 
then, the community was successful in that the plans were eventually dropped. In 
another neighbourhood in Drongen, the Keiskant, there were two planned sitings of 
masts close after each other. After neighbours had been successful in stopping the 
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first siting, the second one went easier because they “still had the same public sup-
port” which allowed for “the engine [to] get started more easily” (Interview D1). In 
Maarkedal, one of the engaged citizens had gone through a 4-year long and successful 
process of protesting against dumping asbestos in an abandoned sandpit in the 
neighbourhood. She was also a writer and knew all the local journalists. In Nieuwkoop, 
engaged citizens were at the time of the siting controversy also in conversation with 
the municipality over the safety of the roads in their newly built area. A near-accident 
with a little girl was the immediate incentive for a few neighbours to demand speed 
bumps from the municipality. But the municipality answered that the respective 
street did not appear on the city’s list of roads with high accident incidences, causing 
angry frustrations from the residents (Interview N3). 
 Citizen engagement around the decision to site a mast could only start if alert 
citizens spotted the announcement of the building permit or noticed construction 
works of the mast. Early engagers wanted to do something against the siting, instead 
of “waiting at home for someone else to take care of it (…). You need to take action 
and not just passively watch things go by” (Interview MA4). Early engagers were active 
members of their neighbourhoods, with their own local businesses, functions in 
neighbourhood associations or as advocates of a particular lifestyle. 
Collective engagement 
As a next step in the engagement process, early engagers made sure that the mast 
siting went from being a personal issue only they were concerned about to becoming 
a collective problem that the whole neighbourhood – or at least a critical mass – was 
troubled by. Early engagers thought it was impossible to do something about the 
siting alone, “unless you were in politics or had lots of power” (Interview MA4). They 
were keen to inform their neighbours, most of whom were unaware of the intended 
siting: “the more people know about it, the more we were able to do something 
about it and to stand a chance” (Interview MA4). In Maarkedal, one of the early en-
gagers who owned a youth centre, explained how he went to work after hearing of 
the intended siting: 
I went to the municipality to view the building permit, to see whether it is correct. 
I then consulted my brother. I told him it was not good for us. Then I checked 
with the neighbours, what they thought (Interview MA1). 
He convinced other neighbours to join. As a convinced neighbour explained: “[h]e 
came and warned the neighbours about what was about to happen, (…) then I said 
‘OK, I’m actually against it [mast] and also want to get involved with you’. That is how 
it started” (Interview MA4). Neighbours joined to “inform other people in the area. So 
everyone did particular parts of the streets. We rang the doors to inform people 
about what was going to happen” (Interview MA4). In Spijkenisse, three neighbours 
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did the same: they decided to print some leaflets and “inform the neighbourhood” by 
going door to door (Interview S2). In Nieuwkoop, the main early engager had experi-
enced health problems from exposure to a base station in his working environment. 
This personal experience made him quite adamant in his goal to convince his neigh-
bours to engage with the siting of a mast, especially because it was intended to be 
sited in the neighbourhood of several schools. He made a 7-paged flyer to “update 
neighbours of the possible dangers” to their health if they would live in close vicinity 
to a mast. He distributed those flyers in mailboxes in his neighbourhood (Interview 
N1). He managed to get a few neighbours on board who became alarmed by his pam-
phlet, like this one: 
[t]here was a small announcement in the local newspaper that they were siting a 
mast, a UMTS mast. At that moment I thought, OK, whatever. Then, one of the 
neighbours, who knew more about it, went door-to-door to distribute some in-
formation about UMTS. Then we all read it and I started to think ‘oh dear, that 
doesn’t sound very good’ (Interview N2).  
If a number of neighbours were willing to join the engagement against the mast, a 
group was established, sometimes with names like ‘Spijkenisse against radiation’ but 
more often generically called ‘action group’, ‘working group’ or ‘action committee’. 
The groups consisted of a core of initiators – the early engagers, usually not more 
than 3 people – with a larger ring of supporters who were actively involved, for exam-
ple, by making a website, distributing flyers, talking to press and local politicians, going 
door-to-door to talk to people, etc. As one core engager described it, those were 
“people who want[ed] to roll their sleeves up” (Interview D1). Around that set of ac-
tive contributors to the collective engagement, one could draw another ring of more 
‘passive’ citizens who also supported the engagement: those that signed petitions, 
read newspaper articles and blog entries, and generally listened to and sympathised 
with the group of engaged citizens. In Nieuwkoop, citizens collected around 200 signa-
tures when they went round the neighbourhood, in Drongen (Keiskant) around 900. 
This support became also visible in other ways: one citizen leading the collective en-
gagement in his neighbourhood told me how people approached him in the street or 
at a football match to ask how things were going, and to express their hope that he 
would make sure the mast was not sited (Interview N3). 
 Within this larger circle, neighbours were thus not visibly involved in the collec-
tive actions but were perceived as an important encouragement and support. If a 
larger number of neighbours were convinced that the siting of a mast was indeed 
something they should be concerned about, the group of engaged citizens was rein-
forced in its conviction that it was a cause worth engaging for, as expressed by this 
engager: 
73 
[i]f a signature campaign at the local schools gives so much response, then you do 
feel that you are doing something good. And then you also know that if you then 
take action in a more structured way, that you will get the support. (…) You’re not 
some loner fighting against something, but you do it for a bigger cause. And in 
thinking about the notice of objection, gathering these signatures, and talking to 
people, you realise that this is quite an important issue (Interview N3). 
In all examined cases, the change of the engagement from an individual concern – “a 
loner fighting” – to a collective one – “a bigger cause” – was crucial in furthering the 
engagement (Interview N3). In most cases, the collective engagement awakened a 
thrill of excitement in neighbours, and a sense of power, like David being able to de-
feat Goliath. In their accounts of the collective engagement to me during interviews, 
many citizens became quite nostalgic about how it had bonded the neighbourhood, 
made strangers into acquaintances, or had strengthened the existing relationships – 
made everything “a bit more social” (Interview S2). Those emotions were to be found 
most in my two Flemish cases (Maarkedal and Drongen) where citizens had been 
successful in averting the siting of the base station, and in Spijkenisse, where citizens 
were not successful but did get the support of the municipality. In Maastricht and 
Nieuwkoop the contested base stations were sited in the end and by the time I spoke 
to citizens, many had become embittered by their negative experiences with the en-
gagement. Yet, even in those cases, a powerful sense of strength had been present at 
one stage or another in the engagement process. Because without it, citizens would 
not have been troubled to sit together and come up with a strategy to change a deci-
sion that they felt would negatively impact their surroundings. 
 Thus far, I have discussed how citizens decided whether to engage and who en-
gaged. For early engagers, the siting of a mast was in conflict with their vision of their 
neighbourhood or their own business. That was their incentive to dive into the topic 
and figure out what was going on. They tried to convince neighbours to join the en-
gagement, because early engagers considered a critical mass of support from neigh-
bours crucial to legitimate their concerns. This meant that only a few citizens were 
very active in the engagement, with the rest of the neighbourhood sympathising with 
their cause and helping in little ways such as signing petitions and simply keeping the 
issue alive by talking about it. Once a collective of engaged citizens had been estab-
lished, the next step was deciding on how to engage with the siting of the base sta-
tion. 
 Collectives of engaged citizens came together to discuss the options in actions 
and procedures. In Drongen, one of them related how this went: 
[a]nd then you start to think about how best to respond. What are the possibili-
ties? When you’re in a group, more than one strategy is then presented. I re-
member for example one person saying ‘we should go to the city council, let 
them know how we think!’. Anger. Then it isn’t always easy to keep the harmony 
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in one group. If you suggest a strategy that is counterproductive, for example, to 
get into conflict with policymakers, then you ruin it. So it also demands some di-
plomacy, and strategic insights (Interview D3). 
In all of my cases of mast siting controversies, citizens argued and acted alike, even 
though none of them mentioned it as explicitly as in the above quote. No matter how 
angry and frustrated citizens were, the way they engaged was always productive, i.e. 
they worked within the boundaries of the democratic system and the rules of law, 
pursuing the democratic rights they felt entitled to. Only once did it happen that 
something unlawful occurred when in Spijkenisse, after the construction work had 
started for the mast, someone had vandalised some of the material. The group of 
engaged citizens however was very quick to denounce any involvement in this. 
 Collective engagement was for and foremost targeted at averting the siting of the 
base station by way of existing democratic procedures in public administration law. 
Citizens wanted to either influence the impending decision about the mast siting or 
change the decision that had already been taken. In both circumstances, citizens 
turned their efforts towards the local decision-making authority: the municipality. 
Groups of engaged citizens in Nieuwkoop, Maastricht, Maarkedal and Drongen 
(Keiskant) set to work to compile a dossier (see Picture 3.5. & 3.6.) that would result in 
filing an official complaint with the municipality against the siting of the base station 
which is called a notice of objection (bezwaarschrift) in Belgium or a submission of 
their viewpoints (zienswijze) in the Netherlands. In Drongen (station) the construction 
work of the mast had already started, so a few engaged citizens immediately decided 
to apply for a temporary injunction to halt the construction work at the court of first 
instance in Ghent. In Spijkenisse, construction work had also started which meant that 
filing a complaint with the municipality was too late. Instead, engaged citizens tried to 
persuade the municipality to withdraw the building permit. 
 Extra pressure was added by the short time available for citizens to compile their 
dossiers: 6 weeks in the Netherlands and 4 weeks in Belgium. In Maarkedal, for exam-
ple, the group of engaged citizens came together for the first time on 10 December, 
and 6 days later, they handed in the notice of objection. To re-enforce their argument, 
groups of engaged citizens gathered signatures on the notice of objection via the 
Internet, door-to-door, at schools or at public events such as soccer games. They also 
printed ready-made notices of objection in local newspapers for others to convenient-
ly hand in to the municipality. It served the aim to “show the municipality that it is not 
just a small group but a big group of people that have comments on the proposal” 
(Interview M2). Engaged citizens also contacted journalists from the local media who 
were usually very keen on reporting on the actions, and mostly ended up supporting 
the engagement “because they love their neighbourhood. They try to protect it with 
their pen and listen to people who make a stand for something”, as someone said in 
Maarkedal (Interview MA2). Journalists followed the developments closely (for exam-
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ple, going to meetings), included contact information on how to help the neighbours 
in their articles, published personal comments and generally followed up on the en-
gagement. 
 Engaged citizens tried to mobilise people they assumed could make a difference, 
such as local politicians, the major, aldermen or headmasters of schools. In Spijkenisse 
and Nieuwkoop, citizens used their right to comment in the meetings of the city coun-
cil and pleaded the politicians present to stop the siting. In Spijkenisse, on a cold 
morning, a few engaged citizens tied themselves to the base of an electricity pylon in 
which a mobile phone operator planned to site some antennas (see Picture 3.7.). This 
pylon was situated in the same park where another operator planned to site a mast, 
the one that had sparked the citizen engagement in the first place. But actions like 
these in Spijkenisse – which are more like protest actions – were rather rare, and did 
not occur in any of my other cases. 
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Pictures 3.5 & 3.6. – Dossiers of engaged citizens in two mast siting controversies. Photographs by author.  
 
 
Picture 3.7. – Engaged citizens tied to the base of an electricity pylon in Spijkenisse in which a mobile phone 
operator wanted to install antennas. Photograph by Algemeen Dagblad. 
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Knowledge gathering 
Groups of engaged citizens thus tried to strengthen their notices of objection with the 
power of numbers, i.e. gathering many signatures and individual submissions of view-
points, and with the power of networking, i.e. gathering the support of people of 
influence in their neighbourhood. They also worked hard to put the right arguments 
into the notice of objection. Finding more information on masts for wireless commu-
nication technology and mast siting practices was the first step, as one citizen said: 
“because you want to have a say in the siting process, you want to gain more and 
more knowledge” (Interview N3). Collectively engaging in mast siting controversies 
thus meant collectively gathering this knowledge. In Maarkedal, “[e]verybody contrib-
uted – in a meeting people would say like ‘I read this’, ‘I heard that’ or ‘I saw this TV 
programme about it’. It was very much alive in the group” (Interview MA2). In any 
mast siting controversy, there were different reasons for citizens to engage (see Table 
3.1. for an example of a submission of viewpoints by the working group in Maastricht): 
[i]t’s a shame for the recreation. It is not compatible with the character of the 
landscape. [The mast] would become one of the highest points in Flanders. It 
does not fit aesthetically in the landscape. And also that it is not good for our 
health (Interview MA1). 
[t]here are three major arguments: one is health, the other has to do with how it 
looks in the environment, this can really bother people and another has to do 
with the devaluation of the houses (Interview N3). 
I think [people started to engage] mostly because of the visual aspect. A lot of 
them did not worry about their health but about the school here a few hundred 
meters away. So people have considered that it might not be one hundred per 
cent healthy, but also NIMBY [Not In My Back Yard] plays a role. I also have a mo-
bile phone and I know it might not be healthy (…) And the other side of the street 
will have done it more out of solidarity than anything else. It’s a good neighbour-
hood here (Interview D3). 
[t]here are two arguments in the neighbourhood that play a role: first one is 
health aspects (…) There are some studies that show it is harmful. Fine, we also 
named them [in the notice of objection] because this was supported by a part of 
the population. Personally I don’t believe it. (…) The second point is that the mu-
nicipality has an antenna policy with policy about base stations in the city. (…) In it 
is says as a first point that the visual impact should remain as minimal as possible. 
[The fact that the mast is so high] has offended me greatly (Interview M2). 
Our analysis of 211 Dutch municipalities (see Figure 1.3. in chapter 1) already showed 
that various arguments circulate in mast siting controversies ranging from concerns 
78 
about health, landscape pollution, devaluation of property prices, technical malfunc-
tions or environmental damage to a general dissatisfaction with the lack of infor-
mation or participation in the siting process or worries about the quality of the deci-
sion-making process or distrust of the mobile phone operators. The groups of en-
gaged citizens thus set to work to collect “all arguments that the group found im-
portant against the siting” in order to “translate [these concerns] in the submission of 
viewpoints”, as the group in Maastricht said (Interview M2). 
 
Table 3.1. – Shortened version of the official submission of viewpoints (zienswijzen) of the working group of 
engaged citizens in Maastricht (Buurtplatform Vroendaal, n.d.).  
- The current zoning plan does not allow the siting of the UMTS-mast - The granting of the permission is (at least partially) is contrary to the ‘Antennapolicy’ - The arguments [of mobile phone operator] and municipality are built on shaky foundations (why the 
mast is needed / why it has to be so high) - The building application [of the mobile phone operator] could not be inspected publicly and can thus 
not be taken into consideration - Inadequate communication of the municipality (we are not taken seriously as neighbourhood c.q. 
despised) - Municipality calls visual presence of 40 metre high mast minimal (!) - Very scant ‘Natuurwaardeonderzoek’ [ecological value research] (ecological research in an area of 
merely 10x10 metres!) - Considering the surrounding landscape, a mast is unacceptable (no reaction from the 
Welstandscommissie [building inspector employed to enforce the regulations regarding the external 
appearance of buildings]) - The presence of a mast can lead to health complaints (if only by suggestion!) - The mast is located next to a school, a home for elderly and residential houses (requiring a more 
careful procedure) - In a mast of 40 metres [the mobile phone operator] can allow other operators (by which [the mobile 
phone operator] earns money) - The technological developments go so fast that UMTS will be outdated in a few years 
 
A municipal official in Maastricht was surprised to see that the working group got “to 
the bottom of these things, to see which objections they can raise (…). Sometimes this 
is very technical” (Interview M8). But ‘being technical’ was exactly the aim of the col-
lectives of engaged citizens: a substantial part of the argument was directed at show-
ing the inadequacy of the municipal decision to grant a building permit to build a mast 
in that particular spot in their neighbourhood. In order to substantiate this claim, it 
was felt that neighbours were needed “who are well informed or have a background 
in something, who can deliver substantive knowledge” (Interview M2), as an engaged 
citizen in Maastricht said, who had a lawyer and someone working in environmental 
sciences in their working group. In Nieuwkoop, the citizen that initiated the engage-
ment was a lawyer. The group in Maarkedal also agreed that the notice of objection 
79 
should contain technical-legal language: “[y]ou can express yourself emotionally, but 
you have to show numbers and facts. That’s important” (Interview MA1). This was not 
an easy task, and felt quite daunting for the group in Nieuwkoop: “you dread this, 
because you have never done anything like it. But eventually you do it” (Interview N3). 
Also in Drongen (Keiskant), citizens agreed that writing a notice of objection was not 
simple, because it was almost like a legal document, but “thanks to the large support 
we had, there were enough people that were well-educated” (Interview D1). 
 Citizens showed the presumed misgoverning of the mast siting by the local au-
thorities through scrutinising the permit decision and the spatial planning rules. The 
group of engaged citizens in Drongen (Keiskant) emphasised that “[i]t is important 
that you speak in the language of the department of spatial planning [dienst steden-
bouw], since they will approve or disapprove the dossier” (Interview D1). This meant 
looking up the zoning plan for the area, since an argument could be made that the 
mast – an industrial installation – did not fit in a public area, such as close to schools 
(in Nieuwkoop) or sports facilities (in Drongen, Keiskant), or did not fit in a (preserved) 
nature area (Maastricht, Maarkedal and Drongen, station). In Maastricht and Drongen 
(Keiskant) the groups of engaged citizens also argued that the mast did not adhere to 
the strict building regulations in their neighbourhood. The group in Drongen said: 
[i]t is unreasonable to enforce strict regulations for the land division as well as for 
porches and carports because of reasons of the landscape (…) and yet to allow a 
mast of 32 metres that is much more disturbing (Citizens Keiskant (Drongen), 
2006). 
In Maastricht, citizens also had to follow strict regulations on the external appearance 
of the houses they had built some years ago: “the fences couldn’t be more than 60 
centimetres, and the colour of the houses was supposed to be cream colour and not 
white” (Interview M2). They were indignant about the fact that the mast did not have 
to abide by any of these rules: 
[s]o [years ago] you had all these discussions in the neighbourhood. Everyone is 
eventually very happy but it is still fresh in our memories. Next thing you know 
they are siting a mast right next to our neighbourhood. What’s that all about? (In-
terview M2). 
Questioning the siting of the mast on the basis of spatial planning went hand in hand 
with proposing alternative locations for the mast to be sited: outside of residential 
areas, often in nearby industrial zones. 
 Citizens found it very hard to believe that there was only one possibility for the 
mast to be sited, and they told that they were moreover very suspicious of the rea-
sons for being so. This suspicion was raised by the perceived financial gains that the 
mobile phone operator would get from letting other companies use the mast for so-
called site-sharing: operators that site their antennas in the same mast have to pay a 
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fee to the company owning the mast. Another reason for suspicion was the lack of 
evidence the mobile phone operator could muster for why the mast had to be sited at 
all, especially when there were already other base stations in the neighbourhood and 
no apparent complaints were signalled about mobile phone reception by citizens in 
the neighbourhood. This was an argument in the submission of viewpoints of the 
citizen group in Maastricht, who had closely read the mobile phone operators’ appli-
cation for a building permit:  
[i]n the page on the situation in Heer [neighbourhood in Maastricht] it says – and 
not constructively argued with figures – that a mast is needed and that in time it 
will always be needed. There is a coloured map to illustrate the current coverage. 
The question is on what is this coloured map based? Where are the closest masts, 
that are insufficient according to [the mobile phone operator]? Why is a mast of 
almost 40 metres high needed, one that will eventually only cover a very small 
area? (Zienswijze ontwerpontheffing/ontwerpbouwvergunning, 2011). 
In Nieuwkoop, citizens asked around in the neighbourhood whether there were any 
complaints and asked for ‘proof’ of complaints from the mobile phone operator: 
[t]hat is what we asked for, if the reception is so bad here, then you surely must 
have a dossier about it, that there are many phone calls about complaints from 
Nieuwkoop. Well, it turned out there were no complaints (Interview N2). 
None of the citizens, nor the municipality, received information from the mobile 
phone operator that showed problems with the network and thus the need for a 
mast. When I talked about this issue to a representative of one mobile phone opera-
tor, who was responsible for the siting in Nieuwkoop, he informed me that the opera-
tor does not site base stations because of a lack of good reception, but because of a 
lack of capacity, i.e. the available antennas will not be able to take all calls at the same 
time (Interview N11). In those cases, he explained, there is no ostensible problem with 
the connectivity or signal reception yet, but the operator tries to avert problems for 
its particular customers in the future. As another representative of the same mobile 
phone operator said: “[w]e don’t build for ourselves but for the customer” (Interview 
M8). From my interviews with mobile phone operators it became clear that they were 
very reluctant to share information about siting practices because of competition with 
other operators.13 Their default reaction to citizens demanding justification for the 
siting in their neighbourhood was an economical one, i.e. masts are “the last resort” 
for operators because they only have downsides as the building of them is a long-
                                                                
13 When the first base stations for the use of car telephones were sited in the Netherlands in the beginning 
of the 1990s by the only telecom operator PTT (Staatsbedrijf der Posterijen, Telegrafie en Telefonie), the 
company was secretive about the number of base stations as they saw it as “company information and thus 
confidential” (Van een onzer verslaggevers, March 18, 1994). Since the beginning of the 2000s, however, all 
of the antennas can be found online (antenneregister.nl), and mobile phone operators have to send a plan 
with to-be-sited antennas to the municipalities.  
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time, intensive and expensive process (Interview M8). They informed me that, “[i]f we 
are willing to spend a large sum of money to site a mast, then you can be certain that 
we think it will pay off. In fact, there is no discussion [about whether masts are need-
ed or not] because these masts are not cheap” (Interview N11). 
 Engaged citizens thus firstly tried to gather information on the spatial planning 
aspects of the mast siting to find reasons to criticise this decision. The perceived mis-
management of the municipality did not only remain restricted to spatial planning 
aspects, but was also targeted at citizen participation in the decision to site the mast. 
This became particularly manifest if citizens failed in their attempts to be in rapport 
with the municipality about the need to rethink the siting decision, which happened in 
Nieuwkoop and Maastricht. An engaged citizen in Nieuwkoop became frustrated by 
his failed attempts to get the municipality to change their decision by way of petitions, 
public inquiries at council meetings and conversations with the aldermen of local 
planning: “[n]ow you have the feeling that democracy was not followed. But the city 
council, the major and aldermen are there for the citizens, right? But that is an illu-
sion” (Interview N3). He was particularly vexed by the fact that the municipality would 
not take seriously his views and the siting issue in general: 
I think it is grossly underestimated how much [effect] the siting of a base station 
[has] – it is surely different from constructing a road, or drenching a ditch (…) 
They [the municipality] thought it was simply like ‘We need a new mast, where 
does the operator want it to be sited? (…) The whole issue with citizens getting 
involved, I think they see it only as an encumbrance (Interview N3). 
A neighbour echoed the same complaint: “[t]he municipality has played a submissive 
role towards the telecom industry; and has not felt the slightest need to account for 
its actions to the citizens” (Interview N1). A local politician sympathetic to the citizens’ 
engagement thought it was the municipality’s task not only to oblige the mobile 
phone operators’ requests of siting, but also to consider the obligation to citizens to 
take away uncertainty, confusion, misunderstanding and concerns (Interview N8). 
Another member of the group in Nieuwkoop was shocked to find out during a meet-
ing with the alderman for spatial planning how little he knew about the issue, whilst 
she considered it the municipality’s task to be knowledgeable in order to make an 
informed decision (Interview N2). Also in Spijkenisse, this was felt as a serious short-
coming on behalf of the municipality: 
[i]t still bothers me a bit that people [the mobile phone operator and the munici-
pality] make decisions without being well informed, just thinking ‘this will be OK’. 
But I think you shouldn’t make decisions on the basis of not-knowing, you should 
first gain more knowledge (Interview S1). 
In Maastricht, citizens were also surprised by the lack of participation from the munic-
ipality: 
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[c]itizen involvement [in this neighbourhood] is very high, but with this decision 
[to site mast] all complaints have been shuffled aside. This does not match with 
citizen participation and neighbourhood-oriented works. Citizens’ credibility in lo-
cal politics has already decreased considerably and will decrease further with this 
decision (M1, 2011). 
It is exactly this assumed lack of municipalities’ knowledge, communication and citizen 
participation that spurred citizens in all my cases to find out more information them-
selves elsewhere, such as in jurisdiction and public administration law. 
 Still, the municipality was the first contact point for most citizens when they first 
heard about the intended siting. As one municipal official said: “[i]nitially, you actually 
get a lot of questions from people” (Interview N6). In Spijkenisse, where a resident 
contacted the municipality after he heard about the siting: 
[b]ack then I called the municipality to ask ‘who can tell me something about [the 
mast]?’. I didn’t get an answer. Neither from the city councillors that I knew per-
sonally. They had no idea, and said that if an application for a building permit was 
handed in without anybody being against it, it would simply be granted permis-
sion (Interview S1). 
For him, the lack of information and knowledge by the municipality, i.e. the authority 
that allowed the siting of the base station, was a major incentive to dive into the topic, 
as it was for many engaged citizens: 
[t]hen it started to become alive. I thought to myself: I don’t agree, one decides 
upon things one doesn’t know anything about, nobody can explain it to me, and 
yet we all have to accept it. Yes, then you start to dig your heels in. I don’t agree, 
so then I come into action. I just want to know what is going on. And I think [mast 
siting controversies] all over the country often start like that (Interview S1). 
Informed by my case studies, I conclude that citizen engagement with the decision to 
site a mast was mostly shaped by the perceived inadequacy of the municipality to 
make an informed decision about the mast siting. Collectives of engaged citizens set to 
work to understand the jurisdiction and public administration law related to these 
siting practices in order to unpack the building permit and show flaws in its design. 
Other concerns about the quality of local government related to citizens’ rights of 
participation and good information. 
The argument of ‘health risks’ 
In their search for information, citizens also came across another argument that often 
became a forceful reproach towards the mismanagement of the municipality: the 
possibility of health risks from the exposure to radiofrequency electromagnetic fields 
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(RF EMF) emitted by the antennas in the mast. How did they come across the health 
risk argument? 
The Internet: the message of health risks 
In mast siting controversies, citizens made use of a wide network of people who were 
able to provide them with information or support for their notices of objection: the 
municipality, local politicians, journalists, lawyers and neighbours with expertise on 
spatial planning, environmental issues, local politics or previous citizen engagements. 
These networks were usually very local. There was also another very accessible yet 
not so local network, which became a source of huge amounts of information: the 
Internet. All engaged citizens used the Internet, even those that did not know how to 
use it, asked friends to help them (Interview M3): “[f]irst we searched the Internet for 
‘GSM mast’ for hours and hours” (Interview D1). What did citizens find online?: 
[y]ou run into stories that it really is not quite clear what is going on, what the ef-
fects are and there are also some frightening stories. And that you can’t really ar-
gue anymore that that there is nothing the matter. And then you think, hold on a 
minute, we are talking about my kids (Interview N3). 
[s]o I started to read a bit more about it, to get a bit deeper, and then I stumbled 
upon messages that contradicted each other (Interview S7). 
The ‘frightening stories’ and ‘contradicting messages’ refer to accounts about detri-
mental health effects from exposure to RF EMF from base stations or other devices 
(such as mobile phones, Wi-Fi stations or DECT phones). As another engaged citizen 
explained about going online: “[h]ealth risks is pretty much the first hit” (Interview 
M2). When citizens started surfing, they came across several websites solely dedicat-
ed to the topic of base stations and health: “[t]here is also a website, a Dutch website 
on which all sorts of stories and studies are quoted that GSM and UMTS is indeed 
harmful. We read those and took them into account” (Interview M2). From the mid-
2000s, these websites highlighted health risks of electromagnetic fields (see Picture 
3.8.). Examples of such websites are wegmetumts.nl, StopUMTS.nl, stralingsarm-
nederland.org (NL), stralingsrisicos.nl, stichtingehs.nl, and beperkdestraling.org (B) 
(see Table 3.2.). 
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Picture 3.8. – Poster from website 
Wegmetumts with two slogans: ‘UMTS 
is cause of disease’ (top) and ‘UMTS, 
the digital asbestos of the 21st centu-
ry?’ (bottom). Downloaded from 
www.wegmetumts.nl, on June 7, 2010 
(picture is no longer viewable in 
archived websites from Waybackma-
chine). 
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Table 3.2. – The most important grassroots support teams and other organisations that support engaged 
citizens in the Netherlands and Flanders. 
 
  
StopUMTS (NL) 
 
StopUMTS is a grassroots support team (mostly) active 
online. Through its website, it offers a plethora of 
information on EMF, with a focus on scientific studies. 
It is often the first point of information for engaged 
citizens looking for information on siting.  
Meldpunt Gezondheid en Milieu (NL) 
Dutch Organisation for Monitoring Health and 
Environment 
 
Environmental organisation that strove for a clean and 
safe environment without pollutants. It recorded cases 
of environment related health complaints, such as 
electromagnetic fields. It seized to exist in 2012. For a 
number of years it received financial support from the 
Dutch government. 
Nederlands Instituut voor Bouwbiologie en  
Ecologie (NIBE) (NL) 
The Dutch Institute for Building Biology and 
Ecology  
NIBE is the representative of the building biology 
movement in the Netherlands. It is a consultancy in the 
area of environmentally friendly and healthy building, 
of which EMF are part. It also represents a growing 
profession of woonbiologen: those that measure EMF 
and other possible indoor ‘pollutants’ to help people 
with health complaints.  
Nationaal Platform Stralingsrisico’s (NPS) (NL) 
National Platform Radiation risks (author’s 
translation) 
The NPS is a grassroots support team active online. 
Through its website, it provides information about EMF 
and health (www.stralingsrisicos.nl). It grew out of the 
citizen engagement in Spijkenisse. A few years ago, 
some of its members started a new organisation, the 
International EMF Alliance.  
Stichting Elektrohypersensitiviteit (ESH) (NL) 
Dutch ElektroHyperSensitivity Foundation (EHS) 
The foundation is a contact point, information centre 
and interest group for people suffering from EHS. Its 
mission is to accomplish a life as normal as possible for 
elektrohypersensitive people. It calls for the recognition 
of EHS as a disease.  
Beperk de Straling (BE) 
Restrict the Radiation (author’s translation) 
Beperk de Straling is a Flemish grassroots support team 
active online and offline. Its aim is to create awareness 
about EMF and health. It grew out of the citizen 
engagement in Drongen. 
Stralings Arm Nederland (NL) 
Low Radiation the Netherlands  
(author’s translation) 
Grassroots support team that started out as Weg met 
UMTS (www.awaywithumts.nl – this website does not 
exist anymore, but old pages can be accessed through 
the WayBackMachine) but soon became Stralings Arm 
Nederland. Its aim is to lower the level of exposure of 
RF EMF because of health concerns. This group is the 
fiercest and most aggressive in its language compared 
to the other grassroots support teams.  
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Engaged citizens became very familiar with these websites, the most popular being 
beperkdestraling.org in Flanders and StopUMTS.nl in the Netherlands: 
[t]hen we went to look on the Internet and we came across this website of 
StopUMTS. And there you can read many negative reports. And that was basically 
the reason to launch some action (Interview S2). 
StopUMTS is a site on which to find a lot of information. It collects worldwide in-
formation in this field. Both negative and positive. (…) But the important thing is 
that there are many messages that indicate that it is not good (Interview N1). 
[I found information] through StopUMTS (…) it makes you really alarmed. It’s real-
ly not nice (Interview N2). 
[w]e got into contact with StopUMTS rather soon. Because a lot of the infor-
mation comes together there and then you also realise quite soon that this is a 
problematic issue that plays out with many masts (Interview N3). 
These websites showed citizens that they were not the first neither the only ones 
engaging with a decision to site a base station for mobile communication. This could 
have the effect of strengthening the engagement such as in Maarkedal where one of 
the citizens referred to another group in Flanders that had won a lawsuit to prevent 
the siting of the mast: “this made us feel stronger, like, if we try our best we can also 
get that far” (Interview MA4). All of these websites served the same purpose, in the 
words of wegmetumts.nl (awaywithumts.nl): “to offer (forthcoming) activists infor-
mation about how to try to halt the siting of a planned base station” (Weg met UMTS, 
2009a). On that particular website, the information consisted of detailed overviews of 
a few mast siting controversies, with downloads to notices of objection and letters of 
complaint to municipalities, mobile phone operators or owners of the plots of land 
where the mast was (to be) sited. These websites offer a plethora of information on 
which courses of action to take for collectives of engaged citizens. Apart from provid-
ing concrete information on health risks and courses of action, this strengthened the 
idea of the engagers that it was a good cause, worth engaging with. 
 StopUMTS, for example, received regular emails to ask what one could do against 
a mast. It therefore advised several courses of action on its website since 2005, the 
first one being ‘social action’: inform neighbours about the plans for siting and about 
the alleged detrimental health effects. StopUMTS offered ready-made leaflets and 
flyers to help with that. Secondly, contact the municipality, mobile phone operators, 
politicians and local press. Also, refer the press to StopUMTS if they had questions one 
was unable to answer. Thirdly, make the mobile phone operator, the municipality and 
the owners of the plot of land on which the mast is sited liable for possible future 
health damage and devaluation of house prices. One could download a form for the 
insurance claim from the website. Next, convince the municipality that the mast could 
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be dangerous so that they can make their own policy on the basis of the precaution-
ary principle. And finally, if one wants to take judicial steps, a particular law firm with 
experience in these matters was advised, and StopUMTS insisted that it was para-
mount that evidence and indications in the form of full-fledged papers and studies of 
health risks should be delivered to the judge who is obliged to look into them. All 
these papers, which were regularly updated, could be downloaded from their web-
site.14 
 The websites thus proposed various courses of action, informed by the belief that 
exposure to base stations was dangerous for one’s health. StopUMTS.nl and other 
websites clearly stated that their mission was to “halt the siting of literally ill-making 
UMTS masts” (StopUMTS, 2004a) by providing a “critical look at the health aspects of 
mobile communication” (StopUMTS, 2005). In 2007, one could read on the website of 
stralingsrisico’s (radiation risks): 
[a] global medical experiment is taking place. The central question in this experi-
ment is: how does the human body react to a lifelong exposure to non-ionizing, 
high frequency and pulsed electromagnetic fields with weak intensity? Such a 
medical experiment on a global scale, carried out on hundreds of millions of citi-
zens who are not informed about it, has never been done in the history of hu-
mankind! It is contrary with the Dutch constitution and the Declaration of Human 
Rights (Stralingsrisico’s, 2013). 
The bulk of information on these websites were scientific studies, papers or proceed-
ings of conferences, i.e. technical documents with professional jargon that served as 
evidence that there are health risks from RF EMF. Other bits of information were real-
life stories of people and animals presumably getting ill from EMF, news on local mast 
siting controversies, on jurisdiction, and on European and worldwide developments. 
 People who had also engaged at one point around the siting of a base station in 
their own neighbourhood initiated most of these websites. They wanted to share their 
story, help or warn other people who were dealing with the same problem. Others 
became involved with these websites because of experiences with illnesses that they 
attributed to exposure to RF EMF, amongst which base stations. The initiator of 
StopUMTS.nl for example explained why he set up the website in 2004 (StopUMTS, 
2004c): as a healthy person in his early twenties, he moved into a new flat, and soon 
afterwards started to develop all sorts of health complaints such as heart palpitations, 
                                                                
14 That is what one citizen in Nieuwkoop did when he decided to go to court: he provided the judge and 
lawyers of the mobile phone operator with a list of documents. As the lawyers of the mobile phone opera-
tor told me: “[t]hey came with a pile of reports – they had printed quite a lot and submitted them with the 
judge. They had clearly emptied StopUMTS.nl!” (Interview N10). The lawyers did not read all of these re-
ports, and neither would the judge, they said. One of the reports however was so recently published that 
the Gezondheidsraad had not taken it into account in its reviews, so that was sent to them for a quick 
review. But it did not change the overall conclusion from the lawyers and the judge: the studies the citizens 
provided were not convincing evidence.  
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fatigue, dullness, sleeping problems and allergic reactions to food. He searched the 
Internet for possible explanations, and found some articles about possible effects of 
electromagnetic fields. This prompted him to buy a high frequency fields measuring 
device. Inside his flat, there were several spots where the “red lights indicating maxi-
mum” went on. He then noticed the many antennas that were on the roof of the 
hospital across his flat. He briefly considered asking them to shut some down, but 
then he realised this would be impossible. He moved back to his parents’ home, 
where things went much better, but still he had health problems from time to time. 
He then also measured the EMF in the house and discovered that the DECT wireless 
phone was the culprit, as it “transmits 24 hours a day, whether calls are made or not, 
whether the phone is in the charger or not”. He thus managed to find “peace of mind” 
again, and finished his studies. By exploring the EMF exposure further, he found out 
that almost all the flats in the city he used to live in had the same height of exposure, 
this could even be measured on the streets. He decided to come up with an “escape 
plan” and figured that in some sparsely populated rural areas in France, ensuring 
UMTS coverage would be too expensive for mobile operators. But then suddenly he 
had a change of mind: he wanted to “resist this forced emigration”. He first contacted 
the responsible municipalities, but his request to end the rollout of UMTS was unsuc-
cessful. He then decided to start the website StopUMTS.nl “to speed up the process” 
of “hav[ing] a country that is free of radiation”. The website would assist this aim by 
“summing up the facts and by making accountable the responsible companies, agen-
cies and political parties and calling them to action” (Ibid.). 
 So, unlike the engaged citizens in mast siting controversies, the stakes were dif-
ferent for the initiators of these websites: they were concerned, not about one par-
ticular mast at one particular spot, but about all masts everywhere. Also the tone of 
voice of the websites was unlike the approach of engaged citizens: it was much more 
antagonistic and opposing. The websites tried to ignite a sense of indignity and urgen-
cy that citizens should rise up against the establishment by way of exposing the scan-
dalous nature of government and industry in mast siting practices. One could read on 
wegmetumts.nl: 
[i]t is of the UTMOST importance that we citizens join forces and form an action 
movement of hundred thousands of people against UMTS. Only by the power of 
many people and with actions, protests and judicial measures can we prevent 
that we are being radiated to bits because of financial gains for a small elite group 
of industrials, bankers and leaders (Weg met UMTS, 2009b, emphasis in original). 
 Most websites showed a profound distrust of governments, industry and scien-
tific institutions and organisations. StopUMTS, for example, alluded to the inability to 
trust the Dutch government when it came to health aspects, as it had also neglected 
the risks of asbestos and smoking in the past, and now its “hands were stained with 
blood” (StopUMTS, 2004b). Beperk de Straling claimed that the World Health Organi-
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sation (WHO), i.e. “the point of reference for doctors, scientists, researchers and poli-
cymakers”, was unscientific because it was financed by the telecom industry (Beperk 
de Straling, 2008). Wegmetumts devoted one webpage to ventilating its “aversion” 
against one member of the Gezondheidsraad who was believed to have financial ties 
with the telecom industry (Weg met UMTS, 2009b). The latter also used provocative 
slogans such as ‘UMTS = assassinator’, ‘UMTS is the digital asbestos of the 21st centu-
ry’ (see Picture 3.8.) and ‘The government: “Wir haben es nicht gewuβt?”’ (Ibid.). This 
incendiary rhetoric of conspiracy and negligence by those in power continued for 
many years. In 2012, a new online platform was established by one self-proclaimed 
‘radiation activist’, called Burgerministerie voor Stralingsbescherming (Ministry of 
citizens for radiation protection). He proclaimed the year 2012 the year of the velvet 
revolution, as the call for truth became louder and louder, the lobbies behind manipu-
lative government and telecom organisations were becoming visible and the “unmask-
ing” was believed to be not far away (Burgerministerie voor Stralingsbescherming, 
2012). 
 These websites thus tried to exert their influence on readers in different ways: by 
informing them about the assumed health risks from masts, by proposing a particular 
set of social actions and by exposing an overall mismanagement of mast siting. All of 
this information was imbued with a sense of indignation and sometimes blatent out-
rage (such as in the case of wegmetumts.nl). The websites served as important impe-
tuses for engaged citizens to continue with what they were doing. It showed that 
there were many other people concerned about masts; it gave them more reasons to 
engage as it pointed to possible health risks; it gave ‘evidence’ for their notices of 
objection in the form of scientific studies showing harmful effects from exposure to RF 
EMF; and it fed into already prevailing ideas about the misgoverning of national and 
local authorities. Moreover, the people behind the websites sometimes also played a 
role as mentor such as in Nieuwkoop, where someone from StopUMTS.nl contacted 
one of the engaged citizens to tell him that he should continue with his actions and 
not give up, and also gave advice for the lawsuit that the citizen was planning against 
the siting. Team StopUMTS also posted on the website of the working group in Maas-
tricht: “[f]or the most current and complete information about the health aspects of 
mobile telephony see StopUMTS.nl” (Team StopUMTS, 2010). So it was hard for en-
gaged citizens actively searching for information on mast siting not to bump into one 
of those websites and its message of health risks. 
Uncertainty and pleas for precaution 
But how did engaged citizens digest the knowledge available on these websites that 
pointed to a possibility of health risk? How did they value and make sense of it? Some 
citizens were already familiar with the story of possible negative health effects from 
mobile phones and masts and wanted to find out the truth behind it: 
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[s]o I went on the Internet to find out what actually was true, but it didn’t reas-
sure me, on the contrary. I also heard every time that (…) some studies are paid 
by the telecom companies and then I am not sure anymore (Interview MA3). 
This particular engaged citizen found it very hard to make up her mind, and she was 
not the only one. Citizens talked about the uncertainties in knowledge and the con-
flicting evidence about the harmfulness of wireless communication technology. Un-
certainty and ambiguity were important reasons for them to engage with the siting of 
a mast: 
[b]ecause I think, one is uncertain about these things, there is no certainty. One 
professor contradicts the other. And my principle is, if you are not sure that it is 
not harmful, you don’t do it, especially not close to children, [hence] close to 
schools (Interview D4). 
[a]s long as it is not indisputably proven that it cannot hurt, you should be careful. 
That’s what it is about. And do not take unnecessary risks. Where you expose 
people permanently to extra radiation (Interview D8). 
[e]specially that there is not much certainty about the consequences. And then I 
think, if we would be 10 years along the line, and would know more about the 
consequences and we would know that it is not harmful, then perhaps (…) (Inter-
view MA4). 
[a] lot of research has been done but there is not really a definite answer to the 
question whether it is actually harmful or not. And I think as long as one cannot 
say with certainty that it is not harmful (...) yes, then I think you better be careful 
(Interview MA2). 
Most engaged citizens were unsure about the existence of health effects from masts, 
but took into account that there might be negative health effects and thus preferred 
to err on the side of caution. Only a few engaged citizens were really convinced about 
health risks. In the explanations of these ‘convinced’ citizens, they largely took over 
the rhetoric of the websites, such as StopUMTS.nl: they pointed to scandalous stories 
about the links between national governments, rogue scientists and industry. They 
were very knowledgeable on the topic of EMF health risks and conversations with me 
would turn quickly from a focus on the particular siting controversy in their neigh-
bourhood to a general story about health risks of RF EMF (not only masts). They re-
ferred to the latest studies and used jargon such as ‘glucoses metabolism’ or ‘electro-
cardiograms’ to explain the existence of health effects (Interview N1). For most en-
gaged citizens, however, the issue of mast siting was not framed as a definite risk, 
such as the websites did, but as a possible cause of illness. 
 Because of the uncertainty, citizens were thus interested in the likelihood of 
unanticipated consequences. They argued that the uncertainties should lead to pre-
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cautionary measures. The following remarks from engaged citizens in mast siting con-
troversies or those active on blogs illustrate this: 
[t]here might not be any evidence that the radiation is harmful, but there is also 
no evidence that it is not harmful (Engaged citizen quoted in newspaper article 
Onrust in wijken over UMTS-zenders. Wachten op Zürich, 2005) 
[a]re there studies? Can this research show that there are NO harmful effects 
from this radiation? (Blog post of Swa, 2009 on a radio show about EMF and 
health) 
I would like to reverse the argumentation (demonstrate that it cannot hurt). (Also 
on the longer term) (Blog post of Rieks, 2009 on a television programme about 
EMF and health) 
Most citizens did not bother to read or understand the scientific studies found on the 
websites. As one of them said “I didn’t read [the reports] completely, nor did I read 
them thoroughly. Some things are so in-depth, that I think: you can read them and 
you see letters on the paper but you cannot evaluate it” (Interview N3). The way peo-
ple made sense of the plethora of information on health risks found online was to 
weave that information with other forms of knowledge and experience. Concerns 
about health risks were mentioned more often in mast siting controversies if people 
were ill or were anxious about the health of neighbours. In Maastricht and Maarkedal, 
engaged citizens referred to neighbours with cancer who “were not keen on living 
next to a mast” (Interview MA1). There was also one person concerned about the 
effects of the mast on his knee prosthetic (Interview M4). These arguments however 
remained rather marginal within the engagement process in those two neighbour-
hoods. In Nieuwkoop on the other hand, similar concern about another vulnerable 
group in society, i.e. children, became the cornerstone of the engagement against the 
siting. The siting of a base station close to a group of schools was mainly framed in 
terms of ‘health risks’ to the youngsters. The headmaster of the primary school ex-
plained: 
[a]s long as it is not clear that there are risks linked to the siting of UMTS masts in 
the direct vicinity of the school, we shall forcibly advice the municipality to not 
site the new UMTS masts on the little plot of land 300 metres away from the 
school building. One must rule out each risk, especially with a building where a 
1000 children get education (Interview N5). 
The group of engaged citizens emphasised repeatedly that their “point remains that 
we are dealing with a vulnerable group, children in this case, who are knowingly ex-
posed. According to us, you should not take that risk” (Interview N3). 
 The health framing in Nieuwkoop was moreover reinforced by the fact that one 
of the early engagers had embodied experiences of being electrohypersensitive, i.e. 
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he became ill after being exposed to RF EMF. One could read dozens of stories about 
electrohypersensitivity online, such as the case of the initiator of StopUMTS. Yet, 
these stories had much more power of expression if they came from an inner circle of 
neighbours, friends or family. The alderman of spatial planning in Ghent had a son 
who had experienced health problems due to exposure to EMF sources. The alderman 
told me he was first sceptical, but became convinced once the source of EMF (a GPS 
tracker) was taken away and his son recovered completely (Interview D8). He was 
supportive of the citizen engagement with the siting and urged the city council to 
forbid base stations siting close to schools, hospitals and elderly homes. Sometimes 
engaged citizens also referred to professionals with practical experience, such as gen-
eral practitioners, whose experiences had led them to believe that wireless communi-
cation technology might be harmful. By way of appeals (appèls), a number of general 
practitioners proclaimed that a growing number of patients suffers from health prob-
lems that they (partially) attribute to EMF sources.15 Citizens in Drongen felt reassured 
in their engagement by the support of an oncologist from a nearby hospital who be-
came to believe in harmful effects of RF EMF through his experiences in his clinical 
practice: “those people are not going to put their reputation on the line for nothing. It 
strengthened our belief in the just cause” (Interview D1). 
 Information from the websites and from knowledgeable neighbours was thus 
triangulated with other sources of understanding that people had. Not only personal 
(embodied) and collective experiences of illness, but also experiences with local and 
national authorities played a defining role in the engagement. The citizens engaged in 
mast siting often had experience in engaging with their municipality, the outcome of 
which had an influence on their relationship with and their views of the municipality. 
In Drongen, for example, the engaged citizens had already won a case with the munic-
ipality about the construction of a highway in the neighbourhood and maintained 
good relationships with some of the aldermen (schepen).16 In Nieuwkoop, citizens 
were frustrated about the competences of the municipality, lamenting how they had 
not done a good job thus far. Even if citizens did not actively engage with the munici-
pality yet, their views on how the municipaliy was governed seemed to play a role in 
their reaction towards the decision to site a mast in their neighbourhood.17 Citizens 
did not engage with the national authorities in the same way, but they had experienc-
es of how governments dealt with issues that might be similar to the siting of base 
stations. Trust in authorities played a role in how citizens made sense of mast siting. A 
few citizens made comparisons with asbestos and tobacco (Interviews S1, S2, S7, N9, 
                                                                
15 For example, the Freiburger Appel (2002), Hofer Appel (2005) and Barneveld Appel (2006), see 
www.stopumts.nl.  
16 In Belgium, aldermen are part of the city council. In the Netherlands, they are not (since 2002).  
17 At an information session in Valkenswaard at which I was present, for example, some citizens sketched a 
very negative image of local politics and claimed that you could only get something done if you knew an 
alderman (wethouder) personally.  
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D2 & MA2). One engaged citizen in Spijkenisse said in an interview for the local news-
paper: “[i]n 1968 it became known that asbestos was harmful. The Gezondheidsraad 
only established legal rules well over 25 years later. That is also the agency that de-
cides now about exposure limits for GSM and UMTS” (Polder, 2005). In Drongen 
(Keiskant), citizens also made the comparison in their notice of objection: 
[t]he comparison with the asbestos issue is clear: there were also no conclusive 
studies to label this material that was initially heralded as ‘universal remedy’ as a 
carcinogenic. A couple of decennia later we (unfortunately) know better! DON’T 
LET US MAKE THE SAME MISTAKE AGAIN! Medicines are tested as many times as 
it needs to know all (amongst other potentially harmful) effects. With technologi-
cal innovations this is apparently not necessary. Try to understand if you can! (D1, 
2007: 8, emphasis in original). 
My observations yielded that equating the risks from RF EMF with asbestos and to-
bacco is a favourite trope for those convinced of health risks from base stations (see 
picture 3.8. and picture 3.9.).  
 
 
Picture 3.9. – Poster from the websites Beperkdestraling.be, StopUMTS.nl and next-up.org with the slogan 
‘Passive GSM radiation = Passive smoking (Keep your distance)’. Downloaded from http://www.next-
up.org/images/logo_passieve_gsm_straling_passief_roken.jpg#10 on December 12, 2013 
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 Information about health risks was thus assimilated into a broader landscape of 
knowledge and experience that citizens already had. But also new knowledge was 
created that was held against the knowledge found online, as in the case of Spijkenis-
se where citizens from Spijkenisse against Radiation decided to buy a measuring de-
vice to “clarify what [the mast] actually does” (Interview S2, also see chapter 1). After 
reading stories about health risks online, these engaged citizens became curious to 
find out how the situation in their neighbourhood was at the moment, before the 
mast was sited. Through the Internet, they came into contact with someone who did 
research into environmental illnesses (Interview S1). This person advised them to buy 
a measuring device to measure the EMF exposure in their neighbourhood, which they 
promptly did because as one of them said: “I cannot smell it, I cannot see it, but I do 
want to know it” (Interview S1). They first experimented with measuring in their 
homes, where they found out that the microwave oven and the DECT phones emitted 
radio waves. In the streets, nothing could be measured. So they shifted their attention 
to the flat complexes on the other side of the city that had several GSM and UMTS 
antennas on the roof (see Pictures 3.10. & 3.11.). While walking around there resi-
dents approached them to ask what they were doing. This contact prompted resi-
dents to talk about their illnesses, which they had thus far not attributed to the an-
tennas on the roofs. But if they went to measure in the flats of those who were will, 
their measuring device signalled higer levels of radio waves, too high, according to the 
engaged citizens. 
 The citizens of Spijkenisse against Radiation became scared by these findings: 
“the stories we read [online], we observed them ourselves. When people said ‘I have 
complaints and problems’, if we measured [in their homes], there was quite a lot of 
radiation. How could that be?” (Interview S1). This inspired the engaged citizens to 
tackle the issue “in a – between quotation marks – scientific way” (S1). They decided 
to set up a survey with health related questions, distributed this in one of the flats, 
recorded radiation, and analysed the results. They were convinced that it was “fairly 
thoroughly done for a few amateurs” (S1). The results amazed them: 
[o]n the side [of the flat] where the antennas were located – where we could also 
measure it – a higher percentage of tenants had all sorts of weird [health] com-
plaints. On the other side where we had hardly measured any radiation, we also 
did not receive many complaints back (…) We did it in a very simple but objective 
way. We simply categorised everything from the front and the back of the flat 
and now looking at these striking differences. I mean, you can’t make this up! 
(S1). 
This newly acquired knowledge left a deep impression on these engaged citizens and 
convinced them that the stories that they had read elsewhere about people getting ill 
from exposure to RF EMF were in fact true. The scientific information on health risks 
was thus assimilated in this broader landscape of knowledge. 
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Picture 3.10. & 3.11. – Two engaged citizens of Spijkenisse against Radiation with their measuring device in 
a flat in Spijkenisse (source: De Botlek, October 25, 2005. Photographs by John de Pater). 
  
 In their search for information about masts and in search for arguments to use in 
their notices of objections, engaged citizens indefinitely came across the argument of 
possible health risks. What sort of impact this knowledge had on the engagement 
process differed from case to case. What all cases had in common was that the notion 
of harmfulness from masts was appropriated in a landscape of knowledge of those 
particular individuals and neighbourhoods, which to a large degree shaped its impact. 
In Spijkenisse, citizens produced their own local knowledge that seemed to substanti-
ate the stories about risks. This was a major incentive for the group to continue their 
engagement with a focus on safeguarding their neighbours from possible health ef-
fects. In Maastricht, on the contrary, several of the engaged citizens were not con-
vinced about the risks, and the argument was thus put alongside many others (see 
Table 3.1.). It was the same situation in Maarkedal, where from the beginning the 
mast siting had mostly been framed as a destruction of the landscape and as such as a 
bad local planning decision. In Nieuwkoop, the personal embodied experiences of one 
of the early engagers had put health risks on the agenda from the start. The first thing 
this person did was going around the neighbourhood with a 7-page pamphlet warning 
his neighbours about the health risks. The fact that the mast would be sited close to 
several schools added to the focus on health risks. In Drongen (station and Keiskant), 
one of the engaged citizens became very intrigued by everything he heard about 
health risks and decided to dive more into the topic. This had its bearing on the en-
gagement, as ‘health risks’ became a prominent argument in the notices of objection 
and in the court case. 
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The argument of ‘health risks’: a blind alley 
In any case, the possibility of health risks strengthened the belief for many that their 
engagement was worth their time and effort and that they should not give up easily. 
Citizens thus put together their notices of objection, networked and lobbied those in 
local power, and pleaded the municipality in many different ways to listen to them. 
Many citizens were left disillusioned when they found out that the municipality did 
not find their appeal convincing and was thus not inclined to change their decision. 
Even in those cases where the municipality was supportive of the engagement, such 
as in Spijkenisse and Drongen, little could be done to alter the siting decision. The 
possible health risks from exposure to base stations was not a topic that could be 
discussed with the municipality. This was, for example, evidenced during a public 
information evening organised by the municipality of Nieuwkoop, which one engaged 
citizen attended: 
[t]his information meeting was very one-sided. Health, that was not under discus-
sion, that was not an item on the agenda, and we shouldn’t talk about it at all. 
Then the whole room lived up, like ‘help, what kind of weird comment is that?’. 
One could only talk about constructional aspects, so about how high, how wide. 
And that was something we could appeal against. But we thought: whether it’s 
yellow, green or orange, it will never be pretty, and that is also not the point. We 
are concerned about the health effects (Interview N2). 
The municipal official for spatial planning in Nieuwkoop explained that municipalities 
had to follow the national policy on siting antennas and masts for wireless communi-
cation technology. When residents reacted to the siting with submissions of view-
points that pointed to possible health risks, the municipality’s hands were tied: 
[w]e cannot do a lot with them because health risks is not something about which 
the municipality can have its own opinion. There is a clear jurisdiction by now 
that states that you have to follow the judgement of the Gezondheidsraad and 
that as a municipality you cannot make something of your own. (…) And so that’s 
what we do (Interview N6). 
Also in Maastricht, the alderman for spatial planning said that when citizens hand in 
notices of objection, this is something they “are quickly finished with, because we 
simply follow the national policy and that again is based on all sorts of international 
research (…) that has shown that there is no danger” (Interview M7). Concretely, he 
said, this meant that the mobile phone operator has to show that the installation 
adhered to the exposure norms established by the government in order for the mu-
nicipality to grant the building permit. Another alderman for spatial planning con-
curred: “radiation is not a topic or item on which we can refuse the siting of a mast. 
That is determined nationally by The Hague [Dutch national government]” (Interview 
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E1). Even if the municipality was supportive of the citizen engagement, as was the 
case in Spijkenisse, it did not have the means to change anything about the intended 
siting, as the alderman in Spijkenisse said: 
[s]o we did take it seriously, but I’ve always tried to – like with electricity pylons – 
to have the discussion, well it’s not a discussion, because I cannot decide about 
this as a municipality whether it is dangerous or not. I have to take into account 
what The Hague thinks, which conditions I have to follow. If The Hague says ‘it’s 
safe’ or ‘it’s safe within this distance’, well, then I have to work with that (Inter-
view S4). 
In Belgium, the municipality is not even the one giving the permit for building a mast, 
but it gives an advice to the deciding authority, the regional public servant for local 
spatial planning (gewestelijke stedenbouwkunidge ambtenaar), part of the Flemish 
government. The municipality is obliged to organise a public inquiry upon which it 
determines its advice (Departement Leefmilieu, Natuur en Energie, n.d.). In the case 
of Drongen, the city of Ghent had made its own antenna policy based on conversa-
tions with the mobile phone operators and the Flemish region to make sure that their 
advices would always be followed. The city’s advice about not siting a mast close to 
the houses near the station had not been followed, and it was therefore also support-
ive of the engaged citizens’ legal actions against the siting decision (Interview D6). In 
the two Flemish cases, citizens won a court case and the base station was not sited. In 
Drongen, citizens attributed their legal success to the persuasiveness of the scientific 
studies showing health risks from the technology (Interview D2, D3 & D7). The judge 
had ruled out of precaution, they contended. Yet, the legal experts involved argues 
that this outcome can also be explained by a nearly two-year gap in the Flemish legis-
lation of antennas (Interview MA6, MA7 & MA8). Mobile phone operators simply did 
not have any legislation about safety margins to refer to, and this was enough for the 
judge to rule that the siting permit was not legal (see section The antenna policy: 
exposure limits and calls for more science in chapter 4). Once legislation was installed 
in 2010, citizens were unable to win a court case again based on the argument of 
health risks (Interview MA7 & 8). 
 For both Dutch and Flemish citizens (except for this period when there was no 
legislation), the focus on health risks thus seemed to be unproductive, as it ended in a 
blind alley. The municipalities’ hands were tied, even if they supported the concerns 
of their citizens. It seemed that the government the citizens had turned their efforts 
to, was not the one making the crucial decisions. This was done in ‘The Hague’ (Dutch 
national government) or on a regional level – some other place where the engaged 
citizens had not tried to exert their power. In order to understand why ‘health risks’ 
had become the dominant focus and a non-issue, i.e. something that did not warrant 
discussion on a local level, let alone had an impact on the siting decision, we need to 
take a closer look at the broader political and institutional context of mast siting, 
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which I will do in the next chapter. After reporting my empirical findings in the previ-
ous sections, I now continue with interpreting these findings in the remainder of this 
chapter. I particularly focus on three aspects that were prominent in the empirical 
discussion: collectives of engaged citizens, science in the public domain and the ap-
peal of health risks. 
Discussion: understanding citizen engagement in mast siting 
Collectives of engaged citizens 
Citizens engaging with the siting of a base station did not do this on their own. Mast 
siting controversies cannot be glossed over as actions from “some loner fighting” who 
has not yet understood that we live in the 21st century. Engaged citizens were not 
anti-technology, but were well-embedded, highly educated, active and social individu-
als that tried to get neighbours together to change a decision that they felt would 
impact negatively on their living environment. This sense of “together we are strong” 
should not be underestimated (Interview S2). It often was the engine of the engage-
ment. It is something witnessed by other scholars studying citizen initiatives, such as 
Leighninger (2006) who has worked with many public engagement efforts in the Unit-
ed States. He refers to the concept of ‘public happiness’ by Hannah Arendt to describe 
the “kinds of feeling people talk about when they have been involved in democratic 
governance” such as in setting up a street association for example (Leighninger, 2006: 
35). Hannah Arendt was one of the first political philosophers to discuss happiness in 
relation to politics, in particular in the context of revolutions (Arendt, 1963). At the 
time of the American revolution (1765-1783), Arendt argued, ‘public happiness’ 
meant freedom and participation in political life: “it consisted in the citizen’s right of 
access to the public realm, in his share in public power” (Arendt, 1963: 124). The roots 
of the idea of ‘public happiness’ went back to the second U.S. president John Adams, 
Arendt claimed, who described it as: 
[w]herever men, women or children are to be found, whether they be old or 
young, rich or poor, high or low, wise or foolish, ignorant or learned, every indi-
vidual is strongly actuated by a desire to be seen, heard, talked of, approved and 
respected by the people about him (Arendt, 1963: 119). 
Arends’ and Adams’ definition of ‘public happiness’ captures the sense of collectively 
engaging that seems to be vital for any engagement that I witnessed in mast siting 
controversies to really kick off. 
 In the first step of the engagement process, early engagers wanted to be ap-
proved and respected by their neighbours, to know that their engagement was a col-
lective cause worth their effort. Engaged citizens wanted for and foremost to be heard 
and to be taken seriously by the local authorities who they considered to be (more or 
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less) in charge of the siting decision. Often citizens felt that they were not heard and 
taken seriously, even though they experienced themselves to be more knowledgeable 
on the issue than the government officials and politicians they contacted. Yet, en-
gaged citizens did not give up easily. The initial hopes of a swift victory might have 
withered after some time, but in general, they spent an awful lot of time and effort 
trying to engage. The notion of ‘public happiness’ might also give us a clue as to why 
this is so. Leighninger claims that this type of active and engaged citizenship is more 
than a means to an end: “[w]hen people get together in small groups and large groups 
to share concerns, make decisions and solve problems, they don’t just appreciate the 
tangible outcomes – they place a high value on the experience itself” (Leighninger, 
2006: 35). Some of the cases seem to confirm this. In Spijkenisse, the main engager 
kept on being active in the neighbourhood and is now a member of the residents’ 
association. In Maarkedal, the engagement sparked an annual New Year’s Eve tradi-
tion where neighbours gather around a bonfire. 
 Siting controversies are spontaneous forms of citizen involvement in local politics. 
No matter which reasons prevailed for citizens to start and continue their engage-
ment – whether it was a concern about their health, about the landscape or about 
their property values, they were all politically active citizens demanding a good deci-
sion-making process about the siting. They were not per se against the mast itself (as 
many of them did use devices that require antennas for mobile communication), but 
they wanted the authorities to take thorough decisions, that also weighed in the pos-
sibility of risks to health. Citizen engagement aroung the siting of base stations has to 
be understood as part of a changing political landscape in which democracy is more 
than just about elections. Traditional forms of political engagement such as voting or 
party membership have declined since the 1970s, at least in the Netherlands 
(Verhoeven, 2009; WRR, 2012). Instead, taking part in action groups or demonstra-
tions, signing petitions, contacting media, establishing citizen groups or any other 
‘unconventional’ form of political engagement are on the rise. In fact, by now, they 
have become quite conventional ways in which citizens try to voice their concerns, 
anger, and calls for policy change (Ibid.). The French political scientist Rosanvallon 
(2008) understands these sorts of practices by which society demands transparency of 
information, participation and political responsibility from its rulers as a new form of 
democracy, which he calls ‘counter-democracy’. One might assume that citizens have 
become less politically interested, Rosanvallon claims, yet, citizens have shown their 
political awareness with greater “social attentiveness” that results in “counter-
democratic practices” that “give rise to informal, parallel forms of authority, or correc-
tive powers” (Rosanvallon, 2008: 290–291). I would like to argue that citizen engage-
ment in mast siting controversies can be understood as such a counter-democratic 
practice. 
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 Within the changing political landscape, citizen engagement can take different 
forms such as policy participation, social participation and social initiatives (WRR, 
2012): 
[i]n the ﬁrst two of these, policymakers take the lead and citizens are ‘allowed’ to 
take part by having their say, for instance, or by acting as volunteers. In the third 
category, that of social initiatives, citizens themselves are increasingly showing 
enterprise (WRR, 2012: 11; English summary). 
Only the latter (social initiative) is a non-orchestrated form of citizen engagement, of 
which mast siting controversies are an example. This may at first seem a rather trou-
bling form of citizen engagement, as it may slow down the decision-making process 
and arguably hinder economic development. Yet, citizens in mast siting controversies 
acted within the boundaries of the established rules and regulations, such as filing an 
official complaint. I thus argue that citizen engagement in mast siting controversies 
can be typified as ‘agonistic’, a concept I take from Chantal Mouffe (2000, 2005) as 
used by Imrat Verhoeven (2009). Agonistic relations are different from antagonistic. In 
both relations, there is a ‘we-against-them’ divide, but in antagonistic relations, this 
comes down to rivalry as both sides are considered each other’s enemy. In agonistic 
relationships – say between neighbours and the municipality that has to give a build-
ing permit for a base station – one speaks of opponents rather than enemies. In the 
case of mast siting controversies, citizens respected the boundaries of the political 
system. Opponents acknowledged sharing the same political environment. Simply put, 
citizens tried to change policy by respecting the rules of democracy and the constitu-
tional state. 
 In all cases, the engagement was framed by deeper social, cultural and political 
commitments of the engaged citizens. The personal backgrounds of especially the 
early engagers were important in determining the course of the engagement. In 
Nieuwkoop, for example, the experiences of illness of the early engager immediately 
drew attention to possible health risks. This finding also came back in the case studies 
of mast siting controversies that I reviewed in the previous chapter (Drake, 2006; Law 
and McNeish, 2007; Soneryd, 2007), particularly Drake attributed the engaged citi-
zens’ focus on health risks to the professional background of one the early engagers. 
Each community that became engaged had a culture, i.e. “a sense of ongoing practic-
es, habits, norms, identities, and relationships” that sustained engagement against a 
development that did not fit with this culture (Gibson, 2006: 8). In Maastricht and 
Maarkedal, for example, neighbours shared the same culture of living in the country-
side and the desire to protect it. This sense of neighbourhood culture was critical in 
transforming the siting of a mast from an individual to a collective concern that the 
neighbourhood was bothered about. 
 The groups of engaged citizens that were set up in order to advance the collective 
engagement have many similarities with what the social movement literature calls 
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‘grassroots groups’ (Tesh, 2000). ‘Grassroots’ is a term common in U.S. politics to 
refer to public opinion or individual members of a political party, the most basic or 
fundamental political level. In social movement theory (also mostly coming from the 
U.S.), ‘grassroots groups’ usually refer to a collective of citizens on a local or neigh-
bourhood level that are formed because of some problem in the community, often 
environmental and planning issues such as a planned landfill or incinerator, or existing 
industrial activities (Tesh, 2000).18 These groups are called grassroots groups, because 
they are quintessentially local in their connection to a particular area, neighbourhood 
or a set of streets. The groups are formed by local people, and all of the work is done 
by them. Becoming part of such a grassroots group is not by an official membership, 
but by giving one’s support. The structure of these grassroots groups is very informal, 
and people come and go as they please. Endorsement from other neighbours is very 
important since grassroots groups have no or little budget. In case they want to go to 
court, money is needed, and then the larger number of supporters literally pays off. 
Grassroots groups stay together and active as long as they need to, usually disbanding 
when the goal is achieved or not. 
 The citizen groups that were formed in mast siting controversies share many of 
the characteristics of grassroots groups: they were ad hoc, local, open, flexible and 
temporary. Yet, I prefer calling them ‘collectives’ or ‘groups’ of engaged citizens, be-
cause the term grassroots is so much embedded in the environmental movement, and 
I would not want to typify mast siting controversies as primarily environmental issues, 
even though it has links with the movement.19 Citizens in mast siting controversies did 
not always act out of the same interests, neither were their reasons always about the 
object itself (the mast). Despite the fact that “every person has his own story, why 
they think [the siting] is illogical” (Interview MA1), citizens were very much a collective 
of individuals engaging together. 
 In the review of social scientific research, we saw that several risk research stud-
ies showed a link between high perceived risk and high distrust in regulators (industry 
and/or government) (and vice versa) (see chapter 2). Also in my case studies, a num-
ber of citizens distrusted the (local and national) government, mobile phone operators 
and (sometimes) scientific institutions and organisations. In Nieuwkoop, citizens espe-
cially expressed low trust in the municipality. In all cases, citizens distrusted the mo-
bile phone operators. The websites that engaged citizens turned to further amplified 
the perceptions of mistrust by relating stories of the mismanagement of the govern-
ment and referring to previous health scares. According to Löfstedt (2005), ‘trust’ 
                                                                
18 Also see www.grassrootsgrantmakers.org  
19 For example, the Stichting Milieuziektes (literal translation: Foundation Environmental Diseases) con-
cerned itself with RF EMF as a form of ‘pollution’ (see section The presumed deficit of scientific knowledge in 
chapter 5) and Prof. Lucas Reijnders, who instigated public interest in possible health risks from RF EMF, 
was also active in the environmental movement (see section Wireless communication technology in the 
public arena in chapter 4). 
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consists of three dimensions: fairness (defined by a view of the process or outcome as 
being (im)partial), competence (defined by an evaluation of the process as being 
(non)proficient), and efficiency (defined by an evaluation of the spending of taxpayers’ 
money in the regulatory process). In the mast siting controversies I studied, fairness 
and competence were the main aspects that came up. Citizens argued that the siting 
process was not fair because the mobile phone operators exerted too much influence 
on the national government, and this ultimately prevented the government from 
making competent decisions. In all cases, citizens were critical about the decision-
making process of the municipality, and considered the latter to be simply following 
mobile phone operators’ instructions. 
 In conclusion of this section, I showed that the collective aspect of engaged citi-
zens was paramount in understanding why and how citizens engaged with mast siting. 
I argued that mast siting controversies were forms of social and political initiatives – 
actions of counter-democracy – of which citizens were the engine. A few individuals 
needed to take the initiative, but citizens engaged together and needed the approval 
of neighbours to justify their actions. They took matters into their own hands without 
top-down assistance from the state. The idea of public happiness captured the signifi-
cance that engaged citizens contributed to the engagement. My research seems to 
imply that the extent to which citizen engagement takes shape depends on the exist-
ence of a growing or strongly established neighbourhood culture that binds citizens 
together. 
Grassroots support teams 
Other engaged citizens also played a crucial role in stimulating the collective engage-
ment of citizens: websites of individuals or groups that supported local citizens, but 
also operated on regional, national and even international levels. Some case study 
research of mast siting controversies (Drake, 2006; Law and McNeish, 2007; Soneryd, 
2007) also showed that the engagement did not remain restricted to the local area, 
but citizens addressed national government and organisations to find support (see 
chapter 2). Yet, none of the authors discussed the extent to which these organisations 
played a role in local controversies, and the impact it had on the engagement. In my 
analysis, it became clear that these networks played a crucial role in furthering the 
engagement. The websites did not only give information about possible health risks 
from RF EMF, but also proposed courses of action to take for the engaged citizens. 
The literature on social movements can again be helpful to understand the role of 
these websites. They, or more specifically the individuals behind them, roughly fit the 
description of ‘grassroots support groups’ (Tesh, 2000). In the literature on environ-
mental movements, grassroots support groups are a relatively new phenomenon: 
they “exist to help local organizations” because they “provide information on mobiliz-
ing members, running meetings, using scientific data, talking with the media, pressur-
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ing policymakers, and dealing with stress” (Tesh, 2000: 3). They indeed support grass-
roots groups, not only with information, but also with acknowledging their struggles 
and fears. Yet, Tesh (2000) also describes grassroots support groups as “run[ning] 
periodic conferences to bring local activists together” and having “real offices and 
paid staff”, even if it is on a small budget. 
 In Belgium and the Netherlands, for most of the grassroots support groups con-
cerned with mast siting, this is not the case. The offices are usually in someone’s living 
room or study, and as one of the founders of one the websites assured me once, it 
might feel like a fulltime job, but it is not a paid one. Even speaking of groups might be 
overstating it, since it is unclear how many people are actively involved in any of these 
initiatives, because of all the work that is done behind screens – quite literally in the 
sense of computer screens. Some of them also seem to be wary to identify them-
selves: one of the main figures behind StopUMTS preferred to have a telephone inter-
view with me instead of a face-to-face one in the office to ensure the complete priva-
cy of other members. So, it would be better to speak of ‘grassroots support teams’, as 
a team can already be more than one person. Overall, it is much more low-key but 
therefore not less successful. One does not need a real office in order to reach people. 
Nowadays, people find each other through the Internet, and this has raised the power 
of these online grassroots support teams immensely. 
 The contact with the grassroots support teams online had several impacts on 
collectives of engaged citizens: it informed citizens about possible detrimental health 
effects from masts, it proposed a particular set of social actions, it exposed an overall 
mismanagement of mast siting and it served as an acknowledgement of their cause. 
Through the contact with grassroots support teams, the engagement often became 
increasingly focused on possible health effects from masts. Citizens were thus inter-
ested in the likelihood of unanticipated consequences. They highlighted the uncer-
tainties and pleaded for precautionary measures, such as not siting the masts close to 
schools or densely populated areas. Consequently, and contrary to the grassroots 
support teams, engaged citizens did not demand the ending of the siting of all base 
stations but focused on alternative locations where this particular mast could also be 
sited. 
Engaged citizens’ understanding of risk 
The extent to which the argument of health risks from base stations, pushed forward 
by grassroots support teams, had a significant impact on the engagement depended 
on the culture of the neighbourhood and the citizens’ earlier experience, knowledge 
and commitments. Numerous studies in the field of Public Understanding of Science 
(PUS) show that citizens are embedded in a diverse and shifting landscape of 
knowledge and experience (Grove-White et al., 2000; Irwin and Wynne, 1996; Ot-
tinger, 2013a, 2013b; Wyatt and Henwood, 2006). When having to make a decision 
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vis-à-vis technologically complex products, such as the siting of a mast, they rely cru-
cially on judgements of others (personal or institutional, friends or other organisa-
tions) and on individual or collective experiences. This may be the experience of hav-
ing a friend or relative that suffers from electrohypersensitivity, or having several 
cases of cancer in the neighbourhood that makes one more cautious for extra ‘bur-
dens’ on the ill-ones. Tesh and Williams (1996) use a different concept, that of ‘identi-
ty politics’ to explain how, in their case, the environmental movement also “(…) bases 
demands on the lived experiences, common knowledge, and shared values of ordinary 
people” (Tesh and Williams, 1996: 294). Plough and Krimsky (1987) refer to citizens’ 
own knowledges and experiences as ‘cultural rationality’ or ‘rationality of the social-
world’, to compare it with ‘technical rationality’, which stands for depersonalised 
technical and scientific explanations: 
[b]eyond statistical probabilities and risk-benefit ratios, public risk perception is 
understood through a distinctive form of rationality, one that is shaped by the 
circumstances under which the risk is identified and publicized, the standing or 
place of the individual in his or her community, and the social values of the com-
munity as a whole. (…) It is concerned with the impacts, intrusions or implications 
of a particular event or phenomenon on the social relations that constitute that 
world (Fischer, 2005: 55). 
All these scholars point to the importance of context and relations in understanding 
citizens’ reactions to issues that might involve risks. Also in my analysis, citizen en-
gagements could only be understood as embedded in the local context. 
 Researchers in PUS have taken an ethnographic approach to find out how infor-
mation about a new technology and (possibly) about its negative (health) effects is 
woven into personal lives and how it is constructed during the course of interactions. 
They have challenged the idea that beliefs about technologies are simply the result of 
individual cognitive processes (Tulloch and Lupton, 2001; Veen et al., 2011), to be 
measured by large scale surveys (see chapter 2). Brian Wynne (1996) showed in his 
well-known case study of the Cumbrian farmers whose sheep were exposed to radio-
active soil contamination, that the ‘intellectual’ understanding of risks (thus how citi-
zens make sense of risk information) is a process of social identity-construction. Social 
identity, in turn, is a function of social relations, but is never stable since life is rife 
with messiness, ambivalence and contradictions. In his case study, for example, most 
farmers believed that the radioactive fallout on the Cumbrian hills came from the 
nearby Sellafield nuclear reprocessing plant and not from the radioactive fallout from 
Chernobyl, as government scientists claimed. This belief however was only uttered in 
interviews with Wynne and his colleagues and not pursued in any official way (Lash 
and Wynne, 1992; Wynne, 2008). Many of the farmers’ family members worked in the 
plant, thus “to believe that Sellafield was at least partly to blame (…) was potentially 
to undermine local commitment to the plant and its central role in the local economy 
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and society” (Wynne, 2008: 25). Through in-depth interviews with farmers, Wynne 
came across these different forms of ‘private reflexity’ (Lash and Wynne, 1992: 7), i.e. 
people’s struggles to reconcile conflicting identities in social networks. In a similar 
study approach, Sally Wyatt and Flis Henwood (2006) investigated women’s under-
standings of what constituted ‘risks’ regarding menopause and its treatments. They 
argued that this understanding changed over time and that, even though women 
referred to media accounts of the issue, “women’s own experiences and those of 
their friends, neighbors, colleagues and family are often more decisive” (Wyatt and 
Henwood, 2006: 233). The authors found three ways in which women dealt with the 
uncertainties associated with health risks from menopause treatments: 1) not engaging 
with knowledge claims at all, 2) relying on their own embodied experiences, and 3) 
accepting some future uncertainty. 
 These studies into the public understanding of science and risk-issues show that 
the everyday life experiences of citizens is crucial in understanding their reactions to 
radiation pollution, menopause or mast siting. Mast siting controversies can only be 
understood, I argue, if one takes citizens’ processes of reflexivity (Lash and Wynne, 
1992; Wyatt and Henwood, 2006) into account. In the examined cases, the culture of 
the neighbourhood, the embodied experiences of EMF or other health issues and the 
experiences of neighbours, friends and family with EMF but also with previous en-
gagements, largely shaped the course of the engagement. This is in line with Timoti-
jevic and Barnett’s (2006) and Collins’ (2010) studies into public understanding of RF 
EMF health risks (see chapter 2). They pointed to an array of understandings and 
experiences people related to in order to form an opinion about RF EMF and possible 
health risks.  
The appeal of the ‘health risk framing’ 
In my case studies, especially in Spijkenisse, Drongen and Nieuwkoop, a focus on 
health became stronger as the engagement went on. The few case studies of mast 
siting controversies that I reviewed in the previous chapter also identified this mecha-
nism, but they did not investigate this in-depth over several cases. My analysis shows, 
firstly, that citizens did not frame mast siting as a definite risk but as an uncertain risk, 
that warranted precautionary measures. They were not so much convinced that there 
were in fact risks related to the siting of masts, but they wanted to take the possibility 
of risk into account. Secondly, as discussed above, the extent to which the argument 
of health risk made sense to citizens depended on the neighbourhood culture, the 
personal views of the early engagers and the landscapes of knowledge and experience 
in which citizens were embedded. 
 Thirdly, portraying the siting of masts as an infringement on people’s health had 
the discursive power to create a collective belief that there was a problem and that 
action was needed to solve this problem. It helped to frame mast siting as a cause 
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worth engaging. Thus, in other words, a collective action frame was established. Col-
lective action frame is a concept from social movement theory that denotes the fram-
ing of particular issues as problems that have to be dealt with through collective ac-
tions in the form of social movements, organised groups or NGOs (Benford and Snow, 
2000; Tesh, 2000). In the literature, the organisation of collective action is foremost a 
discursive process in which framing of meanings plays an important role. The ‘uncer-
tain risk’ framing can be understood as a rather convincing and successful frame in 
establishing a collective, for several reasons (compare de Bruijn, 2011). First of all, it 
has an inherent logic: it makes sense to believe that exposure to RF EMF might make 
people ill, as it is commonly known that other forms of radiation such as ionising radi-
ation may negatively affect health. Additionally, there is a long-lasting debate about 
the harmfulness of low frequency electromagnetic fields from power lines, as well as 
microwaves from radar, ovens and other applications. Secondly, it resonates and 
activates shared beliefs and values of the importance of taking care of one’s health 
and the health of one’s family (especially young ones). Thirdly, it is a message that can 
be repeated constantly: new studies that demonstrate a link between exposure to RF 
EMF and illnesses are made available through networks (such as the grassroots sup-
port teams) daily, as well as stories about people getting ill and more ‘evidence’ that 
industry and government are covering up important evidence. Lastly, it uses linguistic 
means such as metaphors and comparisons: the comparison with asbestos and smok-
ing are powerful tropes that do not need words in order to get the message of negli-
gence across. It is believed to be a convincing argument towards governments. 
 A next reason why the focus on health dominated related to the agonistic charac-
ter of citizen engagement. This had an influence on the means by which citizens tried 
to influence the policy-making process of mast siting. They were keen to approach the 
issue in a legal, technical and scientific way – thus finding ‘good arguments’ that the 
authorities or judges could not ignore. Those who started a court case, for example, 
referred to particular scientific studies that reported negative health effects from RF 
EMF and to the endorsement of the precautionary principle by the European Union. 
This finding is in line with social movement theory that shows that the appeal of scien-
tific rationality in environmental conflicts is high (Tesh and Williams, 1996; Tesh, 
2000). Tesh (2000) claims that even though the environmental movement can oppose 
pollution in a moral realm, “justified on the basis that exposure violates social values 
such as personal control, fairness, and community cohesion (…) [it] emphasized sci-
ence since the beginning of the movement” (Tesh, 2000: 94–95). Irwin and Wynne 
(1996) explain the appeal of science in citizen engagement because of science’s al-
leged objective and disinterested characteristics: “there is an assumption that science 
is an important force for human improvement and that it offers a uniquely privileged 
view of the everyday world” (Irwin & Wynne, 1996, p. 6). Also in my case study re-
search, I observed the appeal and power of scientific arguments, an aspect I will fur-
ther explore in chapter 5. 
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 To conclude, ‘risk’ and not least, ‘health’ can be a powerful concern. Even in 
those cases where health risks were not the main reason for engaging, citizens would 
incorporate it into their notices of objection, and would communicate about it to the 
press and other interested parties. One could claim that arguing around scientific 
uncertainty is more likely to have impact than trying to argue about local or even 
personal impacts (such as impact on house prices). In that sense, the rhetoric of ‘risks’ 
and ‘uncertainty’ can be seen as a political instrument used by citizens to try to put 
certain social problems, in this case the siting of base stations, on the public agenda 
(compare Borraz, 2008). 
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Introduction 
At a quick glance, all of the mast siting controversies I studied could have been typi-
fied predominantly as cases of concern for possible health risks. Indeed, this concern 
was uttered in newspaper articles, on blogs and websites of groups of engaged citi-
zens and in interviews with me in all of my cases. Yet, diving deeper into each mast 
siting controversy showed not only that there were many more concerns, but also 
that these concerns were imbued with a sense of deep dissatisfaction at how the 
siting had been dealt with by local authorities (see chapter 3). Citizens engaged collec-
tively to influence the municipal decision to allow a mast for wireless communication 
to be sited on that spot. They soon figured out that municipalities in fact did not have 
much power. Even though municipalities are the ones that either give an exemption 
decision and building permit to the mobile phone operators (the Netherlands) or an 
informed advice about siting to the authorities in charge of the permits (Flanders), 
most of the rules and regulations around siting are decided by national (Dutch) or 
regional (Flemish) policy and mobile phone company strategies. Engaged citizens 
found out that it is not the municipalities but another higher authority that deter-
mines what municipalities can and cannot do and how much leeway they have in 
making a company site its base station somewhere else. Municipalities in the Nether-
lands declared to be “simply following the national policy” (Interview M7) when they 
refuted the engaged citizens’ notices of objection against the siting of the mast, and 
especially the concerns about uncertain health risks: “radiation is not a topic or item 
on which we can refuse the siting of a mast. That is determined nationally by The 
Hague” (Interview E1). As we saw in the last chapter, this led to a paradoxical situa-
tion: municipalities were the authorities that citizens turned to, yet their hands were 
tied by national or regional policies. This meant that municipalities could not accom-
modate citizens’ concerns, even if they wanted; and that the topic of health concerns 
was not an issue for discussion on this local level.  
 In this chapter, I discuss why and how this situation could occur by focusing on 
the interplay of government policies with citizen engagement around mast siting. How 
did national policies on the siting of antennas develop and shape local policy, and 
citizen engagement? Who were the main actors involved in shaping this policy, and 
what was their role? I zoom out from a focus on the engaged citizen and the collec-
tives that emerged around the siting of base stations and instead pay attention to the 
international and national levels of dealing with the implementation of a wireless 
communication network: the institutional and political frames. I go back some time to 
the beginning of the establishment of a wireless communication network in the 
1990s, to a time when the mobile world as we know it today was still in the making, 
and analyse the policy developments (in particular of siting) around this innovative 
technology. I mainly focus on the Netherlands and its international networks, but also 
briefly discuss the Belgian/Flemish situation as a point of reference. I discuss the de-
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velopment of wireless communication technology and associated concerns and ideas 
in different arenas. Firstly, I look at the public arena in the 1990s when stories about 
mobile telephony started to appear in the media. Secondly, I discuss the expert arena 
in which experts addressed questions about EMF and health. Thirdly, I analyse the 
Dutch policy arena in the 1990s during which the government invested in mobile 
telephony and the first parliamentary questions about the harmfulness of the tech-
nology arose. Fourthly, I go through the local policy arena of municipalities’ first reac-
tions to siting of base stations. Lastly, I focus on the industry arena and their reactions 
of corporate responsibility to increasing societal concerns about siting. In the follow-
ing sections, I dive deeper into the Dutch antenna policy that was established in the 
beginning of the 2000s as a reaction to the discussions in the different arenas in the 
1990s and early 2000s. The government interpreted these discussions, and especially 
those on the local policy level, as concerns about health impacts from antennas and 
thus focused on science-based information as a response. One aspect of this science-
based policy was the provision of risk information to citizens, not through nation-wide 
campaigns, but through spokespersons such as the Antennebureau and municipalities. 
I conclude this chapter by summarising what these findings mean in terms of under-
standing the dynamics of the wireless communication technology controversy. 
Wireless communication technology in the public arena: concerns, but no big issue 
In the early 1990s, the development of wireless communication technology was still in 
its infancy. In the 1980s, it was heralded as a technology that could increase economic 
productivity by helping business people ‘on the go’ to be in constant touch with the 
office (Agar, 2004). It was not until the change from analogue (first generation, 1G) to 
digital (second generation, 2G) in the 1990s, that mobile phone use really kicked off 
and became affordable and available for many more people. The United States took a 
head start: in 1990, there were around 5 million mobile phone subscriptions, five 
years later this number had grown to 33 million, 10 years later to 109 million (In-
foplease, 2007). From the early 1990s, there were attempts to put the issue of health 
risk from wireless communication technology – focusing on either mobile phones or 
base stations – on the public agenda. In the United States, in 1992, the topic of health 
risks from mobile phones first came up for discussion in a lawsuit against a mobile 
phone operator. Susan Reynard undertook legal action after developing a brain tu-
mour which she believed to be caused by her frequent use of her mobile phone (Ni-
cholson, 2001). Even though there had been cases related to EMF about broadcast 
towers or military and police radar, this was the first litigation in relation to a mobile 
phone (Burgess, 2004). 
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 In the Netherlands, the newspaper NRC Handelsblad20 reported briefly on the 
‘brain cancer lawsuit’ in February 1993, with the headline ‘Mobile phones cause panic 
in the U.S.’ (Ligtenberg, 1993). The article reported that the story had scared many 
Americans, who were sceptical of the industry’s denials of any health risks from mo-
bile phones. It even had its repercussions on Wall Street, as shares from big compa-
nies such as Motorola dropped slowly. After Susan Reynard’s husband’s appearance 
on the popular television show Larry King Live, an industry conducted poll found that 
half of all Americans knew about the lawsuit (Burgess, 2004). In the Netherlands by 
contrast, there had not been any anxiety caused by the highly mediatised ‘scary story’, 
according to the NRC. The article reported that a spokesperson from the then only 
telecommunication company in the Netherlands, the PTT (Staatsbedrijf der Posterijen, 
Telegrafie en Telefonie), said that no questions were received about this issue (Ligten-
berg, 1993). Three years earlier, the same Dutch newspaper had reported in the same 
soberly manner on the Americans’ concerns about electromagnetic fields in an article 
about working with computer screens (Köhler, 1990). The journalist was very critical 
of the American tendency to pay ‘disproportionate attention’ to harm from technolo-
gies, instruments or chemicals compared to harm from human behaviour. As an ex-
ample he cited the cleaning of asbestos in school buildings, which cost several million 
dollars but only saves one life per 100 million children: “rationally speaking the money 
would be better spent on swimming lessons for the American youth” (Köhler, 1990). 
 It is not until 1994 that we see the first public debate about health risks from 
wireless communication technology in the Dutch written media. An article in the 
newspaper Algemeen Dagblad21 (n.a., 1994) discussed the concerns of Lucas 
Reijnders, a professor in environmental sciences, conservationist and policy advisor of 
the Stichting Natuur en Milieu (Foundation Nature and Environment, author’s transla-
tion), an influential Dutch environmental organisation founded in 1972 (Parlement en 
Politiek, 2013). His concerns were targeted at the “poles that the PTT is placing in the 
whole country for strengthening the network for car telephones”. He warned that 
“radiation” from base stations can cause cancer (n.a., 1994). Reijnders seemed to 
have been triggered by the publication of two Swedish studies linking living close to 
high-voltage lines with increased chances of childhood leukaemia. The results of these 
studies were for Reijnders “reason enough” to argue that it was needed “to take 
measures now and not wait until a causal connection is proven for a 100 per cent” 
(n.a., 1994). Reijnders thus projected these new concerns about exposure to base 
stations into existing debates about possible health effects from the entire electro-
magnetic spectrum. Placing the activity of base station siting in a wider frame of other 
EMF risk issues was a way to create larger meaning around the topic. In the opinion 
article Reijnders alluded to new scientific evidence related to exposure to high-voltage 
                                                                
20 The NRC Handelsblad is considered a quality newspaper in the Netherlands, (see van der Hoeven, 2012). 
21 Algemeen Dagblad is the second largest paying morning newspaper in the Netherlands. 
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power lines which is part of the EMF spectrum (extremely low frequency or ELF), but 
is not the same as radiofrequencies from base stations. 
 Concerns about technologies spanning the wide spectrum of electromagnetic 
fields date back some time. Before the 1990s, other and older microwave technolo-
gies such as radio communication, colour television, computer screens and microwave 
ovens had prompted some concerns about harmful radiation (Burgess, 2004; Goldha-
ber et al., 1988; Murphy, 2006; Passchier, 1999; Steneck, 1984). In 1981, in the Neth-
erlands, parliamentary questions were asked about leakages from microwave ovens 
(Tweede Kamer, 1981). Throughout the 1990s, the Dutch press reported repeatedly 
on new scientific insights related to exposure to high-voltage power lines (ELF EMF, 
see Figure 1.1. in chapter 1), but also on a case in which several U.S. soldiers attribut-
ed their cancer to earlier exposure to radar (Nieuwenhuis, 1998). At the end of the 
1970s, concerns about ELF emerged, first in the United States and then in Europe, and 
were often linked to concerns about wireless communication technology (Burgess, 
2004; Passchier, 1999). The one-man initiative Microwave News, for example, a U.S. 
newsletter devoted completely to EMF-issues since 1981, has been involved in raising 
awareness first about high-voltage power lines and later about mobile phones (Bur-
gess, 2004). Also in expert circles, which I will discuss in more detail in the next sec-
tion, the question of possible risks from RF EMF (such as from base stations) were 
assimilated into the existing knowledge on other applications of the electromagnetic 
spectrum, and ELF EMF had already received a lot of scientific attention in the previ-
ous years. The Dutch Kennisplatform EMV & Gezondheid, for example, addressed both 
RF EMF and ELF EMF issues (see chapter 5). From a scientific perspective, there was a 
clear link between RF EMF and ELF EMF, even though the interaction of RF EMF and 
ELF EMF with matter is different. Citizens who wanted to pay attention to base station 
siting of mobile telephony thus tapped into this rhetoric of ELF EMF and its scientific 
evidence for a possible link between childhood leukaemia and exposure to electric 
and magnetic fields. 
 Eric van Rongen, doctor in radiobiology and scientific staff at the Gezond-
heidsraad (Health Council of the Netherlands) reacted to Reijnders’ allegations (Van 
Rongen, 1994). Van Rongen claimed that Reijnders got the science all wrong because 
he mixed up two sorts of ‘radiation’22: low frequency electromagnetic fields (high-
voltage power lines) and radiofrequent fields (mobile phone masts). Van Rongen stat-
ed: “it is scientifically unacceptable to contribute an alleged effect of exposure of one 
sort of radiation to another” (Van Rongen, 1994). Reijnders countered in another 
newspaper article that mobile phone masts also emit low frequency EMF and that he 
was thus “not sure whether we can speak about a safe situation concerning exposure 
to radiofrequency electromagnetic fields in the Netherlands” (Reijnders, 1994). After 
                                                                
22 Van Rongen writes in his article that ‘radiation’ is not the correct term, but that he uses it to make things 
easier to understand. 
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these three opinion articles, there was no further newspaper debate between the two 
men, neither a broader debate in the media. 
 Overall, in the beginning of the 1990s, there was little public attention for health 
risks from wireless communication technology. Reijnders can be considered the first in 
the Netherlands to try to put the issue of possible negative health effects from mobile 
phone masts on the public agenda. He tried to project the siting of base stations into a 
wider frame of contention, in this case the debates about possible health risk from 
exposure to electric and magnetic fields. Reijnders claimed to have been triggered to 
gain more in-depth knowledge about radiation from mobile phone masts by questions 
from citizens to the Stichting Natuur en Milieu such as ‘can these PTT masts be harm-
ful?’ (as described by Bröer et al. (2010) on the basis of an interview with Reijnders). 
However, the newspaper debate did not lead to much more input from citizens. It 
remained a rather technical discussion between Reijnders as self-proclaimed whistle-
blower of possible health risks and a staff member working on electromagnetic fields 
from the Gezondheidsraad. The Gezondheidsraad had put the possible health effects 
of EMF on its agenda, by its own initiative, partly in order to update advisory reports 
from the 1970s, so it was not surprising that a staff member of the Gezondheidsraad 
reacted to Reijnders’ warnings. The Gezondheidsraad is (and has been since 1902) an 
independent statutory advisory body that advises ministers and parliament on the 
state of the art concerning questions about public health. Ministers and parliament 
can ask for advice, but the Gezondheidsraad can also give unsolicited advice when it 
considers a topic of importance (for an in-depth discussion of the Gezondheidsraad, 
see Bijker et al., 2009). This happened with EMF and health. Its staff members thus 
became involved with national and international expert bodies on EMF. In fact, dis-
cussions about possible health effects from sources of non-ionising radiation were 
mostly restricted to the expert arena. The articles by Reijnders thus had the effect 
that the expert discussion on EMF became briefly visible in the public arena. For staff 
members of the Gezondheidsraad, the issue of health risks from wireless communica-
tion technology was assimilated into a larger international debate about the safety of 
applications of practices involving the exposure to electromagnetic radiation and 
fields, divided between non-ionising and ionising electromagnetic radiation (see Fig-
ure 1.1. in chapter 1). 
 In the Netherlands, in the 1990s, public discussions about wireless communica-
tion technology were restricted to a few opinion articles from a professor in environ-
mental sciences who proclaimed health risks from the base stations for the budding 
GSM-network. The media also paid some attention to other EMF-issues such as radar 
or high-voltage power lines. The fact that a staff member of the Gezondheidsraad 
reacted to the opinion articles shows that EMF was a topic in the hands of scientists, 
and that RF EMF from base stations for wireless communication technology fitted into 
existing scientific insights about possible health risks from ionising and non-ionising 
electromagnetic radiation. 
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Wireless communication technology in the expert arena: focus on health risks of 
EMF 
The history of the protection from non-ionising radiation, of which radiofrequency 
electromagnetic fields is part, is closely tied to the history of protection from ionising 
radiation. In the early 20th century, protection from ionising radiation became increas-
ingly important after the discovery of its harmful effects. In 1925, the first Interna-
tional Congress of Radiology declared the need for establishing international protec-
tion standards. Three years later, the International X-ray and Radium Commission was 
established – the predecessor of the later International Commission on Radiological 
Protection – and the first safety recommendations were published (Clarke and Valen-
tin, 2009; International Commission on Radiological Protection, 1928; Lindell, 1996). 
Initially, the protection of the individual was emphasised. This focus changed after the 
Second World War, with the nuclear weapons trials and the applications of nuclear 
energy for electricity production. A new profession of ‘health physics’ or ‘specialists in 
radiation protection’ arose around that time – the Health Physics Society, which is 
mainly based in the U.S., dates from 1956 – that aimed to protect humans and the 
environment from detrimental effects of ionising radiation. The exposure limits of the 
second part of the 20th century were based on the assumption that there is no safe 
exposure level, thus there is no level that does not entail a risk of genetic defects. 
 Applications of non-ionising radiation date from the early 20th century. As the 
practices with possible exposures to non-ionising electromagnetic radiation of fields 
increased throughout the 20th century – think of radar, electrical appliances and the 
electricity networks, radio transmitters, microwave ovens, solariums, computer 
screens and mobile phones and antennas – the question about possible health risks 
from non-ionising radiation also became more relevant. It has a certain logic that 
scholarly interest in non-ionising electromagnetic fields mostly came from experts 
already working on ionising radiation. The international federation of radiation protec-
tion societies, the International Radiation Protection Association (IRPA), decided to set 
up the International Non-Ionizing Radiation Committee (INIRC) in 1977. This latter 
committee changed into the International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation 
Protection (ICNIRP) in 1992 (International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation 
Protection (ICNIRP), n.d.). Like its counterpart in ionising radiation, the INIRC also 
proposed exposure limits for non-ionising radiation (Duchêne et al., 1991). But unlike 
the norms for ionising radiation, for which it was (and still is) believed that there is no 
safe threshold, at least for cancer induction and genetic effects, the rationale behind 
the exposure limits for non-ionising is based on the assumption — common in non-
cancer toxicology — that there is a threshold below which no health effects are to be 
expected. 
 In the Netherlands, the Gezondheidsraad advised the government on protection 
from ionising radiation since 1926 (Gezondheidsraad, 1926). The interest in non-
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ionising radiation started in the 1970s when the Gezondheidsraad prepared several 
advices on radiofrequency electromagnetic fields, specifically micro meter radiation, 
optical radiation and UV-radiation (Gezondheidsraad, 1975, 1978). The focus was 
primarily advising the government about safe working environments. In line with what 
was happening internationally, some Gezondheidsraad staff working on these advices 
had expertise in the area of ionising radiation but became increasingly interested in 
non-ionising radiation.23 They were part of a network of professionals working on 
EMF, such as the Fachverband für Strahlenschutz, the organisation of radiation protec-
tion professionals in Germany and German-speaking Switzerland, who also had a 
group that was actively working on non-ionising radiation (Arbeitskreis nicht-
ionisierende Strahlung, AKNIR). In the 1990s, some staff members of the Gezond-
heidsraad also had contacts with professionals in the United States carrying out re-
search into radio frequent fields, such as possible health effects of mobile phones or 
effects of high-voltage lines power lines. This area of research was still in development 
but the U.S. took a head start.24 Informed by the international scholarly debate, the 
Gezondheidsraad set general exposure limits for RF EMF for the public and workers 
(Gezondheidsraad, 1997), but did not specifically focus on the exposure from mobile 
phones or base stations. Internationally, exposure limits for RF EMF were established. 
The ICNIRP published its recommendations in 1998 (International Commission on 
Non-Ionising Radiation Protection, 1998), which were endorsed by the European Un-
ion in 1999 (The Council of the European Union, 1999). The World Health Organisa-
tion (WHO) and the European Union were furthermore funding major international 
research projects on electromagnetic fields and health risks. In 1995, the European 
Commission announced the funding of an international epidemiological investigation 
called ‘INTERPHONE’, that ran from 2000 to 2005, into the link between mobile phone 
use and cancer. A year later, the WHO launched the ‘International EMF project’ that 
addressed all sorts of EMF, including radiofrequencies from mobile phones. Both 
projects referred to the rapid development of wireless communication technology 
and the ubiquitous presence of mobile phones around the world (European Commis-
sion, n.d.; International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), n.d.). 
 In the Gezondheidsraad, questions about possible health risks from wireless 
communication technology, such as the public allegations by Reijnders about harm-
fulness from base stations, were assimilated in an (existing) expert body of knowledge 
about the safety of all applications of practices involving the exposure to electromag-
netic radiation and fields. Interest in the safety of RF EMF increased when wireless 
                                                                
23 Most of the staff members of the Gezondheidsraad have a PhD degree. 
24 Personal communication Wim Passchier, former deputy executive director of the Gezondheidsraad. This 
interest in scientific research into RF EMF could have been triggered by the Reynard’s lawsuit discussed 
earlier and by on-going controversy about a high-voltage power line between New York and the Niagara 
Falls. In addition, in the 1990s, the Wireless Technology Research platform was established in the U.S., 
sponsored by industry. 
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communication technology became more prominent in society in the early 1990s. 
Radiation protection specialists with a background in ionising radiation also began to 
focus on non-ionising radiation, as the establishment of the INIRC by the IRPA shows. 
Even though these are different physical phenomena, in policy terms, the protection 
against RF EMF is related to the protection against ionising radiation. A number of 
people and organisations such as the Gezondheidsraad that were in charge of advising 
the government on protection were active in both domains. I assert that, to a certain 
extent, the way of thinking about how to deal with applications that expose individu-
als or groups of people to ionising radiation framed dealing with protection from non-
ionising radiation. Solutions were thus sought in establishing exposure limits to pro-
tect individuals and groups in society. In contrast to ionising radiation, a threshold was 
identified below which (in general) no risks for health effects (for the public) are to be 
expected. The effect of the interaction of RF EMF is heating of tissue, which is an ef-
fect that is theoretically well understood. It is the basis for today’s exposure limits. 
Until the end of the 1990s, there was hardly any discussion about possible ‘low doses’ 
and non-thermal effects.25 
 In the expert arena, the issue of possible health effects from mobile communica-
tion was placed in established scientific debates of known and unknown effects of the 
entire electromagnetic spectrum. Scientists projected the issue into a larger scientific 
question of the safety of electromagnetic fields, of which RF EMF from base stations 
was only a minor part. Yet, throughout the 1990s, the scientific interest grew in possi-
ble health effects from wireless communication technology and in establishing expo-
sure limits. 
Wireless communication technology in the policy arena: technology push 
In the policy arena, the primary interest was in the economic potential of the technol-
ogy. From the early 1990s, preparations were made for a law on telecommunication 
services, in pursuit of the liberalisation of the market for telecommunication networks 
and services (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 1998). Debates preceding the law in 
parliament26 focused on licences and market competitiveness. In a deliberation of the 
law in 1998, a member of parliament applauded the Minister of Economic Affairs’ 
efforts: 
[l]ast year the investments in information technology and telecommunications 
grew faster in our country than other West-European countries. That is of great 
                                                                
25 This changed throughout the 2000s. Concerned citizen(s) (groups) and some experts are known to criti-
cise the exposure limits on the basis that they only protect against thermal effects. The discussion then 
focuses on the possible existence of low-exposure non-thermal effects (see chapter 5). 
26 These debates took place in the Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (Lower Chamber or House of Repre-
sentatives), which together with the Eerste Kamer (Upper Chamber or Senate) make up the Dutch parlia-
ment. 
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importance, because this sector is crucial for the growth of employment and be-
cause optimal telecommunication facilities are the most important conditions for 
the establishment of international companies (Tweede Kamer, 1998). 
The law thus provided a framework for the optimal use of this new and booming 
technology that was believed to bring great economic benefits to the country and to 
its citizens in interconnecting them all. In the policy arena, attention was thus focused 
on the ‘goede kansen’ or ‘opportunities’ of the technology (WRR (Scientific Council for 
Government Policy), 2010). 
 In 1997, the Vaste Kamercommissie van Verkeer en Waterstaat (Parliamentary 
Committee of Transport, Public Works and Water Management) asked a number of 
questions about the health safety and nuisance of electromagnetic fields (Tweede 
Kamer, 1997). The parliamentary committee explained that parliamentarians had 
regularly received signals from concerned citizens about the influence of radio waves 
from radio transmitters, GSM base stations, mobile phones and electromagnetic fields 
from power lines. The committee sketched a situation of scientific uncertainty, by 
referring to scientific studies “that mention possible effects (…) on genetic material 
(…) and the occurrence of cancer” and the 1997 Gezondheidsraad report that con-
cluded that exposure to certain EMF could have a negative influence on health in 
certain circumstances. The committee therefore asked whether there was reason for 
“extra caution” (Tweede Kamer, 1997). The committee further had questions about 
the spatial planning aspects of base stations: what if exposure limits would become 
stricter in the future, how would that affect existing base stations and what policy 
options did the ministry have? The response of the Minister of Transport, Public 
Works and Water Management was one of general reassurance. It claimed that, 
based on the advices of the Gezondheidsraad, it was not to be expected that exposure 
limits had to become stricter in the short run. However, the minister also acknowl-
edged the increasing public concern about siting practices. It announced to deal with 
the “increasing public interest in possible health risks” by way of intensification of 
interdepartmental cooperation and by ‘keeping a finger on the pulse’: “[w]e will keep 
up with the scientific developments in the area of health effects of electromagnetic 
radiation so that the policy can be changed in case of new insights” (Tweede Kamer, 
1997). 
 The government thus tackled the kwade kansen or ‘bad chances’ (WRR, 2010) of 
the wireless communication technology by referring to the expert arena. The govern-
ment used the Gezondheidsraad and its advices as arbitrators, i.e. the government 
stated that scientific knowledge would be decisive in changing its policy. The issue 
thus remained open as the government promised to keep an eye on new scientific 
developments – by means of the Gezondheidsraad. With this position, the govern-
ment tied the policy arena and the expert arena together. It was, however, not the 
first time the government had reacted to concerns about base stations by taking re-
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course to the expert arena. In their letter, the parliamentary committee referred to 
public discussions in three so-called transmitter conglomerates, i.e. neighbourhoods 
that lived in close proximity to several radio transmitters (ANP, 1996; Ritsema, 1996; 
Van Dinther, 1996). Since the late 1980s, residents of one such village, Zeewolde, had 
complained about technical interferences with household equipment but also raised 
concerns about their health. By then, the government also reacted in a reassuring 
way: the emitted fields were within the safety standards proposed by the IRPA 
(Tweede Kamer, 1988a). Further scientific research into the influence of radiation on 
the health of the residents was not considered needed by the Dutch government 
(Tweede Kamer, 1988b). Yet, in 1996, in response to continuing complaints from resi-
dents in Zeewolde about headaches, concentration problems and fatigue, the Ge-
meentelijke Geneeskundige Dienst (GGD, Community Health Services) performed 
research that concluded the case, according to the government, as it did not show a 
causal connection between the health complaints and the radio frequent electromag-
netic fields of the transmitters (Tweede Kamer, 1996). 
 I conclude in this section that, in the 1990s, the Dutch government focused on 
creating policies that enabled the development of wireless communication technolo-
gy. When questions arose about possible health risks from RF EMF (also from other 
applications such as radio stations), the government responded by referring to its 
scientific advisory body, the Gezondheidsraad. According to the ministry, the Gezond-
heidsraad did not find any evidence for health risks from RF EMF, but would keep a 
close track of scientific developments. The government thus responded in a reassur-
ing way and promised to keep an eye on future scientific developments.  
Wireless communication technology in the local policy arena: dissatisfaction with 
siting practices 
Despite the government’s referral to increasing public anxiety about possible health 
risks from wireless communication technology in its 1997 responses to parliamentary 
questions, it was not the case that citizens were only concerned about their health in 
relation to base stations (see chapter 3). Not just citizens, but also municipalities felt 
taken by surprise by what they considered as questionable interventions in spatial 
planning. In 1995 and 1998, the government auctioned several licences for GSM-
frequencies, and in 2000, for UMTS. Telecom operators thus soon began to develop 
their networks by siting numerous base stations. There were two incentives to do this 
quickly: mobile phone operators had spent a lot of money on the licenses, and they 
were obliged to provide nationwide coverage in a few years, or “in a punishing pace” 
as some media typified it (Köhler, 1999; Lammerse, 1999)_ENREF_18. One newspaper 
journalist compared the siting process to a war: “[i]n the fight for the billion market of 
mobile phones, the new providers elbow each other out of the way to occupy the 
country with an army of base stations” (Wittenberg, 1999). The article continued by 
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explaining that in times of war, rules, etiquette, scruples, or forms of participation are 
impediments that slow down the march. The journalist had spoken to tenants of 
blocks of buildings who complained about the siting of antennas on their roofs. The 
telecom operators deemed high buildings a perfect location for their antennas. More-
over, antennas were attractive for flat owners, because they could “rent out the roof 
of their tenants for good money” However, tenants felt “taken by surprise when 
French and English speaking mechanics start drilling on the roof unannounced” (Köh-
ler, 1999). In another newspaper article a tenant uttered the same complaints: “[i]t 
should be impossible that the landlord who is used to sending around letters about 
every little colour on every little door (…) now all of a sudden sends up a team of con-
tractors up on the roof unannounced” (Köhler, 1999). 
 The presumed economic, profit-driven aspects of wireless communication tech-
nology – the money flat owners make, the profits of telecom operators27, and the 
incomes the government generated with the sale of licences – were a common theme 
in mast siting controversies. As one person phrased it in a newspaper article about 
citizen engagement in a mast siting controversy in Spijkenisse: “the reason why the 
government does not intervene is because of the money that is involved” (Polder, 
2005). A blog post on a website dealing with a local case of mast siting called ‘no mast 
here’ was even more specific: “[t]he government has sold the UMTS-licences for 
about 3 million euro and cooperates with the operators to build over the Netherlands 
with base stations. According to that same government, there are no health risks (…) 
How careful! What a coincidence!” (n.a, 2009). Also in the online platform called 
Burgerministerie voor Stralingsbescherming (Ministry of citizens for radiation protec-
tion) the opinion reigned that “all health interests are being sacrificed to the econom-
ic development” (Burgerministerie voor Stralingsbescherming, 2012). 
 At the end of the millennium, the “surprise attacks” of the mobile phone opera-
tors (Wittenberg, 1999) – in the journalist’s war analogy – led to feelings of discon-
tent, mistrust and resentment amongst tenants of high buildings and municipalities. 
Some local authorities had become frustrated with the uncontrolled proliferation of 
antennas (wildgroei). They had no overview of how many base stations there were in 
their city, neither where or how many more to expect. Some tried to remedy this 
spatial planning problem by regulating the siting of base station with building permits. 
Other municipalities wanted to accommodate their citizens’ concerns about health 
risks by prohibiting the siting of antennas on residential areas, hospitals, and nursing 
homes. In my case studies, which all occurred in the mid-2000s, the municipalities 
                                                                
27 Indeed, the telecom industry was generally perceived as wealthy. Yet, it is important to make a distinction 
between the producers of mobile phones and other devices such as Apple, Samsung or Nokia and the 
telecom operators that provide wireless services and are responsible for siting base stations such as T-
Mobile or KPN. In the Netherlands, the telecom industry was made up solely of these operators, who found 
themselves in financial difficulties throughout the 2000s (e.g. because of the purchasing of expensive 
licenses for the use of frequencies, see later in this chapter). This is important to note because manufactur-
ers are not an actor in siting controversies, but telecom operators are. 
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also tried to develop their own policy. Only one of them, the Flemish city of Ghent (of 
which Drongen is a formerly independent municipality) was successful in installing 
their own antenna policy with guidelines about siting: putting antennas together on 
existing masts, bridges, and electricity pylons and preventing siting close to schools, 
hospitals and elderly homes. This policy originated from both an urban planning (after 
the antennas for television were taken away, the city did not want this kind of prolif-
eration anymore) and precautionary perspective (because of uncertainties about 
health risks). The policy could not be enforced, but the city made agreements with 
each mobile phone operator and the guidelines are usually followed (Interview D6). 
The city council in Maastricht and Nieuwkoop also had a local antenna policy, but this 
was mainly a recapitulation of the Dutch national antenna policy (see section From 
technology push to national antenna policy in chapter 4), with a few adaptations, for 
example, about how to communicate about siting to neighbours. As I will discuss later 
in this chapter, there was not a lot of flexibility for Dutch municipalities to make their 
own local antenna policies, as the national government prescribed the rules and regu-
lations. 
 Nonetheless, at the end of the 1990s, when mobile phone operators started to 
site antennas all over the Netherlands, some municipalities sought more influence on 
the siting process. In 1999, the municipality of Dordrecht, for example, established an 
antenna policy that took into account local planning issues but also fear for health 
risks (n.a., 1999a). The fact that the Gezondheidsraad claimed that there was no evi-
dence for the existence of health risks, did not take away the unrest, according to the 
municipal official responsible for spatial planning in Dordrecht (Municipal official Dor-
drecht, personal communication, August 2, 2012). A number of municipalities copied 
this antenna policy: Haarlem, Utrecht and Amsterdam. Also the city of Haar-
lemmermeer demanded that each antenna or mast needed a building permit, making 
around 40 base stations ‘illegal’ overnight. This new policy primarily aimed to tackle 
the increasing destruction of the landscape, which the city council considered an im-
pairment of the enjoyment of residence for its citizens. The municipality stated that it 
was willing to cooperate with mobile phone operators in order to ensure nationwide 
coverage, but only in a responsible way taking into account urban planning and social 
demands (Haarlemmermeer.nl, 1999a). In addition, some landlords became more 
reluctant to site antennas on their roofs because of tenants’ complaints. In the spring 
of 1999, one telecom operator was forced to take several antennas off the roof of a 
flat after tenants complained of health problems. The housing corporation owning the 
flat did not want to take any risks and ended the contract with the operator. It an-
nounced that the antennas could only be placed back on the roof if “it was conclusive-
ly proven that GSM-antennas are no danger for the national health” (Lammerse, 
1999). 
 At the end of the 1990s, municipalities sought to influence the emerging and 
unregulated activity of base station sitings that took place on their territories. The 
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municipalities were especially concerned about the uncontrolled proliferation of an-
tennas and some wanted to take precautionary measures because of the possibility of 
health risks. It did not take long before mobile phone operators and the national gov-
ernment reacted to these local developments. 
Wireless communication in the industry arena: social responsibility 
Telecom operators became increasingly concerned that the rollout of their networks 
would be slowed down if more municipalities and property owners would become 
reluctant to allow the siting of base stations. With an average sale of 300.000 mobile 
phones per month, and with high competition on the market because of three new 
mobile phone operators, demands for qualitative national coverage were high (n.a., 
1999b). The telecom operators believed that the “wild-west stories” about health 
risks – as one telecom operator official called it – were to a large extent responsible 
for the reluctance of building owners to allow base station siting (n.a., 1999b). It was 
thus not surprising that the operators challenged the city of Haarlemmermeer’s new 
siting policy to declare most of the antennas in the city illegal in court. For the opera-
tors, it was astonishing that the judge in administrative law ruled in favour of Haar-
lemmermeer, i.e. GSM-base stations did in fact need a building permit (Haar-
lemmermeer.nl, 1999b). In 2001, The Council of State confirmed this judgment. For 
telecom operators, this ruling seemed dramatic as they retained that “municipal offi-
cials would start dictating where base stations are the be sited”, leading to “great gaps 
in our coverage” (Lammerse, 1999). 
 The then five telecom operators of the Netherlands reacted by joining forces and 
establishing MoNet (Mobile Network Operators the Netherlands) in the summer of 
1999 (MoNet - Mobiele Netwerkoperators Nederland, 2000).28 The aim of MoNet was 
to become a central information service about the safety of the technology. To show 
the industry’s concern about “the nature and scale of reports that allege to health 
risks from GSM-antennas” (Ibid.), it set up a website and a free telephone number for 
inquiries about antennas, published brochures (the first one titled ‘GSM-antennas for 
mobile communication: safety comes first’) and coordinated a ‘national information 
service brigade’ that gave presentations about GSM-antennas to municipalities, resi-
dents’ associations or other interested parties. With MoNet, the operators could act 
as one voice in contacts with the authorities. The first action was to hand over a newly 
agreed code of conduct about the siting and maintenance of base stations to the 
Minister of Transport and Public Works in which it was stipulated how the operators 
would work together and with the municipalities in realising sufficient coverage (Mo-
Net - Mobiele Netwerkoperators Nederland, 1999a). MoNet also tried to convince 
                                                                
28 The same initiatives took place in other countries such as in Germany where the Informationszentrum 
Mobilfunk (The IZMF Information Centre for Mobile Communications) was established in 2001. 
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municipalities of the operators’ new ‘siting etiquette’ by addressing them directly at 
conferences organised for municipal officials by the Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeen-
ten (VNG, Association of Dutch Municipalities) (MoNet - Mobiele Netwerkoperators 
Nederland, 1999b). 
 Whatever its message, MoNet was keen to emphasise the operators’ social re-
sponsibility in providing a good network. In its speech to the VNG it referred to the 
immense popularity of the mobile phone as a gift for mother’s day, Christmas or Sin-
terklaas (Saint Nicolas Day) to point out that “the Netherlands chooses massively for 
mobile communication” (Ibid.). Throughout the 2000s, the operators continued em-
phasising the ‘opportunities’ of the technology as a societal good, sometimes even a 
necessity. In 2011 in Valkenswaard, a representative of the operator that was plan-
ning on siting a mast, opened her presentation at an information evening for residents 
with a newspaper article about the 2010 earthquakes in Haiti (participant observation 
Valkenswaard). A man that became trapped under the debris had been able to safe 
himself by looking up the necessary techniques online with his mobile (participant 
observation Valkenswaard). Operators also related to me during interviews that the 
technology “serves a great societal need to stay mobile”. I was informed that emer-
gency services, the police, the fire brigade all use it, “sometimes it is said that it harms 
your health, but it can in fact safe lives” (Interviews M9 & N11). 
 The mobile phone operators reacted to increasing concerns about base station 
siting, and especially the ‘restrictive’ local antenna policies that a number of munici-
palities developed, by joining forces in MoNet. Its goal was two-fold: to increase the 
awareness of the perceived necessity of a wireless communication network and to 
convey an attitude of professionalism towards municipalities. Just as the mobile 
phone operators, the national government’s reaction to the societal concerns about 
base station siting also mainly focused on the problem of lack of siting locations. It 
sought to remedy the problem by establishing a national antenna policy. 
From technology push to national antenna policy 
The government shared the operators’ sense of necessity of wireless communication 
technology. It quickly reacted to the concerns on a local level by drafting a new policy 
on siting antennas and masts (Tweede Kamer, 2000). In the previous sections, I dis-
cussed how the siting of antennas raised several issues concerning local planning, 
health and economic investments. All of these issues needed to be addressed in the 
antenna policy. Different departments, with the Ministry of Economic Affairs as the 
initiator, drafted the policy. The focus on the economic potential of a mobile network 
became the starting point of the antenna policy. The Ministry of Economic Affairs was 
(is) responsible for handing out permits for the frequencies that are needed for wire-
less applications. Moreover, since 2002, the Agentschap Telecom (Radiocommunica-
tions Agency) is part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs as the safety inspector of 
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antennas. The Antennebureau (Antenna Bureau) is also part of the Agency. The Minis-
try of Transport, Public Works and Water Management and the Ministry for Housing, 
Spatial Planning and Environmental Management were responsible for the spatial 
planning aspects of antennas (the two departments merged in 2010 to become the 
Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environ-
ment). The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport was (is) responsible for the health-
aspects of the antennas. The Ministry for Social Affairs and Employment was (is) also 
involved concerning legislation for employees who come into contact with EMF-
sources. 
 The local antenna policies that the municipalities of Dordrecht, Haarlemmermeer, 
Amsterdam and others had drawn up were not implemented for long, because, in the 
words of the municipal official responsible for spatial planning in Dordrecht: 
it apparently led to a too big constriction of the rollout possibilities for the net-
works, because within a very short time, the government made new regulations 
that side-lined the municipal policy. This did not really improve the [citizens’] 
trust in the government (Municipal official Dordrecht, personal communication, 
August 2, 2012).  
Early 2000, the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport sent a letter to all the GGD’en in 
which he sketched the current situation of societal reactions to the siting of base 
stations. It addressed the media attention on possible health risks, and the change of 
attitude in many municipalities towards base station siting from a laissez-faire to a 
strict policy, according to the ministry often based on the assumption of health risks. 
In the letter, the minister announced the plans for a new antenna policy and its recent 
decision to follow the exposure limits for RF EMF as set by the European Union in 
1999 (The Council of the European Union, 1999), which were based on the 1998 IC-
NIRP recommendations (International Commission on Non-Ionising Radiation Protec-
tion, 1998). These exposure limits were in line with what the Gezondheidsraad had 
recommended three years earlier (Gezondheidsraad, 1997). The minister explained 
that “de facto this means that if the electromagnetic field strengths remain below the 
European recommendation, a building permit cannot be refused on the basis of 
health reasons” (Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport, 2000). The minis-
ter thus ensured that municipalities were restricted in making their decisions on 
whether or not to give permission to site base stations. 
 At the end of the year 2000, the antenna policy was ready. In a letter to parlia-
ment, the Ministry of Transport and Public Works and Water Management wrote: 
[t]he Netherlands is running ahead in ICT developments. To maintain and prefer-
ably consolidate this position a good wireless infrastructure is indispensable. The 
recent rise of antennas has, however, led to questions from administrators and 
the public. In specific, there is a lack of clarity about spatial planning and public 
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health. At the same time, operators are confronted with a lack of places for siting 
(Staatssecretaris van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2000). 
The government identified several ‘bottlenecks’ to the siting of antennas pointing to 
three relevant actors: local authorities, mobile phone operators and citizens. The 
government assumed that municipalities did not have enough information (about the 
technique, health, policies, environmental planning and jurisdiction) to define their 
own policy. Moreover, the policy of many municipalities had arguably a very ad-hoc 
character, initiated by incidents and fed by societal unrest rather than based on “ac-
tual, objective information and national guidelines” (Tweede Kamer, 2000: 8). Fric-
tions existed between the telecom operators and municipalities, according to the 
government, because the former were very quick in siting antennas, sometimes even 
before permits were given, whilst the latter often felt ‘pressured’ or ‘taken by sur-
prise’ by the operators. There was also an increasing administrative burden on both 
municipalities and operators. Because some municipalities implemented a restrictive 
policy on siting base stations or postponed decisions, it was believed that operators 
were behind schedule in realising their networks, leading to economic losses. Due to 
the presumed lack of siting locations, there was also a lack of ‘healthy’ competition 
amongst operators which was deemed important by the government. The last bottle-
neck identified by the government was an increasing social unrest, which the govern-
ment attributed to concerns about possible negative health effects and about the 
well-being of citizens living in close vicinity to antennas. According to the government, 
these upheavals had put great pressure on local authorities. 
 The new antenna policy was drafted with the objective to tackle all these prob-
lems by “stimulat[ing] and facilitat[ing] enough locations for antennas within clear 
frameworks of health, environment and safety” (Tweede Kamer, 2000: 10). The 
rollout of the technology was portrayed as an economic and even social necessity. 
Throughout the policy document, references were made to the “great societal need” 
for “a swift rollout” of wireless communication networks; citizens and companies 
wanted “an ever increasing communication capacity” and had “high demands for the 
speed by which they can communicate” (Tweede Kamer, 2000: 7, 8 & 10). In parlia-
mentary debates, one politician even spoke of a “moral obligation to do everything in 
power to rollout as quickly as possible” (Tweede Kamer, 2001b: 6). The antenna policy 
came into force in 2002 when the national government, the VNG and the (then) 5 
telecom operators signed the antenna covenant (Staatssecretaris van Verkeer en 
Waterstaat et al., 2002). The covenant stipulated that 1) operators needed to provide 
municipalities with a ‘siting plan’ (an indication of where in the future the operators 
plan to site base stations), 2) base stations below 5 metres were allowed to be sited 
without building permit, 3) base stations between 5 and 40 meters needed a light 
building permit, 4) operators needed to work together and share masts (site-sharing) 
and 5) tenants had to consent to the siting of an antenna on the roof. With these new 
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regulations, the government secured the swift rollout of the technology and particu-
larly its new generation. 
 In parliament, the discussion on the new policy focused mostly on the rights of 
tenants to decide on the siting of antennas on high buildings, the need for information 
for local authorities and citizens and the need for more scientific research into possi-
ble health effects (Tweede Kamer, 2001b: 11). There was little discussion on the role 
of local authorities. One politician commented that the antenna policy referred to 
municipalities in a condescending way: “[t]hey don’t know what they are talking about 
and should not get too much power because then they only mess things up” (Ibid.: 7). 
A representative of another party was wary of the proposal to allow antennas to be 
built without permit up to 5 meters, because it would take away the possibility from 
municipalities to guard the quality of the living environment (Ibid.: 11). The main rep-
resentative of the local authorities, the VNG, seemed to have been reluctant at first 
about the ‘below 5 meters’ rule. The VNG eventually agreed to it because it also 
wanted to administratively unburden the municipalities as much as possible and it 
claimed that citizens would soon get used to sitings (as described by Bröer et al. 
(2010) on the basis of an interview with the VNG). 
 The national government drafted the antenna policy as a reaction to societal 
developments around base station siting, which it viewed as problematic since it 
hampered the rollout of a mobile telephony network. The government’s point of view 
about the necessity of a swift rollout of the technology is crucial for our understanding 
of the interplay between citizens and government in mast siting controversies, be-
cause it explains the government’s view on mast siting controversies. It took the per-
spective that citizen engagement around mast siting and municipalities’ involvement 
in those actions was not to be tolerated. As a consequence, restraints had to be im-
posed. This meant that municipalities’ demands about controlling the spatial planning 
aspects of siting were not granted. On the contrary, municipalities were restricted in 
their policy options. The municipalities’ problems were reduced to problems of lack of 
knowledge on behalf of the municipal officials and citizens. To alleviate this problem, 
municipal official were ‘unburdened’ of their administrative tasks by allowing the 
siting of many base stations without building permits, and the Antennebureau was 
established. 
The antenna policy: calls for better public information 
The antenna policy also announced the establishment of the Antennebureau (Antenna 
Office), an official information portal focused on education about the technology, 
national policy and health policy in relation to antennas for citizens, local govern-
ments and businesses and an Antenneregister (Antenna Register) where all the anten-
nas in the country could be traced. The need for independent public information and 
communication on the policy and technology had been debated and asked for in par-
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liament since 2001 (Tweede Kamer, 2001b: 7). The government briefly considered 
initiating a nation-wide ‘Postbus 51’ campaign (Ibid.: 17), which was the central in-
formation point of the government until 2012, but soon afterwards decided against it: 
[l]ast year [2001] it has been researched whether citizens show interest in infor-
mation about antennas. This research showed that information about base sta-
tions was only desired by individuals who are directly confronted with a base sta-
tion. The Antennebureau does have brochures for citizens about antennas and 
health. Medio 2003 there will be a European information campaign about base 
stations and health (Antennebureau, 2002: 16). 
Instead, it searched for an “objective information point where municipalities, citizens 
and operators can get information on all sorts of matters” (Tweede Kamer, 2001b: 
15). In November 2001, the Antennebureau was established with a sense of urgency 
about the need for public information, as voiced by the State Secretary of Transport 
and Public Works and Water Management in her speech at the opening of the An-
tennebureau. She sketched the societal incentive for the establishment of the An-
tennebureau: 
[w]ith the growth of communication networks we have to take into account that 
questions from society about safety and spatial planning will arise. That there will 
be questions and ambiguities is understandable. Occasionally, messages about 
health risks appear in the media. People also see how antennas change the view 
of their city or village (Staatssecretaris van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2001). 
The Antennebureau consisted of 12 employees at the start who were responsible for 
communication via a website, brochures and a helpdesk. It was intended to inform 
citizens, government, and businesses, as the head explained: “[t]he Antennebureau is 
the right place for anyone with questions about the effects of radiation on health, 
technical interruptions, safety, environment, rules and regulations and technique” 
(Boerema, 2001). ‘Anyone with questions’ thus had to find his or her way to the An-
tennebureau. A number of advertisements about its establishment in daily and weekly 
magazines throughout 2001-2002 had to help to make the information point visible 
(Ibid.). 
 The Antennebureau also actively sought to communicate with professionals and 
intermediaries. In the first year of its existence, it organised several meetings for mu-
nicipal officials with the aim of informing municipalities about the changed rules and 
regulations of the antenna policy (Antennebureau, 2002: 5). The questions that were 
asked by municipal officials during the meetings were published in a report. It is re-
ported that municipal officials asked about local concerns, i.e. ‘why are residents con-
cerned about antennas?’. The Antennebureau answered: 
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[t]he concern is often caused by a lack of knowledge of the effects of a base sta-
tion. The Nationaal Antennebureau is an independent bureau of the government 
(Agentschap Telecom, [Radiocommunications Agency]) that tries to increase the 
knowledge about base stations through information, and by so doing tries to take 
away residents’ concern (Ibid.: 16). 
The Antennebureau thus called upon municipal officials to refer concerned citizens 
with their questions and complaints to them. It also offered the opportunity to munic-
ipalities to organise an information sessions for citizens during which the An-
tennebureau would explain the health aspects and rules and regulations of base sta-
tion siting (see section Trickling down the antenna policy below). 
 In the same way that the mobile phone operators established MoNet as a re-
sponse to societal debates and concerns about base station siting, so did the Dutch 
government initiate the Antennebureau as a central information point for questions 
about siting. The Antennebureau was established with the rationale that local con-
cerns about mast siting were caused by a lack of knowledge about this technology. It 
also assumed that informing citizens about the “effects of radiation on health, tech-
nical interruptions, safety, environment, rules and regulations and technique” would 
take away this concern. The emphasis on the presumed ‘independent’ character of 
the Antennebureau had to contribute to this effect. The aim of the Antennebureau 
was to become a central public information point with all the necessary information 
on the antenna policy, yet this happened all in view of: “streamlining the execution of 
the national antenna policy (…). The aim is clearly to have enough places for siting 
base stations, because the only way to reach each other now and in the future is 
through antennas” (Staatssecretaris van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2001). The estab-
lishment of the Antennebureau was fitted into the government’s view of wireless 
communication technology as the economic boost of the ICT developments that were 
deemed crucial at the end of the 1990s. This resonated, for example, in the opening 
speech of the head of the Antennebureau: “it was impossible to imagine life today 
without mobile communication” (Boerema, 2001). 
 The establishment of the Antennebureau and its focus on informing citizens and 
municipal officials about health-related aspects from wireless communication tech-
nology is a further step in understanding the dynamics of mast siting controversies, 
and in particular, why scientific knowledge became such a dominant topic in discus-
sions about mast siting. With the antenna policy and the Antennebureau, the Dutch 
government moved away from the initial issues that municipalities and citizens raised 
in previous years: concerns about spatial planning aspects, landscape pollution and 
the demand to become involved. Municipal officials were taught that citizens’ con-
cerns about siting arose from concerns about negative health effects, and that the 
Antennebureau would take away these concerns once citizens received independent, 
objective information. The Antennebureau was one of the few policy options munici-
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palities had in dealing with a siting controversy and they thus became dependent on 
its information (see section Trickling down the antenna policy below). I argue, howev-
er, that this information was not catered to the expectations and needs of (engaged) 
citizens. 
The antenna policy: exposure limits and calls for more science 
The government did not only deal with the spatial planning aspects of the technology 
in the antenna policy, but also addressed the increasing concerns of citizens, attribut-
ed to worries about possible health effects from base stations. The government im-
plemented exposure limits for base stations in an indirect way by following the rec-
ommendations of the ICNIRP from 1998 (International Commission on Non-Ionising 
Radiation Protection, 1998), the European Commission from 1999 (Aanbeveling van 
de Raad van Ministers van de Europese Unie van 12 juli 1999) and the advice of the 
Gezondheidsraad from 2000 (Gezondheidsraad: Commissie elektromagnetische 
velden, 2000). The Gezondheidsraad was asked to advice the government on whether 
to take a precautionary approach to the siting of base stations. The Gezondheidsraad 
advised against it because there was no “reasonable assumption” of a health risk from 
non-thermal effects. The only scientifically proven effects of heating were thought to 
be well covered by the existing exposure limits (Ibid.). In 2001, the Gezondheidsraad 
set up a committee on electromagnetic fields with the aim of releasing annual reports 
in which it would review the existing research. It was foreseen that the committee 
would play a signalling role following other Health Council activities in other areas 
such as new health technologies (ten Velden, 1998). In its first annual report in 2001, 
the committee concluded that there was no new scientific evidence of harmful effects 
from RF EMF, but also urged the government to fund more research because of con-
tinuing “societal uncertainties” (Gezondheidsraad: Commissie ELF elektromagnetische 
velden, 2001). Two years earlier, the scientific staff of the Electromagnetic fields 
committee had declared in a newspaper interview that “research [on EMF] is being 
performed everywhere. The Netherlands is an exception in that regard” (Van Engelen, 
February 24, 1999) 
 These calls for more Dutch scientific research were also echoed in the political 
debate on the new antenna policy. During a parliamentary discussion in 2001, the 
president of the Committee of Transport and Public Works and Water Management 
said: 
[w]hat still isn’t clear, are the effects on the long term. Does the government 
want to do research into long term effects? Is the government prepared to take 
initiatives on the national but also international level? We attach great im-
portance to wide-ranging research (Tweede Kamer, 2001b: 13). 
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Some politicians referred to the precautionary principle, in particular the fact that it 
was still not proven that the technology was safe: “[c]ontinued research into the ef-
fects on health is thus called for” (Ibid.: 5). The minister reacted that the precaution-
ary principle was taken into consideration in the antenna policy because the exposure 
limits already took into account a safety factor – “even of 200” (Ibid.: 9). Yet, a few 
members of the parliament kept on calling for more research (Ibid.: 12). They pro-
posed a motion that requested the government to take initiatives for independent 
long-term epidemiological research into radiation from base stations, because there 
was hardly any research yet (Tweede Kamer, 2001a). In 2002, the government asked 
the Gezondheidsraad advice on the type of research “that would provide better in-
sights into possible long term effects of RF EMF” (Gezondheidsraad, 2003: 47). Soon 
afterwards, the government funded the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scien-
tific Research (TNO) to start a research project that directly tried to answer the ques-
tions posed in the parliamentary motion. It investigated possible complaints from 
living close to base stations in an experimental laboratory setting using human test 
subjects.  
 The Dutch government’s decision to fund scientific research as a response to 
siting controversies was not an isolated case. Many European countries set exposure 
limits and invested in research programmes (de Marchi et al., 2009; Kheifets et al., 
2010; Salomon and Borraz, 2007; van Dijk et al., 2011; Walls et al., 2005). In contrast 
with the Netherlands, though, some countries took a precautionary stance, i.e. they 
adapted lower exposure limits for RF EMF than the ones proposed by the ICNIRP or 
the EU (see section Regulatory divergence in chapter 2 for a discussion of these diver-
gences). In 1999, the Dutch government had asked the Gezondheidsraad for advice on 
whether there was any reason, “from a scientific point of view”, to apply more strin-
gent exposure limits than the limits proposed by the ICNIRP based on thermal effects 
(Gezondheidsraad: Commissie elektromagnetische velden, 2000: 45–46). The Ge-
zondheidsraad answered in the negative: the scientific evidence for harmful effects 
was insufficient to justify such a measure. Yet, in other countries such as the U.K., 
France and Belgium, scientific advisory councils did call for precautionary measures. 
 In 2000, the Belgian Hoge Gezondheidsraad (Superior Health Council) advised its 
government to take bigger safety margins than the ICNIRP ones (leading to an expo-
sure limit of 3 V/m at the common frequency of 900 Mhz) since the “INCIRP-WHO 
recommendations are not coherent, show lacunas and imply value judgements that 
are debatable, in the light of, ánd the precautionary principle, ánd sustainable devel-
opment of technologies” (Hoge Gezondheidsraad: Onderafdeling III/4 Stralingen, 
2002: 42). Because of industry protest, the Belgian government finally decided for a 
compromise and chose exposure limits between the EU recommendation and the 
Hoge Gezondheidsraad’s proposal (Belgische Regering, 2005). The Belgian region of 
Brussels, however, tried to lower this norm again (Brusselse Hoofdstedelijke Gewest, 
2007) and in 2009 an Institutional Court decision allowed it to do so, changing the 
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Belgian antenna policy overnight, as the regions (the Walloon and Flemish Regions 
and the Brussels-Capital Region) were now responsible for setting their own exposure 
limits (Het Grondwettelijke Hof, 2009). This led to a lacuna in the Flemish law on siting 
antennas for almost two years: during this time, there were no exposure limits to 
which mobile phone operators could refer when siting base stations. During this time, 
groups of citizens won several court cases against mobile phone operators because of 
this lack of official exposure standards (Interview MA6, MA7 & MA8). The Hoge Ge-
zondheidsraad reconfirmed its pro-precautionary advice in 2009 (Hoge Gezond-
heidsraad, 2009). Flanders now follows the norm established by the Belgian federal 
government in 2005 (Belgische Regering, 2005) with an additional norm of 3V/m on 
locations where people stay for a longer time (Vlaamse Regering, 2011).  
 In this section, I discussed the Dutch government’s dealing with public concerns 
about health effects from living close to base stations. Besides more information 
about health risks from base stations, it addressed these concerns by setting exposure 
limits for the antennas based on the Gezondheidsraad’s advice. Even though there 
were brief discussions in parliament about establishing lower exposure limits as pre-
cautionary measures, the Dutch government followed the advice of the Gezond-
heidsraad. After such a clear position on the appropriateness of the existing exposure 
limits, it seems contradictory that the government also invested in more scientific 
research. This latter policy decision increased the focus on health risks from the tech-
nology, as I will discuss in the next chapter. Moreover, it made ‘science’ into an active 
actor in the controversy around base station siting: science became a judge that had 
to rule whether the siting of base stations was considered safe or not (and thus should 
continue or not). This had a direct influence on mast siting controversies, since the 
government intended to communicate this scientific knowledge to citizens who were 
confronted with the siting of a base station through the Antennebureau. 
Trickling down the antenna policy 
The antenna policy and the national government’s investments in more scientific 
knowledge and more communication of that knowledge changed the situation for 
municipalities. They (or at least some of them) had been an important reason for the 
government to draft the new antenna policy in the first place, and it was thus not 
surprising that clear guidelines were established that determined how much freedom 
municipalities had in deciding whether and where antennas would be sited. The an-
tenna policy stated that municipalities were not allowed to refuse the siting of anten-
nas or masts based on health risks if the EMF exposure from the antennas did not 
exceed the limits recommended by the EU and endorsed by the Dutch government. 
Municipalities only had to give a building permit for the siting of masts (construction 
of pylon), and not for the antennas placed below 5 meters. On the other hand, the 
government urged mobile phone operators to be more open about their siting plans. 
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Municipalities had to receive a map with intended sitings from each mobile phone 
operator every year. One mobile phone operator told me that they try to be open and 
cooperative towards the municipality for example by explaining the map in person if 
necessary, discussing how the sitings fit with the local antenna policy (if that existed) 
and anticipating which masts might become a problem (Interview M9 & S6). 
 Yet, the relationship seems to be an unbalanced one, as one alderman for spatial 
planning phrased it: “providers say ‘we have the assignment from the government, we 
have to site this. We have been given a concession and part of that is to ensure cover-
age within a certain time. The government is behind us” (Interview E1). So concretely 
this meant for the municipality that “you cannot simply say to [a provider] ‘we refuse 
to site a mast’, because if they go to court they apparently win”, according to the 
alderman for spatial planning in Maastricht (Interview M5). The municipalities experi-
enced that their choice of actions was limited: “if a provider shows that its installation 
adheres to the exposure limits, then it is fine for us”, according to the a municipal 
official (Interview M7). The national antenna policy thus put municipalities in a twist. 
They were the first contact point for concerned citizens with questions about mast 
siting, but could not accommodate citizens’ concerns because they were not the au-
thorities in charge concerning base station siting. Sometimes municipalities lined up 
with engaged citizens to react against the national government’s antenna policy, such 
as in Spijkenisse, even though municipalities had no legal rights to do so. The main 
means by which municipalities could address siting controversies was through organ-
ising an information session. The mobile phone operators would often advise the 
municipality – especially when the siting might be “sensitive” – to give information in 
the form of an information evening by the Antennebureau, which the mobile phone 
operators believed to be an independent institution (Interview M9 & N9). 
 The information sessions of the Antennebureau were established from the ra-
tionale that only citizens who were confronted with a siting wanted to be informed. 
The national government considered such an information session as the best way to 
deal with local concerns. A 2005 evaluation of the antenna policy confirmed this view 
as it claimed that “direct, interpersonal communication in the form of, for example, 
information evenings is most suited to the needs of citizens for information, explana-
tion and the feeling of ‘being heard’” (Tweede Kamer, 2005). The evaluation, howev-
er, also stated that “municipalities barely played a role in the communication with 
residents, whilst the position of municipalities, close to citizens and with knowledge of 
the local situation, could be used better” (Ibid.). The national government considered 
municipalities to be crucial actors in translating the national antenna policy to citizens. 
But how did this work in practice? And how did the information sessions influence the 
societal dynamics between citizens and the national antenna policy, citizens and the 
municipality, and citizens and scientific knowledge local dynamics of mast siting con-
troversies? I attended several information sessions during my fieldwork, interviewed 
representatives of the Antennebureau, and asked for citizens’ experiences of these 
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meetings during my case study research (see section The research in chapter 1 and 
appendix 2). 
The organisation of information sessions 
Based on my interviews and participant observations, these meetings had the follow-
ing structure. The Antennebureau presented the technical and policy side of siting 
antennas: the technicalities of antennas (how they work), the practical use of anten-
nas (why society needs them), the national antenna policy and rules and regulations 
(under which circumstances siting is permitted), and the role of the Antennebureau 
(relationship to ministries). In addition, a representative of the mobile phone operator 
who wanted to site a mast or antenna, presented the reason why the base station had 
to be sited there. This involved showing the search areas that the radio-technical 
expert of the mobile phone operator had identified, i.e. areas where the network 
needed to be thickened or where there would be a gap because antennas had to be 
taken away. Within the particular area, the mobile phone operator had chosen a ‘suit-
able’ location. Another integral part of the information evenings was a presentation 
about the health aspects of base stations, given either by the local GGD or by the 
Antennebureau.29 Each presentation on health aspects was slightly different30, but 
overall one discussed what electromagnetic fields are, the types of research investi-
gating the possible health risks from RF EMF and the types of effects from exposure to 
RF EMF such as thermal and non-thermal effects and interference with medical devic-
es. The GGD further detailed the possible non-thermal health effects such as brain 
activity during sleep and cognitive functioning, and showed the evidence supporting 
these complaints for each possible effect. In addition, studies that circulate on the 
websites of grassroots support teams such as StopUMTS were mentioned, and their 
scientific rigour was questioned. The overall message of the GGD presentations was 
that the likelihood of health complaints due to exposure to RF EMF was small, but that 
more research efforts were needed and were on their way. 
Communication of risks to an engaged audience 
Information sessions are an important part of the activities of the Antennebureau on 
the local level, as organising an information session is considered an outstanding way 
to provide knowledge about wireless communication technology to engaged citizens. 
Yet, in cases of mast siting controversies, I assert that this assumption is problematic 
                                                                
29 At one information evening, the representative of the Antennebureau did not want to involve the GGD, as 
this person believed that the Antennebureau had more up-to-date information and was thus better 
equipped to present.  
30 I observed only one presentation by the GGD during the information session in Echt (GGD Limburg Noord, 
2012). However, an online search revealed several presentations with largely the same slides (for example, 
GGD Hollands Noorden, 2007; GGD Regio Nijmegen, 2012). 
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for several reasons. Firstly, presenting ‘clear scientific facts’ to citizens is difficult since 
scientific facts can be contested (as we have seen in chapter 3) and (engaged) citizens 
debate the uncertainties within scientific knowledge. Secondly, (engaged) citizens can 
and do acquire knowledge elsewhere before coming to the information session. Lastly, 
the audience can consist of not only neighbours but also individuals from grassroots 
support teams or other professionals who are very critical of the information provid-
ed. I will discuss these three issues in more detail in the following sections, as they are 
crucial for understanding the interplay and the dynamics of siting controversies. 
Presenting science 
I will first discuss the issue of the Antennebureau’s task of presenting the govern-
ment’s view on scientific knowledge. Citizens attending information meetings turned 
out to be more interested in the uncertainties in scientific knowledge and the broader 
idea of what counts as relevant knowledge than in the established scientific facts. As I 
outlined in the previous chapter, most engaged citizens in my cases were not so much 
convinced that there were in fact adverse health effects related to masts, but they 
had serious doubts about it. The presentations of the Antennebureau, however, did 
not address, let alone openly discuss, these uncertainties. They were set up as oppor-
tunities to convey the facts about the antenna policy and health aspects as under-
stood by the government and by its experts. The only way in which the GGD alluded to 
uncertainties during presentations – without explicitly uttering the word – was when 
it referred to the need for more research into long-term effects and aspecific com-
plaints (e.g. around electrohypersensitivity) (GGD Regio Nijmegen, 2012). The GGD 
mentioned that more research and keeping track of developments were also precau-
tionary measures. 
 The GGD spent a large portion of the presentation on discussing particular stud-
ies that did or did not adhere to these standards. For example, a study commonly 
known as Naila (Eger et al., 2004) that claimed to show an increased risk of cancer 
when living close to a base station was highlighted as “not adher[ing] to the criteria of 
good scientific research”, according to the GGD Noord-Limburg. The GGD thus implic-
itly explained the criteria for good scientific research according to the government, 
and presented them as established facts. The Naila study was conducted by five Ger-
man physicians who ran a statistical evaluation of medical data of cancer occurrences 
in a radius of 400 meters from a base station in the city of Naila and found more oc-
currences of cancer within this area. It quickly became a popular resource for engaged 
citizens and grassroots support teams. In Nieuwkoop, for example, the study featured 
in the documents of the lawsuit that some engaged citizens started against the mobile 
phone operator, as an example of a study showing adverse health effects from RF 
EMF (N1, 2004). The study was also mentioned in my conversations with engaged 
citizens there. During one occasion when I walked around the neighbourhood with 
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one of them, he pointed out that his house was within 400 meters of the mast, as was 
the football field. The 400-meter radius thus became an indicator of unsafety for him 
(Interview N3). Scientific and health institutes reacted to the popularity of the study 
amongst engaged citizens by questioning its scientific standards, such as the GGD did 
during information sessions. The Gezondheidsraad disqualified the study in its Elec-
tromagnetic Fields: Annual Update 2005 on EMF, even though the commission nor-
mally does not review studies that are not peer-reviewed (Gezondheidsraad, 2005: 
87–89). 
 The GGD put a lot of effort into explaining why certain studies were not taken 
into account in the government’s antenna policy because their scientific quality was 
deemed inadequate. Yet, as I will explain in detail in the next chapter, these scientific 
criteria can be contested, and also were contested by citizens during the information 
session in Echt. Citizens in the audience questioned the scientific studies presented, 
and were interested in how uncertainties were taken into account. One citizen com-
mented on the “vague results” of the presented studies: “you say Wi-Fi – there is no 
effect on children, but how can you say that already, you cannot research this in just 
one year?” The representative of the GGD reacted by saying that scientists have only 
found an effect from heating (thermal effect) and that so far none of the studies gives 
a clear image of possible effects. The citizen replied: “so you draw conclusions on the 
basis of something uncertain?”. Another citizen in the room also referred to the last 
slide in which it was suggested that more research was needed for children: “let’s 
accept that there are uncertainties and let’s take the precautionary principle into 
account”. The representative of the GGD replied “as a clarification: there are large 
safety margins taken into account” and referred again to the precautionary measure 
of more research. 
 Communicating the scientific knowledge to citizens was not as straightforward as 
the Dutch government assumed: it came down to communicating the scientific 
knowledge that the national government deemed relevant. Any presentation thus 
involved explaining the government’s criteria to which scientific studies had to abide 
in order to become considered as proof of harmfulness or safety. Citizens were pre-
sumed to rely on the information on scientific studies, and on the best siting locations, 
provided by the mobile phone operator, and endorsed by the government. In this 
‘information provision’ context, there was however no room for uncertainties to be 
discussed (compare Grove-White et al., 2000). The scientific studies were “cast as 
inputs to choice, their uncertainties or limitations [become] matters for individual 
judgment – and not grounds on which expert claims could be criticized” (compare 
Ottinger, 2013b: 54). Indeed, the goal of the information sessions was to “give objec-
tive information so that [people] can make their own choice”, according to the repre-
sentative of the Antennebureau (Interview N9). This “objective information”, however, 
was contested by the audience and other studies, disqualified by the government and 
its experts’ bodies, were brought to the fore (see chapter 5). 
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Citizens’ information needs 
Another reason why information sessions did not have a soothing effect on siting 
controversies, as the government assumed, was the discrepancy between the primary 
aim of information sessions, i.e. communicating information, and the actual infor-
mation needs of citizens. Engaged citizens often already gained knowledge elsewhere, 
through their different landscapes of knowledge (see chapter 3). Part of this infor-
mation came from government sources, but a large chunk originated from grassroots 
support teams that were very critical of many of the studies on which the government 
relied. Moreover, through personal networks, citizens encountered stories of people 
experiencing illnesses that they attributed to exposure to base stations or other EMF 
sources. It often occurred during meetings that people stood up and told their own 
personal experiences with the technology, usually about illnesses they or others have 
developed. “Stories of experience are very common during meetings; they are very 
emotional and tragic and are often received with applause”, according to a staff 
member of the Antennebureau (Interview N9). This seems to have happened during 
an information session in Maastricht: “if you are convinced that such a mast has an 
effect on your health then you speak up”, according to the municipal official in Maas-
tricht who had been present at the meeting (Interview M8). She immediately added 
that “this of course brings forth a lot of emotion”. The problem in her view was the 
ensuing dynamic with the official presenters in the meetings, those that “tried to 
refute this objectively”: “that is very difficult, because the emotion is sometimes so 
deep that you cannot convince this person that it is incorrect what he thinks. That it is 
not scientifically proven what he says”.  
 The whole idea of the information evenings of “giv[ing] objective information so 
that [people] can make their own choice”, as a staff member of the Antennebureau 
put it (Interview N9), was at odds with the needs of engaged citizens, present at these 
evenings. There was a mismatch between citizens’ and organisers’ views of the infor-
mation session: citizens wanted to discuss the situation of the upcoming siting, but 
the official speakers there could only convey information meant to convince individual 
citizens. The sessions were not designed as opportunities for public discussion, as 
classical town hall meetings or informal public meetings. Yet, by the time an infor-
mation session was organised, citizens often already started a collective engagement 
against the siting. In Valkenswaard, for example, the municipality did not want any 
questions to be asked during the session and had provided pen and paper for ques-
tions to be written down and answered at the very end of the meeting. Citizens were 
not happy about this, especially when at the end of the meeting, there was not 
enough time and the municipal representative said they would answer the questions 
in written form later, much to the annoyance of the people present. 
 From my participant observations and interviews, I conclude that people going to 
such meetings mainly consisted of engaged citizens, who were part of a collective, and 
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who were well informed already. A representative of a mobile phone operator 
claimed that those that agree with the siting do not come, and those that like to get 
more information are usually silent during the meetings (Interview M9). A staff mem-
ber of the Antennebureau explained that she gives the information session for those 
who are still in doubt in order “to prevent that they are heavily influenced by the 
group of fierce opponents”. And even if those ‘doubters’ are happy with the infor-
mation received, “those are not the ones you hear, only the fierce group” (Interview 
N9). According to these actors, the information provision should mainly be catered to 
those individuals that have not yet formed a strong opinion, before they can be influ-
enced by any of their neighbours. However, my analysis of mast siting controversies 
and information sessions shows that information sessions should 1) not just be about 
one-way communication, but about listening to citizens and involving them in the 
siting decision and 2) should primarily be catered to engaged citizens, because they 
are the ones who are most involved with the mast siting and who are in need of dis-
cussion. 
A mixed audience 
I observed that at such information evenings, also members of grassroots support 
teams or individuals with a clear interest in proclaiming health risks from base stations 
were present. They did not have a stake in this particular mast siting, but sought influ-
ence in all base station sitings, hence in the national policy. Information sessions were 
not only attended by residents of the neighbourhood where the mast was going to be 
sited but also by those who saw it as their task to warn people against possible dan-
gers of RF EMF. In two of the meetings I observed, a man had been present who 
caught everyone’s attention, much to the dismay of the organiser. He made his pres-
ence known as soon as he entered the building, because he wore a hat with a cloth 
draped over it that supposedly protected him from EMF, as I learned later. He also 
had several measuring devices with him that zoomed and beeped throughout the 
entire meeting. He identified himself as the initiator of the Flemish grassroots support 
team StralingsArmVlaanderen: he was electrohypersensitive and went to any infor-
mation session organised within 100 kilometres from his home. He disrupted the 
presenters regularly with very specific and technical questions, sighed, and moaned 
regularly, presumably whenever something was said that he did not agree with. Dur-
ing one information session, he was joined by someone who identified himself as a 
building biologist (Baubiolog in German), meaning that he measured EMF in homes 
and took into account exposure limits that were “much lower” than the ones present-
ed during the information session. He claimed that people slept better and felt better 
after he had reduced the exposure to EMF in the house. Also, in Spijkenisse, a man 
had attended the information session with a fake bird in a little cage, all the while 
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proclaiming that they had these birds in the mines to warn them for gasses but that 
now there was no bird to warn anyone against too much radiation (Interview S7). 
 The presence of individuals that did not live in the neighbourhood further ampli-
fied the discrepancy between the Antennebureau’s aim of providing information to 
those citizens who supposedly lacked it, and the reality of engaged citizens who al-
ready acquired knowledge and formed an opinion about the siting and who wanted to 
discuss the siting decision, or at least the specific location. Actually, through these 
information sessions, the local citizens personally met individuals who advanced the 
view that exposure to base stations makes you ill, which was at odds with the gov-
ernment’s view. 
Information sessions as crucial dynamic in siting controversy 
In all of the Dutch mast siting controversies I studied, the municipality organised an 
information session with the Antennebureau. These meetings, however, often did not 
have the intended effect of appeasing the mast siting controversy. In Spijkenisse, the 
room in which the meeting was held was much too small for the number of people 
showing up. The engaged citizens had distributed flyers in the neighbourhood and had 
instructed people to attend the meeting en masse. The then alderman of spatial plan-
ning who organised the meeting still remembered it well after several years: 
[t]there were so many people from the direct neighbourhood and there was such 
a tense atmosphere. Especially the opponents who made it very clear that they 
did not want it. And that meant that no matter which arguments were used, peo-
ple did not or hardly listened (Interview S3). 
Also in Maastricht and Nieuwkoop, the meetings became quite heated. In Maastricht, 
there was “a lot of hustle and bustle. A lot of questions, more than there was time 
for” (Interview M2). In Nieuwkoop, people became “so upset that they ran outside, 
slammed the door behind them and walked away in anger” (Interview N3). The citi-
zens there referred to the meeting as a “good news show” (Interview N1) or “meeting 
of reassurance” (Interview N5) and claimed that even more neighbours became con-
cerned after the meeting because it was purposely set up to reassure them instead of 
getting them involved and listening to their concerns. When the municipality organ-
ised a second meeting in Nieuwkoop a few weeks into the mast siting controversy, the 
engaged citizens refused to attend, which angered the alderman of spatial planning. 
The engaged citizens reasoned that it did not make sense to go again, since they al-
ready made their arguments clear in their notices of objection and in conversations 
with the municipality. The line of approach of the information session was to explain, 
again, that radiation is not dangerous and that it was really the best place to site the 
mast, all points with which they disagreed, according to one engaged citizen (Inter-
view N3). 
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 I summarise the societal dynamics around information sessions as follows: 1) the 
audience was a critical and knowledgeable set of citizens and interested parties. They 
were interested in discussing the siting and expected to be heard. As it concerns in-
formation, they were not unaware of the science, but they were mostly interested in 
questioning the scientific knowledge by referring to uncertainties. Secondly, 2) the 
expectations citizens had about these meetings, especially if they already started to 
engage around the siting, did not fit with the official aim of the meetings, which was 
to convey (scientific) knowledge. The information sessions usually took place some 
weeks after the announcement of a siting, and often only after there had been some 
societal unrest (such as a lot of questions to the municipality, media attention or col-
lectives of engaged citizens being formed), but yet the whole idea of the meetings was 
one of informing individual citizens who lacked information, in the form of top-down 
communication. Citizens, on the other hand, 3) saw the information sessions as an 
opportunity to voice their concerns, critique and questions. The information meetings 
did thus not strike with the expectations of citizens: many had the idea that there 
would be room for an open discussion, for example about the location of the to-be-
sited mast. 
 As I discussed in chapter 3, citizens were not against the siting of all masts in the 
entire country, but demanded a thorough decision from the municipality on where to 
site this particular mast. The Dutch government, however, assumed that citizen en-
gagement arose from a general fear of radiation, and thus citizens were cast as being 
against all masts anywhere. The government seemed to have reacted to the rhetoric 
of grassroots support teams, who were very avid in opposing all masts (see chapter 3). 
Citizens’ arguments about the siting in local controversies were different: they never 
opposed the development of the entire technology, but were mainly concerned about 
the mismanagement of the local siting process and the quality of the decision-making 
process. Also in the information sessions, it became clear that citizens wanted to dis-
cuss the location of the mast, yet instead there was a one-way communication of 
generic information about health risks and national policy. 
 There are some positive examples from mast sitings that underline the im-
portance of involving local residents in the decision on where to site the mast. In one 
of the information sessions I attended, in Euverem, there was room to discuss the 
location of the siting. This seemed to be the upshot of some coincidences. The mobile 
phone operator was present and agreed to opening up the discussion of the location. 
When the session was organised, the mast was planned to be sited in the village cen-
tre, close to a car park and a children’s playground. Most citizens did not agree with 
this location. During the session, the mobile phone operator explained the alternative 
locations that the technical expert had identified, of which some were located in the 
fields surrounding the village. Citizens were in favour of one of these alternative loca-
tions. It had not previously been considered because it did not fit in the municipality’s 
zoning plan. The council member of spatial planning agreed that the municipality 
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could and would change the zoning plan after the majority of citizens present at the 
information session consented to this location. The mobile phone operator told me 
that they valued such an unanimous decision and even tried to incorporate local 
knowledge of citizens in some siting decisions (Interview M8). They gave an example 
of an information evening where they discussed four possible locations with the 
neighbours. The citizens came up with a fifth location, which the mobile phone opera-
tor had excluded because the owner did not cooperate. Neighbours informed them 
that there were new owners, who eventually agreed to the siting of an antenna on 
their roof. 
 I conclude that information sessions are vital in understanding the dynamics in 
mast siting controversies, because they show the tensions and discrepancies between 
different government levels: the national government that came up with the national 
antenna policy, and local government (municipalities) that have to act as spokesper-
sons of this national policy. The national government decided in its national antenna 
policy that citizens were disqualified to engage, but should be informed about the 
policy, a responsibility that came down to municipalities with the help of the An-
tennebureau. During such information evenings, generic information is conveyed 
about scientific studies into health risks from RF EMF, the national antenna policy and 
the mobile phone operator’s approach in finding a location. Yet, I argued that citizen 
engagement arose because of concerns about the local situation (chapter 3). Citizens 
that are present in these sessions are interested in their local situation and ask ques-
tions such as ‘why does the mast need to be sited at that particular location?’ Citizens 
assess the siting decision as a decision of their local government, with whom they 
have previous experiences and for whom they hold specific expectations. Hence, 
there is a mismatch between the national policy assumption about citizens and their 
concerns and related solutions to mast siting controversies and the local engagement 
of citizens. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I went through different arenas to show the range of discussions 
about mast siting, rules and regulations of the antenna policy, and implications of this 
policy. 
 The national government antenna policy was a re-action to societal develop-
ments around base station siting: citizens and/or municipalities started to engage 
around the siting of base stations. Some municipalities developed their own antenna 
policy that imposed restrictions on the perceived uncontrolled proliferation of base 
stations. The national government and the mobile phone operators viewed these 
developments as problematic since it hampered the rollout of a mobile telephony 
network. The government’s antenna policy established safety margins based on the 
Gezondheidsraad advice. According to the government, the existing scientific 
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knowledge about health risks from RF EMF gave a reassuring picture, yet the govern-
ment also deemed it necessary to fund more research to keep on monitoring the 
situation. On the other hand, the antenna policy also ensured that neither citizens nor 
municipalities could disrupt the siting of base stations on the basis of possible health 
risks. The municipalities’ problems were reduced to problems of lack of knowledge on 
behalf of the municipal officials and citizens. To alleviate this problem, municipal offi-
cial were ‘unburdened’ of their administrative tasks by allowing the siting of many 
base stations without building permits. The government also established the An-
tennebureau as a central information point about the antenna policy. In different 
ways, the national government’s policy diminished the municipalities’ authority in 
deciding about base station siting. 
 The struggle between different levels of government, i.e. the national govern-
ment and municipalities, about the legitimacy of mast and antenna siting led to a 
restriction of the policy options for municipalities and reduced them to spokespersons 
for the national antenna policy. The antenna policy put the municipalities in a split: 
they had to follow strict rules and regulations on base station siting yet could not 
ignore the dissatisfaction and concerns expressed by their citizens. One task of the 
Antennebureau was to help municipalities in dealing with local concerns by giving 
direct information about antennas in the form of presentations. Yet, as my previous 
analysis of citizen engagement showed (chapter 3), citizens wanted to become in-
volved in the decision-making process and wanted their concerns to be taken serious-
ly. The information sessions were set up from the premise that citizens lacked 
knowledge, or had been misinformed, about the health aspects from masts. They 
were not intended as deliberations, but as one-way information flows. Citizens at-
tending these meetings had different expectations of the purpose of these gatherings: 
they wanted to discuss the siting, explore alternative locations, questioned scientific 
assurances and wanted to discuss uncertainty and precaution. The topic of health 
risks was thus not something that the municipalities ought to discuss, but rather ought 
to communicate, as it was a matter that was dealt with by the national government 
and by its advisory bodies and (inter)national scientists (see next chapter). At the 
same time, the arrangement in place made any reference to health risks on a local 
level a dead alley, which was contrary to what citizens expected (compare chapter 3), 
which further increased the tensions. 
 I conclude this chapter by summarising what the analysis of the political decision-
making process means in terms of understanding the dynamics of the wireless com-
munication technology controversy. Firstly, the prioritisation of the national level of 
regulation in the antenna policy led to the denial of the legitimacy of local govern-
ment levels in siting decisions. Over time, municipalities only got a bureaucratic, exec-
utive role without much room for local involvement in the siting decision. The national 
government decided that municipalities 1) had to consent to the siting of most of the 
base stations and 2) were not (much) involved in where the base stations would be 
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sited. These decisions were in the hands of the mobile phone operators. The national 
government thus enforced a national policy that ignored the local concerns that the 
initial rollout of the technology had raised. Secondly, the Dutch government’s policy 
response of risk communication to concerned citizens reinforced the assumption that 
citizens’ concerns about siting were solely related to health risks. This not only meant 
that the Dutch government ignored all the other issues that municipalities and citizens 
raised, such as concerns about spatial planning aspects, landscape pollution and the 
demand to become involved, but also led to a particular governance strategy of in-
vesting in risk research and risk communication, which I will discuss in detail in the 
next chapter. 
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The role of science in the antenna policy 
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Introduction 
The Dutch government’s strategy in dealing with siting controversies consisted of 
investing in risk research and risk communication. This ‘risk-based’ policy approach 
tackled two presumed deficits: a deficit of scientific knowledge and a deficit of com-
munication of that knowledge. In 2005, the Minister of Economic Affairs31 explained: 
we “think that every large-scale introduction of new technologies, such as UMTS, 
should coincide with precise communication and information and with the execution 
of research into possible and unintended side effects of these new technologies” 
(Tweede Kamer, 2005). If science could proof that siting base stations was without 
risk, the logic went, and if society could understand the science behind EMF health 
effects, there could be no legitimate opposition to siting anymore. To these ends, the 
government turned to science. It asked its science advisors for advice and funded 
scientific research into possible negative health effects of the technology. In 2002, The 
Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) received funding to 
investigate health risks from living in close vicinity to base stations, with a particular 
focus on UMTS-technology. Two years later, the government partly funded another 
Swiss research into UMTS-technology. In 2006, again, it invested 16.6 million euro in a 
research programme on EMF and health. Scientific knowledge about possible health 
risks from exposure to RF EMF also became the basis of the government’s communi-
cation plan. Since 2001, the Antennebureau ensured the communication of the na-
tional antenna policy to professionals, municipalities and other interested parties (see 
chapter 4). In the following years, the government also invested in a network of ex-
pertise on EMF and Health that concentrated on risk research and risk communica-
tion, the Kennisplatform EMV & Gezondheid (Kennisplatform EMV&G; Knowledge 
Platform EMF & Health). This network also set up the Klankbordgroep (Sounding 
Board), i.e. a deliberation exercise with diverse societal actors, such as grassroots 
support teams and interest groups, to discuss the topic of EMF and health. 
 In this chapter, I discuss how the Dutch government relied on and used the image 
of science as arbiter in dealing with mast siting controversies. Because the siting of 
base stations invoked questions about safety margins and possible health effects, the 
government turned to scientists for more insights into the health aspects related to 
this technology. Yet, as I have argued in the previous chapters, the siting of base sta-
tion was also a societal problem that had a close connection to issues of spatial plan-
ning regulation, participatory governance and rights of protection. Still, it was scien-
tific knowledge that became centre stage in the years following the first siting contro-
versies. In the previous chapter, I argued that the decision-making process around 
mast siting controversies in the Netherlands illuminated the “deeply problematic habit 
                                                                
31See section From technology push to national antenna policy in chapter 4 for an 
overview of the ministries responsible for the antenna policy.  
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of describing public issues involving scientific questions as ‘scientific issues’” (Wynne, 
2006: 124; my emphasis). The government framed mast siting controversies as a 
problem of health risks and thus as a ‘risk issue’, and hence as a scientific issue. Once 
the activity of mast siting had been identified and accepted as a ‘risk’, a ‘risk-based’ 
policy approach could be applied, i.e. a “set of standards, protocols and guidelines 
that define how risk objects should be assessed, evaluated, managed, communicated 
and monitored” (Borraz, 2011: 970). The goal of a risk-based policy approach is to turn 
societal concerns into ‘risks’ that can be scrutinised by scientists, who are believed to 
have the authority and capacity to characterise, assess and reduce uncertainties. The 
Dutch government expected that the “broad array of measures and activities in the 
area of information, communication and research” would improve the societal ac-
ceptance of mast siting (Tweede Kamer, 2005). However, during the period in which 
the government invested in scientific research and communication, the number of 
mast siting controversies rose significantly. I argue that using science as arbiter in the 
political and social discussion about base station siting shifted the public debate from 
dissatisfaction about spatial planning regulation to a focus on health risks. It polarised 
the positions in the controversy and over time science went from judge to becoming 
judged itself. 
 I will first discuss the social science literature on science for policy: the type of 
scientific practice that is closely connected to policymaking. What do we know about 
the role of science in politics and policy? I use these insights to explain the decision-
making process around mobile phone mast siting in the Netherland between 2002 
and 2006, when the government funded research into health risks from RF EMF to 
tackle the presumed deficit of scientific knowledge. Next, I describe the critical reac-
tions from societal actors on the government’s portrayal of ‘regulatory science’ (Jasa-
noff, 1990). Science became an important resource, not just for policy makers but also 
for engaged citizens, grassroots support groups and other interested parties. Science 
went from judge of a policy decision (should we continue with the siting of mobile 
phone masts?) to being judged itself by public actors (is this the right knowledge on 
which to base decisions?). Instead of appeasing the controversy, the focus on health 
risk entrenched the public discussion and polarised the different views about mast 
siting. Notwithstanding the social and political discussion that the resort to regulatory 
science had generated, the government continued its communication plan of provid-
ing ‘clear’ scientific knowledge to society through intermediaries. In chapter 4, I dis-
cussed the communication activities of the Antennebureau. In this chapter, I focus on 
another arrangement, the Kennisplatform EMV&G, which can also be considered as 
an attempt at deliberation. 
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Science for policy 
The dual steps that the Dutch government undertook in order to solve siting contro-
versies – risk research and risk communication – could be witnessed in many Europe-
an countries at the time (see section Early engagement in chapter 2). Science for poli-
cy has become common practice today in politics: 
We live in a political culture that is steeped in science. When faced with dilemmas 
over food safety or phone masts, climate change or child vaccination, the first re-
sponse of politicians and regulators is to seek refuge in ‘sound science’ and the 
advisors who produce it (Wilsdon and Willis, 2004: 13). 
The calls for ‘evidence-based policy’ can be explained by the “the degree to which the 
problems that society faces have some close connection to the issues of science and 
technology, for example in the areas such as disease, development, terrorism, envi-
ronmental impacts, adoption of new technologies, and so on” (Pielke, 2007: 31). 
Moreover, there is an assumption that science is a powerful ally because it is believed 
to provide solid proof – a vision of how science and politics could work together that is 
deeply engrained in our modern society. The idea that science should provide conclu-
sive evidence that society needs – or in other words, the idea that policy should be 
based on objective, reliable knowledge – has a long history in Western thinking, going 
back at least to Plato’s Republic (Millstone, 2007). 
 This classical or conventional account of science-based policy-making is known as 
‘the technocratic model’ or ‘linear model’ (Millstone et al., 2004; Pielke, 2007). In this 
view, scientific consideration and expert advice are seen as the only solid basis for 
policy-making. Science is understood as a ‘factual policy informant’. In this model, 
policymakers deploy science as a source of public and political authority, or as Brian 
Wynne (Welsh and Wynne, 2013; Wynne, 2010) has phrased it, as ‘scientism’. Scien-
tism is the engrained assumption that scientific evidence is the only authority that can 
justify policy action. If science is used to appease controversial political decisions, 
politicians and policymakers rely heavily on the image of science as research and spe-
cialist knowledge-production. In this view, science is primarily concerned with produc-
ing ‘certified knowledge’, a term coined by the godfather of American sociology of 
science Robert Merton, and signifies knowledge that is not tainted by economics, 
politics, religion or ideology, but that is only strictly scientifically certified (Merton, 
1973). Science is thus portrayed as a tidy set of knowledge ready to be fed into policy. 
The only thing politicians have to do is commission research, await its results and base 
their policies on the outcomes of scientific research. It has often been encapsulated in 
the claim that policy should be based on, and only on, ‘sound science’: “[i]n this ‘tech-
nocratic model’ the politician becomes fully dependent on the expert. Politics is re-
placed by a scientifically rationalized administration” (Weingart, 1999, p. 154). It has 
been a specific guidance for the role of science in the context of decision making since 
147 
after World War II (Pielke, 2007; Weingart, 1999). It is still very much alive today un-
der the new umbrella of ‘evidence-based policy’ (Slob and Staman, 2012). 
 In the technocratic model, the role of science is well-defined as one of providing 
objective, reliable knowledge. This view of science has been criticised by scholars from 
science and technology studies (STS) and policy sciences who have investigated the 
actual role of science and expertise in policy and decision making (see for example, 
Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990; Harremoës et al., 2001; Hilgartner, 2000; Jasanoff and 
Wynne, 1998; Jasanoff, 1990, 2005; Klinke and Renn, 2002; Millstone et al., 2008; 
Nelkin, 1979; van Asselt et al., 2013; van Asselt, 2005). This type of research is con-
cerned with the relationship between science and policy processes, taking into ac-
count the intermediary layer of expertise, or ‘regulatory science’ (Jasanoff, 1990). 
Several decades of scholarship has unravelled a number of dynamics in the making of 
science, and in particular science for policy, each of which I will discuss in more detail 
in the next sections. Firstly, that science is socially constructed, i.e. the outcome of 
value judgments and boundary work. Secondly, that science often does not end con-
troversy that involves political, technical and scientific questions, but may in fact rein-
force it. Thirdly, that public disagreement with the judgment of science advisers is not 
the result of a lack of knowledge on the part of citizens (intellectual deficit), but rather 
the outcome of the public’s ability to disagree with underlying normative assumptions 
in scientific advice. These findings challenge the conventional technocratic assump-
tions about the nature of scientific knowledge and the role of experts. 
STS insight: science is socially constructed 
The linear model assumes that the boundaries between science and policy are well 
defined and ring-fenced: science produces facts that guarantee the best policy deci-
sions. Social science research, however, has shown that (regulatory) science is not 
independent from the social and political context in which it is embedded. Instead, 
the boundaries between science and policy or politics are constantly being renegoti-
ated as part of a political process (Jasanoff, 1990). The social context can thus not be 
separated from the scientific context, but is an integral part of it. The concept of ‘co-
production’ is used to refer to the understanding that scientific knowledge is not in-
dependent of political context, but is co-produced by scientists and the society within 
which they are embedded (Jasanoff, 1996, 2004). The outcomes of scientific process-
es are invariably framed by value judgments such as which scientific disciplines and 
knowledge is relevant, what to do with dissenting viewpoints, what should count as 
relevant evidence and how to interpret scientific results. Analyses by social scientists 
(see e.g. Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998) have provided detailed evidence that indicates 
that “a range of prior social, cultural, institutional, and practical commitments are 
embedded and reproduced, usually tacitly, within technical risk assessments that 
typically purport to be objective” (van Zwanenberg & Millstone, 2000, p. 259). 
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 Millstone and colleagues (2008), for instance, explain how scientists make up-
stream framing assumptions when deciding on, performing and evaluating scientific 
evidence for policy ends. Scientists make crucial assumptions in their work related to 
what kinds of objects and phenomena they are interested in, which are relevant and 
which should be ignored or discounted (prior ontological assumptions). Scientists 
make different sorts of assumptions: a) epistemological assumptions about what 
there is to be known, and what counts as relevant forms of knowledge and evidence; 
b) methodological assumptions about what are appropriate means for generating 
knowledge claims, and how those claims can be supported and/or challenged; and c) 
normative and interpretative assumptions about how the outcome of their delibera-
tions should be reported and represented. Scientists thus disagree over what counts 
as relevant forms of knowledge and evidence. These disagreements become prob-
lematic when science is used to solve a political controversy. Values that are embed-
ded in scientific knowledge for regulatory policy are then exposed to public scrutiny. 
The framing assumptions are part and parcel of the scientific enterprise, but crucially, 
determine the ways in which science for policy is framed, conducted and reported. 
For example, different scientists may weigh scientific uncertainties differently, as 
becomes apparent from different conclusions from advisory panels or expert delibera-
tions, also on EMF and health risks (see Schütz and Wiedemann, 2005; van Dijk et al., 
2011; see chapter 2, section Regulatory divergence). 
 Thus, a view of science as an apolitical, objective and reliable factual policy in-
formant is problematic, since it does not strike with how science for policy actually 
works: 
[t]he idea that science could even provide proof is a misunderstanding (or mis-
representation) of science and therefore of the role that science ever could play 
in policy. In all but the most trivial cases, science does not produce logically indis-
putable proofs about the natural world. At best it produces a robust consensus 
based on a process of inquiry that allows for continued scrutiny, re-examination, 
and revision (Oreskes, 2004: 369–370). 
The insights about the socially constructed nature of science severally complicate the 
traditional image of science as factual policy informant, left to its own devices far 
away from politics. Consequently, scholars have asked how we can explain the contin-
ued authoritative role of science in policymaking, even though science is socially con-
structed. How can science be socially shaped and yet still be used as a technocratic 
instrument to end social and political controversies? Social scientists have explained 
this ‘paradox of scientific authority’ (Bijker et al., 2009) with the concept of boundary 
work, which relates to the social construction and demarcation of what science is and 
what it is not. 
 Scholars have particularly been interested in how scientific advisory bodies, 
charged with providing governments with scientific advice on matters of public health, 
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draw boundaries to present their advice as sound science. Research has been done on 
the Gezondheidsraad in the Netherlands (Bijker et al., 2009), the U.S. National Acad-
emy of Sciences (Hilgartner, 2000) and several American advisory bodies in the area of 
regulation of chemicals (Jasanoff, 1990). The research shows that advisory bodies 
draw boundaries between science and politics, between science and non-science, 
between the advisory body itself and science, between scientific disciplines, and so on 
(Bijker et al., 2009; Hilgartner, 2000; Jasanoff, 1990). Boundary work is performed at 
each step of preparing a scientific advice or report: the social organisation and the 
constitution of committee members or panels of experts (which expertise is needed?), 
reviewing literature (which knowledge is relevant?), developing recommendations 
(oriented at science, politicians, practitioners, etc.?) and landing the report (what is 
the advisory body’s aim?). According to Bijker and colleagues, advisory bodies pro-
duce ‘serviceable truths’ (Jasanoff, 1990), i.e. “truthful scientific knowledge that is 
deliberately aimed at serving certain, often policy, goals” (Bijker et al., 2009: 142). The 
work of science advisory institutes is thus both scientific and policy-oriented, it is “a 
hybrid activity that combines elements of scientific evidence and reasoning with large 
doses of social and political judgment” (Jasanoff, 1990: 229). In their work, science 
advisors thus construct and maintain their credibility through boundary work. 
STS insight: science polarises viewpoints in controversies 
The second insight from STS that helps to understand the role of science in controver-
sies is the finding that using science for policy often has a polarising effect on contro-
versies. 
 In the early days of science and technology studies, ‘controversy studies’ 
emerged out of an interest in exploring science as a human product, as something 
that has to be made by people. Scholars started to look at controversies both in the 
present (Collins and Pinch, 1982; Collins, 1985; Pickering, 1984) and in the past 
(Shapin and Schaffer, 1985). Controversies were productive sites to observe science, 
they argued, since no facts had been established yet. It was analogous to observing 
how ships are put in bottles: “[i]nstitutionalised beliefs about the natural world are 
like the ship in the bottle, whereas instances of scientific controversy offer us the 
opportunity to see that the ship was once a pile of sticks and strings, and that it was 
once outside the bottle” (Shapin and Schaffer, 1985: 7). Soon controversy studies 
extended their scope from disputes over knowledge that were largely restricted with-
in the scientific community to disputes that took place outside the confines of the 
laboratory or field site’ (for an overview, see Martin and Richards, 1995; Sismondo, 
2012, chapter 11). These studies no longer solely focused on key scientists that are 
involved in a scientific controversy, but on a much larger number of actors such as 
government bodies, experts, citizen organisations, social movement groups and indus-
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try. Scholars wondered why science was often unable to end disagreements around 
issues of health, safety, and environment. 
 Dorothy Nelkin’s (1987, 1979) pioneering work on the role of science and tech-
nology in social and political disputes showed that controversies over science and 
technology are not per se disputes about the everyday implications of – say a waste 
siting repository – but are more often disputes about political control and the capacity 
of citizens to influence their power. Controversies over science and technology thus 
“reflect broader tensions in society” such as “the disagreement over the appropriate 
role of government, [or] the struggle between individual autonomy and community 
goals” (Nelkin, 1979: xi). Nelkin observed that a better understanding of the scientific 
facts often does not put an end to the controversy, but might in fact reinforce value 
disputes and competing interests. If conflicting scientific views come together in a 
decision making process, then the ‘truth’ does not automatically pop up after a long 
scientific deliberative process. Rather, each side tends to elaborate more and more, 
leading to polarisation and entrenchment of their positions instead of a move to the 
middle ground. This polarisation is caused, according to Nelkin, by the values that are 
inherent in questions portrayed as being purely scientific such as “what is an accepta-
ble level of risk? Who should assume responsibility for evaluating science projects 
when they may have an impact on public health?” (Nelkin, 1987, p. 285). 
 Several decades of STS and science policy research has corrobarated Nelkin’s 
findings by showing that, in policy areas for which scientific knowledge is deemed 
indispensable, “the growth of considerable bodies of scientific knowledge, created 
especially to resolve political dispute and enable effective decision making, has often 
been accompanied instead by growing political controversy and gridlock” (Sarewitz, 
2004, p. 386). Scholars claim that the uncertain nature of science for policy enhances 
the controversy: 
the competition for the latest, and therefore supposedly most compelling, scien-
tific knowledge drives the recruitment of expertise far beyond the realm of con-
sensual knowledge right up to the research frontier where knowledge claims are 
uncertain, contested, and open to challenge (Weingart, 1999: 158). 
Because regulatory science mostly investigates issues that are at “the realm of yet 
uncertain knowledge”, more scientific knowledge can in fact amplify the scientific and 
public discussion (Weingart, 1999: 160). Many scholars have observed that technical 
or scientific expertise becomes a crucial resource in controversies, not only used by 
policy makers but also by public actors such as engaged citizens, NGOs or other inter-
est groups (Hannigan, 1995; Leach & Scoones, 2007; Murphy, 2006; Nelkin, 1979; 
Tesh, 2000). 
 STS researchers have indicated that, contrary to the usual scientific myth, discus-
sions of contradicting scientific evidence do not always produce serviceable truths. 
Instead, when the results of the scientific inquiry have political or economic conse-
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quences, differences in knowledge are likely to be amplified by scientists, but also by 
public actors (Oreskes, 2004). 
STS insight: the public understands science 
Social scientists interested in science for policy have also analysed the public’s role in 
controversies involving scientific issues. The technocratic vision that these scholars 
criticise portrays citizens as passive recipients of scientific knowledge, who mostly 
misunderstand what scientists say. Public refusal to accept the opinion of science 
advisors thus comes down to the public’s failure to understand the meaning of sci-
ence, i.e. it reflects an intellectual deficit. This ‘deficit model’ of public understanding 
of science has long been discredited (see Irwin and Wynne, 1996). Moreover, the 
technocratic perspective views the public as a homogenous entity who reason and act 
alike. The field of Public Understanding of Science (PUS) has investigated the role of 
many heterogeneous publics in scientific and technological issues, with diverse values 
that can change depending on the context. It has come to several conclusions. Firstly, 
it indicates that the way publics make sense of science is not only through scrutinising 
the formal contents of science (what is said), but also through evaluating the institu-
tions and scientists presenting this knowledge (who says it), as I already discussed in 
chapter 3 and 4. Secondly, Brian Wynne’s well-known case study of the Cumbrian 
sheep farmers set the ground work for a plethora of studies that showed that mem-
bers of the interested public often have expertise that relates to the problem or issue 
at hand, which may conflict with the experts’ opinion (see section Grassroots support 
teams in chapter 3). Thirdly, members of the public can disagree with the normative 
assumptions or assumptions about the social world that are inherent in the produc-
tion of scientific knowledge, but which are unacknowledged by scientists or policy 
makers. 
 According to Wynne, there are three elements of the public understanding of 
science: “the formal contents of scientific knowledge; the methods and processes of 
science; and its forms of institutional embedding, patronage, organization, and con-
trol” (Wynne, 1992: 37). When publics do not agree with the policies that depend on 
particular scientific knowledge, they may criticise all three aspects of science. They 
thus not only doubt the scientific knowledge (the formal contents of scientific 
knowledge), but can also analyse the ways in which the knowledge is produced 
(methods and processes of science), and scrutinise the institutions, organisations and 
political actors whose legitimacy depends on the accuracy of this knowledge (forms of 
institutional embedding, patronage, organisation and control). Publics can thus attrib-
ute a range of social meanings to science that may overlap and conflict. They may 
belief in the abilities of science to solve modern-day problems. In environmental and 
other public controversies, for example, the notion that science is a source of fact and 
theories about reality that can and should settle disputes and guide political actions 
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remains a strongly held belief, also by publics (Frickel et al., 2010; Sarewitz, 2004; 
Murphy, 2006; Tesh and Williams, 1996). Different public social constructions of ‘sci-
ence’ can thus easily overlap: 
[p]eople are not solely disenchanted or disinherited in the face of science; rather, 
they discursively man[o]euvre around science in a variety of trajectories that can, 
on one hand, sustain the mystique and the status of science and, on the other, 
undermine them (Michael, 1992: 330) 
Consequently, if citizens disagree with scientific findings, it is not because they do not 
understand science as a research culture. Rather, it has to do with the “historical pro-
cess [that] has placed ever-increasing demands on public credulity and trust in institu-
tions, practices, commitments, reassurances, promises and predicted impacts, all 
justified in the generic name of ‘science’” (Wynne, 2006: 212). Citizens do not only 
judge the contents of scientific results, but also take into account the context in which 
the knowledge was gained (e.g. ties with industry) and the purposes of this knowledge 
(e.g. if it serves the goals of a particular ministry). Citizens are interested in questions 
that are about science, but that cannot be solved by science alone. Examples of these 
questions are: ‘Who has the legitimacy to decide on an important issue that may im-
pact public health?’, ‘Who will take responsibility for possible effects in the future?’, 
‘Who will be in charge, and can we trust them?’ or ‘What is an acceptable level of risk 
that society should take?’ (Grove-White et al., 2000; Leach, 2005). The public under-
standing of science is thus much more embedded in their experiences of life and is “a 
logical entailment of the gap between public understanding of recurrently present 
ignorance and uncertainty, and the exclusive focus on positive knowledge within the 
official information culture of transparency and openness” (Grove-White et al., 2000: 
29). 
 STS scholars in PUS have thus convincingly argued that publics understand sci-
ence in different ways, but also that they acquire and challenge knowledge. 
The presumed deficit of scientific knowledge 
I will come back to these three insights from STS and policy sciences about the social 
construction of science, the polarising effect of using science as scientism and the 
public understanding of science, to explain the Dutch controversy that arose over 
mast siting. I will first discuss the policy decision to deal with the presumed deficit of 
scientific knowledge, which I argue comes down to using science as scientism or pre-
sumed public authority knowledge. 
 In the 2000s, the government focused predominantly on possible health effects 
in dealing with local dissatisfaction about base station siting. It asserted that public 
discussions were increasingly about health risks instead of other issues such as spatial 
planning: 
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[i]n the practice of antenna siting, it turns out that the societal discussion is now-
adays less about local planning aspects than it used to be, and increasingly about 
(fear of) risks for health damage. There has been a slight shift of focus (Ministerie 
van Economische Zaken et al., 2005: 5). 
[t]he Antennebureau had been established back then to answer questions about 
the antenna policy and about more technical issues. Since mid-2004, the number 
of questions and complaints about the topic antennas and health has grown 
strongly (Tweede Kamer, 2005). 
These observations affirmed the government’s risk-based approach in dealing with 
siting controversies. Nevertheless, by the mid-2000s, the funding of research into 
health risks from RF EMF had caused quite some controversy, and even deadlock. In 
2005 and 2006, around 70 municipalities decided to install a moratorium on the siting 
of masts until science had provided more clarity on health risks. This controversial 
episode started in 2002, when the government decided to fund a study into UMTS-
technology and health risks, the TNO study, after Parliament had demanded more 
research into health risks from base stations (see chapter 4). 
The TNO study 
The results of the TNO-research project were ready to be announced in September 
2003 (Zwamborn et al., 2003). In the beginning of their research report, the research-
ers explained how their study was directly informed by politicians’ requests for more 
research: 
[t]he parliamentarian Wagenaar submitted a motion during the consultation of 
the National Antenna Policy in which the government was asked to “initiate inde-
pendent scientific epidemiological research into the effects of radiation from an-
tennas on the long-term and to research the complaints made.” (…) This study 
can be seen as a first answer to this motion and has therefore been given the re-
search question to investigate the subjective complaints that were attributed to 
GSM base stations (Ibid.: 2). 
The TNO researchers reported that their study – known as the COFAM (COgnitive 
Functions And Mobiles) study – showed a statistically significant decrease of feeling of 
well-being in the test subjects such as dizziness and concentration problems after 
being exposed to UMTS-like exposure. The fact that the researchers focused on 
UMTS-like exposure and not GSM-like exposure reflected the societal debate about 
mast siting that had shifted to UMTS. In the media, the researchers expressed their 
surprise at the study results (van Uffelen, 2003). In their double-blind laboratory ex-
periment, two groups of people were exposed to electromagnetic fields similar as 
those coming from UMTS-antennas. The researchers measured the effects on physical 
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well-being and cognitive performance. The researchers explained that the study’s 
results were unique in that they showed a statistically significant effect from UMTS-
like frequencies. Research with a similar design but with fields comparable to mobile 
phones (higher V/m) had already shown a decrease of cognition. The authors explain: 
[i]n literature, it is speculated that that the effects on the cognitive parameters 
may be explained by an unknown mechanism induced by thermal effects. In our 
study, it is shown that the thermal effects are negligible and therefore, an expla-
nation based on thermal effects seems highly unlikely for effects on the cognitive 
parameters (Zwamborn et al., 2003: 62). 
They thus proposed more research into this area and a replication by other scientists 
of their study to see whether this study was just an anomaly or ‘false positive’, i.e. the 
null hypothesis (‘no effect of EMF on health’) had been incorrectly rejected. In other 
words, the COFAM-study had shown a relationship between UMTS-like exposure and 
a decreased feeling of wellbeing, but in reality, there was none. 
 The Minister of Economic Affairs agreed that more research was needed but saw 
no need to stop the planned rollout of the UMTS network because of the study’s re-
sults. He announced that he would support initiatives by foreign research institutes 
that planned to reproduce the COFAM study (Tweede Kamer, 2004b). In May 2004, 
the minister of Health, Welfare and Sport asked the Gezondheidsraad for advice on 
how to proceed with interpreting the COFAM-study results. He asked the Gezond-
heidsraad four questions: 
⦁ What is the Health Council’s assessment of the quality of the COFAM study and 
what does the Council see as the best approach to replication of the study? 
⦁ Is it desirable that additional research is carried out and, if so, what particular 
points should that research address, bearing in mind the nature of research activ-
ities in progress elsewhere? 
⦁ Is ‘perceived well-being’ a sufficiently objective concept for the formulation of 
scientific conclusions? 
⦁ Does the diminution of ‘perceived well-being’ amount to a sufficiently serious 
effect on health to justifymitigating measures? (Gezondheidsraad, 2004: 36). 
Three months later, the Gezondheidsraad informed the ministry that the design and 
implementation of the TNO study were of high scientific standards, but it had some 
comments on the interpretation of the data, including the validity of the question-
naire used to measure the participants’ ‘well-being’. The Gezondheidsraad also ques-
tioned the very notion of ‘well-being’ as a legitimate indication of an adverse health 
effect. The Gezondheidsraad did not find it necessary to take measures if there was a 
minor decrease in well-being, “for instance a certain degree of discomfort which does 
not lead to any mental or physical effects” (Ibid.: 11). It asserted that it depended on 
the definition of ‘well-being’, which, according to the World Health Organisation 
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(WHO) is “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, and not merely 
the absence of disease or infirmity” (Ibid.: 11). The TNO researchers used this defini-
tion in their study. The Gezondheidsraad questioned this interpretation of the concept 
of well-being, because “based on this definition, any decrease in well-being should be 
considered an adverse health effect” (Ibid.: 11). The Gezondheidsraad’s advice to the 
government as its science advisor differed: it claimed that “only when objective evi-
dence is obtained of the generation or exacerbation of physical or mental symptoms, 
can it be said that a health effect is involved which requires mitigating measures” 
(Ibid.: 31). According to the Gezondheidsraad, the TNO study results were no reason 
to change the existing exposure limits since it was not possible to determine whether 
there was a causal connection between exposure to RF EMF and negative health im-
pacts. It concluded its advice to the government by calling for more scientific clarity 
about the question whether exposure to UMTS-fields has a negative effect on well-
being. The government followed the Gezondheidsraad’s advice: it did not implement 
more mitigating measures, such as lowering exposure limits or halting the siting of 
UMTS base stations. Instead, the government agreed that more scientific research 
was needed and started deliberations with a consortium of Swiss universities and 
research institutes who would replicate32 the TNO study. A few months after the pub-
lication of the TNO-study, a new research project known as COFAM II started in Swit-
zerland, which was partly funded by the Dutch government.33 This discussion on 
UMTS-antennas thus continued, while the discussion on GSM-antennas, of which 
there were at the time still many more compared to UMTS, quietened. 
 The TNO study is an example of regulatory science: it was performed with the 
goal of informing politics about possible health risks from wireless communication 
technology. Yet, the TNO study did not provide facts that could literally be translated 
to a policy context. It did not answer the question whether exposure to UMTS-
antennas was a public health risk or not. The study needed to be interpreted by poli-
cymakers. The government’s reaction was one of hesitation and caution: it asked the 
Gezondheidsraad for an interpretation of the study results. In its request for advice to 
the Gezondheidsraad, the relevant ministries indicated that follow-up research was 
needed (Gezondheidsraad, 2004). They therefore asked advice on the best approach 
to replicate the TNO study and on which additional type of research should be carried 
out. The government also asked the Gezondheidsraad two political and value-laden 
questions about the objectivity of the concept of ‘well-being’ and the need for miti-
gating measures. These questions revealed the government’s view of the problem, 
how it could be solved and which aspects were relevant. The Dutch government had 
                                                                
32 Even though the Swiss researchers did more than just replicate the TNO study because they changed the 
research design, the government mostly talked about ‘a replication’ of the TNO study.  
33 COFAM I was funded by the government, the financing of COFAM II went through a Swiss institute. The 
academic article (Regel et al., 2006) says: “[t]he study was supported by Swiss Research Foundation on 
Mobile Communication grant A2004-0.” 
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classified the question of mast siting as a scientific, and not a political one, and there-
by decided that scientists and scientific advisory bodies should resolve it. Even though 
the interpretative scope of the study was left completely in the hands of the Gezond-
heidsraad, the government’s framing of the advice already showed that it was reluc-
tant to accept the study’s results at face value. The government approached the study 
with the assumption that it was a false positive. The solution was a call for more scien-
tific research. The government thus not only relied on its experts, but also deflected 
its responsibilities to them, letting the Gezondheidsraad answer questions that in fact 
belonged to the political realm. 
 The Gezondheidsraad drew a boundary between what was an acceptable risk and 
what was not: it decided that a diminished feeling of well-being was not a serious 
health problem.34 The government portrayed this judgement as the best scientific 
interpretation of the TNO study, thereby classifying the results as not significant 
enough for policy interventions. However, as social scientists have argued for years, 
these risk assessment policy issues are value judgements that can be contested by 
other scientists and by public actors. The grassroots support group StopUMTS, for 
example, criticised the advice: “the Gezondheidsraad does not mind when people get 
dizzy or nauseous and get pain in the chest. The council will only revise its advice 
when it is objectively proven that people become medically ill or when they die” 
(StopUMTS, 2006b). The TNO study reinforced a value dispute about issues that were 
about science, in this case ‘what is an acceptable level of risk for society’. Social scien-
tists have claimed that such questions cannot and should not be solved by science 
alone. Yet, the Dutch government used science as scientism: scientific knowledge 
became the only authority that could answer policy questions. As the social science 
literature on regulatory science showed, the outcome of scientific research by itself 
does not compel policy action. In other words, it is impossible to get a clear answer to 
a normative question (what is the right policy decision) from a statement of fact (this 
study shows a decreased feeling of well-being after test subjects are exposed to 
UMTS-radiation). Nevertheless, the government laid its responsibility with science and 
science advisors. 
The ‘Swiss’ study 
By 2005, the minister was awaiting the results of the COFAM II study, which by now 
had become known as ‘the Swiss study’, to see whether it could reproduce the posi-
tive findings of the TNO study. The government’s reluctance to act upon the results of 
                                                                
34 The Gezondheidsraad’s boundary work and its position in political debates changes according to the 
topic, which is inherent to the council’s way of operation (see Bijker et al., 2009). This means that the 
Gezondheidsraad could take a different approach in other advices. In an advice about the health impact of 
large airports (Gezondheidsraad, 1999), for example, the committee understands ‘public health’ to also 
include quality of life, in contrast to its position on the notion of ‘well-being’ in the TNO-study (see also 
Gezondheidsraad, 2010). 
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the TNO study and to wait for the Swiss study resonated in media reports, where one 
could read that: 
[m]inistries, municipalities, telecom operators and opponents of UMTS masts are 
anxiously looking forward to the Swiss research about the relation between radia-
tion and physical well-being. (…) The ministry will determine its course concerning 
the siting of antennas amongst others on the basis of this research (Oirschot, 
2006) 
This position could also be witnessed during a documentary on mobile phones and 
base stations by the Dutch TV-channel VARA, in which it discussed the results of the 
TNO study. It asked the State Secretary of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environ-
ment whether the rollout of the UMTS network would now be halted until more was 
known about possible health effects. The minister responded that he would not stop 
an important technological development on the basis of ‘unclear views’. He awaited 
the results of the Swiss replication study (VARA, 2004). In parliamentary discussions 
and in a letter to parliament, the State Secretary had also said that the Swiss study 
could possibly be a basis for changing the antenna policy in the future (Tweede Ka-
mer, 2004a, 2004b). 
 This rhetoric of anticipation of more answers from science was so pervasive that 
by the time that the results of the Swiss study were expected – spring 2006 – around 
71 municipalities (out of 458 in 2006) halted all decisions on the siting of base sta-
tions, specifically for UMTS (Tweede Kamer, 2006c). In November 2005, the Minister 
of Economic Affairs together with the State Secretary of Housing, Spatial Planning and 
the Environment had already addressed the municipalities’ reluctance to site UMTS 
base stations in a briefing to parliament. They then stated that “[t]he reason that is 
given for this reluctance is a lack of clarity about possible health effects of electro-
magnetic fields of antennas and the fact that they are awaiting the results of the Swiss 
replication study” (Tweede Kamer, 2005). City councillors and aldermen of municipali-
ties all over the country considered it better to wait before making any decisions on 
siting permits for masts for wireless communication technology. In these discussions, 
the Swiss study was portrayed as providing the ultimate clarity on the issue of base 
stations and health. 
 In a meeting of the city council in Haarlemmermeer it was for example uttered 
that “[b]oth the industry, government and many suspicious residents are anxiously 
awaiting the results of a Swiss study that is expected to give more clarity” (Gemeente 
Haarlemmermeer, 2005). In Berkel en Rodenrijs, the city council did not want to allow 
new UMTS masts “before a Swiss research has proven that electromagnetic radiation 
from base stations is not dangerous for public health” (Eerst onderzoek, dan masten 
(Berkel en Rodenrijs), 2005). In Amersfoort, two political parties did not want any 
more UMTS masts to arise “until it is clear what the risks are for the health of the 
people living in the neighbourhood. (…) Research by order of the national government 
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has to provide more clarity come next autumn” (Geen UMTS totdat risico’s duidelijk 
zijn, 2005). And in Spijkenisse, one could read in the magazine of the municipality: 
[e]ven though there is more and more research into health effects from radiation 
from GSM and UMTS antennas, a clear connection has still not been established. 
All eyes, also in Spijkenisse, are now turned towards a Swiss research that is cur-
rently taking place (Gemeente Spijkenisse, 2006). 
Mobile phone operators accused local politicians of abusing the situation to win votes 
in the upcoming municipal elections. They also pointed out that, based on 2500 stud-
ies, the WHO had concluded that there was no reason for worry. The Swiss study 
should be put in that perspective, instead of now being seen as providing the ultimate 
clarity, according to the industry (de Rodij, 2006). 
 The long-awaited results of the Swiss study became available in June 2006. The 
researchers concluded: 
[i]n contrast to a recent Dutch study, we could not confirm a short-term effect of 
UMTS base station-like exposure on well-being. (…) No conclusions can be drawn 
regarding short-term effects of cell phone exposure or the effects of long-term 
base station-like exposure on human health (Regel et al., 2006: 1270). 
The State Secretary interpreted these results as discrediting the TNO study as a false 
positive. Because the Swiss study’s design was “more detailed and more extensive”, it 
had shown “with more power of expression that those effects [that were found in the 
TNO study] did not occur”, according to the State Secretary (Tweede Kamer, 2006d). 
The State Secretary’s feeling of relief by the Swiss study’s results shone through his 
press release: “[n]ot the slightest effect of UMTS radiation on health” (Ministerie van 
VROM, 2006). In reactions in the written press, the minister spoke with certainty: 
“dozens of studies showed that UMTS radiation is safe on the long term” and “moreo-
ver, there is no scientific ground for doubt” (n.a., 2006a). The State Secretary did not 
ask the Gezondheidsraad to review the Swiss study, nor did he ask for more replica-
tions of the same study design. In the government’s view, the Swiss study had proven 
that UMTS was safe and this was announced as such in a political statement to par-
liament: 
I conclude that the current state of science, taking into account the results of the 
Swiss research, supports my viewpoint that the siting of UMTS-antennas is justi-
fied from a health perspective. After all, the preconditions of public health, envi-
ronment and safety are fulfilled (Tweede Kamer, 2006b: 3–4). 
The Swiss study became a cornerstone in the government’s decision to continue with 
the siting of base stations, or at least, it was portrayed as such. The government por-
trayed the Swiss study as the ultimate judge to the question of the existence of health 
risks from RF EMF. There was no room for doubt, according to the minister: “the Swiss 
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study ends all uncertainty and it shows no effect, not even a little” (Tweede Kamer, 
2006d). 
 During my field research several years after the publication of this study, the 
‘Swiss study’ was still mentioned by municipal officials for whom it represented proof 
of the legitimacy of the antenna policy. A municipal official in Maastricht, for example, 
said, “the famous Swiss study has shown that there is no danger” (Interview M7). The 
municipality of Westmaas informed its citizens that it agreed with the government’s 
standpoint that “refers to a Swiss study into the radiation of UMTS masts. This study 
shows that the preconditions of public health, environment and safety are fulfilled” 
(Municipal official Binnenmaas, personal communication, June 28, 2012). Municipali-
ties thus echoed the words of the State Secretary that were very clearly communicat-
ed after the publication of the Swiss study: the Swiss study had adequately demon-
strated that the siting of base stations was harmless (if the siting conformed to the 
existing exposure limits). 
 Yet, the government also tapped into another image of science: that of science as 
a continuous quest for evidence. The image of science as arbiter stood alongside the 
image of science as vigilant guardian. This became evident in the government’s re-
peated rhetoric of ‘keeping a finger on the pulse’ (‘vinger aan de pols houden’) by 
which was meant that it would keep track of scientific developments. The government 
intended to stay informed about new scientific developments that might point to 
possible health risks by way of its scientific advisors and institutions:  
[t]he Gezondheidsraad and RIVM [National Institute for Public Health and the En-
vironment] keep a close eye on the publication of new research results that might 
affect the assessment of safety of citizens. Through the previously announced re-
search programme with ZonMw, for which I am currently preparing the assign-
ment, I can emphatically keep a finger on the pulse for developments in this field 
(Tweede Kamer, 2006b). 
In this statement, the government referred to its decision to fund ZonMW (The Neth-
erlands Organisation for Health Research and Development) with 16.6 million euro to 
set up a multi-year research programme on EMF and health. The government often 
used the discourse of vigilance in the context of discussions about the antenna policy. 
Already in 1997, during the first political discussions about the antenna policy, the 
government had said, “[w]e will keep up with the scientific developments in the area 
of health effects of electromagnetic radiation so that the policy can be changed in 
case of new insights” (Tweede Kamer, 1997) (see Wireless communication technology 
in the local policy arena section in chapter 4). In parliamentary debates about the 
interpretation of the Swiss study, the State Secretary responded to critical questions, 
“the interpretations [of scientific studies] are not from the State Secretary himself, but 
based on the statements by the WHO and the Gezondheidsraad, who for that matter 
constantly keep a finger on the pulse” (Tweede Kamer, 2006c). 
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 After the government dismissed the TNO study as a false positive and decided to 
contribute to a replication of the study, the importance attributed to the Swiss study 
rose significantly. The government claimed that its results would directly influence 
policy decisions about base station siting. The public debate about mast siting turned 
to discussing the policy implications of scientific studies of health risks from RF EMF. 
Municipalities considered it better to wait for decisions on mast siting until the results 
of the Swiss study were known. The Swiss study became more than just another scien-
tific investigation of possible health risks from exposure to wireless communication 
technology. It became the ultimate judge that decided on the continuation of an im-
portant national policy. When the Swiss study did not find a decreased feeling of well-
being in its test subjects, the government claimed that the siting of base stations 
could continue. Others, however, disputed this decision. 
Disputing the TNO and Swiss study 
At first sight, the risk-based policy approach of the Dutch government to deal with the 
increasing public dissatisfaction with the siting of base stations – tackling the deficit of 
scientific knowledge – seemed to achieve the government’s goal of continuing with 
the siting of base stations. However, it did not have a stabilising effect of ending the 
societal concern about siting that the belief in evidence-based policy implies. In fact, I 
argue that the risk-based policy approach led to a shift in the societal debate on mast 
siting because it facilitated the deepening of a focus on negative health effects. Public 
actors such as engaged citizens and grassroots support teams did not accept the sci-
ence that the government posited as public authority knowledge, but disputed it. 
Using science as scientism led to a polarisation of the debate. Whilst the government 
continued to insist that its policy decision was based on the best available scientific 
evidence and that it kept track of the newest scientific insights, critical voices emerged 
about the way the Dutch government had portrayed the Swiss study as proof of safe-
ty. 
 The representatives of the GGD’en (Community Health Services) considered it 
necessary to remind the minister that the health complaints and concerns of citizens 
should be taken seriously – whatever the Swiss study’s results (n.a., 2006b). In addi-
tion, the Swiss researchers themselves sent out a press release prior to the publica-
tion of their study to assert that their results were not a sufficient basis for policy 
decisions on the exposure to long-term RF EMF. Their study was only targeted to 
finding out about the effects of UMTS-like radiation on the well-being and cognitive 
functioning of test subjects exposed for short periods of time (45 minutes), the Swiss 
researchers said (n.a., 2005b). In the ensuing political debate, also some parliamentar-
ians questioned the carefulness of the State Secretary’s statement that “the Swiss 
study ends all uncertainty and it shows no effect, not even a little” (Tweede Kamer, 
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2006d). A number of political parties emphasised the remaining uncertainties in scien-
tific knowledge, such as the Green Party: 
the limitations of the Swiss research are not explained. (…) Common sense com-
pels to say that there is not a lot known yet about the effect of radiation. Interna-
tionally and on a scientific level, there are lively debates about long-term expo-
sure (Tweede Kamer, 2005). 
These parties called for precaution to be taken into account: “it seems sensible to Mr 
van Dam [Dutch Labour Party] to practice precaution by rolling out a network with less 
masts and less field strengths” (Ibid.). The Green Party also “expected from the gov-
ernment to express uncertainties and deal with them prudently” (Ibid.). They referred 
to other European countries that had decided to lower their emission standards. 
These actors thus challenged the government’s depiction of scientific certainty. Creat-
ing doubt about the Swiss study was an achievable goal because of the government’s 
use of the Swiss study as public authority knowledge, i.e. when “science goes beyond 
supplying the facts to defining the public meaning of problems” (Wynne, 2010: 441). 
The antenna policy was reduced to a question of whether the science was right or 
wrong. The politicians did not dispute the facts of the Swiss study, but the interpreta-
tion of it by the government. The Swiss study was disputed because the more the 
government tried to get robust scientific advice from its experts, the more it revealed 
the socially constructed nature of this knowledge and the inherent uncertainties. 
 Other societal actors besides politicians highlighted scientific uncertainties in the 
Swiss study. One month after the release of the Swiss study, the municipality of 
Spijkenisse – one of the most engaged municipalities – decided to continue with the 
restrictive siting policy and not hand out any building permits for UMTS base stations 
because “it was not clear what the health risks are for the long term. The much talked 
about Swiss study only gives a decisive answer about exposure to radiation over a very 
short period” (Gemeente Spijkenisse, 2006). The city council had asked the group of 
engaged citizens in Spijkenisse to give their view on the Swiss study. ‘Spijkenisse 
against Radiation’ criticised the Swiss study on several grounds: the methodology did 
not take into account the real-life continuous, long term and ubiquitous exposure to 
RF EMF and they considered it suspicious that the full results of the study were not 
disclosed (Interview S1). For these engaged citizens, the Swiss study represented the 
government’s negligence of all those other scientific studies that did show health 
effects (Interview S1 & N8). Even many years later, during my field research, the Swiss 
study was still cited. For example, in a newspaper article about a group of engaged 
citizens in Rijen (NL), the journalist quoted one of them as saying: “[the mast] involves 
health risks. Various studies have shown that, but the municipality hides again behind 
those studies that speak to their advantage, like the Swiss study. That study is totally 
unsound” (Huijben, 2008). A representative of the Antennebureau also mentioned 
that the Swiss study often came up during information sessions as an accusation of 
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the government’s narrow-mindedness concerning the broad array of evidence for 
health risks (Interview N9). The GGD also discussed the TNO and Swiss study in its 
presentations during information sessions for citizens (see section Trickling down the 
antenna policy in chapter 4). 
 The critique of politicians, municipalities and engaged citizens on the Swiss study 
echoed the opinion of grassroots support teams. StopUMTS (2006a), the best known 
grassroots support team in the Netherlands (see chapter 3), commented on the Swiss 
study by first of all stating that the study was irrelevant – a “simple provocation study” 
– since only epidemiological studies (study of disease patterns in human population) 
could answer the question whether exposure to RF EMF is harmful on the long term. 
Yet, taking a closer look at the Swiss study also revealed numerous other defects, 
according to StopUMTS. Firstly, it was thought “surprising” that the scientists did not 
use a UMTS base station in the laboratory, but a frequency generator that generated 
a signal only “resembling” that of a base station. This situation was far from similar to 
reality in which movies, conversations and websites “fly through the air”, the argu-
ment continued, leading to a much less dense signal compared to a real-life situation. 
Secondly, the research did not take into account the participants’ exposure to radia-
tion prior to coming to the lab. This was believed to be problematic, since before the 
test, “when participants walk through the university building where they for example 
develop heart palpitations due to exposure to radiation from WLAN transmitters, they 
then will probably still have these during the research in the laboratory” (StopUMTS, 
2006a). In fact, the Swiss society for electrohypersensitivity Gigaherz asked its mem-
bers to come forward if they participated in the research. The society claimed that 
four participants reported that they all became so ill that they had to withdraw from 
the study. Thirdly, the research only asked participants who “did not smoke, drank 
little coffee and alcohol, slept well, were not fat, left-handed or younger than twenty 
or older than sixty and were not ill” (Ibid.). The results could thus only account for a 
minority of the population. StopUMTS concluded the review by stating that “the high 
standards that the Gezondheidsraad imposes on telecom critical studies were appar-
ently not applicable to the Swiss study, which nevertheless has played a decisive role 
in the political acceptance of the UMTS rollout and still has in surrounding jurispru-
dence” (Ibid.) 
 The same points of criticism on the scientific standards were already voiced in 
2004 by another grassroots support team called Stichting Milieuziektes (literal transla-
tion: Foundation Environmental Diseases), active online and through a newsletter 
(Stichting Milieuziektes, n.d.). Since 2001, the Stichting focused on diseases from the 
environment, be that electromagnetic fields or any other ‘polluter’ in the water or air. 
In 2003, it devoted several pages of its newsletter to scrutinising the TNO study. Even 
though the TNO study found a negative effect on health (in terms of well-being), and 
thus backed up the Stichting’s goal, the organisation nevertheless found a number of 
‘technical problems’ that could be summarised in one overarching critique: the study 
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was not representative of the real-life conditions that people are exposed to. Like the 
comments of StopUMTS on the Swiss study, the Stichting also commented on the fact 
that the scientists used a frequency generator, whose signal was not comparable to a 
normal base station signal, or that the data traffic that takes place in normal circum-
stances (videos, conversations, etc.) was not taken into account. The Stichting deemed it 
important to simulate a real practical situation that takes into account the exposure in 
everyday life, for example in big cities, where people are exposed to a mixture of tech-
nologies, such as GSM, UMTS and Wi-Fi. The TNO study did not take into account this 
cumulative effect of long-term exposure to RF EMF, concluded the Stichting. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. – “Conflict of interest government, TNO and providers?”. The title reads “Objective 
Research?”. The government is portrayed by the Dutch flag, the research institute TNO by its light 
blue logo and the mobile phone operator KPN by its dark blue logo. It reads from top to bottom: 
“Government has 19.3% shares in KPN”, “Government works closely together with TNO”, “TNO 
Telecom develops mobile services”, “Government instructs TNO to conduct UMTS research” 
(StopUMTS, n.d.) 
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The grassroots teams’ analysis did not stop there. Another part of their comments 
focused on the alleged impartiality of the institutions performing the research. 
StopUMTS accused TNO of conflict of interest because of its presumed shared inter-
ests with the government and a mobile phone operator (KPN) (see Figure 5.1.). In 
their self-explanatory picture, StopUMTS reasoned that the study had to be discredit-
ed since 1) the government held shares in the telecom company, 2) the government 
collaborated closely with TNO, 3) TNO developed mobile services for the telecom 
company and d) the government funded TNO to do a study into RF EMF. In the follow-
ing years, the members of StopUMTS also tried to discredit certain members of the 
Gezondheidsraad’s committee that prepared reports on RF EMF, asserting that some 
had close ties with industry, delegitimising their advisory role in the council – and thus 
undermining the authority of the Gezondheidsraad’s advises on wireless communica-
tion technology. The same rhetoric of the untrustworthiness of government, industry 
and scientific institutions resonated in StopUMTS’ reaction to the publication of the 
Swiss study. A law firm closely related to StopUMTS appealed against the ministry’s 
decision and demanded the full disclosure of the data on which the Swiss study’s 
results were based. The ministry replied that the information was already publicly 
available, as a peer-reviewed publication in the academic journal Environmental 
Health Perspectives. In further correspondence, it replied that the Swiss research 
consortium owned the property rights of the raw data and other scientific information 
on the study. The project leader of the Swiss study only allowed access to fellow re-
searchers within a scientific context.35 The same suspicion and surprise at the lack of 
openness was still uttered years later during the interviews I had with engaged citi-
zens that affiliated with similar grassroots support team as StopUMTS (Interview S1). 
The ties between science and industry were also a recurring theme in mast siting 
controversies (see chapter 3).  
 The fact that the government insisted on portraying particular studies as evi-
dence of the harmlessness of wireless communication technology encouraged public 
actors to dive deeper into the scientific aspects of mast siting. The TNO and Swiss 
study became iconic studies on the websites of grassroots support teams, as they 
were considered to represent the government’s mismanagement of the antenna 
policy. Interest groups, such as the Stichting ElektroHypersensitiviteit 
(Dutch ElektroHyperSensitivity Foundation (EHS)) and grassroots support teams, such 
as International EMF Alliance (see Table 3.2. in chapter 3), also started to interact with 
academics, for example, by attending academic conferences on the topic of EMF.36 As 
                                                                
35 All the documents and correspondence on the disclosure of the data of the Swiss study can be found at 
http://www.StopUMTS.nl/doc.php/Reacties/1293, archived at http://www.webcitation.org/6Q6ZxRI6t. 
36 At the conference Low frequency electromagnetic field exposure and modulation of cellular functions, 
organised by the University of Wageningen (NL) and ZonMw in September 16, 2010, there was at least one 
person from a grassroots support team present. Also at the mini-symposium Modern health worries and 
idiopathic environmental intolerance in relation to symptoms. Research, assessment and treatment options, 
organised by the RIVM in Utrecht, February 1, 2011, people from Foundation EHS, Werkgroep Hoogspan-
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I discussed in chapter 3, grassroots support teams backed up citizens’ engagement 
around mast siting, amongst others, by providing a plethora of information on their 
websites. In the period of the public and political discussion on the Swiss study, en-
gaged citizens took over their criticism on the government’s interpretation of particu-
lar studies (as was the case in Spijkenisse). The comments of these groups on scientific 
studies reflect the STS-insights about the public understanding of science. Public ac-
tors did not misunderstand what the Swiss study (or any other study) had researched. 
Their criticism did not originate from a lack of intellectual capacity to understand 
science. Rather, these different publics criticised those aspects of public science that 
they deemed equally important as the actual content of the knowledge itself, more 
specifically, the context in which the knowledge was made, the purposes of this 
knowledge and the policy interpretations of this knowledge. As the STS-literature on 
public understanding of science has shown, public actors evaluated the outcomes of 
science in the light of their own knowledge and experiences. Some had access to ex-
periential knowledge about the effects of exposure from wireless communication 
technology on people’s health. Some also took a critical look at the institutions, scien-
tists and advisory bodies that presented and interpreted this knowledge. 
 The formulation of the Swiss study as proof of safety shifted the public debate to 
one about the merits of scientific studies. The government aimed for a rational ap-
proach to base station siting that was based on scientific evidence. This became espe-
cially evident in its relation to the municipalities that had postponed all building deci-
sions for UMTS-masts between the publication of the TNO and Swiss study. The gov-
ernment told them that there were no grounds anymore to ban the siting of base 
stations. In a newspaper article, the government was quoted as saying: “[w]e don’t 
live in a banana republic and the national government determines the rules on this 
domain” (n.a., 2006a). In June 2006, after parliament debated the Swiss study, the 
government parties also gave their full support to the responsible ministries for the 
continuation of the antenna policy. They did not consider it appropriate for citizens 
and municipalities to continue to engage with the siting of the technology. As one 
Member of Parliament put it in the newspaper, “[w]e can understand that people are 
concerned. But at a certain moment one must accept that there are studies whose 
outcomes may be considered reassuring” (VNG, 2006b). Government parties agreed 
that municipalities – and especially those that continued to refuse siting base stations 
– had to reconcile themselves to the facts and the democratic decisions taken, which 
were informed by those facts: “[h]ard scientific facts show that there is no reason for 
concern. Municipalities must reason from these facts and take away the societal con-
cern instead of feeding it” (Tweede Kamer, 2006c). 
                                                                                                                                                         
ning (working group high tension (ELF)) and International EMF Alliance were there. Moreover, interviewees 
that were involved in grassroots support teams would travel often to attend international conferences.  
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 The government reasoned that science had been the judge, and had decided that 
nobody should be concerned about health risks. For the government, this meant that 
mast siting controversies were not to be tolerated. The government reinforced its 
position as the authority in charge and condemned municipalities that did not follow 
its policy. I discussed in the previous chapter that the antenna policy did not allow 
much involvement of local authorities in siting decisions (see chapter 4). Some munic-
ipalities had temporarily reclaimed their rights of deciding on local planning of masts 
by arguing that they had to wait for scientific clarity about possible health effects from 
UMTS-exposure. In the view of the government, the Swiss study had provided this 
answer and it thus gained the upper hand again in the dispute with the local authori-
ties. At the end of the 1990s, when the rollout of the wireless communication network 
had just begun, the disagreements between the local and national governments about 
siting antennas focused largely on urban and country planning aspects. Municipalities 
were concerned that the proliferation of antennas would lead to landscape pollution 
(see chapter 4). During the episode of the TNO and Swiss study, this focus shifted to a 
question of public safety: did the antennas harm citizens’ health? Some municipalities 
now used scientific arguments to question the antenna policy. Engaged citizens did 
the same. Other reasons for engaging retreated into the background. All actors in the 
controversy now focused on one issue that had become pivotal in the antenna policy, 
i.e. the existence of health risks. Counter-expertise to the government’s view on sci-
ence came from the contact with societal actors who were not engaging against the 
siting of a particular base station, but who engaged against the proliferation of wire-
less communication technology in general: the grassroots support teams (see chapter 
3). This shift in the societal debate about base station siting polarised the different 
positions. Moreover, in the public debate, the position of the more radical grassroots 
support teams moved to the foreground, whilst the local citizen collectives, and their 
concerns, moved to the background. 
The misguided belief in science as a solution to mast siting controversies 
I discussed the (co-)funding of the TNO and Swiss study as products of the govern-
ment’s risk-based approach in dealing with mast siting controversies. The government 
depicted mast siting controversies primarily as instances of citizens’ fear for health 
risks. From this perspective, its investment in more scientific knowledge seemed to be 
a “logical reflex”, as someone from the GGD phrased it in an interview with me (Inter-
view K7). It might seem rather innocent to ask scientists to try to find out what is go-
ing on so that politics and society can get more clarity on the issue. However, as the 
STS and policy science literature has indicated, it becomes a real problem when scien-
tific knowledge is used as scientism or as public authority knowledge (Wynne, 2008). 
Also in the controversies I studied, the resort to science had effects. The government 
represented the Swiss study as knowledge that had the authority to decide on the 
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legitimacy of the public controversy of mast siting. Yet, using science as an arbiter did 
not appease the controversy, but led to fundamental disagreements about the inter-
pretations and implications of scientific results. I argue that the risk-based approach of 
the government shifted the discussion about base station siting from dissatisfaction 
with local siting regulations to a polarised debate about the existence of health risks 
from RF EMF. Science went from judge to being judged. Critics of the government’s 
policy highlighted uncertainties, contested the scientific interpretations and accused 
scientific advisory bodies and scientists of bias. 
 The government assumed that more science would provide solid knowledge on 
which to base policy decisions. Moreover, it also assumed that science would end the 
public debate. Yet, my analysis of mast siting controversies and the use of regulatory 
science revealed several flaws in using and portraying science as the solution to mast 
siting controversies. Firstly, I showed that public concerns about base station siting 
were not just concerns about health risks (see chapter 3). The government thus did 
not address all of the underlying issues of mast siting controversies. The public discus-
sions about mast siting involved questions about risks (and thus science), but it was 
not a purely risk nor scientific issue. Many non-scientific aspects contributed to citizen 
engagements: the question of citizen involvement in the decision, the question of 
adequate local planning, the question of landscape pollution, etc. The ability to have a 
say in whether and where the mast would be sited remained a prime concern for 
citizens (see chapter 3 and 4). On the other hand, in this chapter, I demonstrated that 
science-informed arguments became much more central in public discussions on mast 
siting and wireless communication technology throughout the 2000s. I argue that the 
risk-based approach of the government contributed to this narrowing of the public 
debate on mast siting. 
 Secondly, in this chapter I discussed how science as scientism led to increased 
critique on scientific practices, scientists and scientific advisory bodies. These discus-
sions meant a further polarisation of the views on mast siting. Science became the 
battlefield to argue for or against mast siting. Policy solutions to this situation were 
sought in better explaining the scientific aspects of wireless communication technolo-
gy, which further reinforced the debate on the science involved. Again, the policy 
solution to mast siting moved further away from the other issues that triggered siting 
controversies. The problem was thus extracted from its local context. The local mast 
siting controversies had become a national problem of scientific knowledge, fore-
grounding grassroots support teams. 
The presumed deficit of information 
Next to investing in scientific knowledge, the Dutch government also announced to 
tackle the increasing number of mast siting controversies with more communication 
about health risks from exposure to base stations. During and after the discussions 
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about the Swiss study, all political parties (Tweede Kamer, 2006c), the representative 
organisation of the Dutch municipalities (VNG) (VNG, 2005) and mobile phone opera-
tors (Tweede Kamer, 2006a) criticised the government for its lack of good communi-
cation about the antenna policy to the public and municipalities. In parliamentary 
debates, “insufficient communication” was believed to be “one of the causes of public 
concern” (Ibid.). Parliamentarians wanted “the societal unrest [to] be addressed with 
sincerity” (Tweede Kamer, 2006c). The government agreed that communication was a 
point of improvement. When the Swiss study was published in June 2006, the State 
Secretary of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment said, “the recent societal 
controversy about health aspects of antennas shows that there is a need for clear 
information” (Tweede Kamer, 2006b). Some months later, the Minister of Economic 
Affairs reiterated this point in VNG Magazine: “better knowledge with municipal offi-
cials and better information to citizens could avoid problems” (VNG, 2006a).  
 According to the Minister of Economic Affairs, the problem of public understand-
ing of science was twofold: people not only had difficulty finding, but also understand-
ing ‘correct’ information about EMF and health: 
[i]t is important that people who get involved in base station siting can easily find 
accurate information about this topic. The relationship between electromagnetic 
fields and (un)known possible effects thereof on health is a complex matter. Trust 
in the source of information plays a big role with regard to conviction and credi-
bility (Ministerie van Economische Zaken et al., 2005: 5). 
The minister’s referral to the “trust in the source of information” points to the third 
problem of public understanding of science that the government identified: the argu-
ably dubious quality of information about health aspects from RF EMF that public 
actors read. In the second evaluation of the antenna covenant in 2005, the different 
parties (ministries, VNG and mobile phone operators) said, “during the last period a 
lot of information has been published on the Internet. The quality of this information 
is however varying, absolutely anything mixed together. This can lead to confusion 
and concern” (Ministerie van Economische Zaken et al., 2005: 7). This incited the 
convenant parties to “remain active in providing and making accessible realistic in-
formation” (Ibid.). The general secretary of the Kennisplatform EMV & Gezondheid 
(Kennisplatform EMV&G; Knowledge Platform EMF & Health) also used the notion of 
“realistic knowledge” in describing the goal of the Kennisplatform (Interview K1), an-
other arrangement that was established in the aftermath of the political discussion 
about the TNO and Swiss study. 
 This broad knowledge platform on EMF and health was established as an infor-
mation and communication point to ensure that “scientific knowledge [would] be 
made accessible in a swift, objective and independent manner and [would] be com-
municated to the different societal actors, amongst which the media” (Tweede Kamer, 
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2005).37 It was an initiative of the National Institute for Public Health and the Envi-
ronment (RIVM), the research organisation TNO, the GGD (Community Health Ser-
vices), the Netherlands Organisation for Health Research and Development (ZonMw), 
the energy consulting and testing and certification organisation (KEMA) and the Radi-
ocommunications Agency Netherlands (Agentschap Telecom). The Gezondheidsraad 
had an advisory role. It started in 2007 (with refunding for the years 2011-2014) and 
was linked to the government’s 16.6 million euro investment in a research pro-
gramme on EMF and health (see 5.3.2.). In its letter to parliament after the publica-
tion of the Swiss study results, the State Secretary of Housing, Spatial Planning and 
Environment referred back to the Kennisplatform after mentioning that the siting of 
base stations was “justified from a health perspective”: “I deem it my duty to inform 
society. The previously announced independent Kennisplatform Elektromagnetische 
Velden en Gezondheid can play an important role in that” (Tweede Kamer, 2006b). 
The establishment of the Kennisplatform fitted into the government’s assumptions 
about the need for risk communication, i.e. public actors had a hard time understand-
ing EMF science and public actors mostly had access to biased sources of knowledge: 
[t]he backgrounds of electromagnetic fields and the interpretation of the results 
of scientific studies on EMF are usually too complex for laypersons to be able to 
form a thorough opinion. In addition, to an increasing degree there is information 
available on the Internet, of which the quality and reliability is difficult to assess 
for those interested without scientific expertise in this area. An additional prob-
lem is that in a number of cases, qualitative reliable information is provided with 
scientifically not justified and thus (unintentionally) misleading interpretations 
(Kennisplatform Elektromagnetische Velden en Gezondheid, 2008c: 9). 
Even though the government intended to “inform society”, it did not address citizens 
directly, but acted through what it called ‘intermediaries’ such as municipalities, 
GGD’en, mobile phone operators, housing corporations and other professionals com-
ing into contact with citizens. They formed the ‘frontline’ of the government’s plan of 
better information provision. As I discussed earlier, according to the government, 
these intermediaries (especially municipalities) also suffered from an information 
deficit, and thus contributed to citizens’ confusion about the existence of health risks. 
                                                                
37 See www.kennisplatform.nl. When speaking about the Kennisplatform, I will use the past tense for rea-
sons of readability, even though the Kennisplatform still existed at the time of writing (June 2014). Its fu-
ture, however, was then uncertain. The analysis of the Klankbordgroep and Kennisplatform are based on 
interviews and participant observations of several meetings, see section The research in chapter 1 and 
Appendix 2. 
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Risk communication through intermediaries 
At the end of 2005, the government’s strategy was to provide the local actors stand-
ing in direct contact with citizens, and thus receiving questions from them, with the 
‘right’ knowledge to communicate through the Antennebureau and the Kennisplat-
form EMV&G. All municipalities received a letter to explain the antenna policy in detail 
and special one-day courses for municipal officials dealing with the latest scientific 
insights, the exposure limits and the communication concerning the exposure to EMF 
were organised in 2005-2006 (Tweede Kamer, 2005). The government wanted munic-
ipalities to have the official information at their disposal to ensure that “the feelings of 
unrest” of the citizens asking questions would be “addressed and channelled” (Ibid.). 
In order to “help municipalities to discuss this topic in a rational and balanced way” 
(Ibid.), the government decided to strengthen the Antennebureau’s role to make sure 
that it could continue with offering municipalities the possibility of organising an in-
formation session. Such sessions were perceived as “most suited to the needs of citi-
zens for information, explanation and the feeling of ‘being heard’” (Tweede Kamer, 
2005; see previous chapter for a discussion on the information sessions provided by 
the Antennebureau). 
 In the previous chapter, I argued that these information sessions did not fit with 
citizens’ expectations. They wanted to discuss the local siting of a base station in their 
neighbourhood, but the meetings were set up as opportunities for information provi-
sion about health aspects from siting to citizens. The sessions fitted in the govern-
ment’s assumption of a lack of knowledge on the part of citizens. Yet, as I argued in 
chapter 3, most citizens did not lack information, on the contrary, they managed to 
find plenty of knowledge about mast siting with which to make an informed decision. 
The information sessions were organised as opportunities of information dissemina-
tion to either an ignorant or a misinformed public (see chapter 4). 
 Despite the identified need of citizens for “direct and interpersonal communica-
tion”, the government’s overall communication strategy about the antenna policy was 
not targeted at individual citizens. It did not invest in a national information campaign 
because of the idea, expressed in 2002, that “information about base stations was 
only desired by individuals who are directly confronted with a base station” (An-
tennebureau, 2002: 16; see section The antenna policy: calls for better public infor-
mation in chapter 4). In 2006, the government still found that a public campaign 
would “raise more questions than give answers” (Tweede Kamer, 2006c: 6). The two 
bodies in charge of communicating about EMF, the Antennebureau and the Ken-
nisplatform, did not directly target communication to citizens, but to intermediary 
professionals. The Kennisplatform wanted to “contribute to social debate by providing 
clarity” by making sure that the agencies and authorities who had daily contacts with 
concerned citizens received regular information on the publication of scientific studies 
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and other developments in the field of EMF and health (Kennisplatform Elektromag-
netische Velden, n.d.). 
 In the government’s view, communication about EMF and health to ‘the public’ 
meant ensuring that local authorities and local partners did not suffer from an infor-
mation deficit. Citizens only needed to be informed when they asked questions to 
these actors, or when they were confronted with the siting of a base station. The 
government wanted to have a rational discussion about scientific facts, through in-
termediaries who targeted specific citizens. The establishment of the Kennisplatform 
fitted in this dual strategy of a purposive rational discussion.  
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Table 5.1. – A list of organisations that accepted the invitation by the Kennisplatform for the first Klank-
bordgroep meeting 
Stichting Elektrohypersensitiviteit (ESH) 
Dutch ElektroHyperSensitivity Foundation (EHS) 
The foundation is a contact point, information 
centre and interest group for people suffering from 
EHS. Its mission is to accomplish a life as normal as 
possible for elektrohypersensitive people. It calls for 
the recognition of EHS as a disease.  
Meldpunt Gezondheid en Milieu 
Dutch Organisation for Monitoring Health and 
Environment 
Environmental organisation that strove for a clean 
and safe environment without pollutants. It 
recorded cases of environment related health 
complaints such as electromagnetic fields. It seized 
to exist in 2012. 
MoNet (Mobiele Netwerkoperators Nederland) 
Dutch Mobile Network Operators 
MoNet is a collaboration between the three Dutch 
mobile phone operators to collectively defend their 
interests in discussions with the government, 
municipalities and other societal actors. It is also 
involved in information provision.  
TenneT TenneT is the national electricity transmission 
system operator of the Netherlands (the 
Klankbordgroep also discusses low frequency 
electromagnetic fields) 
Nederlands Instituut voor Bouwbiologie en Ecologie 
(NIBE) 
The Dutch Institute for Building Biology and Ecology  
NIBE is the representative of the building biology 
movement in the Netherlands. It is a consultancy in 
the area of environmentally friendly and healthy 
building. It does research, advises and designs 
buildings that live up to these standards. 
Electromagnetic fields are also part of the built 
environment. It also represents a growing 
profession of woonbiologen: those that measure 
EMF and other possible indoor ‘pollutants’ to help 
people with health complaints.  
Nationaal Platform Stralingsrisico’s (NPS) 
National Platform Radiation risks  
The NPS is a grassroots support team that wants to 
bring the negative health effects from EMF to the 
attention of the Dutch public and government. It 
wants to contribute to a public discussion. 
 
Nederlandse Vereniging voor Medische Beeldvorming 
en Radiotherapie (NVMBR) 
Dutch Organisation for Medical Imaging and 
Radiotherapy 
The NVMBR is the professional association for 
people who work in hospitals with radiation in any 
form (radiology, radiotherapy, ultrasound and MRI). 
It develops guidelines concerning safety of working 
with EMF.  
StopUMTS StopUMTS is a grassroots support team active 
online. Through its website, it offers a plethora of 
information on EMF, with a focus on scientific 
studies. 
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Participation of societal actors 
The Kennisplatform, however, did not only communicate to intermediaries but also 
asked a specific group of public actors to participate in its Klankbordgroep or Sounding 
Board (see pictures 5.2 & 5.3). The Sounding Board provided “societal groups and 
representatives of interest groups with the opportunity to share their questions and 
concerns related to electromagnetic fields” (Kennisplatform Elektromagnetische 
Velden, n.d.). This meant that the Klankbordgroep hosted several societal actors with 
different and conflicting goals and interests, such as mobile phone operators and 
MoNet (Mobile Network Operators the Netherlands), radio amateurs, the interest 
group of people with electrohypersensitivity (EHS), the institute representing building 
biologists and ecologists (Nederlands Instituut voor Bouwbiologie en Ecologie,NIBE), 
and a few grassroots support teams (such as StopUMTS and Nationaal Platform 
Stralingsrisico’s, NPS) (see Table 5.1). The Kennisplatform aimed to become “well-
informed about [societal] questions and concerns and, thus, (…) to contribute to a 
clear social debate on the most relevant subjects” (Kennisplatform Elektromag-
netische Velden, n.d.). A staff member of the Kennisplatform explained the Klank-
bordgroep as “(…) a means to start a dialogue with all concerned parties, with the 
field; to hear what is going on, what are the questions, how are messages received 
and understood?” (Interview K6). 
 The Kennisplatform primarily invited organisations that dealt with health issues of 
EMF in different ways: “[i]n particular, those organisations [were] invited that have a 
relation to the health aspects of electromagnetic fields” (Kennisplatform Elektromag-
netische Velden en Gezondheid, 2008c: 27). Local citizens thus moved to the back-
ground. The Klankbordgroep was portrayed as a way to learn how to deal with risks in 
society, according to its secretary. In his view, scientific knowledge played a crucial 
role in this process: it was important to see what society thought about these risks, 
and to take those insights to science, instead of the other way around (Interview K1). 
The Klankborgroep actors were thus supposed to represent the “voice of society” or 
the “social conscience” in the Kennisplatform (Kennisplatform Elektromagnetische 
Velden en Gezondheid, n.d.). Yet, I would argue that these actors only represented a 
small part of society, i.e. those that were highly concerned about the negative health 
impacts from RF EMF, and hence those that felt at ease with the health risk framing. It 
was not society speaking to the Kennisplatform but societal groups with particular 
interests in curtailing the development of wireless communication technology. 
 As the title of the Kennisplatform already suggested (kennis translates as 
knowledge), the main theme under discussion in the Klankbordgroep was scientific 
knowledge about possible health risks from RF EMF (and ELF EMF). During a typical 
meeting, scientists from the ZonMw programme on EMF and health presented their 
on-going work, and interest groups or grassroots support teams presented recent 
‘societal developments’ such as scientific studies that show negative effects from RF 
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EMF, policy changes in other countries and experiential stories of electrohypersensi-
tives. Klankbordgroep members were encouraged to keep the discussion on a scien-
tific level. If members wanted to spent time on a topic, the board would say, “we can 
pay attention to it if you give new scientific viewpoints”. I argue that the lengthy dis-
cussion of scientific knowledge in the Klankbordgroep had two effects. Firstly, it rein-
forced the dichotomy between two groups of actors: ‘the believers’ and ‘non-
believers’ of health risks, or ‘opponents’ and ‘proponents’ of wireless communication 
technology, as the actors involved labelled these groups (Interview K3 & K7). Second-
ly, it exposed the underlying political and value-laden aspects of scientific knowledge, 
which were a challenge for the Kennisplatform to manage. The Kennisplatform creat-
ed a boundary between science and politics. It positioned itself as only dealing with 
the scientific issues, and not with politics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pictures 5.2 & 5.3 – A meeting of the Klankbordgroep (Sounding Board) of the 
Kennisplatform EMV & Gezondheid (Knowledge Platform EMF & Health). Pho-
tographs by the Kennisplatform EMV & Gezondheid. 
175 
Debating science in society: reinforcing the dichotomy 
After a few years into the existence of the Klankbordgroep, it seemed to be stuck in a 
ritual in which those convinced of the negative health effects of RF EMF tried to con-
vince those who did not agree. The discussion on science with a wide range of societal 
actors had led to the entrenchment of the contradicting views on science and EMF. A 
staff member of the Kennisplatform explained: 
[y]ou see that that it creates more and more distance between each other. They 
[members of Klankbordgroep] listen less to each other and are less driven by ar-
guments. If they already have very strong beliefs [and] there is new information, 
they pick the things that fit their beliefs and use them to strengthen their own 
opinions (...) Scientific information about the causes [of negative health effects] is 
never going to bring people closer together, because it can always be interpreted 
in different ways (Interview K7). 
My analysis shows that the disagreement between the different positions on the ex-
istence of health risks came down to different interpretations of science, in particular 
on what sort of scientific research should be done, how it should be interpreted, and 
how society should act upon the scientific insights gained (compare Brown et al., 
2006; see Table 5.2). The discussions in the Klankbordgroep showed that far from 
being an apolitical activity, discussing science in society revealed normative choices 
and commitments that were commonly defined as ‘scientific’ and thus perceived as 
being the privilege of scientists alone. Discussing ‘science’ went right to the heart of 
political and normative issues such as ‘Who decides when to take precautionary 
measures?’, ‘At what cost should we protect vulnerable groups in society?’, and ‘How 
to deal with gaps in knowledge?’ 
 Societal actors wanted scientists to investigate ‘real life’ situations instead of 
controlled experimental settings, which they claimed were unsuited for electrohyper-
sensitives (belongs to the scientific process of ‘doing scientific research’, see Table 
5.2.). Societal actors also argued that the uncertainties in scientific knowledge should 
be the basis for precautionary measures, whilst the government argued that precau-
tion was taken by funding more scientific research (belongs to the scientific process of 
‘acting on science’). In the setting of the Klankbordgroep, the same issues were raised 
by grassroots support teams and other societal actors critical of the government’s 
view on EMF science. Instead of voicing these concerns online or in newsletters, they 
could now address scientists directly. As a result, ZonMw scientists often ended up 
defending the methodologies and interpretations of their studies after receiving cri-
tique from the societal groups. Most scientists were very open and willing to discuss 
the social relevance and implications of their work, even though on occasion, the 
societal groups’ critique was hostile and depreciatory. This was especially the case 
with psychological research projects that looked into people’s perceptions of health 
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risks from mobile telephony. Societal organisations did not consider these studies to 
be relevant, because researchers assumed that EHS was a psychological problem. The 
societal organisations participating in the Klankbordgroep refuted this and demanded 
more studies into the causal mechanism of health complaints from exposure to RF 
EMF. 
 
 
Table 5.2. – The table displays the differences in opinion about the processes of science, in particular relat-
ed to doing scientific research, interpreting scientific research and acting on science. 
SOCIETAL VIEWS EXPERT VIEWS 
> represented by grassroots support teams & interest 
groups 
> represented by ZonMw scientists, the 
Gezondheidsraad & the Kennisplatform 
I. Doing scientific research   
Experiential knowledge of electrohypersensitives is  
the basis of research projects 
Scientific research needs clear parameters, design 
and tools. Cases of EHS are too messy. 
Investigate ‘real life’ situations of people being  
exposed to EMF 
Provocation studies in a (double-blind) controlled 
experimental laboratory setting are the best way to 
find out whether people react to exposure or not 
II. Interpreting scientific research  
Grey literature (which is understood as non-peer-
reviewed scientific documents such as conference 
proceedings and reports) is included in scientific 
deliberations 
Strict protocols for meta-analysis of scientific studies 
ensure scientific quality (peer-reviewed is one of 
them) 
Weight of evidence: false negatives (Type II error) 
should be avoided (failure to reject a false null 
hypothesis)  
Weight of evidence: false positives (Type I error) 
should be avoided (the incorrect rejection of a true 
null hypothesis) 
III. Acting on science  
Recognise the extent of knowledge gaps and act upon 
uncertainties by taking precautionary measures. 
Scientists should communicate these uncertainties in 
their advice to policy makers. 
Knowledge gaps are filled with more scientific 
knowledge and clear communication of the scientific 
facts and uncertainties. Questions of precaution are 
a political matter, not a scientific one.  
 
 
I found that scientists often bore the brunt of the societal actors’ frustration with a 
lack of influence on the course of the Kennisplatform. Because science was under 
discussion in the Klankbordgroep, scientists seemed the obvious choice of discussant 
with societal actors. Yet, I argue that a pure discussion of science, as the Kennisplat-
form seemed to want it, was impossible. Discussing science equalled discussing the 
moral and political implications of scientific knowledge. Most of the scientists did not 
deal with these underlying issues, and thus deflected any criticism with a reference to 
the scientific values of their studies. This, however, only widened the gap between 
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what societal actors wanted (policy changes) and what scientists could offer (more 
extensive scientific knowledge). 
 Discussing science thus did not automatically lead to an agreement on the best 
scientific practices, the best ways to interpret science and the best ways to act upon 
science. STS scholars have argued that a better understanding of the scientific facts 
and different viewpoints on science often reinforces value disputes and competing 
interests. Such polarisation could result from the disagreement about the values that 
are inherent in scientific deliberations. In the Klankbordgroep, the problem was not so 
much that the opposing positions on the existence of health risks became more en-
trenched throughout the discussions, but that the Kennisplatform did not address 
fundamental ethical and political issues that came up during the debates. 
Challenging and maintaining the boundaries between science and politics 
All three aspects of science – performing, interpreting and acting on science – were 
topics of discussion in the Klankbordgroep. The discussions about the best practices of 
scientific research led to some significant changes in doing science. Societal actors 
were able to put their stamp on the ZonMw programme on EMF and Health. Scientists 
involved in this programme were very willing to accommodate some of the societal 
actors’ views. New and on-going ZonMw research projects tried to involve the experi-
ential knowledge of individuals claiming to suffer from EHS. In 2011, because of the 
on-going discussions on EHS in the Klankbordgroep, ZonMw issued a call for research 
proposals on ‘a diagnostic tool for electrosensitivity’, in which Stichting EHS was in-
volved. This research seemed to be an example of what Nowotny and colleagues call 
‘socially robust knowledge production’ (Nowotny et al., 2001): society was involved in 
the creation of scientific knowledge since the idea for the research came from societal 
organisations and non-scientists were involved in the research project. Yet, this out-
come also further reinforced the assumption that more and better (in this case, social-
ly robust) science was the best solution to deal with possible health risks from wireless 
communication technology. 
 In discussing science – and especially the interpretation and implications of sci-
ence – societal actors also called for policy changes beyond performing scientific re-
search. The Kennisplatform, however, did not act upon the discussions about the 
interpretation and policy implications of scientific knowledge. It argued that it was not 
part of its mandate. These issues, however, continued to polarise the positions in the 
Klankbordgroep. The discussions on the precautionary principle particularly showed 
how the Kennisplatform evaded dealing with ethical and political issues. From the first 
meeting in spring 2008 (Kennisplatform Elektromagnetische Velden en Gezondheid, 
2008b), the Nationaal Platform Stralingsrisico’s (NPS, see Table 5.1.) called attention 
to precautionary measures that were proposed in a publication called the Bio-
Initiative Report (Carpenter and Sage, 2007). A group of scientists, researchers and 
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public health professionals published the Bio-Initiative Report, and called for precau-
tionary measures and lowering of exposure guidelines based on their review of the 
scientific literature on possible health effects from RF EMF. The Dutch government 
asked the Gezondheidsraad to review the report, as it “play[ed] an increasingly promi-
nent role in the debate on electromagnetic fields and health” (Gezondheidsraad, 
2008: 1). It concluded that the Bio-Initiative Report was “not an objective and bal-
anced reflection of the current state of scientific knowledge. Therefore, the report 
does not provide any grounds for revising the current views as to the risks of exposure 
to electromagnetic fields” (Gezondheidsraad, 2008: 4). The Kennisplatform also wrote 
a Kennisbericht (Knowledge Note) that had the same reasoning: the report was not a 
balanced evaluation of the available scientific knowledge. It also added, “it is a politi-
cal and not a scientific assessment whether the exposure limits should be changed 
and whether that involves the application of the precautionary principle. It is not the 
task of the Kennisplatform to make such a pronouncement” (Kennisplatform Elektro-
magnetische Velden en Gezondheid, 2008a: 3).38 The Kennisplatform drew a line be-
tween the political and scientific realm, positioning itself in the latter. 
 This boundary work did not withhold societal groups from wanting to talk about 
precaution and changes in policy more generally in the Klankbordgroep. During the 
second Klankbordgroep meeting, the NPS referred again to the Bio-Initiative Report 
and incited a debate on precaution. The NPS explained that this report asked a differ-
ent question compared to the Gezondheidsraad or the WHO, that is, ‘is there enough 
evidence for harmful health effects to take measures to reduce the risks?’. The Ge-
zondheidsraad asked the question ‘are harmful health effects proven?’, and answered 
it in the negative, the NPS continued. StopUMTS agreed that the report should not be 
criticised because of a few imperfections and weaknesses but that one should look at 
the sum of all the indications of health effects which led to the conclusion that “it is 
high time that something is done in the Netherlands” (Kennisplatform Elektromag-
netische Velden en Gezondheid, 2009a: 31). The discussion in the Klankbordgroep 
then focused on how much evidence was needed to take action. The chairperson 
pointed out that precaution was the government’s task and was not in the hands of 
the Kennisplatform. StopUMTS reacted that this political choice was made based on 
information that the Kennisplatform and Gezondheidsraad supplied to the govern-
ment. The chairperson of the ZonMw programme commission deemed it important 
that when there is a lack of science, better and new research should be done. He 
argued that the question about precaution was not a scientific question, but a societal 
question that needed political deliberation. Yet, these deliberations could be based on 
science, he added. A scientist from the TU Delft who was present in the audience, 
                                                                
38 The European Parliament, on the other hand, embraced the Bio-Initiative study (European Parliament, 
2008). 
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replied that when one is dealing with societal risks, one should more often take into 
account the percentages of false negatives in the decision-making process (Ibid.). 
 Throughout the existence of the Klankbordgroep, members continued to use any 
opportunity to voice their opinion on the need for policy measures, often condensed 
in the language of precaution. This regularly happened, for example, when scientists 
from the ZonMw programme on EMF and Health presented their research in the 
Klankbordgroep. A discussion on the scientific details of a study would then turn into 
the meaning of the study for ‘everyday life’, as in, for those people suffering from EHS 
for example. In one case, the scientist in question answered that it was a political 
issue whether one takes vulnerable groups in society into account (Kennisplatform 
Elektromagnetische Velden en Gezondheid, 2009b). Whenever the discussion turned 
in the direction of implications of science for policy, scientists, ZonMw representatives 
and the Kennisplatform would emphasise the importance of more research, of better-
tailored research questions, and of better communication, but there would be no talk 
of policy changes. Whenever the Stichting EHS demanded not only the recognition of 
EHS but also the establishment of treatments and so-called white areas where EHS 
patients can get away from all EMF sources, the chairperson of the ZonMw pro-
gramme would answer that more research into EHS was important and that ZonMw 
welcomed research proposals on this topic (Kennisplatform Elektromagnetische 
Velden en Gezondheid, 2008b). 
 In the Klankbordgroep discussions, the Kennisplatform positioned itself as a scien-
tific organisation that was separate from politics. Societal actors criticised the lack of a 
link between the platform and politics: “you are in the club, and people talk to you, 
they listen to you politely, but influence? Nil” (Interview K4). They called the Klank-
bordgroep a “lightning rod” that “has to grind the sharp edges from the dispute” (In-
terview K3). The platform countered this critique by arguing that the responsible min-
istries received the agenda and reports of the meetings, and that representatives 
were always present (see for example Kennisplatform Elektromagnetische Velden en 
Gezondheid, 2013: 6). These representatives, however, hardly ever spoke during 
meetings. I conclude that, even though the Klankbordgroep discussed science, only 
the discussion about one aspect of science – the best type of scientific research – had 
produced concrete results. Other issues that the discussion about ‘science’ had raised 
were duly debated, but did not lead to any important changes. Throughout the years, 
the Klankbordgroep paid attention to issues of uncertainty (how to deal with uncer-
tainty, how best to communicate uncertainty), precaution, and the protection of vul-
nerable groups in society. Another topic that was regularly on the agenda was the 
perceived need to help those claiming to suffer from EHS. Despite the valuable in-
sights these discussions produced, the Kennisplatform had problems translating these 
insights into policy actions. 
 Without a clear link between the Klankbordgroep discussions and politics, and 
without a clear communication strategy beyond targeting citizens via intermediaries, 
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it might seem surprising that the Dutch government was enthusiastic and positive 
about the Kennisplatform, as was shown by the recent initiation of two other Ken-
nisplatformen, around wind energy and cattle breeding. Most of the interviewees I 
talked to about the Klankbordgroep were positive about the exchange of knowledge 
and the respect for the diverging opinions that grew significantly since the early days 
of the Klankbordgroep. It became common, for example, to switch off mobile phones 
completely during meetings out of respect for those electrohypersensitives that were 
present. Those that were initially very critical of the existence of health risks from 
mobile telephony gradually became more comfortable talking about EHS and electro-
hypersensitives without always using the disclaimer that it was not a scientifically 
proven illness, such as ‘complaints people attribute to EMF’ or ‘presumed EHS’. The 
growing recognition of EHS as a serious health problem in the Klankbordgroep gave 
the idea that this issue was what ‘society’ was most concerned about when it came to 
wireless communication technology. Society was concerned about health risks from 
RF EMF, and even more specifically, about EHS. Other Klankbordgroep members, such 
as the representative of the mobile phone operators, complained that the narrow 
focus on health risks was not representative of the societal situation. In his view: 
[t]hose health aspects (…) are just a small part of a bigger thing. Because there is 
not so much protest in the country. And only a small part is about health. We 
should not magnify it as if it is in fact a societal problem. But it does look like it is 
a societal problem in the Klankbordgroep. If I talk to people in the streets, they 
have no clue (Interview K8). 
Recently, also the Kennisplatform tried to move the discussion to other issues besides 
EHS, such as children and mobile telephony, in particular issues of cyberbullying, ad-
diction to social media, safety online and concentration problems (Kennisplatform 
Elektromagnetische Velden en Gezondheid, 2013). 
 Summing up, even though the Klankbordgroep had the potential to become an 
interesting arrangement to deal with societal debates about new technologies, it 
nevertheless reinforced the focus on health risks and on scientific knowledge as the 
best way to deal with the issue. ‘Society’ was represented by a small group of actors 
who were convinced of possible health risks from the technology but who did not 
represent engaged citizens or any other societal publics who wanted to engage in 
mast siting decisions. The inclusion of a wider range of evidence and the engagement 
with a larger set of stakeholders and scientific disciplines turned out to be a major 
challenge to expert procedures on which the rationale of the Kennisplatform was 
based (see the second column of table 5.2.). It seemed unable to consider the broader 
issues that were about science, but could not be solved by science. It maintained a 
strict boundary between its own work, which it positioned as only concerned with 
assessing and communicating science, and politics, from which it distanced itself. As a 
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result, the Kennisplatform mainly focused on executing the Dutch government’s 
communication strategy of offering “realistic” information. 
The misguided belief in information as a solution to mast siting controversies 
The Antennebureau and the Kennisplatform were both means to the government’s 
aim of better communicating its antenna policy and the science around EMF health 
risks. These initiatives were a direct reaction to mast siting controversies and more 
generally, to the assumed public deficit of understanding of EMF science. The gov-
ernment assumed that publics lacked scientific information and were misinformed by 
grassroots support teams. Moreover, it assumed that there were only certain types of 
publics that were interested in this information, i.e. citizens who had a personal inter-
est in EMF science and those who were confronted with the siting of a base station in 
their neighbourhood. Communication to citizens thus went indirectly, via intermediar-
ies such as municipalities and GGD’en. Also in the Klankbordgroep, the perspective of 
‘society’ was restricted to the viewpoints of those societal actors that were convinced 
of the harmful health effects of RF EMF. The concerns of citizens engaged in local 
mast siting were left out of consideration. All of these assumptions about communi-
cating EMF science reinforced the risk framing of the societal problem of wireless 
communication technology. The actual societal problems of mast siting, that I ana-
lysed in chapter 3, moved to the background. 
 My analysis of mast siting controversies showed that the government’s assump-
tions about the public understanding of science were misguided. Most of the societal 
actors that the government’s communication strategy targeted did not lack 
knowledge on wireless communication technology (see chapter 3). Engaged citizens 
were well equipped to gather information about the technical, legal and scientific 
aspects of mast siting long before they received information from government 
sources. In fact, most citizens, in particular the early engagers, were more knowledge-
able than the intermediaries they came in contact with. The information citizens 
found online was assimilated in a landscape of knowledge and experiences of these 
citizens (see chapter 3). Citizens did not only make sense of science through evaluat-
ing the contents of the knowledge, also the context in which the knowledge was gen-
erated, its purpose and the normative assumptions embedded in the knowledge were 
evaluated. The government’s conceptions of what kind of knowledge citizens lacked 
did not strike with the needs for information that citizens actually had. Moreover, the 
government’s belief that better communication of science would lead to acceptance 
of base station siting ignored the fact that concerns about health risks were just one 
reason for citizens to engage (see chapter 3). These aspects, however, remained 
unacknowledged in the information provision context of the government’s communi-
cation scheme. 
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 During the 2000s, as the public debate about health risks from base stations pro-
gressed, grassroots support teams tried to convince engaged citizens of the presumed 
flaws in the government’s opinion about EMF science. Yet, grassroots support teams 
and citizens did not want the same thing. The government assumed that grassroots 
support teams represented engaged citizens in the Klankbordgroep, but I argue that 
there is an important difference. The strategy of grassroots support teams was two-
fold: recognition of the existence of health impacts from wireless communication 
technology and the implementation of policy measures that reduce exposure to RF 
EMF in society. Engaged citizens, on the other hand, were interested in gaining influ-
ence on the local siting situation. They did not want to reduce exposure in society, but 
were concerned about the uncertain nature of health risks and wanted to get the 
guarantee that a thorough decision had been taken on the local siting. More reassur-
ing communication about health risks by the Antennebureau did not meet these citi-
zens’ needs (see chapter 4). Nor did their supposed representation by grassroots 
support groups in a knowledge platform reflect their concerns. Engaged citizens 
wanted to discuss the specific siting of base stations in their neighbourhood. 
Conclusion 
Throughout the 2000s, the Dutch government reacted to the increasing public dissat-
isfaction with the siting of base stations by tackling two deficits: a deficit of scientific 
knowledge and a deficit of communication of that knowledge. The government’s fo-
cus in dealing with siting controversies lay predominantly with possible health effects 
of exposure to RF EMF. By resorting to a technocratic policy approach, the govern-
ment relied on the image of science as a source of public and political authority. It 
used science as an arbiter in deciding about the legitimacy of the siting of base sta-
tions. Yet, the resort to science made things worse because it led to a shift in the pub-
lic discussion from a mix of arguments against siting (choice of location, mismanage-
ment local authorities, landscape pollution, need for technology) to a polarised de-
bate about the existence of health risks. Science became judged in different ways: 
societal actors, especially grassroots support teams, criticised the content of scientific 
knowledge and the interpretation by scientists and science advisory bodies, and called 
for attention to the social implications of scientific knowledge. The government react-
ed to the growing societal discussion by investing in risk communication. Its communi-
cation strategies, including the initiative of the Klankbordgroep, started from the con-
viction that health risks were at the heart of the societal debate about mast siting and 
mobile telephony. It thus reasoned from a deficit model of public understanding: 
citizens were ignorant about the scientific facts and would stop being concerned once 
they received the right information. I argued that this was not a case of misunder-
standing science: citizens were not the laypersons that the government took them to 
be. Moreover, the societal groups that were supposed to represent society in the 
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Klankbordgroep further entrenched the focus on health risks as the main societal 
concern. I argued that societal concerns were much broader than a concern about 
health and that discussing science in the Klankbordgroep led to a polarisation be-
tween those who believed in health risks and those who did not. 
 I conclude this chapter by summarising what the analysis of the risk-based gov-
ernance strategy of the Dutch government means in terms of understanding the dy-
namics of the wireless communication technology controversy. Firstly, by investing in 
risk research and communication, the government further framed the societal issues 
around the siting of the technology as health issues. This reasoning justified the in-
vestment in science as the only legitimate answer to the societal controversy. Science, 
however, was not able to make a judgement about the legitimacy of mast siting. This 
led to a discussion about science that continues to this day. It is very unlikely that 
more scientific knowledge will ever provide the conclusive answer that wireless com-
munication is or is not a health risk. The goal of finding the answers in science is fur-
ther hampered by the fact that research can only address yesterday’s technology (see 
e.g. von Gleich, 1999). Secondly, the risk-based governance approach legitimated the 
position of those actors who also relied on scientific knowledge. During the episode of 
the TNO and Swiss study, for example, many municipalities used scientific arguments 
to postpone making a policy decision on mast sitings. Engaged citizens also invested in 
understanding EMF science to use it in their notices of objections or court cases. Es-
pecially those citizens who went to court were convinced that an in-depth analysis of 
particular scientific studies would be a convincing argument. It also explains why the 
Kennisplatform only invited those societal actors who had become convinced of det-
rimental health effects of RF EMF and could be considered ‘experts’ on EMF science. 
Thirdly, the risk-based policy approach turned out to be an intensive, yet unsuccessful 
policy strategy that did not have any relationship with the concerns of citizens about 
mast siting. Concerned citizens, however, were the main reason for the risk-based 
policy approach of the government. Along the way, the initial reasons for citizen en-
gagement with mast siting were lost out of sight. Mast siting controversies are not 
solved by investing in more science and communication. As I have argued in this the-
sis, citizens wanted to engage with mast siting because they wanted the government 
to prudently deal with a new technology for which there were scientific uncertainties. 
The government never considered discussing the best ways to site base stations, tak-
ing into account these societal concerns about precaution. Instead, it asked science to 
answer a different question: are there health risks from exposure to RF EMF? 
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion 
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Engaging with siting controversies 
The siting of infrastructures for old and new technologies is a never-ending story: the 
more people, the more infrastructure for waste management, energy production 
(wind energy, hydraulic fracturing, electricity, nuclear energy, etc.), industrial activities 
and communication technologies (radio, wireless communication, etc.) are needed. 
Citizens who are confronted with the siting of an infrastructure in their neighbour-
hood may not agree with the policy decisions and engage. Politicians, policy makers, 
and social scientists usually find these reactions difficult to understand, especially 
when it comes to technologies that show a high public demand or approval, such as 
masts for mobile telephony or windmills. Siting controversies are therefore generally 
understood as disruptive, unpleasant, challenging and delaying progress. Concepts 
such as Not In My Backyard (NIMBY) have contributed to the image of citizens as op-
posing policy decisions because of irrational and emotional concerns. Especially when 
there are concerns about possible health risks, for which there is no scientific evi-
dence, citizens’ concerns are cast away as ‘risk perceptions’ that do not concur with 
the experts’ views. 
 In this dissertation, I have traced the societal dynamics of one type of siting con-
troversies: the siting of mobile phone masts in the Netherlands and Flanders (Bel-
gium). At the centre of these mast siting controversies have been collectives of citi-
zens engaging with the siting of base stations, networks of organised groups support-
ing citizens in their engagement, municipalities threading a minefield of conflicting 
interests, national policymakers and mobile phone operators trying to solve the dead-
locks that arose over the siting controversies, and scientists infusing their knowledge 
into policy. I have asked how we can understand the societal dynamics and mecha-
nisms that account for the emergence, sustainment and possible ending of mast siting 
controversies? One type of dynamic I was particularly interested in was the role of 
scientific knowledge and uncertainties: how do different actors in the controversy 
(citizens, policy bodies, scientists) use, construct, contest or ignore scientific knowledge 
regarding wireless communication technology? I started my research from the obser-
vation that health risks were a dominant theme in discussions on the technology, and 
especially on siting. Why and how did wireless communication technology become a 
serious ‘health risk’? I explored the dynamics between engaged citizens, different 
levels of decision making, scientific knowledge about health risks from radiofrequency 
electromagnetic fields (RF EMF) and attempts at deliberation. 
 In this concluding chapter, I go back to my research questions and describe the 
insights that my research generated about the societal dynamics of emerging tech-
nologies and of mast siting in particular. I argue that the emergence, sustainment and 
ending of mast siting controversies has to be understood as a dynamic interplay be-
tween citizen engagement around mast siting and governance approaches to this 
engagement. The interaction between different levels of administration accounted for 
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the dominant focus and entrenchment of health risks. Referring to health risks be-
came 1) a politicised argument by citizens (the state should protect its citizens from 
harm), 2) an explanatory factor for mast siting controversies used by the national 
government (citizen engagement arises because of fear of radiation), and 3) the driv-
ing force of a particular policy mode (a risk-based approach). I will explain and empiri-
cally substantiate these findings in more detail in the next sections. I begin by discuss-
ing the different patterns that typify citizen engagement. In the next section, I discuss 
the risk-based policy approach of the Dutch government as response to this citizen 
engagement. In the third section of this chapter, I recapitulate the different dynamics 
that explain why the siting of base stations for wireless communication technology 
became a serious policy problem. I argue that these dynamics can explain the rise of 
controversies around other (emerging) technologies. I end by emphasising the need 
for acknowledging and reconceptualising the democratic role of citizens in siting con-
troversies. 
The dynamics of citizen engagement 
The collective and local character of engagement 
I typified the individuals engaging around the siting of a base station as collectives of 
engaged citizens who tried to change a local decision they disagreed with (see chapter 
3). Engaged citizens were not anti-technology, but they were against the siting of a 
mast on a particular location in their neighbourhood. Citizen engagement with mast 
siting started when alert citizens discovered that a mast was going to be sited or when 
they discovered that construction works on a mast were going on. The official notifica-
tions of exemption decisions (ontheffingsbesluit) and building permits (bouwvergun-
ning) often went unnoticed, and a large number of citizens heard the siting news 
through informal networks and the local media. In any case, a vigilant person was 
needed to spot the announcement and to spread the news in order for the engage-
ment to begin. In all cases, these alert persons – or early engagers as I called them – 
fitted a certain profile: 1) they were higher educated, 2) more than average interested 
in political decision making and 3) well-embedded in local networks (such as a local 
business owner, member of a residence associations or reporter for the local newspa-
per). 
 Even though early engagers were already convinced that the planned siting was a 
negative development, they put considerable effort into exploring whether the neigh-
bourhood wanted to act with them. My research demonstrated that the support of 
neighbours was a precondition for further engagement: if support was secured, the 
mast changed from an individual concern to a local issue that deserved the attention 
of the whole neighbourhood. Once the siting of a mast had become a shared concern, 
the commitment deepened. In most cases, citizens established a group of neighbours. 
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The early engagers, usually not more than three people, were the most active mem-
bers of this group and started to build a dossier with technical, legal, political and 
health-related information. Yet, in all case studies, they considered it necessary to 
inform the neighbourhood regularly, to ensure the continued support. These groups 
thus shared a lot of the characteristics of what the environmental and social move-
ment literature calls ‘grassroots groups’ (Tesh, 2000): they were tied to a neighbour-
hood, informal, open, temporary and flexible. 
 After the support of neighbours was secured and a grassroots group was estab-
lished, engaged citizens set to work to make a plan to get involved in the siting deci-
sion. My case study research showed that most groups of engaged citizens drafted an 
official complaint for the municipality: a notice of objection (bezwaarschrift, Belgium) 
or a submission of their viewpoints (zienswijze, the Netherlands). This shows that 
citizen engagement was agonistic (Mouffe, 2005): citizens questioned the policy-
making decisions around mast siting, but did this within the boundaries of a political 
system. They perceived the mobilisation of different viewpoints on siting as a form of 
active responsibility. Engaged citizens incorporated a wide range of arguments in 
these complaints, representing the diverse views of the group of neighbours. Yet, 
often the emphasis of the complaints was put on those arguments that the early en-
gagers found most important and that usually also represented the ‘culture’ of the 
neighbourhood (compare Gibson, 2006), i.e. the values, practices and norms that 
attributed to a certain identity of a neighbourhood. Young neighbourhoods with chil-
dren mostly focused on the possibility of health risks and neighbourhoods close to or 
in the countryside focused on the landscape pollution of the mast. 
 I argued that citizen engagements are forms of bottom-up social initiatives that fit 
into a new vision on politics and society. Scholars assert that traditional forms of polit-
ical engagement are in decline, but citizens get involved in politics on their own ac-
cord, without the top-down invitation of the government (Rosanvallon, 2008; 
Verhoeven, 2009; WRR, 2012). Citizen engagement in mast siting controversies can 
thus be understood as such a counter-democratic practice (Rosanvallon, 2008), even 
though the idea of ‘counter’ seems to be at odds with Rosanvallon’s meaning of the 
term: he refers to the rising societal demands for participation, involvement and 
transparency. The engaged citizens I met in my research demanded an opportunity to 
voice their constructive criticism, to be taken seriously, and to have a say in an im-
portant local decision. Engaged citizens strove to achieve, in more or lesser degree, 
what Arendt (1963; also see Leighninger, 2006) called ‘public happiness’: the feeling 
of participating in politics, of being part of an invaluable experience. 
Dependence on networks 
Next to the collective and local character of citizen engagement, my research also 
showed the importance of networks for citizen engagement. Neighbours, friends and 
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family living in the vicinity were the closest source of support. Engaged citizens also 
turned to local politicians, the municipality and journalists to further the engagement. 
In their quest for information about masts on the Internet, engaged citizens encoun-
tered what I call the ‘grassroots support teams’ whose purpose was to inform citizens 
about negative health effects from exposure to EMF. These websites of grassroots 
support teams turned out to be crucial for the engagement in all of my cases (see 
chapter 3 and 5). The contact with the grassroots support teams online had several 
impacts on collectives of engaged citizens: it served as an acknowledgement of their 
cause, it informed citizens about possible detrimental health effects from masts, it 
proposed a particular set of social actions, and it exposed an overall mismanagement 
of mast siting by government and industry. The grassroots support teams supported 
local citizen engagements, but also operated on regional, national and even interna-
tional levels. 
 The grassroots support teams were eager to convince engaged citizens that RF 
EMF emitted by antennas is a serious health concern. However, the extent to which 
the argument of health effects of masts made sense and was picked up by citizens, 
depended on the resonance of it with the culture of the neighbourhood and citizens’ 
own experiences, knowledge and commitments. I have argued that citizens were 
embedded in a diverse and shifting landscape of knowledge and experience (chapter 
3). They thus relied on opinions of others (personal or institutional, friends or other 
organisations) and on individual or collective experiences in order to make a judgment 
about the harmfulness of the mast. These experiences could relate to health risks 
(such as knowing a person who claims to be electrohypersensitive), but also to the 
local political situation. Citizens’ perspectives of mast siting were thus shaped by what 
is known in the literature on public understanding of science as ‘processes of reflexivi-
ty’ (Lash and Wynne, 1992; Wyatt and Henwood, 2006) that extend far beyond a 
simple right or wrong understanding of the risks associated with the technology. 
 The argument of possible health risks often played a role in mast siting controver-
sies, but citizens put the argument in the context of a mismanagement of siting prac-
tices, with the local government as the main culprit. Unlike the grassroots support 
teams who wanted to end the siting of all masts in the entire country (and even be-
yond), engaged citizens argued that the siting on that particular spot in their neigh-
bourhood was a bad decision. The grassroots support teams argued in a ‘definite risk 
frame’, i.e. there are health risks. Engaged citizens pointed to an ‘unknown risk 
frame’, i.e. there are too many uncertainties in the scientific knowledge to rule out 
the possibility of risk. Both frames call for different policy actions: the former calls for 
the restriction of the technology and the acknowledgement of health risks; the latter 
calls for a thorough local planning decision on whether and where to site a mast. 
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The appeal of health risk framing 
Neither the national government, nor many social scientists studying the issue 
acknowledged this difference. In chapter 2, I reviewed the existing social science liter-
ature on mast siting controversies and wireless communication technology. This 
showed an overall focus within academia, especially within risk studies, on citizens’ 
understandings or perceptions of health risks associated with the technology. The 
conclusions of these studies often pointed to a need for better communication of the 
risks. I criticised these studies for having limited value to understanding siting contro-
versies. Firstly, they portray citizens as individuals with predetermined or unchangea-
ble ideas about the technology, whilst citizens acted as collectives in siting controver-
sies and made sense of the technology through landscapes of knowledge and experi-
ence (chapter 3). Secondly, these studies start from the unsubstantiated assumption 
that citizens were afraid of the radiation from base stations and for that reason, were 
not willing to allow the siting of one in their neighbourhood. This supposes that the 
controversy was best understood as a ‘risk-issue’, and thus as a problem of (misun-
derstood) scientific knowledge. 
 However, my analysis of the case studies (chapter 3), and the representative 
analysis of Dutch municipalities (chapter 1) showed that mast siting controversies 
arose for divergent reasons. The controversies cannot simply be labelled as ‘risk is-
sues’. I divided the concerns into five categories: concerns about 1) possible health 
risks, 2) lack of involvement in the decision-making process, 3) landscape pollution, 4) 
devaluation of property prices and 5) impact on flora and fauna (see Figure 1.3. in 
chapter 1). In many cases, however, citizens voiced a combination of arguments. If 
one argument prevailed, it was mostly related to health concerns or concerns about 
landscape pollution. The interviews with engaged citizens in the different mast siting 
controversies also showed a profound resentment towards the municipality: citizens 
accused the municipality that it did not properly manage the siting process and looked 
after the mobile phone operator’s interests instead of its citizens. 
 Despite the multitude of arguments against the siting of base stations that citi-
zens put forward in mast siting controversies, the argument about health risks was a 
theme in all of my cases. My research showed that citizens considered the risk fram-
ing a rather convincing and successful frame (chapter 3). It seemed to strike a sympa-
thetic chord: unlike arguments about lowering of housing prices, landscape pollution 
or more or less personal grudges against the municipality, the idea that neighbours’ 
health should be protected was an argument that was hard not to sympathise with. 
Moreover, portraying the siting of masts as an infringement on people’s health had 
the discursive power to create a collective belief that there was a problem and that 
action was needed to solve this problem. The argument of health risks also made 
sense to engaged citizens because it fitted with other, non-scientific sources of under-
standing people had, such as personal (embodied) and collective experiences of ill-
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nesses attributed to RF EMF exposure. It resonated and activated shared beliefs and 
values: taking care of one’s health and the health of one’s family (especially young 
ones) was considered to be of paramount importance. In addition, citizens were famil-
iar with other forms of environmental exposures, whose (possible) harmfulness 
strengthened the belief in the negative health effects from RF EMF. Ionising radiation 
is known to negatively affect health, but also the possibilities of harmfulness of low 
frequency electromagnetic fields from power lines, as well as microwaves from radar, 
ovens and other applications have been duly debated in the past and present. 
 Citizens engaged with the health risk framing of the issue – i.e. as a problem of 
unknown health effects from exposure to RF EMF – because it strengthened their 
cause. They used the language of risk as a political instrument that gave them the 
power to demand policy changes. They considered it an argument that could not be 
neglected by (local) governments, politicians and media. Yet, the national govern-
ment’s approach to mast siting did not match with the expectations and views of 
citizens. Moreover, the resort to health risks turned out to be a blind alley in the 
Netherlands, in contrast to my cases in Flanders. In the next section, I discuss the risk-
based approach to mast siting with the aim of showing the discrepancy between en-
gaged citizens’ and the national government’s perspectives on mast siting.  
Governance approach to mast siting 
Disqualifying citizen engagement 
In chapter 4 and 5, I discussed the developments and implications of the Dutch gov-
ernment’s policy on wireless communication technology and mast siting. After the 
sale of GSM- and UMTS-frequencies (o.a. extended GSM in 1998 and UMTS in 2000) 
to mobile phone operators, the Dutch national government was concerned with safe-
guarding the swift rollout of a wireless communication network. When citizens and 
municipalities started to question the siting of base stations, the government (and the 
mobile phone operators) classified these developments as sources of possible delays 
to the progress of the formation of a network. The government questioned neither 
the need for such a network, nor the urgency of its establishment. From such a start-
ing point, the government understood citizen engagement as a form of protest or 
resistance to a technology that it believed to be in the nation’s best interest. The gov-
ernment’s national antenna policy (2000) had to secure the formation of a network 
and ensure the ending of the controversies. It wanted to achieve these goals by 
changing the regulation on siting: antennas up to 5 metres could be sited without a 
building permit and constructions up to 40 metres needed a light building permit from 
the municipality. 
 The national antenna policy curtailed the local government’s means to have a 
significant vote on whether and where siting would occur. Municipalities could deny 
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the siting of masts based on a conflict with the local zoning plan, but the Dutch anten-
na policy prescribed that concerns about health risks were not a legitimate reason to 
refuse the siting of a base station. If the operation of the antennas did not violate the 
exposure limits that the government implemented, such operation had to be consid-
ered safe for public health. The decision on the locations for siting was left entirely to 
the mobile phone operators who approached municipalities whenever they needed to 
build a mast. These policy decisions put municipalities in a difficult position: they were 
the first contact point for engaged citizens with questions and concerns about siting, 
because citizens considered the municipality to be the authority in charge. Yet, munic-
ipalities had very few legal means with which to negotiate the siting of base stations 
on their territory. My analysis showed that the decision-making process emphasised 
the national interests and not the local level. Municipalities had no formal room for 
local involvement in base station siting, only an administrative, bureaucratic role. 
 I characterised the decision-making process around mast siting as a narrow de-
bate about the chances and risks of wireless communication technology (chapter 4 
and 5). The government enforced national policy, thereby passing over local policy 
and ignoring the societal debate that had started after the first base stations were 
sited. The antenna policy had major consequences for citizen engagements. The na-
tional government disqualified the legitimacy of citizens as stakeholders in siting deci-
sions by limiting the municipalities’ power in choosing the location of base stations 
and thus denying a local democratic decision-making process. The government did not 
see citizen engagement as forms of spontaneous participation in local politics, but 
dismissed citizen involvement as unfounded concerns about health risks. In political 
discussions on the antenna policy, citizens were portrayed either as consumers of a 
much-needed technology or as ignorant protesters against the necessity of the devel-
opment of wireless communication technology. Concerns about health thus became 
the government’s explanation for mast siting controversies. This understanding of 
mast siting controversies also became the driving force of a risk-based policy ap-
proach. 
Risk-based policy approach 
Another strategy of the government to deal with mast siting controversies was the 
removal of the issue from the policy domain to that of scientific expertise. It trans-
formed the issue from a political question with many uncertainties to a narrow scien-
tific question for which expert advice was deemed indispensable. The national gov-
ernment’s risk-based regulatory approach was rooted in 1) the denial of the legitima-
cy of citizen engagement in mast siting practices; 2) the understanding of mast siting 
controversies as the outcome of unfounded fears for health risks from the antennas; 
and 3) the assumption that mast siting controversies could be dissolved by investing in 
scientific knowledge about health risks and risk communication. A risk-based ap-
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proach thus became the government’s policy for understanding and dealing with 
siting controversies. It offered an explanation for the controversies, i.e. the public 
misunderstands the risks, and offered solutions, i.e. invest in more research and ex-
plain risks more clearly. I recapitulate my analyis of the previous chapters by looking at 
the 1) deficit of scientific knowledge about possible health risks from antennas, 2) 
deficit of communication of this scientific knowledge and 3) the most recent govern-
ment initiative in dealing with mast siting controversies: the participation of ‘society’ 
in a sounding board. 
Risk science: from judge to being judged 
The government used science as scientism (Welsh and Wynne, 2013; Wynne, 2010) or 
as an arbiter or judge, as I called it (see chapter 5). Scientism is the engrained assump-
tion that scientific evidence is the only authority that can justify policy action. Scien-
tific knowledge had to decide whether the rollout of a wireless communication net-
work was legitimate or not. I showed that even though framing a societal issue in 
terms of ‘risk’ might seem to depoliticise the debate because of the presumed impar-
tiality and authority of science as the unchallengeable source of knowledge, it in fact 
made the controversy worse because science became the battlefield to argue for or 
against siting. I argued that regulatory science could never provide policy answers, 
even if it was asked to. The government left the necessary policy interpretation of 
scientific studies to its scientific advisory body the Gezondheidsraad, who drew a 
boundary between what was an acceptable and unacceptable risk. Societal actors, 
however, disputed the Gezondheidsraad’s judgement. The risk-based policy approach 
led to a shift in the public debate on siting from a diverse discussion about the desira-
bility of base stations and the spatial planning aspects of base station siting to a polar-
ised debate about the existence of health risks. Critics of the government’s policy 
contested the scientific interpretations, accused scientific advisory bodies and insti-
tutes of partiality and highlighted uncertainties in the scientific knowledge. They ex-
posed the inherent values that were embedded in regulatory science and drew atten-
tion to such value-laden questions as ‘How to deal with disagreements among ex-
perts?’, ‘What to do with uncertainties in scientific knowledge?’ and ‘Who is responsi-
ble for the possibilities of nasty surprises from the technology?’. Because of the risk-
based policy approach, the issue of base station siting became scientised. An outcome 
of this scientisation was that science itself – and scientists – went from judge(s) to 
being judged themselves. Because science-informed arguments became central, pub-
lic actors such as grassroots support teams also shifted their attention from the local 
to the national decision-making level as the arena where they hoped to be able to 
influence policy. 
 The risk-based policy approach thus had the effect of relabeling the issue of mast 
siting from a spatial planning question to a scientific question about health risks. As I 
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have argued throughout this thesis, the public discussions about mast siting involved 
questions about risk, but it was not purely a scientific problem. The problem was ex-
tracted from its local context and the actual local concerns that mast siting had trig-
gered were lost out of sight. The government portrayed science as an ultimate judge, 
ascribed with the power to evaluate whether the rollout of the technology was legiti-
mate or not. The belief that siting controversies were about health risks, and thus 
science, became deeply entrenched. So much so, that there was no possibility for 
other policy solutions anymore. 
Risk communication: reinforcing the deficit model 
A second aspect of the government’s risk-based approach was the development of 
stronger communication programmes. The communication programmes were devel-
oped from two assumptions: 1) only a limited part of the public was in need of infor-
mation, i.e. citizens who were confronted with the siting of a base station and those 
who asked questions to intermediaries such as the municipalities, GGD’en (Communi-
ty Health Services) and mobile phone operators and 2) those publics lacked scientific 
information about health risks and were misinformed by untrustworthy information 
from the Internet. I argued that the second rationale is known as the ‘deficit model of 
public understanding of science’ and has been discredited by social scientists for 
years, but is still a strongly held belief in risk management (Irwin and Wynne, 1996; 
Short and Rosa, 2004; Sturgis and Allum, 2004). Since municipalities were perceived as 
important intermediaries or even spokespersons between the national government 
and citizens, the government expected that the availability of more and better-
tailored communication to municipalities would lead to less siting controversies. 
 In the early 2000s, the government established the Nationaal Antennebureau to 
help municipalities to deal with local concerns about mast siting (chapter 3 and 4). 
Organising an information session during which the Antennebureau, local GGD and 
mobile phone operators explained the regulatory, technical and health aspects of 
base station siting was considered the preferable way by which municipalities could 
address citizen’s concerns. These meetings were based on the assumption that more 
knowledge on mast siting, and especially on health effects, would appease existing 
siting controversies or prevent new ones. In chapter 4, however, I argued that the 
information sessions were not attuned to the political and societal needs around mast 
siting. It suppressed the possibility of citizen engagement with local politics and the 
possibility for local politics to play an accommodating role towards citizens. The in-
formation sessions provided generic information on the antenna policy, but citizens 
were interested in the local situation, i.e. they wanted to discuss the local siting, as I 
showed in chapter 3. The sessions were not set up as deliberations, but focused on 
reassuring citizens that there was nothing to worry about in scientific terms. This 
unidirectional scientific information did not cater to the needs of the audience, who 
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mostly consisted of collectives of engaged citizens who questioned the scientific stud-
ies presented and who pointed to scientific uncertainties. 
 I argued that the government’s assumption about the public deficit in knowledge 
ignored three aspects of mast siting controversies that my analysis yielded. Firstly, 
public discussions of EMF were not just epistemic issues, but touched upon broader 
societal questions of technology innovation, spatial planning, citizen engagement in 
local politics and property rights (chapter 3). Secondly, the societal actors that the 
communication was targeted to, such as engaged citizens in mast siting controversies, 
were not deficient in knowledge, but usually gathered information on diverse aspects 
of base station siting prior to receiving the government’s information and considered 
themselves more knowledgeable than municipal officials (chapter 3). Thirdly, citizens 
made sense of scientific information by fitting it into their landscape of knowledge 
and experience and by judging its content, context and purpose (chapter 3). It was 
thus not a case of misunderstanding science but a case of public disagreement with 
the implicit normative assumptions that using science as scientism implies. 
 The assumption that communication should only go through intermediaries di-
minished the role of municipalities to one of risk communicators. Municipalities, how-
ever, tried to influence the local siting policy in alternative ways, such as supporting 
citizen engagements, postponing the policy decision on mast siting until the national 
government provided more scientific clarity or starting a lawsuit against the mobile 
phone operator (chapter 5). From a risk management perspective (Löfstedt, 2005), 
the local support of the national policy by political actors is considered crucial for any 
policy to be successful, because citizens are not likely to trust a national policy deci-
sion if the municipality is critical of this decision. Better communication about the lack 
of health risks from wireless communication technology, however, did not involve 
local authorities in the antenna policy, but reduced them to spokespersons of a policy 
that many of them criticised. 
Participation of ‘society’: entrenching the health risk framing 
In 2007, the government’s plan of communicating to citizens via intermediaries con-
tinued with the establishment of the Kennisplatform EMV & Gezondheid (Knowledge 
Platform EMF & Health, see chapter 5). The Kennisplatform gathered all the profes-
sional knowledge and expertise on EMF and health in the Netherlands in order to 
provide the latest information to intermediaries who stood in close contact with citi-
zens. Even though all of this information was accessible via a website, the Kennisplat-
form did not put any efforts into publicising this information to a wider public audi-
ence. The idea remained that people who wanted information would also be able to 
find this information. The Kennisplatform claimed to listen to the ‘voice of society’ by 
entering into conversation with a particular public group who represented those that 
were convinced of harmful effects from RF EMF, i.e. grassroots support teams and 
196 
interest groups for electrohypersensitives. This conversation took place in the Klank-
bordgroep (Sounding Group). 
 In chapter 5, I argued that the invitation of these actors reinforced the national 
government’s understanding of, and dealing with, the societal problem of mast siting 
as a health risk issue and hence a scientific problem. The position of more radical 
grassroots support teams became foregrounded, while the concerns of local citizen 
collectives disappeared in the background. The discussions of scientific knowledge in 
the Klankbordgroep, however, did not lead to a mutual agreement on how to deal 
with EMF and health in society. Besides the growing respect for the different opinions 
and the start of a research project in which societal actors were involved, the Klank-
bordgroep primarily exposed the fundamental differences in opinion about the politi-
cal nature of EMF science. I distinguished between three processes of science that 
were under discussion (compare Brown et al., 2006; see Table 5.2. in chapter 5): doing 
scientific research, interpreting scientific research and acting on science. The Ken-
nisplatform encouraged discussions of the first aspect – doing scientific research – 
between the grassroots supports teams and interest groups and ZonMw scientists. 
The grassroots supports teams and interest groups, however, also wanted to discuss 
the interpretation of scientific results, and the implications of these results. They de-
manded policy changes, but the Kennisplatform drew a sharp boundary between its 
scientific task of evaluating and communicating science, and politics. In recent years, 
the Klankbordgroep tried to focus on broader issues of EMF and health (beyond the 
narrow focus on electryhypersensitivity) and continued its efforts to provide clear 
communication to intermediaries. 
 I concluded that the Klankbordgroep had the potential to become a productive 
forum where diverse groups – experts, policy makers, health care professionals, socie-
tal organisation, and industry – could discuss wireless communication technology in 
society. Yet, from the start, the societal issue of wireless communication technology 
was framed as a scientific issue. The initiative of involving ‘society’ only arose at a 
point when the political and public debate about wireless communication technology 
had already indurated to a health risk question. The outcomes of these discussions 
thus also focused on science: involving particular societal groups, who represented 
people’s concerns about health risks, in scientific research programmes and more 
clearly communicating the diverse views on science that came up during the discus-
sions. For this reason, I argued that the Kennisplatform and Klankbordgroep were 
another dynamic in understanding why wireless communication technology became a 
serious health risk, even though the siting of base stations evoked a diverse range of 
reactions. It reinforced the deployment of scientific knowledge as scientism in public 
discussions on EMF. This led to the contradictory situation that health risks were dis-
missed as legitimate arguments on a local level (objections against base stations could 
not be made on the basis of health aspects), but were nevertheless debated on a 
national level by societal actors who supposedly represented ‘society’. 
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 The health risk framing became central in the national discussions of mast siting. 
The diverse local concerns of municipalities and engaged citizens did not feature in 
these deliberations. The risk-based policy approach of the government, and especially 
the establishment of the Kennisplatform, removed engaged citizens and their con-
cerns from the table. This, however, did not mean that these concerns ceased to exist: 
siting controversies continued to emerge until today. The gap between the local and 
national level widened throughout the years, as the national government entrenched 
the focus on health risks as the best way to deal with mast siting controversies. In this 
thesis, I argued that the local perspective on the governance problem of mast siting 
was one of incapacity to influence a local policy decision: local actors wanted to be 
involved in deciding where the mast would be sited. The national perspective on the 
governance problem of mast siting controversies, on the other hand, was one of defi-
cits – of science and of communication. This mismatch between the local and national 
levels attributed to the continued emergence and sustainment of mast siting contro-
versies. 
 Citizen engagement was mostly without concrete results. It ended either when 
the mast was sited or when a judge ruled in favour or against the siting. Deeply con-
vinced of the harmfulness of RF EMF, the most ardent engaged citizens established 
groups that extended far beyond the localities of the neighbourhood and municipality 
(such as in Spijkenisse and Drongen). They wanted to change policy on national, Euro-
pean and international levels, which turned out to be policy arenas where one could 
actually discuss health risks. The issue then moved beyond the locality of the neigh-
bourhood. Most engaged citizens, however, did not continue on this path. During the 
interviews I had with them (sometimes years later) about the engagement, they ex-
pressed their frustration and resentment at not having been able to influence local 
policy-making processes. Some could not understand how their goodwill to become 
engaged could have been so easily cast aside. 
The dynamics of controversies around technologies 
In chapter 1, I argued that my research on siting controversies fitted into a broader 
academic and policy debate about how society should deal with (emerging) technolo-
gies (Blankesteijn et al., 2014a; Boholm and Lofstedt, 2013; Callon et al., 2009; Hess 
and Coley, 2012; Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998; Ottinger, 2013b; Stilgoe et al., 2013; 
Verhoeven, 2009). My analysis of the interaction between society, science and poli-
cymaking in mast siting controversies adds to this growing body of literature. This 
thesis points to several dynamics and patterns that show the conditions under which 
controversies can arise over technological innovations. Some dynamics only relate to 
the local implementation of technologies, and others can also be witnessed in public 
and political debates about innovations that do not need to be sited. The discussion of 
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these dynamics also shows how the issue of mast siting controversies could have been 
dealt with differently, in other words, how it could have been otherwise. 
 I first discuss three local dynamics that are important in understanding why the 
siting of a particular technology might become controversial: 
 
The lack of public options to become involved in decisions about siting of the tech-
nology and/or the lack of choices about siting 
 
The citizens that I encountered in my research, and several city councils, were disap-
pointed and frustrated that they were not able to participate in the siting decision. I 
argued in this thesis that this lack of involvement was an incentive for citizens to start 
to engage. It is striking that in those cases where citizens could decide between differ-
ent siting options, there was no controversy, such as in one of my case studies, Eu-
verem, and in a few municipalities where neighbours could chose different locations 
that the mobile phone operator had picked out (see section Information sessions as 
crucial dynamic in siting controversies in chapter 4). Even though I do not have enough 
empirical evidence to fully support this hypothesis, I am inclined to state that more 
mast siting controversies might have been solved if citizens and municipalities would 
have been involved in the location choice. This fits with my consistent observation 
that citizens wanted to be taken seriously, and wanted to engage. If they felt that they 
were not, the engagement deepened. 
 
The dynamics of the local community: the embeddedness of public concerns about 
siting in their neighbourhood culture and in a history of contestation about local or 
national issues (for example, previous disagreements about spatial planning or the 
experiences of national health scares) 
 
It was a recurrent finding in my research that the local character of the neighbour-
hood largely influenced whether citizens started to engage, which arguments were 
used and what actions were undertaken. The decision-making process around mast 
siting, however, did not value or take into account the cultural, historical or social 
dimensions that shaped the main qualities of a neighbourhood. In those cases where 
citizens highly valued the protection of their landscape and urban surroundings, the 
siting of mast was seen as an invasion of this character. All of the mast siting contro-
versies I investigated took place in neighbourhoods with a strong identity, which was 
particularly embodied by the early engagers. 
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The enforcement of a national policy without taking local considerations into ac-
count and without acknowledging a decisive role for local authorities 
 
The Dutch government’s antenna policy negated the authority of local governments 
to influence the local siting processes. In order to encourage the rollout of wireless 
communication technology, the government decided that most base stations could be 
sited with only the permission of the building owner and without a building permit. 
Mobile phone operators only needed a building permit for the construction of masts: 
they chose the location to which municipalities could object only based on a conflict 
with the local zoning plan. This industry-supported policy strategy never questioned 
the need or the urgency of a nationwide network. The government even added to the 
urgency by legally enforcing all mobile phone operators to provide such a network in a 
few years. From such a position, mast siting controversies became perceived as even 
more problematic. My analysis showed that it would have made a lot of sense to 
question the limited role of local actors in the antenna policy: why could municipali-
ties and citizens not have any rights to decide on base station siting? Moreover, the 
urge by which the government pushed for the expansion of a wireless communication 
network denied a broader discussion on the implementation of the technology. There 
was no debate possible about technical solutions to base station siting, such as invest-
ing in the development of alternative base stations (e.g. smaller or less visible in the 
surrounding) or obliging mobile phone operators to camouflage base stations (anten-
nas and masts). Neither was there any thorough discussion about the perceived need 
for multiple mobile phone operators who all had to site base stations simultaneously, 
beyond the demand to ‘site-share’ (allowing the siting of antennas from other mobile 
phone operators on one mast). 
 Next, I also noticed several other dynamics that can be witnessed in more general 
public and political debates about technologies: 
 
The exclusive framing by policymakers of public issues in scientific terms, even 
though the societal debate is multifaceted, with a diversity of interests and touches 
upon important themes in society 
 
My analysis showed that the public discussion on wireless communication technology 
was complex, multi-layered, and was related to economics, the environment, health, 
community involvement, spatial planning and the social need for the technology. I 
argued that the public debate on wireless communication was much broader than just 
a question of health risks from antennas or mobile phones. The introduction of wire-
less communication technology had a major influence on the way people communi-
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cate with each other, and thus on the functioning of society. Especially around the 
time of the UMTS-generation in the mid-2000s, citizens involved in mast siting contro-
versies worried about this social aspect of wireless communication technology. By 
now, this discussion has moved to the background because hardly anybody doubts 
the benefits of wireless communication technology anymore. Instead, other social 
problems related to the technology have emerged, such as privacy issues, addiction to 
mobile phones, cyber bullying and concentration problems due to intensive use of 
mobile phones and tablets. I argued that the risk-based policy approach of the gov-
ernment narrowed the broad discussion on the technology to a focus on ‘EMF and 
health’. In the Klankbordgroep, this focus was further condensed to a discussion about 
possible health effects of RF EMF exposure, and especially electrohypersensitivity.  
 
The existence of and easy access (through the Internet) to a strong counter-
expertise network consisting of grassroots support teams and interest groups who 
politicise uncertainties and expose values embedded in scientific knowledge 
 
The contact with grassroots support teams was a crucial aspect of citizen engage-
ment. In some cases, this contact changed the focus of the engagement to an argu-
ment about health risks. The involvement of grassroots support teams in mast siting 
controversies and in the public debate on wireless communication technology also 
had another important effect on the dynamics of siting controversies: the national 
government equated societal concerns about mast siting with the arguments about 
health risks from these grassroots support teams. Consequently, when a deliberative 
platform was established that wanted to hear the opinion of ‘society’, i.e. the Klank-
bordgroep, these groups were invited as the representation of societal concerns 
about the technology. However, I argued that there were important differences be-
tween grassroots support teams and engaged citizens. The former wanted to convince 
the government of the harmfulness of health risks and were thus eager to engage in 
conversation with scientists about the question whether there are health risks from 
RF EMF. Engaged citizens, on the other hand, were not convinced of the harmfulness 
of RF EMF, but of the existence of uncertainties that warranted a prudent approach to 
siting base stations. They thus asked the question whether this was the best place to 
site base stations, in view of the precautionary approach. 
 
The execution of a risk-based policy response that dismisses any health-related 
concerns and precautionary arguments by using scientific studies and scientific 
advisory bodies as arbiters who draw boundaries between what is an acceptable 
and unacceptable risk 
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‘Risk’ became the dominant mode of explanation for the emergence of mast siting 
controversies and for its policy solutions. The central role of science in understanding 
and acting upon mast siting controversies performed a particular citizen who was not 
supposed to become involved in the siting practices but who needed to be educated 
about science. The government portrayed science as an ultimate judge, ascribed with 
the power to evaluate whether the rollout of the technology was legitimate or not. As 
I have argued throughout this thesis, the public discussions about mast siting involved 
questions about risk, but it was not purely a scientific problem. 
Concluding remarks: moving beyond risk 
My analysis has made apparent the negative consequences of dealing with a multi-
faceted societal issue only in terms of a risk-issue. It made siting controversies into a 
problem of science and communication, and a challenge that needed to be overcome, 
according to the government. My findings relate to an increasing academic interest in 
the use of a risk-based policy approach, as a presumed powerful and legitimate way of 
dealing with emerging technologies and siting controversies (Borraz, 2008; Hood et 
al., 2001; Jasanoff, 1999; Power, 2004; Rothstein et al., 2006, 2013; Stirling, 1998). 
The prevalence of contemporary risk discourses seems to lie in a paradox (Borraz, 
2008). On the one hand, risk serves as a political instrument by which social problems 
gain access to the public agenda, i.e. it is a means of politicising new forms of vulnera-
bility by calling onto the state for more protection and security. On the other hand, 
risk is a means of transforming governing practices, through recourse to science-
based approaches, i.e. risk serves as a technocratic instrument by which sensitive 
issues are depoliticised. Siting controversies are instances where these different fram-
ings and understandings of risk co-exist. Multiple actors can use the same language, 
but can mean opposite things. Sometimes, the vocabulary of risk might even be used 
as a substitute for other non-risk related concerns. In this thesis, I have analysed the 
risk debates around mast siting as outcomes of a social process by which uncertainties 
that were raised by the siting of base stations – related to the authority of municipali-
ties, spatial planning, or involvement of citizens – were converted into questions of 
risk, and hence scientific issues. I would like to argue that a thorough analysis of the 
power of risk, both as a legitimising and delegitimising force, in siting and technologi-
cal controversies adds significantly to understanding the social, political and scientific 
dynamics that play out in these controversies. 
 Social scientists have to be careful not to resort to well-established risk explana-
tions in their attempts to explain siting controversies. As I argued in chapter 2, some 
scholars in risk perception research do not question whether the issue is in fact best 
understood as a risk issue, and thus impose a particular understanding of the problem 
on their respondents. That is why I chose to use the notion of engagement in this 
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thesis: as a constant reminder that citizens are not passive laypersons who suffer from 
deficits, but are active social beings. As long as we continue to portray siting or tech-
nological controversies as cases of the result of cognitive discrepancies between so-
called laypersons and experts, and as long as the only solution is one of better risk 
communication, controversies will remain problems. In this thesis, I have argued that 
policymakers, industry, academics and society should start to see siting controversies 
as spontaneous, non-orchestrated forms of citizen involvement in local politics, and 
thus as political demands for participation. This reconceptualisation opens up a new 
array of possibilities in dealing with societal conflicts – not necessarily easier, cheaper 
or more effective – but more tailored to the essence of the problem. 
 Engaged citizens were usually well-embedded, active and social individuals who 
were part of a neighbourhood. I argue that they are the kind of citizens that the Dutch 
government has recently started to identify as possible engines of its doe-democratie 
(do-democracy) or vitale samenleving (vital society) (Ministerie van Binnenlandse 
Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2013). According to the Minister of the Interior and King-
dom Relations, the doe-democratie relates to the “changing relations between gov-
ernment, citizen and market [that] demand from ‘the’ government that it actively 
trusts and enables societal initiatives in the public domain, thereby increasingly letting 
go of its steering role and handing over its authority” (Ibid.: 9). In recent years, several 
governmental advisory bodies urged the government to involve citizens in political 
decisions and to use the expertise and knowledge that citizens have (see e.g. Raad 
voor het Openbaar Bestuur, 2012; Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2012; WRR, 2012). 
In its reaction to these calls, the government emphasised its desire to contribute to 
such a transition to a doe-democratie. The government, for example, tries to encour-
age citizens to become involved in their own neighbourhoods (see Noorderhaven and 
Timmers, 2009; Tonkens, 2010 for a discussion of two local citizen initiatives). Howev-
er, the Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (The Netherlands Scientific 
Council for Government Policy) (2012), one of the advisory bodies that put the issue 
of citizen engagement on the agenda, observed that the government simultaneously 
under- and overestimated citizens about their possibilities for active engagement. 
 My analysis of mast siting controversies as forms of spontaneous citizen initia-
tives showed that the government underestimated the need for citizen involvement in 
base station siting. Instead, it portrayed the engagement of citizens with mast siting as 
a problem of deficits. How can we get siting controversies out of the negative lime-
light? We need to turn the focus on citizens in siting controversies upside down: see 
them as engagers in siting decisions with legitimate views, instead of ‘protesters’. 
Citizen engagement should be taken seriously, instead of casting it aside as ‘misunder-
standings of science’, ‘resistance to change’, or ‘subjective risk perceptions’. If policy 
makers welcome citizen engagement as a form of genuine critique, siting controver-
sies can be viewed as a healthy sign of democracy at work. This opens the path to 
more democratic solutions to siting controversies – solutions that move beyond risk. 
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APPENDIX 1: 
Overview of case studies 
 
SPIJKENISSE 
NL 
 
2004 
October 
Municipality of Spijkenisse gives building permit to KPN [mobile phone company] to site a 
mast with UMTS-antennas in Park Waterland.  
2005 
June 
KPN starts construction work. 
Neighbours notice construction work and ask the municipality questions about it.  
August The municipality organises an information session in which it and KPN explain the need for 
the mast. 
Citizens start to engage with the siting and establish Spijkenisse tegen Straling (Spijkenisse 
against Radiation). 
Local building corporation Maasdelta announces that it will not permit the siting of antennas 
on any of its buildings. 
October The municipality asks KPN to wait with the siting of the mast. KPN halts the works. 
Spijkenisse tegen Straling measures the electromagnetic fields in a flat complex in the city 
and investigates residents’ health complaints.  
November KPN informs the municipality that it will resume the construction works shortly. 
Spijkenisse tegen Straling and other neighbours prevent the siting of antennas in an existing 
electricity pylon in Park Waterland by tying themselves to the pylon. 
The biggest political party in Spijkenisse (Onafhankelijk nieuw Spijkenisse) asks KPN to 
abandon the plan for mast siting. KPN sees no reason to do that.  
December Municipality withdraws the building permit of the mast. It awaits the results of a scientific 
study in Switzerland that will examine health effects of exposure to UMTS-like radiation. 
KPN appeals in court against the decision to withdraw the building permit. 
By order of the municipality, research bureau TNO EPS measures the electromagnetic fields 
strengths on several roofs of flats in the city.  
2006 
February 
 
TNO EPS concludes research: the EMF strengths are far below the European exposure limits. 
On the basis of these measurements, the GGD (Community Health Services) reports that 
there is no health risk from living close to a base station.  
June The municipality examines the recently released results of the so-called ‘Swiss study’ that 
showed no adverse health effects from exposure to UMTS-like EMFs.  
July The three biggest political parties in Spijkenisse hand in a motion that calls for a temporarily 
halt of building permissions for the construction of UMTS-masts. It is adopted. 
KPN takes legal action.  
2007 
March 
The judge rules in favour of KPN: the UMTS-mast can be sited. KPN and the municipality 
slowly start to communicate again. 
April Spijkenisse against Radiation measures the EMF close to two schools and claims the 
exposure is too high. The school’s headmasters are surprised and do not agree with these 
findings. By order of the municipality, research bureau TNO EPS repeats the measurements.  
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May KPN starts the construction works on the UMTS-mast in Park Waterland.  
June & 
October 
The construction site is vandalised 
2008 
March 
The municipality ends its restrictive policy against UMTS-masts as one of the last Dutch 
municipalities.  
MAASTRICHT 
NL 
 
2010 
March 
 
Neighbours are notified about the intended siting of a UMTS-mast in Heer, a neighbourhood 
in Maastricht. The neighbourhood association (buurtplatform) initiates a working groups 
called ‘UMTS-mast’ and start to engage with the siting. 
The municipality organises an information evening. Some neighbours complain that they did 
not receive an invitation. The municipality decides to organise a second information evening 
in April.  
April Second information session. Neighbours have questions about the choice of location. The 
municipality decides to investigate alternative options. 
Neighbours hand over their submission of viewpoints (zienswijzen) with around 300 
signatures from neighbours to the alderman for spatial planning (wethouder). The 
neighbours also have a private talk with him.  
May until 
September 
2011 
The municipality investigates the submission of viewpoints of the citizens to see whether 
 
September 
 
The municipality informs the neighbourhood that it does not have any legal grounds to 
object to the siting of the base station. It argues that the neighbours cannot be accepted as 
claimants and thus their arguments have to be dismissed, but that it, nevertheless, has 
investigated some of the claims. The municipality investigated the height of the mast (39.9 
meters), alternative locations and impact on protected wildlife.  
October 
 
The working group of the neighbourhood association decides not to start a legal procedure 
against the municipality because they do not think to have much chance to win. The costs 
and efforts are considered to be too great.  
… The mast is sited 
 
DRONGEN 
BE 
 
2005 
May 
NMBS (National Railway Company of Belgium) asks the municipality’s permission to build 
a mobile phone mast for emergency communication next to the station in Drongen. The 
municipal advice to the regional planning official (Gewestelijk stedenbouwkundig 
ambtenaar, who is in charge of building permits) is negative because of visual pollution.  
2006 
January 
The regional planning official gives a building permit to NMBS arguing that the societal 
need for railroad emergency communication outweighs visual pollution.  
May 
 
NMBS starts construction work on the mast. Neighbours were not informed and start to 
engage with the siting. They take immediate action and apply for a temporary injunction 
(kortgeding) in local court. They set up a neighbourhood group that will become known as 
‘Beperk de Straling’ (Restrict the Radiation) and still exists today (2014).  
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June 
 
Several neighbours hand in a notice of objection (bezwaarschrift) with the municipality 
and appeal for cassation of the building permit with the Council of State (Raad van State).  
September 
 
The verdict on the temporary injunction is in favour of the neighbours. 
The mobile phone operator Belgacom-Mobile applies for a building permit for the 
construction of a mast for mobile telephony next to a sports complex in the Keiskant in 
Drongen, a neighbourhood south of the station. The operator does not get a permit.  
2007 
April 
NMBS restarts construction work on the mast near the station in Drongen. Neighbours 
apply for a second temporary injunction (kortgeding) in local court.  
June 
 
The verdict on the temporary injunction is again in favour of the neighbours. NMBS 
cannot start works on the mast near the station. The company lodges an appeal against 
this decision in higher court.  
October 
 
Belgacom-Mobile again applies for a building permit near the sports complex in Keiskant, 
Drongen.  
Neighbours of the Keiskant hand in notices of objections with the municipality against the 
siting of a mast with over a 1000 signatures.  
November NMBS starts to work again on the mast near the station, against the judge’s ruling.  
December NMBS loses appeal in higher court and stops working on the mast.  
2010 
July 
 
Judgment of the First Auditor of the Council of State (who assesses the case and presents 
an opinion in open court): the mast cannot be sited because of lack of motivation 
concerning the health risks (at the time, there were no exposure limits in place because of 
the absence of Flemish regulation).  
August 
 
The regional planning official (Gewestelijk stedenbouwkundig ambtenaar) decides to 
withdraw the building permit for the mast close to the station in Drongen based on the 
report of the First Auditor of the Council of State 
The mast is not sited 
 
MAARKEDAL 
BE 
 
2008 
November 
Neighbours of the Kafhoek, a neighbourhood in Maarkedal, receive notice from mobile 
phone operator Base that an existing radio mast will be replaced with a GSM-mast.  
December 
 
A few neighbours start to engage with the siting and go round the neighbourhood to 
invite others to a meeting in which they decide to draft a notice of objection that is 
submitted to the municipality a week later. 
The owners of the youth centre next to the field where the mast will be sited receive an 
eco-award from the Flemish government. The owners take this opportunity to talk to the 
minister’s representative about the mast.  
2009 
February 
The municipality gives a positive advice to the siting of the GSM-mast. Neighbours contact 
the regional authority in charge of the granting of the building permit and give their 
objections. They also contact several ministers.  
March 
 
Neighbours find out that there is no building permit for the existing radio mast and report 
this offence.  
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June The regional authorities grant a permit to build the GSM-mast. A few neighbours start a 
legal procedure by appealing for cassation of the building permit with the Council of State 
(Raad van State).  
September The neighbours organise a dinner to pay for the legal costs.  
December 
 
The Council of State reverses the regional authorities’ building permit on the basis of a 
lack of formal rules by which to assess the health effects of the electromagnetic fields 
from the antennas. At this time, there is no Flemish legislation on exposure limits. 
The mast is not sited 
NIEUWKOOP 
NL 
 
2008 
May 
The mobile phone operator KPN asks permission from the municipality to build two masts 
in Nieuwkoop, one close to the school and recreation terrains called de Dulen. The 
municipality starts the exemption procedure (vrijstellingsprocedure) for the siting of base 
stations.  
September 
 
Citizens and the primary school start to engage and collect notices of objection 
(zienswijzen) for the municipality.  
December 
 
The municipality organises an information evening for the neighbourhood. 
Engaged citizens collect signatures at the school gates for the notices of objection.  
November 
 
The local political party Midden Partij Nieuwkoop (MPN) submits a motion that calls for 
the establishment of a local antenna policy before allowing the siting of UMTS-antennas. 
The motion is adopted. 
Engaged citizens hand over more than 120 notices of objection to the alderman for spatial 
planning (wethouder) 
The municipality agrees with the mobile phone operator to postpone the exemption 
procedure until local antenna policy is provided.  
2009 
June 
The concept nota of the local antenna policy is ready. It is deposited for inspection at the 
city hall for 9 weeks.  
September The municipality receives 4 comments on the concept nota, all focused on possible health 
risks due to exposure to base stations. 
December 
 
Discussion of the antenna policy in the council meeting. Two local parties (Midden Partij 
Nieuwkoop and Progressief Nieuwkoop) submit an amendment: masts should not be 
allowed to be sited in densely populated areas. The amendment is not passed. The 
antenna policy states that health reasons do not play a role in granting building permits 
for masts.  
2010 
March 
Municipality grants building permit to the mobile phone operator for the two UMTS-masts 
in Nieuwkoop.  
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April 3 engaged citizens lodge an appeal against the siting decision with the regional court (The 
Hague) 
The mobile phone operator starts construction work on the mast. Engaged citizens start 
an interim provision procedure in court (voorlopige voorzieningsprocedure) to halt the 
siting. 
Engaged citizens ask for expressions of support (a.o. donating money for the legal costs) 
through social media and newsletters of the school. 
One of them also uses his public rights to speak in a council meeting about the local 
concerns about siting.  
May Several political parties keep on addressing the issue by asking questions about the siting 
and submitting another motion to discuss alternative locations for the UMTS-masts with 
the mobile phone operator. The motion is not adopted. 
An engaged citizen asks for access to the documents stating that there is inadequate 
mobile phone connection in Nieuwkoop based on the freedom of information law (Wet 
openbaarheid van bestuur). The municipality does not have these records.  
July The interim provision procedure in court is in favour of the engaged citizens. The mobile 
phone operator halts the construction works.  
December The citizens’ appeal against the building permit with the local court is disallowed. The 
construction work of the mast is legal and can continue. 
The same engaged citizens appeal against this court decision at the Council of State (Raad 
van State).  
2011 
August 
 
 
2012 
February  
The engaged citizens loose the appeal in higher court. 
There are no legal options anymore, but one of the engaged citizens suggests to do a so-
called blood count study, where blood is taken from residents before the mast is sited, 
and again a few months later to detect any possible health effects from the exposure to 
the electromagnetic fields.  
The mast is sited 
 
EUVEREM 
NL 
 
2010 
March  
The municipality announces plans of mobile phone operator KPN/Ericsson to site a mast 
for mobile telephony in Euverem (part of the city of Gulpen-Wittem). 
The municipality organises an information session in Euverem. During this evening, 
citizens express their objections against the location of the mast, in the main street of 
Euverem, close to a car park and playground. Even though all citizens want the mast 
because of lack of UMTS-reception in the village, they ask the municipality and mobile 
phone operator for alternative locations. The mobile phone operator is willing to look into 
it, and the alderman for spatial planning agrees to change the zoning place if necessary to 
allow siting in a different area.  
2010 
August 
… 
The municipality grants a building permit for the construction of a UMTS-mast in Euverem, 
in a field next to a bungalow park, away from the main street of Euverem.  
The mast is sited 
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APPENDIX 2: 
Data collection 
 
 
Exploratory interviews 
MoNet (Mobile Network Operators the Netherlands)  22-09-2009 Baarn (NL) 
BIPT (Belgisch Instituut voor Postdiensten en Telecommunicatie)  11-10-2010 Brussels (B) 
Policy maker of the Environment, Nature and Energy Department 
of the Flemish government (LNE)  
28-09-2010 Brussels (B) 
Spokesperson GSM Operator Forum Belgium 04-10-2010 Brussels (B) 
 
 
Interviews for case studies 
 Name Date Duration of 
interview 
Location Information about 
interviewee 
 Maastricht     
M1 Citizen 1 06-09-2011 40 min.  Maastricht Former chairman 
buurtplatform 
(neighbourhood association)  
M2 Citizen 2 15-09-2011 1h10 Maastricht Active member of 
buurtplatform 
(neighbourhood association)  
M3 Citizen 3 16-09-2011 1h00 Maastricht Chairman buurtplatform 
(neighbourhood association)  
M4 Citizen 4 24-10-2011 53 min.  Maastricht Resident of neighbourhood 
M5 City councilmember 
(alderman) responsible 
for antenna policy 
09-09-2011 26 min.  Maastricht  
M6 Staff member of 
Antennebureau 
13-09-2011 10 min. 
(telephone 
call)  
Maastricht  
M7 Municipal official 
working on antenna 
policy 
21-09-2011 50 min.  Maastricht  
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 Name Date Duration of 
interview 
Location Information about 
interviewee 
M8 Municipal official 
responsible for 
relationships with the 
neighbourhood in 
question 
(stadsdeelleider)  
04-10-2011 47 min.  Maastricht  
M9 Representatives of the 
mobile phone operator 
 
21-10-2011 54 min. Maastricht  
 Spijkenisse     
S1 Citizen 1 
 
01-11-2011 
 
3h27 
 
Spijkenisse 
 
Resident of neighbourhood 
Founder of ‘Spijkenisse tegen 
Straling’ (Spijkenisse against 
Radiation) 
Founder of International 
EMF Alliance 
S2 Citizen 2 
 
26-11-2011 
 
1h10 
 
Spijkenisse 
 
Resident of neighbourhood 
Co-founder of ‘Spijkenisse 
tegen Straling’ (Spijkenisse 
against Radiation)  
S3 Alderman (wethouder) 
of spatial planning 
(2002-2006) 
02-11-2011 
 
57 min. 
 
Spijkenisse 
 
gave permission for the 
siting of a mast 
S4 Alderman (wethouder) 
of spatial planning 
(2006-2014) 
02-11-2011 
 
44 min. 
 
Spijkenisse 
 
The contested mast siting 
was one of the cases coming 
from the previous 
administration for the newly 
appointed alderman in 2006 
S5 Alderman (wethouder) 
of Sports, Culture, 
Tourism, Education and 
Welfare 
04-12-2011 
 
36 min.  Spijkenisse  Alderman at time of mast 
siting controversy 
Resident of neighbourhood 
S6 Representative mobile 
phone operator 
03-11-2011 59 min. Den Bosch  
S7 Councillor (raadslid) 1 04-12-2011 1h10 Spijkenisse Resident of neighbourhood 
Opposed siting (PvdA)  
S8 Councillor (raadslid) 2 03-11-2011 1h04  Spijkenisse Opposed siting (ONS 
Spijkenisse) 
 
 Nieuwkoop     
N1 Citizen 1 26-02-2011 1h40 Nieuwkoop Resident of neighbourhood 
210 
 Name Date Duration of 
interview 
Location Information about 
interviewee 
N2 Citizen 2 02-03-2011 1h20 Nieuwkoop Resident of neighbourhood 
N3 Citizen 3 09-03-2011 1h15 Nieuwkoop Resident of neighbourhood 
N4 Journalist of local 
newspaper Witte 
Weekblad 
03-03-2011 23 min. Nieuw-Vennep Wrote several pieces on the 
mast siting controversy 
N5 Headmaster of primary 
school 
08-03-2011 50 min. Nieuwkoop  
N6 Municipal official of 
Nieuwkoop working on 
spatial planning 
21-02-2011 53 min. Ter Aar  
N7 Alderman (wethouder) 
of spatial planning 
27-06-2011 59 min. Nieuwkoop Responsible for spatial 
planning issues at time of 
mast siting controversy 
N8 City councillor (raadslid) 
 
09-03-2011 01h03 Alphen aan de 
Rijn 
Opposed siting (Samen Beter 
Nieuwkoop)  
N9 Staff member of 
Antennebureau 
17-03-2011 01h26 Amersfoort Presented at information 
session about the siting of 
the mast in Nieuwkoop 
N10 2 lawyers of mobile 
phone operator 
04-03-2011 57 min. Amsterdam  
N11 Representative of 
mobile phone operator 
20-05-2011 50 min. Den Bosch Was responsible for 
particular siting in 
Nieuwkoop 
 
 Euverem     
E1 Mayor of Gulpen-
Wittem (Euverem is part 
of Gulpen-Wittem) 
27-02-2012 28 min. Gulpen  
 Informal talks with 
neighbours during 
information session 
 
    
 Drongen     
D1 Citizen 1 25-05-2011 01h33 Drongen Resident of neighbourhood 
close to the station 
Owner of local business 
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 Name Date Duration of 
interview 
Location Information about 
interviewee 
D2 Citizen 2 
 
13-05-2011 2h Drongen Resident of neighbourhood 
close to the station 
Founder of Beperk de 
Straling (Restrict the 
Radiation)  
D3 Citizen 3 11-05-2011 01h29 Drongen Resident of neighbourhood 
Keiskant 
Former member of Beperk 
de Straling 
D4 City councillor 
(gemeenteraadslid)  
26-05-2011 30 min. Drongen Resident of neighbourhood 
close to the station 
Opposed siting 
D5 Belgian Railways 
communications 
manager 
14-06-2011 35 min. Brussels In charge of the mast close 
to Drongen station that was 
needed for the 
communications network of 
the Belgian Railroads 
D6 Alderman (schepen) of 
spatial planning 
13-05-2011 53 min. Ghent Responsible for spatial 
planning issues at time of 
mast siting controversy 
D7 Lawyer of citizens 19-05-2011 01h05 Drongen  
D8 Alderman (schepen) of 
education 
 
05-07-2011 56 min. Ghent Personally involved in siting 
controversies in Drongen 
Called for banning masts 
close to schools 
D9 Municipal official 
responsible for 
relationships with the 
neighbourhood in 
question (wijkregisseur)  
 
19-05-2011 39 min. Ghent  
 Maarkedal     
MA1 Citizen 1 15-04-2012 01h18 Maarkedal Resident of neighbourhood 
Owner of youth centre 
MA2 Citizen 2 15-04-2012 51 min. Maarkedal Resident of neighbourhood 
Owner of Bed and Breakfast 
MA3 Citizen 3 04-04-2012 18 min. Maarkedal Resident of neighbourhood 
MA4 Citizen 4 04-05-2012 37 min. Maarkedal Resident of neighbourhood 
MA5 Mayor 04-05-2012 38 min. Maarkedal  
MA6 Lawyer of citizens 04-05-2012 01h05 Maarkedal  
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 Name Date Duration of 
interview 
Location Information about 
interviewee 
MA7 Lawyer of mobile phone 
operator 
01-05-2012 57 min. Antwerp  
MA8 Lawyer of Flemish 
government 
10-08-2012 41 min. Ghent The Flemish government 
became involved when 
citizens appealed for 
cassation of the building 
permit of the mast with the 
Council of State (Raad van 
State). 
 
Interviews Kennisplatform & Klankbordgroep 
 Name Date  Duration of 
interview 
Location Information about interviewee 
K1 Kennisplatform 
staff 
24/04/2012 
 
01h42 Utrecht General secretary of the 
Kennisplatform, employed at RIVM 
K2 Klankbordgroep 
member 
07/05/2012 
 
02h30 Ede-
Wageningen 
Chairman of the Stichting 
elektrohypersensitiviteit (EHS) 
(Dutch ElektroHyperSensitivity 
Foundation) with a seat in the 
Klankbordgroep 
K3 Klankbordgroep 
member 
07/05/2012 
 
52 min. Telephone call  Founder of StopUMTS with a seat in 
the Klankbordgroep 
K4 Klankbordgroep 
member 
08/05/2012 
 
01h15 Delft Nederlands Instituut voor 
Bouwbiologie en Ecologie (NIBE) 
(The Dutch Institute for Building 
Biology and Ecology) with a seat in 
the Klankbordgroep 
K5 Researcher 14/05/2012 
 
01h06 Bilthoven Researcher at RIVM who is involved 
in research into EMF and health 
K6 Kennisplatform 
staff 
14/05/2012 
 
36 min. Bilthoven Chairman of the communication 
forum of the Kennisplatform, 
employed at RIVM 
K7 Kennisplatform 
staff 
14/05/2012 
 
48 min. Utrecht Member of the communication 
forum of the Kennisplatform, 
employed at GGD 
K8 Klankbordgroep 
member 
15/05/2012 01h14 Den Bosch MoNet (Mobile Network Operators 
the Netherlands) with a seat in the 
Klankbordgroep 
K9 Advisory role 16/05/2012 
 
01h15 The Hague Scientific Staff Member at 
Gezondheidsraad 
K10 Kennisplatform 04/07/2012 01h14 Bilthoven Former member of the board of the 
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 Name Date  Duration of 
interview 
Location Information about interviewee 
staff  Kennisplatform, employed at RIVM 
K11 Research 
programme 
committee member 
04/07/2012 
 
01h01 Vleuten ZonMw Research Programme 
Electromagnetic Fields and Health 
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Participant observations 
Activity Date Location 
Information sessions for citizens (Antennebureau)   
Euverem (NL) 23-03-2010 Euverem (Gulpen-Wittem) 
(NL) 
Valkenswaard (NL) (with thanks to Bert de Graaff for sharing his 
notes with me) 
24-01-2011 Valkenswaard (NL) 
Echt (NL)  14-08-2012 Echt-Susteren (NL) 
Courses   
Basiscursus Antennevraagstukken (Basic course Antenna 
Questions) (Antennebureau) 
07-10-2010 Amersfoort (NL) 
Updatecursus Antennevraagstukken (Update course Antenna 
Questions) 
17-03-2011 Amersfoort (NL) 
Zendantennes … een hot item. Praktisch draaiboek (Base stations 
… a hot item. Practical plan) (Department of Environment, 
Nature and Energy of Flanders)  
09-06-2011 Hasselt (B) 
Conferences   
Low frequency electromagnetic field exposure and modulation 
of cellular functions, organised by the University of Wageningen 
and the Netherlands Organisation for Health Research and 
Development (ZonMw) 
16-09-2010 Wageningen (NL) 
Modern health worries and idiopathic environmental intolerance 
in relation to symptoms. Research, assessment and treatment 
options, organised by the National Institute for Public Health and 
the Environment (RIVM) in Utrecht 
01-02-2011 Utrecht (NL) 
Meetings in relation to Kennisplatform EMV & Gezondheid 
(Knoweldge Platform EMF & Health)  
  
5th Klankbordgroep (Sounding Board) meeting 03-02-2011 ‘s-Hertogenbosch (NL) 
6th Klankbordgroep (Sounding Board) meeting 20-10-2011 ‘s-Hertogenbosch (NL) 
7th Klankbordgroep (Sounding Board) meeting 15-03-2012 ‘s-Hertogenbosch (NL) 
Bijeenkomst onderzoeker en maatschappij (Meeting research 
and society) – extra meeting with selected participants initiated 
by discussions in the Klankbordgroep 
06-09-2012 Amsterdam (NL) 
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APPENDIX 3: 
Interview protocol case studies 
 
For the English translation, see page 218. 
 
Introduceer onderzoek, wat en waarom. 
Algemeen 
⦁ Kunt u vertellen hoe u in contact kwam met de thematiek van masten? Hoe bent 
u hierin betrokken geraakt? [experience and behaviour question]  
⦁ Kunt u kort zeggen wat u vindt van het thema masten? Wat is uw mening hier-
over? [opinion and values question]  
⦁ Hoe belangrijk is het voor u? Wat zijn uw persoonlijke gevoelens bij het thema 
masten? Bent u er emotioneel bij betrokken? [feeling questions]  
Sociale beweging arena 
Hoofdvragen: 
⦁ Wat waren volgens u de problemen rondom het thema masten? 
⦁ Wat is uw mening over deze problemen? 
⦁ Hebt u deze problemen besproken met derden? Bent u ergens naartoe gegaan 
met uw mening over de problemen? Werd er naar u geluisterd? 
Deelvragen: 
Bredere context 
⦁ Wat is de aanloop geweest? 
⦁ Waren er al eerder discussies over andere kwesties? 
 
Voortrekkers/leidende figuren/burgerbeweging/actievoerders 
⦁ Wie nam het voortouw? Waarom? 
⦁ Is er een groepje ontstaan rond een aantal voortrekkers? 
⦁ Wat is uw mening over deze groep mensen? 
⦁ Wat was uw relatie met hen? 
216 
Zoektocht naar informatie 
⦁ Hebt u (meer) informatie gezocht over het onderwerp masten? 
⦁ Wat voor soort informatie hebt u gevonden? 
⦁ Waar hebt u de informatie over masten vandaan gehaald? 
⦁ Wat leert(de) de informatie u? 
⦁ Had u het gevoel er iets aan te hebben? [kwaliteit – betrouwbaarheid] 
⦁ [indien wetenschappelijke informatie]: Als ik dergelijke informatie lees, heb ik 
vaak moeite met het begrijpen van wat er staat. Is de informatie die u hebt gele-
zen duidelijk? 
⦁ Is uw mening over masten veranderd bij het vinden van nieuwe informatie? 
 
Wetenschap en onzekerheden 
Afhankelijk van in hoeverre de interviewee zelf dit onderwerp aanhaalt, leidt ik het 
onderwerp in aan de hand van een krantenartikel van die bepaalde casus waarin het er 
over gezondheidsrisico’s wordt gesproken. Als het onderwerp al is besproken door de 
interviewee, dan haak ik daarop in.  
⦁ Wat is uw mening over deze berichten over gezondheidsrisico’s? [opinion questi-
on] 
⦁ Hebt u zelf ervaringen met dergelijke risico’s of verhalen over risico’s? [experien-
ce question] 
⦁ Kwamen dit soort zorgen aan bod in uw buurt? [knowledge question]  
Politieke arena 
Hoofdvragen: 
⦁ Wat was de rol van de gemeente en de gemeentelijke politiek toen er sprake was 
van het plaatsen van een mast? 
⦁ Wat is uw mening over de rol van de gemeente en de gemeentelijke politiek? 
Deelvragen: 
Gemeente 
⦁ Hoe werd de thematiek van masten door de gemeente behandeld (indien van 
toepassing)? 
⦁ Hoe is het contact met de gemeente verlopen? 
⦁ Wat was het standpunt van de gemeente? 
⦁ Wat is uw mening over dit standpunt? 
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Lokale politici 
⦁ Was er ook interesse in het thema masten van (lokale) politici? 
⦁ Wat was het standpunt van deze politici/die politicus? 
⦁ Wat is uw mening over dit standpunt? 
 
Nationale politiek 
⦁ Is er ook contact geweest met ministers of politieke partijen op natio-
naal/regionaal niveau? 
Media arena 
Hoofdvragen: 
⦁ Heeft de media bericht over de mast? 
⦁ Wat is uw mening over deze berichtgeving? 
⦁ Laat u zich door de media informeren? 
⦁ Heeft het volgens u de gang van zaken beïnvloed? 
Legale arena 
Hoofdvragen: 
⦁ Is er op enig moment sprake geweest om een advocaat of jurist te raadplegen? 
⦁ Wat is uw mening over de rol van advocaten en juridische instanties in deze the-
matiek? 
 
Afsluiting 
 
⦁ Is er nog iets dat u kwijt wil? 
⦁ Vond u het een prettig interview? 
⦁ Hebt u nog namen van mensen die ik echt moet interviewen? 
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English translation 
 
Introduce research, what and why. 
General 
⦁ Can you tell me how you came into contact with the subject of masts? How did 
you become involved? [experience and behaviour question]  
⦁ Can you briefly say what you think about the issue of masts? What is your opin-
ion? [opinion and values question]  
⦁ How important is it for you? What are your personal feelings with the issue? Are 
you emotionally involved? [feeling questions] 
Social movement arena 
Main questions: 
⦁ What were the problems of the issue of mast siting according to you?  
⦁ What is your opinion about these problems? 
⦁ Did you discuss these problems with others? Did you seek help or advice about 
your opinion? Were you listened to? 
Subquestions: 
Broader context 
⦁ What was the run-up? 
⦁ Were there previously discussions about other issues in the neighbourhood? 
 
Pioneers/leading figures/civil movement/campaigners 
⦁ Who took the lead? Why? 
⦁ Did people join a group around these leaders? 
⦁ What is your opinion about this group of people? 
⦁ What was your relationship with them? 
 
Search for information 
⦁ Did you search (more) information about the topic of masts? 
⦁ What kind of information did you find? 
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⦁ Where did you get the information about masts? 
⦁ What did you learn from this information? 
⦁ Did you have the feeling that it was useful? [quality – reliability] 
⦁ [in case of scientific information]: when I read scientific information, I often find it 
difficult to understand what it says. Was the information you read clear to you? 
⦁ Did your opinion about masts change when you found new information? 
 
Science and uncertainties 
Depending on whether the interviewee brings up this topic him/herself, I will introduce 
the issue by way of a newspaper article of that particular case in which health risks are 
mentioned. If the topic is already mentioned I will refer back to it.  
⦁ What is your opinion about these messages of health concerns? [opinion ques-
tion] 
⦁ What are your experiences with these concerns? [experience question] 
⦁ Were these sort of concerns mentioned in your neighbourhood? [knowledge 
question] 
Political arena 
Main questions: 
⦁ What was the role of the municipality and local politics with the siting? 
⦁ What is your opinion about the role of the municipality concerning siting? 
Subquestions: 
Municipality 
⦁ How did the municipality deal with the issue of mast siting? 
⦁ How was the contact with the municipality? 
⦁ What was the municipality’s viewpoint on the siting? 
⦁ What is your opinion about this viewpoint? 
 
Local politics 
⦁ Was there also an interest from local politicians? 
⦁ What was their viewpoint? 
⦁ What is your opinion about this viewpoint? 
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National politics 
⦁ Was there also contact with ministers or political parties on a national/regional 
level? 
Media arena 
Main questions: 
⦁ Did the media report about the mast? 
⦁ What is your opinion about this coverage? 
⦁ Were you informed by the media? 
⦁ Did it influence the course of events according to you? 
Legal arena 
Main questions: 
⦁ Do you know whether you or someone else considered consulting a lawyer? 
⦁ What is your opinion about the role of lawyers in this siting case? 
Conclusion 
⦁ Is there something else you want to say? 
⦁ Did you like the interview? 
⦁ Do you have names of people that I could interview? 
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APPENDIX 4: 
Atlas.ti Coding Scheme 
 
RQ: How to understand the societal dynamics and mechanisms [CODE: Dynamics], in 
particular the role of scientific knowledge and uncertainties therein [CODE: Dealing 
with science], that account for the emergence, sustainment or (possible) ending 
[CODE: Phasing] of local mast siting controversies [CODE: Networks]? 
 
>> Why and how did wireless communication technology become a serious health 
concern that had/has to be dealt with primarily by scientific research? Or why and 
how did/does the risk framing dominate? [CODE: Why & How] 
 
>> How do actors in the public arena (the public, advisors, companies and policy bod-
ies) and in local mast siting controversies use, construct, contest or ignore scientific 
knowledge regarding the RF EMF issue? [CODE: Dealing with science] [SUBCODE: 
Uncertainty] 
FRAMING 
How do actors define/see the problem? 
⦁ Health 
Problem is framed as an issue of health risk 
⦁ Democracy 
Problem is framed as spatial planning issue that involves democratic aspects 
⦁ Aesthetics 
Problem is framed as landscape pollution 
⦁ Economics 
Problem is framed as devaluation of property prices 
⦁ Location 
Problem is framed as inadequate spatial planning issue 
⦁ Miscellaneous 
⦁ Why & How 
Why and how does risk framing dominate or push aside other framings? 
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DEALING WITH SCIENCE 
How do actors deal with science and uncertainty? 
DYNAMICS 
How do the actors act? What do they do? 
⦁ Resource mobilisation 
Finding information, collecting money to pay for activities, establishing a citizen 
group, contacting media, etc. 
⦁ Expert mobilisation 
Establishing contact with experts and professionals (scientists, Antennebureau, 
GGD, lawyers, etc.) 
⦁ Network mobilisation 
Finding a support network of neighbours, friends, family, local politicians, journal-
ists, etc. 
EMOTIONS 
What kind of emotions are expressed?  
PHASING (based on Benford and Snow, 2000) 
How do the actors act throughout the controversy? 
⦁ Diagnostic phase 
Construction of sense of injustice 
⦁ Prognostic phase 
Development of solutions, action plans and strategies 
⦁ Motivational phase 
Creation of motivation to participate in engagement 
NETWORKS 
Different levels at which local controversies operate, the networks that are formed, 
multi-scale and multi-actor dynamics that are connected to the local issues 
OTHER 
Any other issues that cannot be categorised 
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING  
 
Aan de plaatsing van infrastructuren voor oude en nieuwe technologieën komt nooit 
een einde: hoe meer mensen, hoe meer infrastructuur voor afvalbeheer, energiepro-
ductie (windenergie, elektriciteit, kernenergie, enz.), industriële activiteiten en com-
municatietechnologieën (radio, draadloze communicatie, etc. ) nodig is. Het komt 
regelmatig voor dat burgers die geconfronteerd worden met de bouw van een infra-
structuur in hun buurt het niet eens zijn met deze beleidsbeslissing en hiertegen age-
ren. Vaak vinden politici, beleidsmakers en sociale wetenschappers deze reacties 
moeilijk te begrijpen, vooral als het gaat om technologieën die populair zijn (bijvoor-
beeld, masten voor mobiele telefonie) of als ‘goed’ bestempeld zijn (bijvoorbeeld, 
windmolens om groene energie te genereren). Inplantingscontroverses over land-
schapsverandering of ongewenste infrastructuur worden daarom over het algemeen 
opgevat als ontwrichtend, onaangenaam, uitdagend en een blokkade voor (technolo-
gische en economische) vooruitgang. Begrippen als Not In My Backyard (NIMBY) (let-
terlijk: niet in mijn achtertuin) hebben bijgedragen aan het imago van burgers die 
protesteren tegen beleidsbeslissingen vanwege irrationele en emotionele zorgen. 
Vooral wanneer bezorgdheid over mogelijke gezondheidsrisico’s een rol speelt, waar-
voor er geen duidelijk wetenschappelijk bewijs is, worden de zorgen van burgers weg-
gezet als 'risicopercepties' die ver verwijderd zijn van de wetenschappelijke interpre-
taties van de zogenaamde échte risico’s.  
 In dit proefschrift stel ik deze typering in vraag aan de hand van casusonderzoek 
naar de maatschappelijke dynamiek van een bepaald type van controverse: de plaat-
sing van zendmasten voor mobiele telefonie in Nederland en Vlaanderen (België). In 
deze dynamiek staan verschillende actoren centraal: de GSM-operatoren die hun 
masten willen plaatsen, de collectieven van burgers die zich engageren om de plaat-
sing te voorkomen, netwerken van georganiseerde groeperingen die burgers onder-
steunen in hun engagement, gemeenten die te maken krijgen met tegenstrijdige be-
langen van burgers, nationale beleidsmakers en GSM-operatoren, en wetenschappers 
die hun kennis beschikbaar maken voor beleidsmakers en andere partijen. Ik vraag me 
af hoe we de maatschappelijke dynamiek en de mechanismen die verantwoordelijk 
zijn voor het ontstaan, de voortzetting en de (mogelijke) beëindiging van mastencon-
troverses kunnen begrijpen? Ik ben vooral geïnteresseerd in de rol van wetenschappe-
lijke kennis en onzekerheden: hoe verschillende actoren in de controverse (burgers, 
beleidsorganen, wetenschappers) gebruik maken van en voortbouwen op de weten-
schappelijke kennis betreffende draadloze communicatietechnologie, en/of deze 
betwisten of negeren? Ik start mijn onderzoek vanuit de observatie dat gezondheidsri-
sico's een dominant thema zijn in discussies over deze technologie, en vooral in dis-
cussies over het plaatsen van masten. Ik vraag me daarom af waarom, en hoe, draad-
loze communicatietechnologie is kunnen uitgroeien tot een significant 'gezondheidsri-
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sico'? Ik verken de dynamiek tussen betrokken burgers, verschillende niveaus van be-
sluitvorming, de wetenschappelijke kennis over de gezondheidsrisico's van radiofre-
quente elektromagnetische velden (RF EMV) en pogingen tot overleg en participatie. 
 Uit mijn onderzoek komt naar voren dat de opkomst, ondersteuning en beëindi-
ging van controverses over masten opgevat dient te worden als een dynamische wis-
selwerking tussen burgerbetrokkenheid bij het plaatsen van masten en governance 
benaderingen van dit engagement. De interactie tussen verschillende niveaus van 
beleid (gemeentelijk en nationaal niveau) leidde tot een dominante focus op en ver-
ankering van gezondheidsrisico’s van EMV. Verwijzen naar gezondheidsrisico's werd 1) 
een gepolitiseerd argument gebruikt door burgers (‘de staat moet haar burgers be-
schermen tegen schade’), 2) een verklarende factor voor de controverses gebruikt 
door de nationale overheid (‘burgerbetrokkenheid ontstaat vanwege de angst voor 
straling’), en 3) de drijvende kracht van een bepaald beleidskoers (een risico-
gebaseerde aanpak).  
 Ik baseer deze bevindingen op een kwalitatieve analyse van 1) verschillende ca-
sussen van mastencontroverses in Nederland en Vlaanderen, 2) beleidsprocessen 
rond mobiele telefonie en mastencontroverses en 3) het ontstaan en bestaan van 
(kennis)netwerken rond mobiele telefonie. Ik selecteerde 4 Nederlandse en 2 Vlaamse 
casussen en gebruikten diverse bronnen zoals media-archieven, relevante beleids- en 
juridische documenten, websites van burgers of groeperingen, interviews met betrok-
ken burgers en lokale actoren (in totaal 46 interviews) en observaties van bijeenkom-
sten. Ik analyseerde internationale, nationale, regionale en lokale besluitvormingspro-
cessen (Kamerstukken, persberichten en wetgeving) en mediaberichten rondom het 
plaatsen van masten door desktop onderzoek van online bronnen en het bijwonen 
van bijeenkomsten georganiseerd door beleidsactoren. Om de vorming van netwer-
ken, zowel geïnitieerd door burgers (bottom-up) als door beleidsmakers (top-down), 
te onderzoeken zocht ik online naar websites van lokale, nationale en internationale 
groeperingen die ageren tegen masten, sprak ik met deze (belangen)groeperingen 
(die ik grassroots support teams noem) en andere betrokkenen bij een belangrijk 
Nederlands kennisnetwerk, het Kennisplatform EMV & Gezondheid (in totaal 11 inter-
views). Het Kennisplatform is een overheidsinitiatief waarin kennisinstituten (zoals het 
RIVM), industrie, belangenverenigingen, grassroots support teams en wetenschappers 
met elkaar in gesprek gaan over EMV en gezondheid. Daarnaast woonde ik bijeen-
komsten bij van dit Kennisplatform.  
 
Mijn analyse van de bestaande sociaalwetenschappelijke literatuur over controverses 
rond masten en publieke zorgen over draadloze communicatietechnologie in hoofd-
stuk 2 wijst erop dat het huidige academische debat zich vooral richt op de risicoper-
cepties van zogenaamde ‘leken’, d.w.z. zij die geen wetenschappelijke experts zijn. 
Dergelijke studies concluderen dat mensen weinig kennis hebben over de werkelijke 
gezondheidsrisico’s van RF EMV en dat er dus behoefte is aan betere risicocommuni-
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catie. Ondanks de mogelijke meerwaarde van goede (risico)communicatie, bekritiseer 
ik deze studies omdat ze zich vooral op het individu en diens perceptie richten, terwijl 
burgers in mastencontroverses zich vereniging in groeperingen met een heel andere 
dynamiek tot gevolg. Daarnaast gaan deze studies ervan uit dat burgers tegen masten 
zijn omdat ze schrik hebben voor mogelijke gezondheidsrisico’s. De studies zijn er dan 
op gericht om de mate van ‘angst’ te meten en manieren te zoeken om mensen van 
het tegendeel te overtuigen. Ik beweer dat deze onderzoekmethode leidt tot nauwe 
interpretaties van een complex sociaal probleem dat wortels heeft in wetenschap, 
maar niet noodzakelijkerwijs alleen een kwestie van wetenschap (en het zogenaamd 
gebrek hieraan) is. 
 In hoofdstuk 3 bespreek ik burgerengagement of burgerbetrokkenheid bij het 
plaatsen van masten. Ik typeer de burgers die betrokken zijn bij de plaatsing van een 
mast als groepen van geëngageerde burgers die het niet eens zijn met een beslissing 
die hun omgeving aangaat. Ze zijn vaak hoger opgeleid, meer dan gemiddeld geïnte-
resseerd in de politieke besluitvorming die hun omgeving aangaat en goed ingebed in 
lokale netwerken (bijvoorbeeld als lokale ondernemer of lid van een buurtplatform). 
Deze groepen van burgers lijken op wat in de literatuur naar sociale bewegingen be-
kend staat als ‘grassroots’ groeperingen: ze zijn verbonden met een buurt, informeel, 
open, tijdelijk en flexibel. De burgers proberen de mast tegen te houden via de offici-
ele administratieve kanalen van bezwaarschriften en zienswijzen die bij de gemeenten 
kunnen worden ingediend. Ik noem deze vorm van burgerbetrokkenheid daarom 
agonistisch: burgers stellen het beleidsproces in vraag, maar doen dit binnen de gren-
zen van het politieke systeem. 
 In hun zoektocht naar informatie over masten komen geëngageerde burgers via 
het internet in contact met tal van websites van groeperingen of individuen die bur-
gers willen bijstaan in hun lokaal engagement tegen masten. Het contact met deze 
support teams beïnvloedt de lokale burgergroeperingen die zich aan het vormen zijn 
op verschillende manieren: de websites erkennen het belang van het burgerengage-
ment, ze bieden burgers informatie aan over mogelijke gezondheidsrisico’s, ze stellen 
bepaalde sociale acties voor (bijvoorbeeld contact met de media, bezwaarschriften 
schrijven, juridische acties ondernemen) en ze schetsen een beeld van een misleiden-
de industrie en overheid. Dergelijke overkoepelende groeperingen die burgers onder-
steunen in hun engagement staan in de literatuur rond sociale bewegingen bekend als 
grassroots support groups. Een belangrijk verschil in mijn casussen is dat deze onder-
steunende groeperingen zeer klein zijn (tussen 1 en 5 medewerkers/vrijwilligers) maar 
via het Internet een enorme grote groep mensen bereiken, daarom spreek ik over 
teams. Dit is een belangrijke nieuwe ontwikkeling binnen het sociale bewegingen en 
burgerparticipatie onderzoek. 
 Er zijn uiteenlopende redenen waarom burgers zich engageren tegen een mast: 
horizonvervuiling, beschadiging van de omringende natuur, ondeugdelijk besluitvor-
mingsproces door een gebrek aan informatie en inspraak over de geplande locaties, 
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mogelijke waardedaling van omliggende huizen en gezondheidsrisico’s door straling 
van masten. In iedere onderzochte casus is het vooral een gebrek aan informatie en 
inspraak vanuit de lokale overheid dat kwaad bloed zet. Ondanks deze verscheiden-
heid beschouwen burgers het argument van mogelijke gezondheidsrisico’s als erg 
overtuigend in hun betoog. Het garandeert sympathie omdat men op de bres gaat 
staan voor de gezondheid van de medemens. Met andere woorden: het gezondheids-
argument creëert een collectief belang. Daarnaast past het ook in andere niet-
wetenschappelijke vormen van kennis waarmee mensen in contact komen, zoals per-
soonlijke en collectieve ervaringen met ziektes die toegewijd worden aan EMV. Kort-
om, burgers gebruiken de taal van ‘risico’s’ als een politiek instrument om hun enga-
gement te versterken. Ze beschouwen het als een argument dat niet genegeerd kan 
worden door de industrie, overheid en wetenschappers.  
 Toch ziet de overheid burgerengagement – of ‘publiek verzet tegen masten’ zoals 
telecom operatoren het vaak beschrijven – vooral als een probleem van gebrek aan 
kennis over gezondheidsrisico’s. In hoofdstuk 4 beschrijf ik hoe deze visie sinds het 
begin van de jaren 2000 enerzijds resulteerde in het opzetten van onderzoekspro-
gramma’s naar mogelijke gezondheidsrisico’s van masten en anderzijds in betere 
risicocommunicatie naar burgers. Deze risico-gebaseerde benadering bood een ver-
klaring voor de controverses, namelijk het publiek had een verkeerd beeld van de 
risico's en het bood oplossingen, namelijk investeren in meer onderzoek en beter 
uitleggen dat er weinig risico’s zijn. De communicatiestrategie van de rijksoverheid 
bestond uit het opzetten van een informatiepunt, het Antennebureau, dat als belang-
rijke taak had om informatieavonden te verzorgen in buurten waar een mast gepland 
stond. De communicatieactiviteiten van het Antennebureau berustten op twee aan-
names: 1) maar een beperkt deel van de Nederlandse bevolking had informatie over 
masten en EMV nodig, in het bijzonder burgers die geconfronteerd werden met het 
plaatsen van een mast en burgers die direct vragen stelden aan gemeenteambtena-
ren, GGD’en en mobiele operatoren en 2) dat beperkte publiek ontbrak het aan dui-
delijke wetenschappelijk informatie over gezondheidsrisico’s. De tweede aanname 
staat bekend als het ‘deficit model of public understanding of science’ en wordt al 
jaren bekritiseerd door sociale wetenschappers, maar blijft desondanks een hardnek-
kig geloof bij veel beleidsmakers en communicatiespecialisten.  
 Hoofdstuk 5 gaat dieper in op de risico-gebaseerde beleidsaanpak van de rijks-
overheid. Door deze aanpak veranderde het probleem van masten van een politieke 
kwestie met veel onzekerheden in een enge wetenschappelijke vraag die beantwoord 
diende te worden door experts. Deze benadering was geworteld in 1) de ontkenning 
van de legitimiteit van inspraak van burgers bij het plaatsen van masten; 2) de aanna-
me dat mastencontroverses het gevolg waren van ongegronde vrees voor gezond-
heidsrisico's van de antennes; en 3) de aanname dat mastencontroverses konden 
worden opgelost door te investeren in wetenschappelijke kennis over de gezond-
heidsrisico's en risicocommunicatie. ‘Gezondheidseffecten van EMV’ werd op deze 
245 
manier hét centrale thema in nationale discussies over masten. Wetenschap werd 
ingezet als een rechter die als enige kon beslissen over de legitimiteit van de verdere 
uitrol van mobiele telefonie. Wetenschappers konden deze zekerheid echter niet 
bieden en hun studies (en soms zijzelf) kwamen hevig ter discussie te staan omwille 
van de onzekerheden in de wetenschappelijke kennis over EMV en gezondheidseffec-
ten en vermeende belangenverstrengeling.  
 De overheid probeerde deze situatie op te lossen door meer geld vrij te maken 
voor onderzoek en door het Kennisplatform EMV & Gezondheid op te richten om de 
wetenschappelijke expertise op het gebied van EMV en gezondheid te bundelen. 
Daarnaast werd er ook een Klankbordgroep opgericht binnen het Kennisplatform, 
waarin wetenschappers, beleidsmakers, professionals, industrie en maatschappelijke 
organisaties (met name de grassroots support teams) samen kwamen om mobiele 
telefonie te bespreken. Ondanks de insteek van het platform om ‘de stem van de 
maatschappij’ te horen, waren het vooral maatschappelijke actoren die zich ernstig 
zorgen maakten over gezondheidsrisico’s die de discussies domineerden. De uitnodi-
ging van deze actoren als vertegenwoordigers van ‘de maatschappij’ leidde tot een 
verdere vernauwing van de maatschappelijke discussie rond masten tot een gezond-
heidsvraag. Samen met de initiële reacties van de rijksoverheid (meer onderzoek en 
meer risicocommunicatie) leidde het platform er ook toe dat de risicoframing van 
masten (‘maken ze je ziek of niet?’) versterkt werd, en dat de zorgen van burgers op 
lokaal niveau niet eens meer aan bod kwamen. Deze wanverhouding tussen de lokale 
en nationale niveaus droeg bij tot de opkomst en het voortbestaan van mastencon-
troverses.  
 In hoofdstuk 6, ten slotte, plaats ik mijn onderzoek in een breder academisch en 
politiek debat over hoe de maatschappij moet omgaan met (nieuwe) technologieën. 
Mijn analyse laat een aantal belangrijke dynamieken zien die verklaren waarom con-
troverses over nieuwe technologieën en/of plaatsingsconflicten ontstaan: 
 
Het gebrek aan betrokkenheid van omwonenden bij beslissingen over het plaatsen 
van technologieën, bijvoorbeeld door inspraak bij de locatiekeuze  
 
Het gebrek aan erkenning van de sociale dynamiek van lokale buurten die bepalend 
is voor de manier waarop op de plaatsing van een technologie wordt gereageerd, 
zoals het belang van een lokale cultuur en de ervaringen met eerdere conflicten 
over ruimtelijke ordening  
 
Het opdringen van een nationaal beleid zonder de zorgen en belangen van lokale 
overheden in acht te nemen, en zonder lokale overheden een duidelijke rol te ge-
ven in de besluitvorming 
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Het bestaan van een sterk netwerk van contra-expertise dat erg toegankelijk is via 
het Internet, bestaande uit actieve burgers, grassroots support teams en belangen-
verenigingen die onzekerheden politiseren en onderliggende waarden en belangen 
van wetenschappelijke kennis belichten 
 
Het exclusief framen van publieke zaken in wetenschappelijke termen door be-
leidsmakers – zelfs wanneer het maatschappelijke debat divers is, er conflicterende 
belangen zijn en belangrijke democratische thema’s aan bod komen  
 
De uitvoering van een risico-gebaseerd beleidsproces dat zorgen over gezondheids-
risico’s en voorzorgsmaatregelen eenvoudigweg verwerpt door wetenschappelijke 
studies en wetenschappelijke raden te gebruiken als scheidsrechters die bepalen 
wat een aanvaardbaar en onaanvaardbaar risico is 
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VALORISATIE ADDENDUM 
Maatschappelijke relevantie 
 
De wetenschappelijke inzichten uit dit proefschrift zijn van waarde in het maatschap-
pelijke debat over de omgang met mogelijke risico’s en onzekerheden van nieuwe 
technologieën en innovaties. Ondanks het feit dat we leven in een kennissamenleving 
waarin innovatie essentieel is, is het anderzijds ook zo dat innovaties onzekerheid 
creëren over mogelijke risico’s. Deze risico’s zijn niet altijd op een eenvoudige manier 
te berekenen met de huidige technische en wetenschappelijke middelen. De laatste 
jaren is er heel wat onrust geweest over innovaties, denk aan genetisch gemanipu-
leerd voedsel, nanotechnologie of schaliegas. Het vertrouwen in de betrouwbaarheid, 
competentie en doelgerichtheid van wetenschappers en beleidsmakers is de afgelo-
pen jaren danig geschaad. De governance van innovaties is daarom een enorme uit-
daging voor onze democratie.  
 Dit proefschrift is van maatschappelijk belang omdat het een grondige reflectie is 
op hoe onze genetwerkte maatschappij met een modern risico-vraagstuk omgaat. Dit 
boek biedt inzichten voor beleidsmakers, wetenschappers en stakeholders in het de-
bat over mobiele telefonie en meer algemeen over innovaties. Een belangrijk inzicht 
gaat over het benutten van wetenschappelijke kennis om een complex sociaal pro-
bleem op te lossen dat wel wortels heeft in wetenschap, maar niet noodzakelijkerwijs 
alleen een kwestie van wetenschap (en het gebrek aan kennis) is. Bovendien is dit 
boek interessant voor een ieder die gefascineerd is door de rol van wetenschap en 
technologie in onze kennissamenleving. Hieronder verduidelijk ik 1) hoe mijn onder-
zoek maatschappelijke relevant is en 2) wat ik ondernomen heb om deze relevantie 
publiekelijk te maken.  
 
1) Het onderzoek in dit proefschrift is maatschappelijk relevant omdat het bijdraagt 
aan het beantwoorden van een belangrijke vraag waar de maatschappij regelmatig 
mee geconfronteerd wordt: hoe moeten we omgaan met mogelijke risico’s van tech-
nologische en wetenschappelijke innovaties? Dat deze vraag hoog op de wetenschap-
pelijke agenda staat bleek toen Marjolein van Asselt, Tessa Fox en ik in 2011 een 
KNAW-prijs wonnen voor het inzenden van deze vraag ter gelegenheid van het vervol-
ledigen van de KNAW-wetenschapsagenda. Mijn onderzoek stimuleert het denken 
over en beantwoorden van deze vraag door te beargumenteren dat bij het omgaan 
met moderne risicovraagstukken een rationele benadering waarin een technische 
en/of natuurwetenschappelijke vraag centraal komt te staan geen recht doet aan de 
maatschappelijke complexiteit van deze fenomenen. Waarmee ik niet wil zeggen dat 
natuurwetenschappen geen belangrijke rol kunnen spelen bij het beantwoorden van 
dergelijke beleidsvragen. Het probleem is dat wetenschappers meestal geen duidelijk 
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antwoord kunnen geven aangezien er veel onzekerheden zijn. Zijn er gezondheidsrisi-
co’s bij het plaatsen van masten voor omwonenden? Kan je kanker krijgen van mobiel 
telefoneren? Er is geen bewijs voor schadelijkheid, maar het tegendeel kan ook niet 
bewezen worden. Toch wordt er nog steeds verwacht dat wetenschap altijd alle ant-
woorden heeft. Dit leidt tot situaties waarin wetenschap een te belangrijke rol krijgt 
toebedeeld als scheidsrechter die over de toekomst van een technologische ontwikke-
ling beslist. Ik pleit ervoor dat onzekere en omstreden risicovraagstukken niet als puur 
technische kwesties behandeld dienen te worden, maar als politieke vraagstukken 
waarin onzekerheid erkend wordt.  
 Dit is een belangrijke boodschap voor beleidsmakers. Als zij beslissingen willen 
nemen die zowel wetenschappelijk als democratisch verantwoord zijn zullen ze ‘het 
probleem’ van onzekerheden niet kunnen verschuiven naar wetenschappers. Dit is 
niet enkel kwalijk voor beleidsmakers, maar ook voor wetenschappers. Omgaan met 
onzekerheden eist een democratisch proces waarin alle mogelijke perspectieven op 
het probleem geformuleerd én meegenomen worden. Ondanks het feit dat dit proces 
complex, moeilijk en soms zelfs onaangenaam is, en het tevens nog in de kinder-
schoenen staat, lijkt het de uitgelezen manier om maatschappelijke polarisatie te 
voorkomen. Daarnaast laat dit proefschrift zien dat burgers graag betrokken willen 
worden bij lokale beleidsbeslissingen. Het gebrek aan inspraak bij het plaatsen van 
masten was in al mijn casussen een belangrijke reden om te starten met burgerenga-
gement. Het is niet omdat burgers als consumenten een nieuwe technologie omar-
men, dat ze de plaatsing ervan als geëngageerde bewoners van een wijk onproblema-
tisch vinden. Dit is een ‘positieve’ bevinding die – wanneer serieus genomen door 
beleidsmakers – zou kunnen leiden tot minder plaatsingsconflicten.  
 
(2) Hoe heb ik ervoor gezorgd dat de relevantie van mijn onderzoek bekend werd? 
Onderzoek doen naar een hedendaags en controversieel onderwerp betekent dat je 
zelf – bewust of onbewust – een actor wordt in de discussie. Door het interviewen van 
mensen en door mijn aanwezigheid bij bepaalde bijeenkomsten beïnvloedde ik de 
discussie. Zelfs als ik niets zei, of enkel interviewde zonder mijn eigen mening te ver-
kondigen, deden mijn aanwezigheid of mijn vragen mensen nadenken over hun eigen 
rol. Sommige burgers werden bijvoorbeeld versterkt in hun geloof dat ze iets belang-
rijks aan het doen waren, puur omdat een wetenschapper (helemaal uit Maastricht) 
kwam om hun visie te horen. Als etnograaf heb je dus altijd enigszins invloed op het 
thema dat je onderzoekt.  
 Daarnaast heb ik mij ook actiever ingezet om mijn onderzoeksresultaten publie-
kelijk te maken. Ik richtte me vooral op het publiek van beleidsmakers en professio-
nals, door mee te werken aan een project van het Rathenau Instituut over betrouwba-
re wetenschap (Blankesteijn et al., 2014). Op basis van casusonderzoek naar publieke 
controverses rond wetenschap en beleid (waaronder mijn casus over mobiele telefo-
nie) deed het Rathenau Instituut aanbevelingen aan beleidsmakers en wetenschap-
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pers voor de omgang met zulke controverses. Ik schreef ook twee artikelen voor het 
Magazine Nationale Veiligheid en Crisisbeheersing (Hermans and van Asselt, 2012, 
2014), een tweemaandelijkse uitgave van de Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrij-
ding en Veiligheid van het ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie gericht op bestuurders 
en professionals. Daarnaast publiceerde ik een artikel in het Nederlandstalig weten-
schappelijk tijdschrift Bestuurskunde (Hermans et al., 2014). In 2011 kregen Marjolein 
van Asselt, Tessa Fox en ik de KNAW-prijs voor het inzenden van de 50ste vraag van de 
KNAW-wetenschapsagenda. Hiermee belichtten we het belang van onderzoek naar 
risicovraagstukken en het interdisciplinaire veld van risico governance.  
 Daarnaast heb ik ook geïntervenieerd in een mastencontroverse in de buurt. In 
2012 kwam ik in contact met een groep burgers die ontevreden waren over hoe hun 
gemeente omging met de toekomstige plannen om een school vlak naast een mast 
voor mobiele telefonie te bouwen. Bezorgde ouders hadden aangeklopt bij deze 
groep burgers, bekend als de Stichting de Groene Sporenwolf die al enkele jaren op-
kwam voor de belangen van hun omgeving. De stichting wilde graag mijn visie horen. 
Tijdens een gesprek met de stichting gaf ik mijn inzichten over lokale mastcontrover-
ses om een nuchtere bijdrage te kunnen leveren. Tijdens dit gesprek kwamen verschil-
lende bevindingen naar boven: dat een gang naar de rechter om de mast weg te krij-
gen op basis van gezondheidsrisico’s vrijwel kansloos was, dat wetenschap onmogelijk 
kan bewijzen dat iets 100% veilig is, hoe onderzoek naar EMV en gezondheidseffecten 
werkt en wat de wetenschappelijke criteria zijn waarop een studie wordt beoordeeld. 
Vervolgens ging ik in op wat de stichting kon betekenen voor de ouders die ongerust 
waren. Ik vertelde dat het belangrijk was om de ongerustheid van mensen serieus te 
nemen, om te communiceren over onzekerheden en om mensen op hun eigen ver-
antwoordelijkheid en keuzemogelijkheid te wijzen (bijvoorbeeld beperken van per-
soonlijk gebruik van mobieltje of Wi-Fi). Op basis van dit gesprek veranderde de stich-
ting van strategie: ze wilden niet langer een inhoudelijke discussie voeren over de 
schadelijkheid van de mast, omdat die enkel tot polarisatie zou leiden, maar verlegde 
de koers naar meer aandacht voor voorzorgsmaatregelen in de school (zoals beleid 
rond mobieltjes en Wi-Fi) en betere informatievoorziening over de risico’s en onze-
kerheden. Ze publiceerden hierover in de lokale kranten. Op hun verzoek had ik een 
paar weken later ook een gesprek met de directeur van de basisschool waarin ik in-
ging op het belang van goede risicocommunicatie.  
 
Mijn onderzoek heeft tot dusver al voor enige verdieping gezorgd in een erg moeiza-
me discussie. Ik hoop dat ik dit in de toekomst nog verder kan doen.  
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